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Abstract 
This thesis will present a comparative and internationally contextualised history of 
Anglo-French relations in Japan between 1858 and 1868. It will introduce the concept of 
‘enclave empires’ to describe the conduits for Western informal imperialism that were 
created in Japan by the imposition of the treaty-port system in 1858. It will aim to address 
longstanding gaps in the historiography by assessing that system as a multinational 
construct that depended upon the cooperation and collaboration of each treaty power 
operating within it. At the same time, it will show how the management of the Japanese 
treaty-port system was increasingly dominated by the British Empire and the French 
Second Empire, the two most powerful Western trading nations in Japan during the 
1860s. It will examine how global contexts impacted upon British and French foreign 
policymaking during this period, and how this catalysed an increasingly bitter Anglo-
French struggle for control over the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan. It will also seek to 
broaden the scope of the historiography beyond the sphere of diplomatic relations by 
considering the perspectives of prominent non-diplomatic British and French actors 
whenever relevant. Finally, it will address significant historiographical oversights in the 
use of relevant primary source material through the critical appraisal of contemporary 
private paper collections. By adopting this four-pronged methodological approach, this 
thesis will demonstrate that Anglo-French relations fundamentally defined the process of 
creating and developing informal ‘enclave empires’ in Japan in the decade between the 
conclusion of the ‘unequal treaties’ in 1858 and the Meiji Restoration in 1868. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On 8 February 1861, the British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston wrote a private note to 
Lord John Russell, his Foreign Secretary, outlining Britain’s relations with France at the 
time: 
The real truth of the relations of England to France is that the whole drift of our 
policy is to prevent France from realizing her bust scheme of extensions and 
aggression in a great number of quarters, and of course our success in doing so 
must necessarily be the cause of perpetual displeasure to her Government and 
people. But we fulfil our duty as long as we can succeed by negotiation and 
management so as to avoid rupture and open collisions by restraining France by 
the shackles of diplomatic trammels.1 
Although Palmerston wrote these comments in the context of a French military 
intervention in Syria, they neatly summarise the state of Anglo-French relations 
throughout the mid-Victorian period. The relationship between the British Empire and 
the French Second Empire (1852-1870) – two titans of the mid-nineteenth century 
international order – was critical to almost every international crisis that broke out in 
Europe during this era. As the Westphalian system of diplomacy and trade spread across 
the globe, their relationship also influenced many important events that took place outside 
the Old Continent. In a world where rapid improvements in communication and 
technology were bringing the furthest-flung reaches of the planet into the Western sphere 
of influence, this is hardly surprising. If one accepts that the nineteenth century brought 
about the ‘transformation of the world’ into a transnational, transcontinental, and 
transcultural system, then it is fair to say that Britain and France played a significant part 
in that process.2 
                                                
1 The National Archives, London, Russell Papers, PRO30/22/21/105, Palmerston to 
Russell, 8 February 1861. 
2 See Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the 
Nineteenth Century, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), especially pp.xv-
xxii. 
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Palmerston’s comments in 1861 illustrate the extent to which the British government felt 
threatened by France during the 1860s. These two historic rivals had never had an easy 
relationship, of course, and Palmerston was old enough to remember the Napoleonic Wars 
that tore Europe apart. The inauguration of the French Second Empire in 1852 by 
Napoléon III, nephew of Napoléon Bonaparte, was therefore always likely to spark 
concern across the Channel. At the same time, many in the British political establishment, 
including Palmerston himself, were initially enthusiastic about the creation of a new 
constitutional monarchy on the continent. Their hopes were raised further by the joint 
Anglo-French intervention against Russia in the Crimean War (1853-1856), which 
cemented a liberal entente between the two great powers to combat autocratic aggression. 
The war was to prove a high watermark in Anglo-French relations during the mid-
nineteenth century, however, as Napoléon III’s ambitions to revise the treaty settlement 
imposed upon France at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, his support for nationalist 
movements across the European continent, and his increasingly interventionist foreign 
policy outside of Europe began to provoke alarm in Britain. 
Many historians have explored the political relationship between Britain and France 
during the mid-nineteenth century, but few have focused on its impact in East Asia. Even 
fewer have considered how the tensions that came to define this relationship shaped 
events in Japan during the final decade of the late Edo, or bakumatsu, period (1853-1868). 
This is a serious oversight, since Anglo-French relations were integral to the way in which 
a pernicious form of Western informal imperialism known as the ‘treaty-port system’ was 
foisted upon the government of the Tokugawa shogunate, or bakufu, by the notoriously 
‘unequal’ commercial treaties of 1858. I believe that a comprehensive analysis of this 
system cannot be truly complete without understanding the perspectives of the two most 
influential Western powers that operated within it. This thesis will therefore consider how 
the global rivalry that developed between the British and French empires during the 1860s 
impacted upon their commercial and diplomatic policies in Japan. It will analyse the 
decisions of the diplomats who interpreted those policies on the spot, and chart their 
struggle for dominance over the group of international trading enclaves, or treaty ports, 
that sprung up in Japan after the ‘unequal treaties’ were signed. Most importantly, it will 
introduce the concept of ‘enclave empires’ to describe how Japan’s treaty ports became 
conduits for Western informal imperialism in the decade following the imposition of the 
treaty-port system in 1858. It will show how the international character of these ‘enclave 
empires’ prevented any one treaty power from exerting exclusive control over the process 
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of ‘modernising’ Japan, despite Britain’s preponderant commercial and military presence 
in the country and wider region. Finally, it will argue that this constriction of traditional 
great-power imperial rivalries to an international system of commercial treaties defined 
British and French policy in Japan during the mid-nineteenth century. 
 
Britain and France in Japan: A stagnant orthodoxy 
In order to fulfil the objectives laid out above, it is first necessary to establish whether a 
gap exists in the historiography of the Japanese treaty-port system. As a time of great 
political upheaval in Japan, the decade between the imposition of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
in 1858 and the Meiji Restoration in 1868 has been studied extensively by Japanese and 
Western historians alike. It is important to acknowledge and appraise these histories to 
determine whether the role of Anglo-French relations in Japan has been overlooked or 
misunderstood. The following historiographical review will therefore examine the 
existing contributions to this field chronologically in the first instance. Where possible, it 
will then seek to organise them thematically within their own historical context. The aim 
is to assess the discourse not only as a series of individual historical accounts, but also as 
a collective narrative of developing historical trends. By charting the evolution of the 
historiography in this way, any gaps in the current orthodoxy will become apparent. 
Lived History: The Influence of Memoirs 
Memoirs are often among the first historical sources to be published, in many cases years 
or even decades before classified archives are opened or private papers are released. For 
those who have lived through important historical events, they offer the first (if not the 
only) chance in their lifetime to learn about the policies and opinions of prominent 
protagonists in their own words. They can therefore have a powerful effect on shaping 
perceptions of history, and as such have an important role to play in understanding the 
historiography of this topic. Despite its relative insignificance to the general thrust of mid-
nineteenth century international relations, the opening of Japan to Western trade was an 
event of interest to many in Europe and the United States. The unique situation by which 
Japan had been isolated from the world for over two centuries, not to mention the 
opportunities it offered for trade, inspired a natural curiosity about the country within 
Western society. With reliable information on Japan so sparse at the time, a popular 
memoir could influence public perceptions for some time to come. 
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Most of the British memoirs that appeared in the decades immediately after the opening 
of Japan were uncontroversial by the standards of the time. The first was published in 
1860 by Laurence Oliphant, who was present during the negotiations for the first 
commercial treaty between Britain and Japan in 1858. Oliphant criticised the subservient 
attitude of other Western countries in past relations with China and Japan, believing that 
this had encouraged a sense of racial superiority within these ‘semi-civilized’ empires 
which had contributed to Britain’s political problems in the region.3 Since foreigners in 
Japan were still suffering from the stigmatism that originated from the submissive 
behaviour of the Dutch during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Oliphant advised 
British diplomats to adopt a policy of ‘combined firmness and forbearance’.4 In other 
words, it was imperative that the Japanese government be sternly educated on the strength 
and power of the British Empire from the outset of commercial relations if the mistakes 
of China were to be avoided. This memoir is a revealing insight into British attitudes and 
policies towards Japan during the mid-nineteenth century. Since the opening of the 
country had been achieved with what seemed like relative ease in comparison to the much 
more problematic situation in China, hopes were high that Japan would willingly re-enter 
the international world of commerce. To the British politicians, merchants, and 
businessmen interested in expanding Britain’s global trade, Oliphant’s account confirmed 
that new markets and opportunities had been opened in another formerly inaccessible part 
of the world.  
Oliphant only spent two weeks of a three-year expedition to East Asia in Japan, so his 
observations, though interesting, were hardly representative of day-to-day life in the 
Japanese treaty ports. The first memoir to focus entirely on Japanese affairs was published 
by Sir Rutherford Alcock, Britain’s first diplomatic representative to Japan, in 1863.5 A 
characteristically verbose account of the first three years of Anglo-Japanese relations, 
these two-volume memoirs are less a recollection of long-passed events and more a 
lengthy justification for the policy Alcock had pursued in post. They charted the 
deterioration of British relations with the Japanese authorities after the ports were opened 
and described the ever-worsening security situation he had been forced to operate within. 
                                                
3 Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan in the 
Years 1857, ’58, ’59, (New York: Harper & Publishers, 1860).   
4 Ibid., p.466. 
5 Sir Rutherford Alcock, The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of Three Years’ 
Residence in Japan, 2 vols., (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 
1863). 
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Alcock also showed a growing awareness of how the presence of foreign powers in Japan 
had provoked a constitutional crisis that threatened to erupt into civil war. Essentially, he 
used his memoirs to make the case for something to be done to stabilise the situation 
before foreign trade with Japan suffered irrevocable damage. His successor Sir Harry 
Parkes did not publish a similar volume, but a biographical account of his life was 
published in 1894 by Stanley Lane-Poole and Frederick Dickins.6 Commissioned by 
Parkes’s family to portray him and his work in Japan in a positive light, it is to be treated 
with appropriate caution by the historian.7 
In general, these early memoirs did little more than reinforce the accepted view of the 
Victorian age that Japan had joined the community of ‘civilized’ nations by entering the 
British-led system of international trade. Since they echoed mainstream attitudes on the 
‘liberalism’ of free trade and Britain’s justifiable right to impose it on unenlightened 
nations, they can hardly be considered controversial. In the early part of the twentieth 
century, however, two well-known British diplomatic figures published more 
illuminating accounts of mid-nineteenth century Japan. The first was by Algernon 
Bertrand Mitford, a respected member of the British aristocracy and former student 
interpreter at the British Legation in Edo during the 1860s.8 Mitford’s two-volume 
memoirs revealed interesting details about the strained relationship that developed 
between the British and French diplomatic representatives at the Japanese treaty ports, 
but he was careful not to stray into controversial topics that may have offended his 
political friends in the British and Japanese establishments. As later research into his 
private papers revealed, this was probably because Mitford’s initial opinion of the 
Japanese was much more negative than his later memoirs suggested.9  
                                                
6 Stanley Lane-Poole and Frederick Victor Dickins, The life of Sir Harry Parkes: K.C.B., 
G.C.M.G., sometime Her Majesty’s minister to China and Japan, 2 Vols., (London: 
Macmillan, 1894). A similar account was published on Alcock’s life and times in 1900; 
see Alexander Michie, The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era as 
Demonstrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock KCB DCL, Many Years Consul and 
Minister in China, 2 Vols., (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1900). 
7 See Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan, 1865-83, 
(Richmond: Japan Library, 1996), p.vii. 
8 Algernon Bertrand Freeman-Mitford, Baron Redesdale, Memories, 2 Vols., (London: 
Hutchinson, 1915-6).  
9 Hugh Cortazzi, ed., Mitford’s Japan: the Memoirs and Recollections, 1866-1906, of 
Algernon Bertram Mitford, the first Lord Redesdale, (London: Athlone, 1985). 
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In contrast to Mitford’s sanitised account, the memoir published by Sir Ernest Mason 
Satow in 1921 was much more candid.10 Over the course of his long life Satow had 
become well known for his exploits as a diplomat and linguist in Japan, so an account of 
his early days as a student interpreter in Edo would have attracted interest across the 
whole spectrum of British society (especially as it appeared at a time when Britain’s 
future relationship with Japan was under intense scrutiny).11 Satow’s memoirs detailed 
the close links he had cultivated during the 1860s with the alliance of Japanese feudal 
chiefs, or daimyō, that ousted the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868. They also revealed for 
the first time that he had published a series of anonymous articles in the Japan Times in 
1866 calling for revision of the treaties so that the daimyō could share in the profits of 
Western trade. Critically, Satow had also suggested that the shogun should ‘descend to 
his proper position as a great territorial noble, and that a combination of daimiôs under 
the headship of the Mikado [the Japanese emperor] should take his place as the ruling 
power’.12 These provocative articles had been translated into Japanese and circulated 
across the country in a pamphlet entitled Eikoku sakuron (British policy), which both the 
bakufu and the daimyō believed at the time reflected the views of the British legation. 
Although Satow claimed to have had nothing to do with this, he confessed in his memoirs 
that the pamphlet had provoked suspicion about British intentions in Edo until the 
collapse of the Tokugawa regime in 1868.13 Controversially, he also alleged that Sir Harry 
Parkes, the British diplomatic representative in Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration, 
had contributed to the downfall of the last Tokugawa shogun ‘as far as lay in his power’.14 
Satow was the last prominent figure to record a lived history of bakumatsu Japan. A year 
after his death in 1929, a contemporary journal of Townsend Harris, the first American 
minister to Japan, was published in the United States. Unfortunately, Harris stopped 
keeping his journal in mid-1858, so this book revealed nothing new about the years after 
the ports opened to Western trade.15 Sadly, none of the French diplomatic actors who 
                                                
10 Sir Ernest Mason Satow, A Diplomat in Japan, (London: Seeley, Service and Co., 
1921). 
11 He was caricatured by Vanity Fair in 1903; see Ian Ruxton, ed., The Diaries of Sir 
Ernest Satow, British Minister in Tokyo (1895-1900): A Diplomat Returns to Japan, 
(Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press, 2010), p.v. 
12 Satow, op.cit., p.159. 
13 Ibid., pp.159-60. 
14 Ibid., p.300. 
15 Mario Emilio Cosenza, ed., The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris: First American 
Consul and Minister to Japan, (Rutland, VT & Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1930).  
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served in Japan during this critical period wrote a memoir either, even though one of the 
most prominent, Léon Roches, did write an extensive account of the thirty-two years he 
spent living in North Africa before he arrived in Japan.16 The fact that Roches made no 
mention in these two-volume memoirs of his tenure as the French minister plenipotentiary 
in Edo at least tells us something about how he viewed his time there. The absence of 
first-hand accounts from other treaty-power protagonists guaranteed that Satow had the 
final word among the Western ‘men of Meiji’. In the decades that followed his death, his 
memoirs formed the basis of an Anglo-centric historiographical orthodoxy that 
emphasised British leadership of the Japanese treaty-port system. In the absence of 
dissenting voices, a narrative that no other Western maritime trading power ever 
contested Britain’s status as the first among equals in Japan was allowed to flourish 
unchallenged. 
Memoirs can be both a blessing and a curse to the historian. Individualistic by definition, 
they are usually written to justify actions, to cement a reputation, or to emphasize a role 
in important events. As they are often published long after the events that they describe 
have passed, they can often be unreliable historical records. The memoirs described above 
display many of these flaws, and all focus exclusively on British diplomatic relations. 
Though lived history can certainly supplement our understanding of the treaty-port 
system in Japan in a way that official government correspondence cannot, the existing 
first-hand accounts of bakumatsu Japan are clearly insufficient to construct a reliable 
narrative of Anglo-French relations during this period. 
Evaluating the Empire: Post-War Revisions 
The Second World War marked a watershed for historians of Western imperialism. 
Although Britain and France had emerged from the war victorious, their colonial empires 
soon began to crumble in the face of nationalist resistance. In the context of this changing 
world, a revolution in historical thought took place as historians began to consider the 
Western ‘civilising mission’ and the ‘liberal’ imposition of free trade as specific forms of 
imperialism. Perhaps the most significant example of this was the work of historians John 
Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, whose 1953 article ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’17 
debunked the traditional argument that ‘mid-Victorian ‘indifference’ and late-Victorian 
                                                
16 See Léon Roches, Trente-deux ans à travers l’Islam, 2 Vols., (Paris: 1884-5). 
17 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, The Economic 
History Review, 2nd Series, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1953), pp.1-15 
 
 
16 
‘enthusiasm’ for empire were directly related to the rise and decline in free-trade 
beliefs’.18 Instead, they argued that British policy throughout the Victorian age 
consistently followed the principle of extending control informally if possible and only 
formally if necessary. In other words, the creation of informal economic spheres of 
influence under the auspices of free trade was always preferable to the establishment of 
formal colonies, as long as informal methods secured British interests. The mid-
Victorians were not therefore as indifferent to empire as earlier historians had believed, 
nor were the late-Victorians more enthusiastic supporters of it. Instead, ‘British 
governments worked to establish and maintain British paramountcy by whatever means 
best suited the circumstances of their diverse regions of interest’.19 The conventional view 
that British imperial expansion peaked at the end of the nineteenth century, when Britain’s 
‘formal’ empire of dominion reached its full extent, was therefore incorrect. Instead, 
Robinson and Gallagher considered the decisive stage in the history of British imperial 
expansion to be the mid-Victorian age, when the imposition of free trade treaties on 
weaker states created an extensive ‘informal’ economic empire to supplement Britain’s 
‘formal’ colonial one.  
Gallagher and Robinson’s encapsulation of empire provoked a re-examination of 
Britain’s imperial history outside the confines of its formal colonies. Within this context, 
the study of Britain’s role in East Asia gained an entirely new significance for historians 
of empire. One of the most influential works to be published as a result was John K. 
Fairbank’s seminal study of the Chinese treaty-port system, Trade and Diplomacy on the 
China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854.20 Published in two volumes 
in 1953 and reissued several times as a single volume thereafter, this book was the first 
by a Western historian to examine the imposition of the ‘unequal treaties’ from a Chinese 
perspective. Fairbank drew upon his deep understanding of Chinese thought and tradition 
to demonstrate how the treaty-port system had supplanted China’s ancient tributary 
system as the means by which foreigners were incorporated into the universal Chinese 
state. He argued that the treaty ports were akin to the ports assigned for tributary trade in 
ancient China, that consular jurisdiction harked back to the medieval custom of Arab 
visitors taking responsibility for their countrymen, that the ‘most-favoured nation’ clause 
                                                
18 Ibid., p.2. 
19 Ibid., p.12. 
20 John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty 
Ports, 1842-1854, 2 Vols., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). 
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was rooted in the emperor’s benevolence towards all barbarians, and that the treaty tariff 
resembled the oppressive taxes on production and trade levied by China’s ruling Qing 
dynasty. In short, the treaties were as much a product of Chinese traditions as they were 
those of the West, regardless of the fact that tribute signified Chinese superiority and the 
treaties foreign domination. Fairbank believed that the dual origin of the treaty-port 
system created a Sino-Western synarchy in China – ‘a joint Chinese and Western 
administration of the modern centers of Chinese life and trade in the treaty ports’.21 Once 
the final treaty settlement was imposed in China at the end of the Opium Wars in 1858, 
the treaty powers led by Britain sought to prolong the Qing dynasty’s rule over the 
Chinese interior as long as possible while they used their special commercial and religious 
privileges to exploit the country. As a result, the treaty-port system gradually became ‘a 
basic component of the power structure of the Chinese state’.22 This depiction of the 
Chinese treaty-port system as a powerful imperialising force continues to resonate to this 
day, and its links to the concept of ‘enclave empires’ presented in this study are 
undeniable. Fairbank’s characterisation of the ‘unequal treaties’ as an amalgamation of 
both the Chinese and Western diplomatic traditions also helps to explain Japan’s hostility 
towards the treaty-port system during the nineteenth century. 
Another pioneering study of this critical period in Chinese history was Gerald S. 
Graham’s The China Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830-1860, which was published in 
1978.23 This work aimed to build upon the work of W. C. Costin, whose landmark 1937 
study, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860, is still considered to be one of the definitive 
diplomatic histories of the Opium Wars.24 Unlike Costin, who primarily relied upon 
official dispatches to and from the Foreign Office, Graham focused on the role that the 
Royal Navy played in ending China’s long isolation from the international system of 
trade. Conscious of the inextricable links between naval strategy, diplomacy, and politics, 
Graham intertwined official correspondence from the Admiralty, Colonial Office, and 
Foreign Office alongside the private papers of prominent political and naval figures such 
as Lord Palmerston, the Earl of Ellenborough, and the Earl of Auckland. Where possible, 
he also cited private letterbooks from Jardine, Matheson, and Company, one of the richest 
and most powerful British trading houses in nineteenth-century China, and other first-
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hand accounts from the navigators, surveyors and captains who made such a telling 
contribution to the Royal Navy’s success in China. This enabled Graham to give equal 
prominence to the naval commanders, missionaries, diplomats, scholars, and 
administrators who built the Chinese treaty-port system during the nineteenth century. 
Critically, he also argued that there was no such thing as British colonial policy in China, 
and that the only reason why the British gradually strengthened their foothold there was 
simply to safeguard trade and promote it. In other words, it was the demand for equal 
treatment that primarily underpinned British policy towards the Qing dynasty, since 
commercial and diplomatic equality was essential for the maintenance and expansion of 
trade. Whether this meant the creation of a permanent trading base such as Hong Kong 
or a series of free ports open to Britain’s rivals was a matter for the Foreign Office, but it 
was the Royal Navy’s responsibility to implement such decisions by force if necessary. 
In this sense, the navy ‘acted as the cutting edge of British diplomacy’ in the China seas, 
as indeed it did in many other parts of the world.25  
This was a critically important point. Put simply, the survival of the treaty-port system 
depended upon British naval superiority in the China seas. As Graham has pointed out, 
British diplomatic officials on the spot had a clear appreciation of the need to deploy 
British naval forces to protect the Chinese treaty ports, and often did so in the face of 
protests from the regional commander-in-chief. As some of these officials later found 
themselves in prominent diplomatic positions in Japan, it is fair to assume that their 
education in the China school of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ shaped their future attitudes 
towards the Japanese as well. According to Graham, British naval hegemony in China 
was also freely admitted by the other treaty powers. This point helps to explain how 
Britain established and maintained leadership of the Chinese treaty-port system during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Without a doubt, the general deference of 
the other treaty powers to British sea power ensured that the rules of this imperial game 
were always skewed in Britain’s favour. On the other hand, Graham was clear that the 
security of the British position in China depended upon a constant balance of power with 
the other treaty powers – France and Russia especially. Regardless of the relative strength 
of the Royal Navy at any given moment, China policy could never be entirely isolated 
from Europe because it might affect a delicate equilibrium of forces on the other side of 
the world. As one of the first histories to stress the importance of the global context in 
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shaping treaty-power relations in China, the long-term influence of Graham’s work 
cannot be overstated. Certainly, this thesis seeks to learn lessons from the methodology 
he adopted when considering Anglo-French relations in treaty-port Japan.26 
While Fairbank and Graham’s work focused exclusively on the Chinese treaty-port 
system, the post-war era also saw the publication of several equally important 
assessments of its Japanese equivalent. In the immediate aftermath of Japan’s devastating 
defeat in the Second World War, many Japanese and Western historians were keen to 
understand how the country had so rapidly evolved from self-imposed exclusion into a 
militarist empire. Focus soon returned to Japan’s initial interactions with the West, 
especially the enforced opening of the country through the imposition of the ‘unequal 
treaties’ in 1858 and the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate ten years later. As the 
centenary of the Meiji Restoration approached, several new histories were published that 
re-examined the complex relationships between the treaty powers, the bakufu, and its 
domestic opponents during this critical decade. This trend was pioneered by the prolific 
historian W. G. Beasley in his 1951 history of Britain’s interactions with Japan in the 
lead-up to the first commercial treaty of 1858.27 Beasley argued that the British attitude 
towards Japan prior to the imposition of the treaty-port system was at best one of mild 
indifference, characterised by occasional opportunist attempts to establish a trading 
relationship.28 He also challenged the traditional view that it was American diplomacy 
alone that brought about the opening of Japan, arguing instead that it was misplaced fear 
of an impending British attack that compelled the bakufu to relax its policy of seclusion.29 
In other words, the mere presence of a British naval squadron in Chinese waters had 
frightened the Japanese into agreeing to similar trading conditions to those already 
existing in China, even though there was no evidence that Britain had any deliberate 
political or territorial designs upon Japan at the time. In Beasley’s view, British 
imperialism during the mid-nineteenth century was ‘less a matter of intentions than of 
unpremeditated results, of a gradual and often unwilling assumption of political authority 
as the only way of providing the law and order in which trade might flourish’.30 
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In addition to his work with official British sources, Beasley was one of the first Western 
historians to produce a reliable English-language account of the Japanese viewpoint 
during the bakumatsu era. His ground-breaking Select Documents on Japanese Foreign 
Policy, published in 1955, supplemented a compilation of translated Japanese documents 
from the 1850s-60s with an excellent summary of bakufu policy as it struggled to react to 
the arrival of the West.31 For the first time, any scholar who was not fluent in archaic 
Japanese had invaluable access to bakufu sources.32 This work not only provided readers 
with an entirely different perspective to the Anglo-centric, English-language discourse, 
but also clarified some of the logic behind bakufu decision-making, which had previously 
been dismissed as incoherent and reactionary. Beasley went on to produce two more 
studies on the same topic: one a general history of modern Japan;33 the other a work 
entirely dedicated to the Meiji Restoration.34 The latter explained in greater detail the 
social structure of Tokugawa Japan and its fundamental inadaptability with the treaty-
port system. Beasley argued that the Meiji Restoration was to at least some degree a 
domestic revolution, albeit one catalysed specifically by a form of Western imperialism 
that disgraced an already unstable regime by imposing ‘unequal treaties’ upon it.35 
Beasley had not only identified an example of Western informal imperialism at work, but 
also demonstrated its revolutionary effect on domestic Japanese politics. This book 
therefore represented an important stepping-stone towards understanding this period of 
Japanese history far beyond the narrow focus of the contemporary nineteenth-century 
accounts. 
Further progress was soon to be made. Although some Japanese scholars continued to 
assert into the 1960s that Britain had directly supported the 1868 uprising against the 
shogunate, British historians began to question this interpretation as more British 
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diplomatic correspondence became available.36 In 1968, Gordon Daniels published an 
influential article that drew extensively from official British government documentation 
to assert that British support for the anti-Tokugawa forces had been exaggerated.37 
Critically, Daniels had also studied the Hammond Papers, which contained private 
correspondence from Sir Harry Parkes to Edmund Hammond, the British Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs throughout the 1860s. Daniels used these 
documents to show that too much emphasis had been placed on Satow and Mitford’s 
unequivocal support for the anti-bakufu alliance, and that official British policy had 
actually been much more cautious.38 He argued that Parkes had not expected the bakufu 
to collapse, and that, far from plotting its downfall, he had only abandoned it in February 
1868 once the result of the conflict was clear and London had granted him permission to 
do so.39  
This short article paved the way for Grace Fox’s Britain and Japan, a lengthy 
examination of Britain’s mid-nineteenth century relationship with Japan.40 Fox brought 
together the post-war explorations of early Anglo-Japanese relations into one exhaustive 
work that covered the entire spectrum of bilateral societal interaction. A lasting testament 
to early Anglo-Japanese relations, Fox’s compartmentalised analysis purposefully 
separated the role of the diplomatic actors from that of their economic, scientific and 
religious counterparts. This approach attracted some criticism from commentators, who 
argued that it created a doubtful portrayal of a foreign community in Japan where only 
diplomats seriously considered the future relationship between the two countries.41 As 
Fox had only limited access to private papers, her analysis of British diplomatic relations 
with Japan was also overly reliant on official sources. Nonetheless, this was the most 
comprehensive work on Anglo-Japanese relations so far, and it is a testament to that 
achievement that Fox’s book is still commonly referenced by scholars today. 
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Franco-Japanese histories in English developed over a similar, but much slower, 
historiographical trajectory to that of their Anglo-Japanese counterparts. In 1954, John 
Cady published one of the first English-language studies of French imperialism in East 
Asia during the mid-nineteenth century. Rather than focus exclusively on diplomatic 
policymaking on the spot, this work demonstrated how domestic politics in Europe also 
influenced French policy in the Far East. In stark contrast to the economic impulsions at 
the heart of the British imperial project, Cady explained how religion and culture were 
the driving factors behind French imperial expansion into the extra-European periphery. 
This cultural brand of imperialism was particularly prominent during the Second Empire, 
when foreign policymaking was shaped by Emperor Napoléon III’s desire to promote 
French cultural exceptionalism overseas, his sensitivity to the interests of the Catholic 
lobby in Paris, and his willingness to intervene to protect French missionaries in the Far 
East. Cady also explored the rivalries and jealousies that inevitably developed between 
Britain and France whenever their contrasting imperial philosophies clashed in China, but 
he paid little attention to the equivalent situation that arose in Japan.42  
During the early post-war period, the pioneering Japanese scholars Otsuka Takematsu 
and Ishii Takashi drew upon contemporary Japanese sources to argue that France, like 
Britain, had implemented a definitive imperialistic strategy towards bakumatsu Japan.43 
The first English-language study dedicated exclusively to French policy was not 
published until 1971, when a monograph by Meron Medzini made some effort to draw 
comparisons between French and British policy during the early days of the treaty-port 
system.44 Medzini argued that France initially followed Britain’s lead until the arrival in 
1864 of the flamboyant French minister Léon Roches, whose unique ‘politique 
personelle’ created opportunities for France to compete with Britain for political and 
economic influence.45 Medzini also agreed with Ostuka and Ishii that the French 
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government had a predetermined imperialist plan to usurp British leadership of the 
Japanese treaty-port system. As the first study to make this argument to a Western 
audience, Medzini’s work was an important step forward for the discourse. However, it 
was later criticised by the historian Richard Sims for accepting too readily the view of 
French policy advanced by the Japanese scholars, whom Sims believed harboured 
preconceived ideas about Western imperialism based on their limited access to French 
diplomatic records.46 
The historiography of the early post-war period produced some very important revisions 
to traditional interpretations of Western imperialism. Critically, the British benefaction 
of free trade during the mid-Victorian period was reclassified as informal economic 
imperialism. In this context, historians started the important process of reassessing 
Britain’s early interactions with Japan, particularly regarding the role that Britain played 
in the lead up to the Meiji Restoration. Others dedicated themselves to understanding the 
Japanese reaction to the coming of the West, in turn expanding and rebalancing the 
English-language discourse on this topic. A few even began to look at the policies of 
other treaty powers in Japan, including those of France. Unfortunately, many of the 
studies that were published during this era contained a fundamental methodological flaw 
that was first identified by Roger Dingman in a 1971 review of Fox’s Britain and Japan:  
Fox employs a rather narrow, traditional diplomatic analytical technique. Her 
central assumption, never clearly stated, is that Anglo-Japanese relations 
developed on a bilateral axis. Yet much of the interest in these years lies in the 
interplay between those relations and the crystallizing East Asian international 
political order. Fox seems curiously unaware of the impact of broad developments 
– Anglo-French rivalry for influence in both China and Japan, continuing concern 
at Russian expansion in Maritime Provinces and Central Asia, and growing 
American commercial and naval strength – on the Anglo-Japanese relationship.47 
Dingman’s point can be equally applied to many of the post-war histories of early 
Western relations with Japan. By tending to focus on only one aspect of a wider story, 
these histories failed to establish the broader external contexts to the internal 
developments that they described. Yet since global events would have impacted 
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significantly upon Western policymaking in Japan at the time, many of the conclusions 
drawn by the bilateral histories of the post-war period now seem unsatisfactory.  
Expanding Horizons? The Modern Discourse 
In the thirty years since Gallagher and Robinson first posited their theory on the 
‘imperialism of free trade’, successive generations of historians have developed the 
concepts of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ empire into what the British historian John Darwin 
called a ‘powerful and seductive’ model of Victorian imperialism.48 In an influential 
article published in 1997, Darwin explained how this model rested upon five basic 
propositions: that informal empire was the favoured means of mid-Victorian expansion 
due to its convenience and cost-effectiveness; that ‘informality’ was typically abandoned 
for direction intervention or annexation only when ‘national’ (rather than private) 
interests were at stake; that the political consequences of socio-economic change at the 
extra-European periphery often provoked such intervention; that deciding the scale of 
intervention, including the switch from informal to formal empire, was normally the 
prerogative of the ‘official mind’; and finally, that the overall pattern of formal expansion 
was heavily influenced by the importance attached to British supremacy on the Indian 
sub-continent.49 In Darwin’s view, this model implied that Britain’s formal empire-
building after 1880 was a defensive reaction to the growing influence of other imperial 
powers and the threat that they posed to existing British zones of influence. In other 
words, historians of the Gallagher and Robinson school viewed the mid-Victorian age of 
informal ‘peripheral’ empire as the height of British imperial expansion, and the growth 
of formal empire during the latter part of the nineteenth century as symptomatic of 
Britain’s relative decline as a great power.50 
The most rigorous challenge to this doctrine came from P. G. Cain and A. J. Hopkins, 
who published a monumental two-volume study on British imperialism in 1993 that 
fundamentally questioned the parameters of the discourse set by Gallagher and Robinson 
forty years earlier.51 Cain and Hopkins disputed the idea that the root of British 
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imperialism could be found at the extra-European periphery. They acknowledged the part 
played by sub-imperialists and indigenous societies on the frontier, but rejected the 
argument that local crises on the periphery were attributable to locality and personality 
alone. In their view, the peripheral thesis was overly focused on the symptoms of late-
Victorian intervention and annexation rather than their root cause.52 Cain and Hopkins 
attributed this instead to the growing success of a British economic and financial policy 
they termed ‘gentlemanly capitalism’: the innovative but enduring growth over a three-
hundred-year period of a finance and service sector compatible both with aristocratic 
power in the eighteenth century and a new gentlemanly order in the nineteenth.53 In this 
conceptualisation of British imperialism, the years after 1850 were marked as the point 
when City of London financiers rose to prominence and pursued Britain’s economic 
expansion across the globe. For these ‘gentlemanly capitalists’, free trade and sound 
money were concepts that transcended policy to become moral virtues synonymous with 
the liberal progress of civilization.54 Far from ‘the gloomy epilogue to the mid-Victorian 
age of confidence’, therefore, Cain and Hopkins believed that late-Victorian imperialism 
was actually ‘the vehicle of a commercial and financial expansion which continued far 
into the twentieth century’.55  
Although Japan rarely featured in the Cain and Hopkins analysis, their interpretation of 
British imperialism suggested that the imposition of the Japanese treaty-port system in 
the mid-nineteenth century was only the beginning of a period of concerted British 
economic expansion into East Asia that peaked much later in the century. If accurate, this 
would explain why attempts by East Asian states to revise the ‘unequal treaties’ during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were so fiercely resisted by British 
stakeholders. Nonetheless, the Cain and Hopkins model of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ 
provoked intense debate among a new generation of Japanese economic historians who 
were unconvinced by its Eurocentric approach. Perhaps the most prominent dissenter was 
Shigeru Akita, who argued in 1999 that Cain and Hopkins had overlooked the importance 
of Japanese-led intra-Asian trade during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
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Their conception of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ in East Asia had therefore critically 
underestimated the role of imperial Japan and exaggerated the influence of Britain in East 
Asian economic affairs.56 Akita made a convincing case for incorporating more Japanese 
perspectives into the study of British imperial history, even if his analysis was primarily 
focused on events after the First World War. To date, few Japanese economic historians 
have challenged the Cain and Hopkins model when applied to early Anglo-Japanese 
interactions. 
Over the last two decades, the debate on British imperialism has fundamentally shifted 
beyond the traditional-revisionist dichotomy of Gallagher and Robinson and Cain and 
Hopkins. This process started in 1997, when John Darwin published an influential article 
on ‘Imperialism and the Victorians’ that challenged aspects of both hypotheses.57 Darwin 
began by questioning the evidential basis for Robinson and Gallagher’s emphasis on the 
coherence and ubiquitous influence of the ‘official mind’ as one of the primary drivers 
behind British imperial expansion. He then raised doubts about whether ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ was as politically pre-eminent as Cain and Hopkins alleged, and highlighted 
their own uncertainty about how far British intervention was driven by domestic decision-
makers, ‘mega-merchants’ on the spot, pressure groups appealing to the national interest, 
or the sub-imperialism of British proconsuls. By reverting to the first principles of 
Gallagher and Robinson’s theory on the imperialism of free trade, Darwin argued that 
British policy was not at all guided by straightforward criteria as to where and when 
formal or informal modes of expansion were required. On the contrary, British imperial 
expansion was experimental, opportunistic, incoherent, and often the result of the 
inability of the ‘official mind’ to exert consistent influence. Darwin introduced the 
concept of the ‘bridgehead’ as the ‘transmission shaft of imperialism’ – the hinge or 
‘interface’ between the metropole and a local periphery.58 Whether this was a 
commercial, settler, missionary or proconsular presence – or a combination of all four – 
the circumstances and the performance of the ‘bridgehead’ determined whether British 
influence on the periphery was transformed into formal and informal empire. In sum, it 
was the ‘bridgehead’ that best explained the haphazard growth of the Victorian empire, 
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rather than the ‘official mind’ as Gallagher and Robinson believed, or the economic 
imperatives that Cain and Hopkins stressed.59 
Darwin’s ‘bridgehead’ theory was highly applicable to the way in which British 
imperialism extended into East Asia. It suggested that the British refusal to annex China 
during the nineteenth century was not, as previous historians had argued, evidence that 
the ‘official mind’ regarded informal influence within a decaying oriental empire as 
sufficient to safeguard British economic interests there. Darwin also refuted the idea that 
the essentially financial nature of those economic interests dictated a strenuous effort to 
hold the Chinese state together as a fair field for multinational financial enterprise. 
Instead, he argued that the relatively underdeveloped nature of British private interests in 
China maximised official freedom of action and safeguarded narrowly diplomatic 
priorities. Unlike in Africa, British entrepreneurs in China proved incapable of building 
a local business empire and exerting influence in London – both of which were critical to 
the success of the ‘bridgehead’ in securing intervention from the metropole. The 
obscurities of Chinese commercial practice and the difficulty of penetrating the China 
market also made British traders reliant upon Foreign Office support to exercise their 
treaty rights. The ‘bridgeheads’ of occupation in China were therefore weaker and more 
dependent upon diplomatic, financial or military aid from home than elsewhere on the 
periphery. The result was a treaty-port society dominated by the consulates and the 
commercial hierarchies of the major trading houses and banks, where the restraining 
authority of the British consul and that of the inherently cautious ‘official mind’ in 
London was much stronger than those parts of the periphery later annexed by the British 
state. According to Darwin, the policy-makers of Whitehall were principally concerned 
about ‘whether the strength of the local ‘bridgehead’ and the force of its domestic lobby 
outweighed the diplomatic hazards of a forward policy’.60 In China (and one must assume 
in Japan as well given the limited extent of British intervention there), whatever pressure 
was exerted by local British interests on the ‘official mind’ was clearly insufficient to 
offset the powerful diplomatic, financial, and military objections to the imposition of 
formal empire.61 
Darwin’s article catalysed a new phase in the historiography of British imperialism in 
which historians attempted to move beyond the concepts of informal and formal empire. 
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In a contribution to Raymond E. Dumett’s 1999 edited collection on Gentlemanly 
Capitalism and British Imperialism, Cain and Hopkins distinguished between two forms 
of power in the international system of both formal and informal empires: ‘structural 
power’ and ‘relational power’.62 ‘Structural power’ referred to the way in which a 
dominant state shaped the framework of international relations and specified the ‘rules of 
the game’ needed to uphold it by establishing control over credit, production, security, 
and knowledge, belief and ideas. Fundamentally, ‘structural power’ was a manifestation 
of the core values and policy priorities of the British liberal state, which included free 
trade, low taxation, and sound money. By contrast, ‘relational power’ concerned the 
negotiations, pressures, and conflicts that determined the outcome of contests within this 
framework. By defining imperialism as a particular form of power in international 
relations rather than as an expression of a purely constitutional arrangement, Cain and 
Hopkins opened up a spectrum of possibilities ranging from informal influence to formal 
control.63 
By 2001, the debate had shifted towards understanding the relationship between British 
imperialism and the history of globalisation. Once again, Cain and Hopkins led the way 
by arguing in the final chapter of the second edition of British Imperialism, 1688-2000 
that the process of imperial expansion was effectively a phase in the history of 
globalisation. They divided European history into three broad and overlapping stages: a 
phase of proto-globalisation between 1648 and 1850, followed by the era of modern 
globalisation from 1850 to 1950, and then by post-colonial globalisations from 1950 to 
the present.64 These ideas were developed further in Gentlemanly Capitalism, 
Imperialism and Global History, a landmark edited collection published in 2002 that 
attempted to understand the evolution of globalisation and the origins of today’s capitalist 
world-economy.65 Broadly speaking, its contributors agreed with Cain and Hopkins that 
British imperialism acted as a uniquely powerful globalising force during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries because it forged transnational economic linkages such as the 
exchange of goods, people, money, technology, and information. In this historical 
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context, editor Shigeru Akita argued that it was now possible to view British imperial 
history as a bridge to global history.66 
This view was echoed by John Darwin, whose article on globalism and imperialism was 
one of the most influential to appear in the Akita collection. By considering British power 
in a global context, Darwin was able to demonstrate how the world economy and global 
geopolitics constrained British imperial expansion between 1830 and 1960. This was 
particularly the case during the mid-Victorian era, when the presence of numerous strong 
or resilient states in Europe, Asia, the Americas, and southern Africa acted as a check on 
Britain’s spheres of influence. The mid-Victorian resort to informal empire was therefore 
as much an admission of Britain’s relative weakness and unwillingness to challenge local 
hegemons as it was a matter of imperial convenience. Indeed, even Lord Palmerston, the 
architect and arbiter of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, was less dogmatically committed to 
unilateral intervention during this period than his reputation suggested – not least because 
of the ferocious criticism he frequently attracted from domestic political opponents for 
pursuing aggressive policies in the Near East and China. Darwin thus disputed the view 
advanced by Gallagher and Robinson that the years between 1830 and 1870 represented 
the height of British imperial power. Instead, he agreed with Cain and Hopkins that 
British imperial expansion did not peak until after globalism set in during the late 
nineteenth century, when British control over an international economy of integrated 
regions and open markets reached its fullest extent. By the 1930s, however, the global 
reach of Britain’s ‘formal’ empire of rule and ‘informal’ empire of trade made both 
acutely vulnerable to political instability worldwide. It was this geopolitical insecurity 
that precipitated a period of crisis and eventual decline in British imperial power in the 
lead up to the Second World War. The rise and fall of the British Empire could therefore 
be explained by three ‘long swings’ of the world economy: the approach (1830s-70s), 
formation (1880s-1920s), and crisis (1930s-40s).67 
The efforts by Akita, Darwin et al. to explain the links between imperialism and globalism 
inspired several other historians to consider the British Empire from a global, 
transnational perspective. One important example of this new phase in the historiography 
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was the British historian Niall Ferguson’s Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. 
In this controversial 2003 work, Ferguson argued that British imperialism acted as a 
positive modernising force compared to other imperial models because it catalysed the 
spread of liberal capitalism and parliamentary democracy across the globe.68 John Darwin 
challenged this idea of British imperial exceptionalism by examining the rise and fall of 
different empires through the ages in his 2007 book, After Tamerlane: The Global History 
of Empire since 1405.69 Darwin’s most recent study, Unfinished Empire: The Global 
Expansion of Britain, published in 2012, built upon his earlier article in Gentlemanly 
Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History by exploring the global history of the British 
Empire in much greater detail.70 This time, Darwin argued that Britain’s overseas empires 
had begun to split into four distinct divisions, or ‘sub-empires’, by the end of the 
eighteenth century. The first consisted of the traditional self-governing colonies of North 
America, the Caribbean, and Australasia over which London had almost no control. The 
second included the Indian possessions that made Britain a great Asian power as well as 
a European one. The third was the ragbag collection of fortresses like Gibraltar, tropical 
colonies such as Ceylon, maritime bridgeheads in East and West Africa, decaying old 
colonies in the British West Indies, and booming trade entrepôts like Singapore and Hong 
Kong. The fourth was the informal or ‘invisible’ empire exemplified by the British 
business empires in Argentina and Uruguay, Britain’s temporary occupation of Egypt, 
and the treaty-port system in China.71 There is little to dispute in Darwin’s assessment 
that these informal colonies were often more valuable than the formal variety, that British 
power was exerted informally because the cost and effect of formal rule seemed 
unnecessary, or because such rule would have been too hard to impose. However, this 
thesis will take issue with his assertion that informal empire was ‘a compromise that 
depended on the cooperation of locals and the absence of rivals’.72 It will demonstrate 
that, in Japan’s ‘enclave empires’ at least, local resistance and treaty-power rivalry were 
often close bedfellows. 
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By far the most comprehensive global history of the nineteenth century to emerge in 
recent years was Jürgen Osterhammel’s The Transformation of the World: A Global 
History of the Nineteenth Century.73 First published in German in 2009 and later 
translated into English in 2014, this monumental study adopted a multifaceted thematic 
approach to explain how technology, science, politics, economics, and other complex 
forces catalysed global change during the ‘long nineteenth century’. By moving beyond 
the traditional Eurocentric and chronological accounts of the era, Osterhammel was able 
to frame imperialism as part of the much wider transformational process that helped to 
create the world in which we live today. In terms of what it teaches us about the 
transnational, transcontinental, and transcultural impact of nineteenth-century 
imperialism in all its guises, Osterhammel’s magnum opus remains the definitive global 
history of that tumultuous era. 
Compared to the rich historiography that now exists on British imperialism in the mid-
Victorian era, far fewer Anglophone historians have explored its French equivalent in 
anywhere near as much detail. Fortunately, this discrepancy has been addressed in recent 
years by the publication of several Francophone studies on the Second Empire, a period 
when Anglo-French imperial rivalry reached new and dangerous heights. One of the most 
useful of these was Jean Baillou’s colossal two-volume study of the French diplomatic 
service from the ancien régime to 1870, which included a very detailed section on the 
mechanics of foreign policy under Napoléon III.74 The most prominent and 
comprehensive study to appear since these two volumes were published in 1984 was 
undoubtedly Pierre Milza’s 2004 biography of Emperor Napoléon III.75 Meticulously 
researched and eloquently written, this sympathetic but honest appraisal of the emperor’s 
life and times is still considered by many to be the definitive account. Despite this, 
Napoléon III was the subject of another monumental biography published by Éric Anceau 
in 2008 to mark the bicentennial of his birth.76 Anceau’s Napoléon III: un Saint-Simon à 
cheval was a brave attempt to understand this highly enigmatic figure, but it failed to 
advance the discourse any further than the parameters set by Milza four years earlier.  
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The same could be said for much of the recent Francophone historiography of the French 
Second Empire. Despite the huge amount of new material that has been dedicated to 
studying the emperor and his regime over the last few decades, it remains difficult for 
historians to square the liberal objectives of the emperor’s interventionist ‘principle of 
nationalities’ foreign policy with his autocratic domestic programme. Milza’s Napoléon 
III: l’homme, le politique, an edited collection also published to coincide with the 2008 
bicentennial, contains a good overview of the debates on these matters, as well as a 
comprehensive bibliography of works published on the Second Empire since 1950.77 
Unfortunately, aside from Bernard Brizay’s Le sac de palais d’Eté, which focuses 
exclusively on the Anglo-French naval expeditions to China between 1858 and 1860, 
very few contemporary French-language histories examine the Second Empire’s East 
Asia policy.78 New Francophone studies of French policy in Japan during this era are 
even more elusive. 
Although many recent studies have put British imperialism into its international context, 
comparative histories of the British and French Empires in either English or French are 
rather thin on the ground. In 1996, Robert Tombs made the important point that, in stark 
contrast to the economic factors that motivated Britain’s mid-Victorian expansion, the 
emperor’s expansionist foreign policy was partly designed to restore French prestige and 
silence his critics at home.79 However, as this point was made in a general survey of 
French history between 1814 and 1914, Tombs did not really have the space to dwell on 
Napoléon III’s policies for very long. Since then, many English-language histories of the 
Second Empire have focused on the motives and methods of the French imperial project 
under Napoléon III rather than on their global impact. In this context, Roger Price’s 2001 
work on French Second Empire: An Anatomy of Political Power is one of the most 
useful.80 Many British and American historians of this period have also followed in the 
footsteps of their French counterparts by producing biographical portrayals of Napoléon 
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III.81 Unfortunately, while these works have injected some important French perspectives 
into the study of the mid-nineteenth century international order, they have very rarely 
examined how Napoléon III’s erratic foreign policy impacted upon events in East Asia, 
let alone in Japan.  
The last three decades have at least seen the addition of new biographical studies 
concerning British personalities in Japan. The former British Ambassador to Japan, Hugh 
Cortazzi, pioneered this trend in 1984 when he drew upon the private correspondence of 
the first British Legation doctor in Edo, William Willis, to publish the first new 
perspective on Sir Harry Parkes for decades.82 Willis’s letters alleged that Parkes had 
been a ‘pestilently active’ taskmaster whose experiences in China had left him with little 
regard for Asian authorities. Despite this, Cortazzi argued that such an attitude was 
generally understandable given the provocation and difficulties that Parkes experienced 
in Japan, and stressed that Willis ultimately had great respect for his superior.83 In 1985, 
Cortazzi restored another important Meiji figure to public prominence by publishing an 
edited collection of the memoirs and correspondence of Algernon Mitford, whose private 
material was brought into the public eye for the first time.84 Nine years later, Cortazzi 
wrote a useful summary of Sir Harry Parkes in a collection of Anglo-Japanese 
biographical portraits.85 After making explicit reference to the bitter personal rivalry that 
had existed between Parkes and Roches, Cortazzi wondered (without drawing upon any 
definitive evidence) if their poor relationship might have made Parkes more inclined to 
support the Restoration movement.86 A second volume in this biographical series 
included interesting articles on Sir Rutherford Alcock and Lawrence Oliphant.87 
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The trend for biographical histories culminated in 1996 with a book by Gordon Daniels 
dedicated entirely to the life of Sir Harry Parkes.88  Here was an opportunity to build upon 
the arguments that Daniels had advanced back in 1968, and to establish a clearer picture 
of Parkes’s relationship with the bakufu, their opponents, and his influential subordinates 
Satow and Mitford. Unfortunately, this book did not go far beyond the official British 
diplomatic record by incorporating the Parkes Papers held in Cambridge University 
Library. Its conclusions were therefore little different to those drawn by earlier Anglo-
Japanese histories. This disappointing work symbolised the limited analytical approach 
that has sometimes been applied to examinations of Britain’s presence in bakumatsu 
Japan. Although these studies have added flavour to the discourse, they have not taken 
sufficient account of broader historiographical currents on British imperialism or 
considered how global contexts impacted upon British foreign policy in Japan. 
Some progress has however been made on interpretations of the French role, albeit along 
a similar trajectory to the revisionist British studies of the post-war years. Jean-Pierre 
Lehmann was the first to take the old orthodoxy to task in a 1980 article for Modern Asian 
Studies that reassessed the personality and policy of Léon Roches.89 Lehmann was 
fiercely critical of Meron Medzini’s earlier assertion that Roches was an imperialist agent 
of Napoléon III, which he believed was based on Medzini’s overreliance on Japanese 
source material and failure to make full use of French documentary evidence.90 Lehmann 
suggested that it was the Japanese who had instigated bilateral initiatives with France, 
rather than the other way round. He also argued that, while Roches had enjoyed some 
admirable successes in Japan, his personality and background had blinded him to the 
realities of the changing situation and evolving threat from the bakufu’s enemies.91  
Lehmann had highlighted a critical gap in the historiography of this period, but it was 
almost another twenty years until a full survey of nineteenth-century Franco-Japanese 
relations appeared. Richard Sims’s French Policy Towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan, 
1854-95, published in 1998, finally rebalanced the Anglo-centric bias of the 
historiography by examining French policy in similar detail to the older studies by Fox et 
                                                
88 Gordon Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes: British Representative in Japan, 1865-83, 
(Richmond: Japan Library, 1996). 
89 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches – Diplomat Extraordinary in the Bakumatsu Era: 
An Assessment of his Personality and Policy’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XIV. No. 2, 
(1980), pp.237-307. 
90 Ibid. p.273.  
91 Ibid., pp.304-6. 
 
 
35 
al. on Britain.92 This important work drew upon French diplomatic documents to 
demonstrate the recurring negativity that defined French relations with Japan during the 
mid-Victorian period. In this context, Sims definitively dismissed the idea that France 
was interested in trade or spreading Christianity in Japan, and stressed instead that the 
principal positive motivation, if there was one at all, was a desire to increase French 
prestige in Asia.93 He also suggested that a general lack of imagination in Paris ensured 
that France missed a huge opportunity to build influence in Japan after the short-lived 
Roches period.94 The comparative approach that Sims adopted finally started the process 
of assessing the Japanese treaty-port system as an international phenomenon. By contrast, 
Christian Polak’s 2002 French-language work, Soie et lumières: l’âge d’or des échanges 
franco-japonais, des origines aux années 1950, was primarily based on traditional 
English-language histories and added little new information.95  
English-language histories on Tokugawa Japan have also undergone an important 
evolution of late as historians have started to consider the events of the 1850s and 1860s 
from the perspective of the bakufu itself. This process began with a 1979 article in 
Monumenta Nipponica in which Marc Ericson highlighted Edo’s attempts to place itself 
within the framework of international affairs. Far from being averse to foreign relations, 
Ericson asserted that the shogunate had been an active promoter of Japan’s position in 
the international community because it had sent many diplomatic missions and students 
to the West.96 Ericson’s article was followed one year later by Conrad Totman’s The 
Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1862-1868, an influential re-examination of how and 
why the bakufu fell from power.97 Totman chose to ignore both the diplomatic 
manoeuvres of the treaty powers and the machinations of the anti-bakufu forces to focus 
instead on the ruinous policies pursued by the Tokugawa government. His detailed 
analysis of the inner workings of the governing regime provided the specialist historian 
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with an important new perspective, even if the vast material he cited from the Japanese 
sources prevented a more precise and effective analysis of Edo’s weaknesses.  
This challenge was soon embraced by several high-profile historians in a new volume of 
The Cambridge History of Japan published in 1989.98 Dedicated exclusively to the 
nineteenth century and later condensed into an edited collection,99 this excellent volume 
expanded upon Totman’s analysis of Tokugawa society to include the political crises it 
had experienced prior to the arrival of the West. It also explored the roots of the 
philosophical malaise that was corroding bakufu authority long before Western gunboats 
entered Edo Bay by charting the development of Tokugawa culture and thought during 
the early nineteenth century. Editor Marius Jansen’s article on the Meiji Restoration was 
particularly influential, as it highlighted the long-term structural weaknesses that 
underpinned the Tokugawa state, echoed Totman’s point that anti-feudal opposition had 
long existed within the ruling Tokugawa elite, and stressed the importance of Japanese 
perceptions of the foreign threat on Edo’s panicked reaction to the challenge of the 
West.100 
Another significant historiographical development in recent decades has been the 
appearance of several accounts of the life and times of the merchants, missionaries, and 
other members of Western society who lived and died at the treaty ports. This trend began 
with the publication in 1992 of Japan Through American Eyes: The Journal of Francis 
Hall, Kanagawa and Yokohama, 1859-1866, edited and annotated by F. G. Notehelfer.101 
An American reporter and entrepreneur with the U.S. trading house Walsh, Hall & 
Company, Hall’s eyewitness account has been described by historian Kevin Murphy as 
‘an important step toward a more complete understanding of the first cultural encounter 
between Japan and America’.102 It certainly marked an important progression in the 
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historiography of treaty-port life, which had hitherto been overly focused on diplomatic 
studies of officials relations between Japan and the treaty-power representatives. 
Two years later, J. E. Hoare published a much more comprehensive effort on the same 
topic. Japan’s Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899 
drew upon an exhaustive collection of government papers, private letters and journals, 
early treaty-port newspapers, and contemporary periodicals to explore every facet of 
treaty-port society over the forty years of their existence.103 It included an examination of 
day-to-day life for the resident merchant class, an analysis of the legal system introduced 
by the extraterritoriality clauses in the treaties, a detailed account of how municipal affairs 
were managed at the ports, and a lively survey of the foreign and Japanese-language 
treaty-port press. Hoare’s vivid depiction of treaty-port society introduced a diverse cast 
of ‘lofty consuls, sometimes idealistic foreigners employed by the Meiji government 
(oyatoi), single-minded missionaries and, early in the experience, foreign troops’.104 He 
also related the Japanese treaty-port system to its Chinese counterpart, making some 
interesting conclusions on the similarities and differences between the two in terms of 
their economic, political, and social impact on each country. 
In the two decades since Hoare first considered how different societal groups shaped 
Japan’s treaty ports, other historians have explored this topic in much greater detail. 
Thanks to works such as Andrew Cobbing’s The Japanese Discovery of Modern Britain: 
Early Travel Encounters in the Far West,105 Kevin Murphy’s The American Merchant 
Experience in Nineteenth-Century Japan,106 and Peter Ennals’s Opening a Window to the 
West: The Foreign Concession at Kobe, Japan, 1868-1899,107 our understanding of 
treaty-port society in Japan has expanded far beyond the confines of official diplomatic 
history. Recent histories of the Chinese treaty-port system have followed a similar 
trajectory, thanks especially to the prolific Robert A. Bickers, whose recent publications 
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include Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism,108 Empire Made Me: An 
Englishman Adrift in Shanghai,109 and The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the 
Qing Empire, 1800-1914.110 In 1998, Jack L. Hammersmith’s Spoilsmen in a “Flowery 
Fairyland”: The Development of the U.S. Legation in Japan, 1859-1906, finally brought 
the historiography on American diplomacy in treaty-port Japan up to speed with earlier 
studies on Britain and France.111 Yet despite these laudable efforts, the role played by the 
French, Dutch, German, Italian, and other non-American or British actors who also 
populated the Japanese and Chinese treaty ports continues to be neglected. Given the 
international nature of the East Asian treaty-port system, this is an unacceptable oversight. 
There have also been some notable efforts in recent years to understand the treaty-port 
system from a global history perspective. One excellent example of this was Turan 
Kayaoglu’s Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman 
Empire, and China, published in 2010.112 Kayaoglu characterised extraterritoriality as a 
form of British ‘legal imperialism’ that was imposed upon three very different Eastern 
empires with three very different legal traditions. The bulk of his book focused on how 
each regime reacted to the imposition of extraterritoriality, and how they attempted to 
overturn it during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Kayaoglu then 
contemporised his findings with an interesting examination of how American ‘legal 
imperialism’ still exists today. His ideas were developed further by Par Kristoffer Cassel 
in his exceptional 2012 work, Grounds of Judgement: Extraterritoriality and Imperial 
Power in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan.113 Cassel combined recent findings on 
Qing history on the nature of ethnicity and law with the history of the treaty-port system 
to demonstrate the fundamental difference between the form of extraterritoriality imposed 
upon China and Japan. He argued that the transition into the treaty-port era was relatively 
seamless in China because a Qing institution for the adjudication of Manchu-Chinese 
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disputes served as a model for the extraterritorial arrangements introduced by the treaties. 
By contrast, Japanese authorities fiercely resisted all attempts to integrate consular and 
mixed courts into the indigenous legal order, ensuring that consular jurisdiction remained 
an alien concept for as long as the treaty-port system existed. Far from a ready-made 
product to be imposed uniformly across the extra-European world, therefore, Cassel 
believed that extraterritoriality was adaptable to local precedents, local understandings of 
power, and local institutions – a theory that fitted neatly with broader historiographical 
trends on the hybrid nature of informal empire. Like Kayaoglu before him, Cassel had 
demonstrated the benefits of adopting a comparative, global approach to the study of 
Japan’s unique encounter with Western imperialism. 
Perhaps the most outstanding global history of pre-Meiji Japan to date was Michael 
Auslin’s Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of 
Japanese Diplomacy, published in 2004.114 Here, at last, was a study of Tokugawa policy 
that understood the impact and importance of Western ‘relational power’ and how it 
revolutionised Japan. Auslin identified a distinctive Tokugawa diplomatic culture based 
on three interlinked boundaries – one ideological, one intellectual and one physical – 
which protected the shogunate from foreign threats and domestic interference.115 During 
the 1850s and 1860s, Edo’s strategy of negotiation with the West led to the gradual 
breakdown of these boundaries and ultimately to a transformation of Japan’s diplomatic 
culture. This in turn provoked sweeping societal change and a fundamental reappraisal of 
Japan’s relationship with the rest of the world.116 Critically, Auslin placed these events 
within their international context by stressing how Western policy in China influenced 
Edo’s strategy of negotiation and Western attitudes towards Japan. He also depicted the 
treaty-port system as an imperialist conceit by which each nation could project power 
over Japan individually or by sharing power collectively. Most importantly, the 
incremental destruction of the boundaries erected by the bakufu led the Japanese to 
understand the British-led imperialist world order, the irresistible force of the global free 
trade economy, and the insignificant part Japan played in all of it.  
By fusing new perspectives on Western imperialism with the study of Japanese domestic 
policy, Auslin succeeded in broadening the discourse on Japan’s entry into the modern 
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world. Ironically, this refreshing approach has exposed further gaps in the historical 
narrative. By definition, Auslin’s analysis focused on the evolution in Japan’s diplomatic 
culture response to the imposition of the treaty-port system, rather than on the interplay 
between the Japanese treaty powers. Furthermore, although he made some attempt to take 
international contexts into account, this was generally only when events elsewhere in East 
Asia directly impacted upon Japanese affairs. Yet the East Asian region was rarely a 
foreign policy priority for the principal treaty powers, as other historical works covered 
in this section made clear. To date, however, no historian has fully considered whether 
extra-Asian contexts shaped the Japanese treaty-port system in the way that regional ones 
did. As this overview of existing literature on the Japanese treaty-port system has shown, 
this is one of several gaps in the historiography that still need to be addressed. 
 
Enclave Empires: A new synthesis 
By charting the evolution of the English and French-language historiography on the East 
Asian treaty-port system, we now have a clearer picture of the great strides that historians 
have made over the last seventy years towards understanding this unique form of informal 
imperialism. Successive generations of historians have advanced increasingly 
sophisticated theories on the global impact of empire, both formal and informal, while 
others have focused on the myriad ways in which these forces shaped extra-European 
societies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Narrower studies of individual 
treaty powers, of treaty-port society, and of specific aspects of the ‘unequal treaties’ have 
also enriched our understanding of the East Asian treaty-port system. More recently, 
historiographical trends suggest a growing desire to explore informal empire in East Asia 
from a comparative, transnational, and transcultural perspective. This thesis will attempt 
to build upon the progress that these studies have made in seeking to understand the 
Japanese treaty-port system within its global context. It will take account of recent trends 
in imperial and global history to demonstrate how the political, economic, and diplomatic 
relationship between the two most powerful Western imperial formations of their day – 
the British Empire and the French Second Empire – shaped events in Japan from the 
opening of treaty relations in 1858 until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. It will also address 
the overreliance on official diplomatic correspondence in much of the existing 
historiography of this period, and consider the extent to which British and French 
personalities who operated in Japan beyond the diplomatic sphere influenced Anglo-
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French relations there. Above all, it will argue that the treaty-port system created 
distinctive informal ‘enclave empires’ in Japan that Britain, France, and the other treaty 
powers fought to control and influence. The main body of the thesis will explore how this 
treaty-power rivalry unfolded during the first decade of treaty relations with Japan so that 
the concept of ‘enclave empires’ can be fully defined in the conclusion. 
Four factors will underpin this study’s methodological approach: the international 
context; the comparative approach; the cast of characters; and the corpus of documents. 
The international context is perhaps the most critical to broadening the scope of the 
historiography beyond the current orthodoxy. Though the ‘opening’ of Japan to the West 
has attracted intensive interest from successive generations of historians, few have framed 
the establishment of the treaty-port system in Japan within the wider regional and global 
contexts.117 This study will endeavour to remedy this oversight by considering where 
Japan fitted into the spectrum of British and French foreign policy priorities during the 
mid-nineteenth century. In the first chapter, it will explore the origins of the Chinese 
treaty-port system to demonstrate the inextricable link between the ‘enclave empires’ that 
were created in Japan and their precursors in China. Thereafter, it will emphasise the 
continued importance of events in China and East Asia in determining the way in which 
British and French policy was made in Japan. It will also identify the wider global 
contexts that played a critical role in shaping treaty-power dynamics in Japan during the 
1860s. This will include analysis of how major geopolitical crises in Europe impacted 
upon British and French policy in East Asia, and how the American Civil War knocked 
the United States out of the race to become the leading treaty power in Japan. By 
considering the wider international context in this way, this thesis will explain how the 
increasingly bitter struggle between Britain and France for control over Japan’s ‘enclave 
empires’ was eventually won. 
The comparative approach is another means by which this thesis will seek to present new 
and fresh perspectives. It is fair to say that much of the current Anglophone and 
Francophone historiography of the Japanese treaty-port system is focused on bilateral 
diplomatic relations between Japan and one external treaty power. This thesis will argue 
that this methodological approach is unsatisfactory given the international character of 
the Japanese treaty-port system. It will therefore reassess that system as a multinational 
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construct that depended upon the cooperation and collaboration of each treaty power that 
operated within it. In the first chapter, it will show that the original five treaty powers 
each played a different role in negotiating the first ‘unequal treaties’ with Japan. It will 
then chart the evolution of treaty-power rivalry in Japan following the opening of trade 
in 1859. We will see how the early years of treaty-port relations were characterised by an 
Anglo-American struggle for control over the process of implementing the ‘unequal 
treaties’, before the American challenge was eventually eclipsed by seismic local, 
regional, and global events. Thereafter, attention will focus on the personal enmity that 
developed between the British and French diplomatic representatives as they fought to 
implement contradictory programmes for the modernisation of Japan in the lead up to the 
Meiji Restoration in 1868. The viewpoints of other treaty-power representatives will be 
acknowledged as far as possible, but generally only when relevant to Anglo-French 
relations. Unfortunately, it is simply not possible within the confines of this study to 
consider the perspectives of all the treaty powers that operated in Japan during the 1860s. 
However, this thesis will also argue that we can only truly understand how traditional 
great-power imperial rivalries developed within the small collection of informal ‘enclave 
empires’ that spanned East Asia by adopting such a comprehensive comparative 
approach. 
The detailed historiographical overview that prefaced this section demonstrated that 
many histories of this period have focused exclusively on the decisions of diplomatic 
actors. This thesis will consider whether incorporating the viewpoints of the much 
broader cast of characters who populated the Japanese treaty ports is also necessary to 
understand how British and French policy developed in bakumatsu Japan. As mentioned 
previously, as well as the diplomatic representatives and their staffs, the treaty ports 
hosted a diverse international community of missionaries, merchants, military personal, 
naval servicemen, journalists, and financiers, to name but a few. This thesis will try to 
determine what impact, if any, this rich tapestry of mid-Victorian society had on shaping 
the direction of treaty-power relations in Japan. It will not attempt to present a thematic 
analysis of each of these societal groups, but simply seek to incorporate individual 
perspectives wherever possible and whenever relevant to the narrative. In so doing, it will 
highlight how certain influential members of the non-diplomatic cast of characters 
contributed directly to the Anglo-French struggle for dominance over the ‘enclave 
empires’ in Japan. 
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Finally, it is also important to incorporate a wider corpus of documentary evidence into 
the study of this period than has hitherto been the case. Unfortunately, many historians 
have only dipped into the vast repository of British private paper archives that are now 
available for study, even though mid-Victorian political and diplomatic figures frequently 
supplemented their official dispatches with private letters. To remedy this oversight, this 
thesis will not only examine the private correspondence between British officials in Japan 
and those in the Foreign Office, but also delve into the private papers of prominent 
ministers who served in other departments of the British government. Where possible, it 
will additionally cite personal letters from the non-governmental figures who also 
contributed to British policymaking at the time. Official publications and dispatches from 
the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, many of which are contained in the National 
Archives at Kew, will still be consulted where necessary, but this thesis will not rely upon 
them in the first instance. On the other hand, as it has been more difficult to locate similar 
private paper collections in the French archives, French documentary evidence will still 
be drawn primarily from the Japan-related ‘Correspondence Politique’, ‘Correspondence 
Commerciale et Consulaire’, and ‘Mémoires et Documents’ sections of the Archives 
Diplomatiques at La Courneuve in Paris. These will be supplemented where relevant with 
private letters from Archives de la Societé des Missions Étrangères de Paris. 
On final note is necessary on sources. The primary issue under scrutiny in this thesis is 
how the international relationship between Britain and France influenced the imposition 
and development of ‘enclave empires’ in Japan between 1858 and 1868. It will therefore 
focus on Anglo-French relations in Japan, not Anglo-French relations with Japan. For this 
reason, Japanese sources have not been consulted. Furthermore, as this thesis will only 
consider the viewpoints of the other treaty powers when relevant to Anglo-French 
relations, most primary source material relating to their policies in Japan is drawn from 
the British and French archives. Nonetheless, I am confident that the corpus of 
documentary evidence analysed in this thesis will shed new light on how British and 
French foreign policy was made during the mid-nineteenth century, wherever in the world 
these two great empires clashed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Terra Incognita: The Treaty-Port System Comes to Japan, 1858 
 
On 31 March 1854, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew C. Perry signed the first ever treaty 
between the United States of America and Japan. After hundreds of years of self-imposed 
seclusion from the West, Perry was confident that the convention he had negotiated would 
finally begin the transformation of this mysterious island empire into a ‘modern’ state.118 
Four years after the conclusion of his Convention of Kanagawa, five Western maritime 
trading nations, including the United States, formally entered into commercial relations 
with Japan. The agreements signed between these powers and the government of the 
Tokugawa shogunate, or bakufu, in 1858 were so unbalanced in terms of the special 
commercial, legal, and political privileges they granted to the former that they have been 
termed ‘unequal treaties’. In effect, they imposed a pernicious form of informal empire 
known as the treaty-port system upon the Japanese state. This system was to play a critical 
role in shaping Western policy in Japan for the remainder of the nineteenth century. 
Japan was not the only East Asian nation that was forced to accept the treaty-port system 
during the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, it had been operating in the region for the best 
part of two decades by the time it finally reached there, having first been imposed upon 
China by the British Empire following victory in the Opium War (1840-1842). The first 
‘unequal treaties’ were therefore originally used to bypass the sovereignty of the Qing 
dynasty, China’s imperial rulers since 1644, rather than that of the feudal military 
government that had ruled Japan since 1600. Given this wider regional context, it is 
simply not possible to understand the forces that created ‘enclave empires’ in Japan 
without first exploring their origins in China. What follows, therefore, is a brief overview 
of how and why the ‘unequal treaties’ were first imposed upon China, a detailed account 
of their introduction to Japan, and an analysis of the similarities and differences between 
the Chinese and Japanese treaty-port systems.  
                                                
118 See W. G. Beasley, ‘The Foreign Threat and the Opening of the Ports’, in Marius B. 
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45 
The treaty-port system in China 
The Opium War was the culmination of decades of increasingly strained relations 
between the British Empire and the Qing dynasty, the two preponderant imperial powers 
of East and West, resulting from the aggressive expansion of British naval and economic 
power into East Asia during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The 
gradual but increasingly forceful British encroachment into the Qing dynasty’s sphere of 
influence brought two distinctly different and fundamentally incompatible systems of 
international relations into direct contact for the first time: Europe’s Westphalian system 
of state sovereignty and China’s Sinocentric system of imperial tribute. Difficulties 
inevitably arose out of this clash of worldviews, most prominently over the proliferation 
of international trade into Qing territory. On the one hand, British merchants wanted 
access to China’s huge and potentially lucrative markets to satisfy the growing British 
demand for Chinese tea, porcelain, and silk. On the other, the Qing government was 
suspicious of foreign intercourse and saw little need for a vast, largely self-sufficient 
empire to trade with the outside world. 
By 1760, the Qing had established a highly restrictive regulatory framework known as 
the Canton system to oversee trade with the West. Under this system, all Western 
commercial transactions were conducted at the southern port city of Canton, where 
foreigners were only permitted to trade with a small group of licensed Chinese ‘Hong’ 
merchants. Europeans were also subject to the jurisdiction of the Qing penal code, which 
lacked an independent judiciary and used forms of capital punishment that were 
considered barbaric in the West, such as public strangulation, beheading, and slow slicing. 
The Canton system was successful in maintaining control over foreign trade in China, but 
the British merchant community put increasing pressure on the British government to 
send an embassy to the Qing emperor to negotiate better trading privileges. The fact that 
the Qing would only accept silver bullion as payment for Chinese goods was particularly 
problematic, as it created a growing trade deficit for British merchants. They began to 
exchange Indian opium for silver to compensate for this deficit during the 1770s, but the 
increasing popularity of opium in China and the haemorrhaging of silver from the country 
exacerbated tensions between Qing officials and foreign traders. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British government made a series of 
overtures to the Qing emperor requesting the opening of official diplomatic relations and 
a relaxation of the restrictions on trade. His refusal to consider any of these requests 
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constituted a serious threat to Britain’s prestige as a global naval power. Matters came to 
a head in 1838, when the Daoguang Emperor issued a decree suppressing the opium trade 
in China. When the Qing authorities demanded the surrender of foreign opium the 
following year, the merchant community at Canton initially refused. This led to the 
immediate suspension of all trade and a blockade of the factories where the foreign 
merchants lived and worked. Eventually, Charles Elliot, the Chief Superintendent of 
British Trade in China, agreed to hand over more than 20,000 chests of opium to the Qing 
authorities. Crucially, the fact that Elliot was a representative of the British Crown meant 
that the British opium merchants in China could demand financial compensation from 
their government in London. Forced into an official response, the British government 
dispatched an imposing naval fleet to seek satisfaction for the insult and reparation for 
the financial losses incurred. Over the following three years, the Royal Navy engaged in 
various bombardments and blockades up and down the Chinese seaboard, before the Qing 
dynasty eventually sued for peace in the summer of 1842.119 
The Opium War has traditionally been portrayed by post-war historians as a clash 
between ancient and modern civilizations. This interpretation is most prominently 
associated with the renowned China historian John K. Fairbank, who depicted the Qing 
dynasty as a moribund power and the Chinese system of international relations as 
anachronistic in comparison to its more sophisticated British counterpart.120 More 
recently, post-revisionists such as James Hevia have criticised this assessment for 
underestimating the complexity of the Chinese tributary system, which granted each 
emperor the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ to rule the world as a living god. As all other countries 
were considered inferior in this system of diplomatic practice, their rulers had to pay 
tribute to the ‘Son of Heaven’. According to Hevia, it was impossible for the Qing 
emperor to accept Western diplomatic conventions and practices because they 
automatically assumed equivalence in status between sovereigns. This made it inevitable 
that Britain would have to fight a war to destroy the Chinese tributary system if it wanted 
to establish regional supremacy in East Asia. Hevia therefore framed the Opium War as 
an ideological conflict, putting forward a theory of imperial rivalry that depicted the 
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47 
British and Chinese systems of international relations as fundamentally incompatible due 
to their inherently coercive characteristics.121 
It is certainly tempting to perceive an underlying impulse for imperial aggrandisement in 
the fundamental changes that Britain introduced to Chinese society after the Opium War. 
On 29 August 1842, Britain forced the Qing emperor to sign the first ‘unequal treaty’, the 
Treaty of Nanking [Nanjing]. This consigned the Canton system to history by opening 
five cities on the Chinese seaboard where British merchants could reside and trade freely. 
It established a low fixed tariff on imports and exports, granted Britain the right to open 
consulates in the new ports, and ceded Hong Kong to Britain in perpetuity. The Qing 
dynasty lost further rights in the supplementary Treaty of the Bogue signed the following 
year, which granted British subjects within the new ports extraterritorial protection from 
Chinese laws, as well as giving Britain ‘most favoured nation’ status. Other Western 
powers with significant trading interests in China wasted no time in securing similar 
trading rights. In 1844, the United States negotiated a more extensive agreement known 
as the Treaty of Wanghia [Wangxia]. The French Treaty of Whampoa [Huangpu], signed 
later the same year, replicated the terms of the American pact but also made France the 
official protector of Catholics in China by forcing the Qing emperor to rescind 
longstanding edicts against Catholic missionaries and grant full toleration to the practice 
of Catholicism. Critically, the ‘most favoured nation’ clause in the Treaty of Tianjin 
meant that the additional rights conferred by these treaties automatically applied to Britain 
as well. Collectively, these treaties formed the ‘treaty-port system’: a mechanism of 
international trade and informal empire that persisted in China for a century.122 
There can be no disputing the imperialist characteristics of the ‘unequal treaties’, to say 
nothing of the manner in which they were imposed. Yet there has been no evidence that 
they were part of a pre-meditated British plot to establish imperial supremacy over China. 
If any ideology played a role in the creation of the treaty-port system, it was free trade, 
not imperial rivalry as Hevia suggested. By the time of the Opium War, support was 
growing in Britain for the liberalisation of economic policy at home and the removal of 
barriers to commerce abroad. Prominent political proponents of this liberal doctrine such 
                                                
121 James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney 
Embassy of 1793, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). For a more detailed overview 
of this debate, see Scott Gilfillan, ‘Extraterritoriality and the British Consular Court 
System in Japan’, Journal on European History of Law, Vol.6, No.1 (2015), pp.59-60. 
122 Spence, op.cit., pp.158-61. 
 
 
48 
as Lord Palmerston, who was Foreign Secretary in Lord Melbourne’s Whig government 
at the time, believed that such measures would facilitate the global capitalist operations 
of Britain’s newly industrialised economy across its empire and beyond. By contrast, they 
saw the national market protection and monopolism characterised by the Canton system 
in China as ‘the expression of an unacceptable civilisation deficit’.123 For Palmerston, the 
confiscation and destruction of British opium by the Qing authorities in 1839 was final 
confirmation that the Chinese system of commerce was fundamentally incompatible with 
the principle of free trade. As David Brown has pointed out, in backing an aggressive 
policy against China, Palmerston’s primary motive was to protect this principle, whether 
it related to trade in opium or anything else.124 Certainly, the belligerent measures that 
the ‘gunboat diplomat’ advocated in China were quintessential examples of what the 
historians Gallagher and Robinson termed the ‘imperialism of free trade’.125 Nonetheless, 
it is important to stress that Palmerston and his acolytes did not see these measures at the 
time as part of an inevitable showdown between the British and Chinese empires, but as 
the necessary means to protect, maintain, and, if possible, extend free trade in China in 
line with their liberal inclinations. 
The international nature of the treaty-port system also raises difficult questions about 
Hevia’s theory of imperial rivalry. If the Opium War was really all about British imperial 
aggrandisement, then why were France and the United States able to share equally in the 
spoils of victory – especially when Britain alone had made the sacrifices necessary to 
force the Qing to abandon the Canton system? The most obvious explanation is that the 
ideology of free trade, by definition, advocated equal treatment for all and the absence of 
commercial monopolies. Yet Britain’s ideological commitment to the dissemination of 
free trade only partly explains why other trading nations were allowed to establish a 
commercial foothold in China. Regional geopolitics were also critically important, for the 
Opium War took place at a time when several Western maritime powers were already 
well established in China and had developed considerable trade interests there. In other 
words, even had Britain wanted to incorporate China into its formal empire it would have 
probably been impossible by the 1840s. China was too large and coherent a political unit, 
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too distant from the source of British naval power, and, most importantly, too lucrative a 
commercial prospect for other Western nations for Britain to be allowed a free rein. 
It is also worth remembering that formal empire was also a notoriously expensive pursuit. 
By comparison, free trade was a much cheaper and more efficient means for accessing 
new and profitable markets, especially given the relative superiority of Britain’s maritime 
trading network compared to those of its commercial rivals. Put simply, the treaty-port 
system was not only the means by which Britain introduced free trade to China, but also 
the method by which it overcame the geopolitical challenge posed by other Western 
nations in the region. By allowing these countries to join an international system of 
commercial treaties, Britain gave each one a stake in its success and a vested interest in 
its defence. It also bound them into a unitary framework of diplomatic relations that 
reduced the ability of the Qing authorities to play one foreign power off against another, 
even though Britain retained the power and influence to shape the rules of this framework 
to suit its own interests. In short, the treaty-port system guaranteed the long-term 
protection of free trade in China and the preservation of British commercial superiority 
there. 
Of course, the treaty-port system was beneficial to the other Western trading nations that 
operated within it as well. It not only enabled them to establish a secure commercial base 
at minimal cost and sacrifice, but also provided them with a platform to propagate their 
own religious and social values in China for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the United 
States and France took great pains to ensure that their respective treaties with the Qing 
dynasty guaranteed religious freedom and tolerance for their missionaries in the treaty 
ports. In addition, the treaty-port system helped to shift the balance of power in East Asia 
to a more equitable position. Compared to the Royal Navy, there were far fewer American 
and French gunboats stationed in Chinese waters. Yet the ‘unequal treaties’ significantly 
reduced this resource gap by giving the United States and France equal diplomatic status 
in China and an equal say in the management of the treaty ports. In theory at least, the 
treaty-port system boosted their diplomatic prestige in East Asia far beyond what their 
military means would otherwise warrant. 
Despite its obvious improvements compared to the Canton system, the new arrangement 
was not as commercially successful as expected. The continued hostility of the Chinese 
population towards foreigners and sustained Qing resistance to the opium trade continued 
to cause problems, while a lower than anticipated demand for Western products also 
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hampered commercial growth. The British government gradually realised that revision of 
the treaties was the only way to secure wider access to Chinese markets and the 
legalisation of the opium trade. In 1854, therefore, the British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Clarendon applied Britain’s ‘most favoured nation’ clause to the 1844 American treaty 
(which contained a provision for treaty negotiation after twelve years). Under this dubious 
premise, Clarendon instructed the British authorities in China to request immediate treaty 
revision with the Qing government.126 All British attempts at renegotiation over the next 
two years failed, however, as Qing officials proved adept at manipulating the legal 
framework of the treaty-port system, first by declaring it too early to revise the American 
or French treaties and then by rejecting Britain’s right to negotiate a new treaty at all.127 
Unfortunately for the Chinese, Lord Palmerston, who became Prime Minister in 1855, 
refused to accept the status quo. In September 1856, he sent a dispatch to the French 
government proposing a joint naval expedition to demonstrate their determination to 
renegotiate the treaties with the Qing emperor.128  
Discussions over this expedition were already underway when news arrived from Canton 
in early December that forced Palmerston’s hand. According to Harry Parkes, the British 
consul in Canton, Qing officials had boarded and illegally searched a Chinese ship, the 
Arrow, which was ostensibly under British protection. When the incident became public 
knowledge in early 1857, Palmerston argued in Parliament that a vigorous response was 
necessary to secure British interests in the region and protect free trade. A majority of the 
House of Commons disagreed, however, and Palmerston’s government was defeated on 
a censure motion on 3 March 1857 over its support for the bombardment of Canton. At 
the general election that followed, Palmerston fought a populist campaign focused on a 
commitment to defend Britain’s commercial rights and the security of its nationals 
abroad. This helped win him a comprehensive victory over the demoralised Tories in 
April, giving his government a clear mandate to seek reparations from China for the 
Arrow affair and immediate treaty revision. Palmerston appointed one of his supporters, 
the Earl of Elgin, as ambassador-extraordinary to China, and entrusted him with 
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plenipotentiary powers, a significant military force, and instructions to negotiate treaty 
revision with the Qing emperor or his representatives at Beijing.129 
The Arrow affair hardly merited such a vigorous response, not least because, as 
Palmerston’s opponents pointed out during the parliamentary debates, the aggressive 
reaction of the British authorities in Canton had been legally, morally, and politically 
questionable.130 Yet Palmerston was willing to stake his political career on this issue 
anyway because the Arrow affair provided the pretext, however weak, for the dispatch of 
a naval expedition that he had considered necessary long before overt hostilities erupted 
at Canton. The key factor shaping this policy was the treaty-port system, which risked 
collapse if the staunch opposition of the Qing emperor to treaty renegotiation continued. 
A unilateral expedition would be morally indefensible, however, as it would suggest that 
Britain desired to monopolise the China trade.131 It would also be questionable from a 
legal standpoint, since Britain’s treaty with China contained no clause for revision. 
Palmerston’s proposal was thus an example of treaty-port diplomacy at work: collective 
diplomacy to compel the Chinese government to negotiate better commercial terms in 
lieu of expensive and morally ambiguous unilateral measures. The cooperation of either 
or both the French or the American governments in this undertaking was critical, because 
only their treaties included clauses for revision in 1856. This was therefore an attempt to 
bring the collective moral and material force of the treaty powers to bear on the Qing 
emperor as far as possible without recourse to overt military action. If the emperor 
continued to refuse to negotiate, however, coercive measures could then be justified as 
being in the interest of all. 
Unfortunately for Palmerston, the Arrow affair had made the U.S. government suspicious 
about British motives. Washington therefore rejected Palmerston’s proposal in April 1857 
on the basis that it wanted to avoid war with China.132 By contrast, the French government 
was very supportive of the British plan and appointed Baron Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros to 
act as joint commander of the Anglo-French force with Elgin. Although French 
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participation was partly motivated by a desire to secure reparation for the brutal execution 
of a French missionary, Father Auguste Chapdelaine, in February 1856, this was by no 
means the most important factor in Napoléon III’s decision to take part.133 Indeed, the 
French government had tolerated the death of missionaries in China and Korea many 
times before without dispatching a military force to the region.134 In fact, just as 
Palmerston had used the Arrow affair to whip up public support for his China policy, the 
Chapdelaine incident was merely a pretext to justify French participation in an expedition 
that had many potential benefits for France. After all, Britain would make the greatest 
military commitment, but France would secure equal commercial advantages, monetary 
indemnities for any military losses, and guaranteed recompense for the execution of its 
missionary. Collective action was also the most effective means by which the French 
government could secure a better commercial treaty with China, as the diplomatic 
equivalency provided by the treaty-port system would give Gros far greater influence 
over the joint negotiations than if he was acting alone. The emperor also wanted to 
reassure the French community in China, which was worried about threats to trade and 
security at the treaty ports, that it would be protected.135  
The decision to ally militarily with Britain in China reveals much about how Napoléon 
III viewed the treaty-port system and France’s role within it. For the proud emperor, 
participation in the joint expedition was first and foremost a matter of national prestige. 
As a treaty power, France theoretically enjoyed equal political status to Britain in China. 
Given the relatively insignificant French military and economic presence in the country, 
however, it is hard to envisage that the Qing emperor perceived France as a country of 
equal standing to Britain. If Napoléon III was to fulfil his ambition to re-establish France 
as a European great power, he could not afford to remain aloof during a crisis that 
threatened French national and economic interests, however limited. Nor could he allow 
Elgin free rein to dictate treaty renegotiation to London’s exclusive advantage.136 As 
Pierre Milza has pointed out, the main reason why Napoléon III dispatched naval forces 
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to China was therefore to ensure that ‘the British were not left as the sole masters of the 
game’.137 
In the end, the joint expedition proved a great success. In December 1857, the Anglo-
French fleet blockaded and seized the port of Canton, before proceeding the following 
spring to the mouth of the Peiho River near the port city of Tianjin. When the allied forces 
anchored at Tianjin and threatened to advance towards Beijing, the Qing emperor finally 
capitulated. The British Treaty of Tientsin [Tianjin], signed on 26 June 1858, was 
comprehensive. It secured residence rights for a British minister in Beijing, opened ten 
new treaty ports, guaranteed free navigation of the Yangtze River, freedom of travel 
within the Chinese interior with valid passports, protection for the open preaching of 
Christianity, and pecuniary indemnities for the British government and its merchants.138 
The French treaty was almost identical but for the inclusion of separate articles securing 
redress for the execution of Father Chapdelaine.139 The American minister, who had 
hoped to profit from acting as a neutral mediator between the conflicting parties, was 
presumably satisfied with a treaty that guaranteed his country the same commercial 
advantages as Britain and France.140 The Russian plenipotentiary Evfimii Putiatin 
achieved even greater success, using intrigue and subversion to secure a treaty that, in 
addition to the same commercial privileges granted to the others, ceded huge swathes of 
Siberia to Russia.141 
For the second time in just over a decade, a British-led military conflict had facilitated 
the imposition and extension of significant and lasting commercial, political, and societal 
change in China. By creating a group of international trading enclaves within Qing 
territory but free from its interference and shielded from its laws, the 1858 treaty 
settlement effectively bypassed the sovereignty of the Qing emperor in the Chinese ports 
still under his direct control.142 Clearly the treaty-port system was not a mechanism by 
which one imperial power sought to annex Qing territory and subject it to formal colonial 
rule, but a more sophisticated form of informal imperialism that created ‘enclave empires’ 
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at the new treaty ports – conduits through which free trade, the principles of so-called 
international law, the diplomatic ideology of Enlightenment Europe, and Western legal, 
political, and religious institutions were introduced into an Eastern empire whose deep 
resistance to foreign intercourse could no longer be tolerated by the imperial powers of 
the West. Critically, the international character of these ‘enclave empires’ prevented any 
one treaty power from carving out individual colonies on the China coast. Instead, the 
treaty powers were each compelled to compete for commercial and political supremacy 
from within China’s existing borders. This confinement of traditional imperial rivalries 
to an international system of commercial treaties had seismic consequences for Western 
relations in East Asia for the rest of the nineteenth century. 
This was certainly the case in Japan, where a similar group of ‘enclave empires’ was 
created just a few weeks after the Treaty of Tianjin was signed. At first glance, this seems 
surprising. Why did the Tokugawa bakufu willingly accept a similar treaty settlement to 
that forced upon the Qing dynasty in military defeat? Were there any differences between 
the ‘unequal treaties’ signed by Japan in 1858 and those imposed upon the Qing earlier 
the same year? Did the treaty powers fight for control over the Japanese treaty-port system 
or accept British predominance there unconditionally? How did regional and global 
contexts impact upon the development of ‘enclave empires’ in Japan, and how did they 
affect treaty-power policy there? What role did diplomatic officials play in shaping these 
‘enclave empires’, and what contribution, if any, did other members of treaty-port society 
make to this process? To begin to answer these important questions, it is first necessary 
to examine why the treaty-port system was introduced to Japan in the first place. 
 
Japan ‘opens’ to the West 
Many historical studies of the modern history of Japan start with the entry of Commodore 
Matthew C. Perry’s squadron of four ‘black ships’ into Edo Bay on 2 July 1853. This 
narrative usually credits Perry’s 1854 Convention of Kanagawa as putting a definitive 
end to the centuries-old policy of self-imposed national ‘seclusion’ known as sakoku, or 
‘closed country’. Unfortunately, the neat conceptualisation of Japan as an empire 
hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world before the arrival of Perry is neither 
accurate nor helpful to understanding the transformation brought about by the 
introduction of the treaty-port system to Japan in 1858. It suggests, as Marius Jansen put 
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it, that ‘there were no foreigners and no foreign policy in Tokugawa Japan’.143 In fact, as 
with the Qing dynasty, the Tokugawa shogunate pursued a distinct foreign policy during 
the Edo period (1603-1868), albeit one focused on Asia rather than the West. Although 
the ideology of Japanese exceptionalism precluded the bakufu from ever joining the 
Chinese system of imperial tribute, Japan still maintained a commercial, cultural, and 
spiritual discourse with both China and Korea throughout this period.  
By contrast, Tokugawa efforts to restrict trade with European countries during the 
seventeenth century and therefore ‘close’ the country were mainly the result of hostility 
towards the diffusion of Christianity across Japan. This hostility was rooted in deeply 
entrenched suspicions about the role of foreign missionaries in Japan that pre-dated the 
establishment of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1600. Suspicions were so heightened by 
1614 that the first Tokugawa shogun, Ieyasu, decided to expel all missionaries from 
Japan, seeing their presence as a threat to his ambition of unifying the country. There was 
widespread persecution of native Christians during the rule of his grandson and successor 
Iemitsu, who also introduced restrictive edicts preventing interaction with European 
Christians such as barring Japanese from travelling overseas on pain of death and highly 
restrictive measures on foreign trade. Thereafter, the only remaining European traders in 
Japan were the Dutch, who were forced to reside on the isolated man-made island of 
Dejima in Nagasaki for over two hundred years, shielded from the wider Japanese 
community.144 
From the perspective of Western observers in the nineteenth century, Japan was closed to 
civilisation.145 A foreign policy that restricted all external contact with the West in order 
to suppress the internal diffusion of a foreign religion did not conform to the ‘law of 
nations’ that dictated international convention and diplomatic practice in Europe and the 
United States. As a result, both contemporary and more recent comparisons between 
Japan’s system of seclusion and the Westphalian system of international relations have 
tended to overstate its ‘isolation’ before 1853. When considered in its proper historical 
and regional context, it becomes clear that Tokugawa foreign policy, although restrictive 
and xenophobic, was by no means ‘backward’. The suppression of foreign intercourse 
and native Christians was instead deliberately designed to maintain Tokugawa control 
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over Japan’s feudatory domains, or han. Indeed, the inherent meaning of the shogun’s 
full title, seii taishōgun (barbarian-subduing generalissimo), made sakoku synonymous 
with Tokugawa power.146 Perry did not therefore ‘open’ Japan to civilisation in 1853, for 
it was already civilised in its own way. Instead, he began the process of imposing an 
entirely alien system of international relations that was devised to facilitate Western trade 
with Japan, rather than to preserve bakufu power in the country. 
Although the Perry Convention conferred international prestige on the United States as 
the first Western country to open relations with a notoriously secluded empire, this 
‘tentative pact’ only granted limited access to coaling stations and ports of refuge.147 
These concessions were important for the American trading vessels making the Pacific 
crossing to China from the western United States, but of little significance to British 
merchants in China. Indeed, the indifference of British merchants and officials alike 
towards Japan explains why it was an American naval commander rather than a British 
one who made the first attempt to open relations with Edo. Despite the British 
government’s commitment to the global extension of free trade, victory in the Opium War 
had not led to many calls in Britain for the extension of the treaty-port system to Japan. 
The prevailing belief among British merchants was that, compared to China’s potentially 
vast markets for Western merchandise, the opportunities for trade in Japan were 
negligible. For their part, British officials in China feared that forcing another 
‘uncivilised’ East Asian government to open to trade would incur great expense and lead 
to many of the same difficulties over local laws, customs, and commercial practices that 
they had encountered with the Qing.148 
With little real understanding of conditions within Japan, the Foreign Office finally 
approved secret plans for a Japanese commercial treaty in 1845. These plans, which were 
drafted by Sir John Davis, the British Superintendent of Trade at Hong Kong, drew 
heavily from his experiences in China on issues such as religious toleration, opium 
smuggling, and diplomatic representation. However, they were indefinitely postponed 
because Davis was unable to assemble the imposing naval force that he believed was 
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necessary to guarantee success. In any case, the British government remained indifferent 
towards Japan even after the U.S. government announced plans to dispatch an expedition 
there in 1852. Rather than challenging the Americans, the then British Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Malmesbury, was content to wait and see if Perry was successful before taking any 
further action. By the time that Lord Clarendon entered the Foreign Office in 1853, 
attention had shifted back to China, where the importance of securing treaty revision was 
becoming increasingly acute. Clarendon was therefore also happy to let the Americans 
take the lead in Japan if it made their cooperation in China more likely. He eventually 
issued new instructions regarding a future Japanese commercial treaty in February 1854 
at the instigation of the then Superintendent of Trade Sir John Bowring. However, the 
outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) in China and the Crimean War (1853-
1856) with Russia diverted Bowring’s attention and resources, and once again British 
plans for a commercial treaty with Japan were postponed.149  
In the end, the first Anglo-Japanese agreement of the nineteenth century was negotiated 
by Rear-Admiral Sir James Stirling, Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China 
Station, who arrived in Japan in September 1854 under the dubious pretext of seeking a 
Russian naval squadron thought to be sheltering in the area. The Stirling Convention, 
signed on 14 October 1854, opened two Japanese ports to British ships in need of repair 
and resupply, and granted ‘most favoured nation’ status for any future openings of ports. 
Yet as it omitted any mention of trade, the convention was heavily criticised by both 
Bowring and the British merchant community in China. Stirling found little support for 
his convention in the Foreign Office or the Board of Trade either, as both would have 
also preferred a commercial treaty. Tired by Stirling’s unhelpful meddling in diplomatic 
affairs, Clarendon informed the Admiralty in early 1856 that all further negotiations over 
opening Japan to trade would be conducted by Bowring. His plans were deferred again 
after fresh hostilities erupted in Canton towards the end of the year, and eventually 
postponed until after the resolution of the new war with China. The Sepoy Mutiny in 
India during the summer of 1857 subsumed British interests in East Asia altogether, as 
Lord Elgin’s expeditionary force, en route to China, was redirected to relieve the 
beleaguered British governor in Calcutta. Again, commercial and foreign policy priorities 
in China and the British Empire had delayed a British expedition to Japan.150 
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The French government’s indifference towards Japan during this period was perhaps even 
more pronounced, even though the French Catholic Church, upon whose support 
Napoléon III in part relied, was by this time actively advocating for the establishment of 
treaty relations with Edo. The Church had long resented the Tokugawa policy of seclusion 
and deep hostility to Christianity, which had proved so successful that no French 
missionary had penetrated the country since 1625. French missionaries from the 
influential Societé des Missions Étrangères de Paris, formed in 1663, had focused instead 
on other parts of East Asia. By the early nineteenth century, they had proliferated across 
Annam, China, Siam, and Vietnam, an achievement that was recognised by the Pope 
when he acknowledged France’s primacy in East Asian missionary operations in 1839. 
However, Japan remained stubbornly inaccessible until 1844, when Admiral Cécille, 
commander of the large French naval squadron sent to East Asia in the aftermath of the 
Opium War, brought a priest from the Missions Étrangères to the Ryūkyū Islands (which 
vaguely acknowledged both Chinese and Japanese suzerainty). Cécille, who viewed 
missionary activities in East Asia as a means to advance French interests in the region, 
also intervened twice in nearby Vietnam in 1845 and 1847 to demand the release of 
imprisoned missionaries and freedom of worship for Catholics.151 
The inauguration of Napoléon III as emperor in 1852 led to a sea change in French official 
attitudes towards the Catholic Church. For the first time, the French government began 
to justify an increasingly interventionist and expansionist foreign policy in East Asia on 
the need to defend and protect the French missionary presence in the region. The 
emperor’s notoriously pious wife Eugenie, who often exhorted her husband to punish 
regimes in Asia that executed missionaries, provided a useful smokescreen in this respect. 
She was particularly animated by the continued persecution of Catholic missionaries in 
Vietnam, which Cécille’s armed interventions of the 1840s had failed to prevent. Matters 
came to a head when the Vietnamese court refused to respond to an official protest from 
Paris over the execution of Catholics in 1856. In June 1857, the emperor decided to use 
the opportunity provided by the Anglo-French expedition to China to force Vietnam to 
surrender one of its ports to France.152 In November 1857, instructions were issued to 
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Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, the commander of the French naval division in East Asia, 
to attack the south of Vietnam once operations in China had concluded.153 These naval 
forays demonstrated Napoléon III’s wider ambition to re-establish France as a global 
power that could compete on an equal footing with Britain. In his view, the persecution 
of Catholics justified the application of aggressive measures in parts of East Asia either 
not yet dominated by Britain, such as Vietnam, or where cooperation with Britain was 
necessary to further French interests, such as China. However, this pretext could never be 
applied in Japan due to the total absence of French missionaries there.154 
In general, the French government also had very little interest in establishing a trading 
relationship with Japan during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Unlike successive 
British governments, the French state had never been ideologically committed to the 
global extension of free trade, nor did this agenda particularly motivate French 
manufacturers. A French equivalent of the British East India Company had been founded 
as early as 1664, but this had made no use of its China trade monopoly whatsoever. The 
monopoly passed in 1719 to the Compagnie des Indes, which enjoyed greater, but still 
limited, commercial success until the right to trade opened up to private merchants during 
the French Revolution (1789-1799). By the first half of the nineteenth century, three or 
four French ships on average were visiting Canton each year. This was a significant 
increase from past numbers, but still meagre in comparison to the volume of British 
merchant shipping in China. When Napoléon III came to power he did at least institute 
economic reforms to promote international trade, but these took some time to bear fruit. 
In addition, most French merchants shared the view of their British counterparts that 
Japan offered limited commercial potential. In short, there was very little appetite within 
Second Empire France for opening Japan to commerce, except from perhaps the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works and a few isolated individuals.155 
Although increasingly interested in the commercial potential of the Ryūkyūs, French 
naval commanders in East Asia were also less adventurous when it came to opening Japan 
itself. Prior to the Perry Expedition, the only attempt to show the French flag at a Japanese 
port occurred in 1846, when Admiral Cécille visited Nagasaki on his own initiative 
following his failed attempt to open the Ryūkyū Islands to trade. Unsurprisingly, he was 
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treated with ‘customary incivility’ and left after two days.156 In contrast to Royal Navy 
commanders like Stirling, the signing of the Perry Convention did little to motivate 
French naval interest in Japan either. During a visit to Nagasaki in May 1855, Captain 
Tardy de Montravel was offered an identical convention to that signed by Stirling the 
year before, but he rejected it on the grounds that he lacked the necessary authority. As 
Richard Sims has pointed out, though Montravel was probably aware of the reception that 
both the Stirling and Perry conventions had received in Europe, his decision still 
displayed a lack of enterprise and interest in attempting to negotiate something better.157 
On the other hand, Montravel may have been content to leave diplomacy to the diplomats 
because he knew that the French Foreign Ministry had already issued orders to Alphonse 
de Bourboulon, the French minister plenipotentiary in China, to negotiate a commercial 
treaty with the Japanese. 
Even these instructions, which were issued by the Quai d’Orsay (the building that housed 
the French Foreign Ministry) in March 1854, did not really indicate a change in French 
attitudes towards Japan. After all, they were only drawn up after Lord Clarendon had 
deliberately shared his orders to Bowring of February 1854 with the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys. Drouyn was therefore merely following the 
British lead when he dispatched similar instructions to Bourboulon a month later, 
although they differed slightly from Clarendon’s by asking Bourboulon to do all he could 
to secure permission for French missionaries to preach openly in Japan.158 When the 
mistaken news arrived in the summer of 1854 that Perry had agreed a commercial treaty 
with the bakufu, Clarendon asked the British Ambassador to France, Lord Cowley, to 
speak with Drouyn about the possibility of sending a joint mission to negotiate a similar 
agreement. As well as guaranteeing success, Clarendon believed that this would ‘afford 
an additional proof of the strict union and friendship which subsist between the 
Governments of England and France, and of their readiness to cooperate with each other 
for the attainment of any object of common interest’.159 
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Despite Clarendon’s hopes that Anglo-French cooperation over treaty revision in China 
would extend to Japan, Bourboulon rejected the idea of negotiating a treaty in concert 
with his British colleague. A strong advocate of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, he was concerned 
that joint action would highlight France’s relative naval weakness, cause confusion over 
precedence, and associate France with Britain in the minds of the suspicious Japanese. 
He was also deeply preoccupied with efforts to secure treaty revision in China, and there 
were no French ships available to convey him to Japan anyway. Convinced that concerted 
action was unbefitting of France’s status, he secured assurances from the Quai d’Orsay 
that ‘mutual support’ did not mean simultaneous action. The outbreak of the Crimean 
War hindered Bourboulon’s ability to plan an independent expedition in any case, just as 
it did for Bowring. Meanwhile, news arrived in Paris that Perry and Stirling had failed to 
secure any worthwhile commercial privileges from the Japanese despite the significant 
naval forces at their backs. Given all this uncertainty, the Foreign Ministry refused to 
make any new arrangements for a commercial treaty with Japan until the British 
government made its future intentions clear.160 
The British and French indifference towards the opening of commercial relations with 
Japan was not shared by the other Western maritime powers. Unlike in China, where 
Britain’s commercial and geopolitical rivals often followed in the Royal Navy’s wake, 
the American, Dutch, and Russian plenipotentiaries who sailed to Japan during the early 
to mid-1850s found themselves free to negotiate with the bakufu on their own terms. 
Despite this, they stuck assiduously to the treaty pattern established by the British in 
China by negotiating a series of intermediate pacts that introduced elements of the treaty-
port system without yet granting rights of free trade or foreign residence. The exception 
was the 1855 Russo-Japanese Treaty of Amity, or Treaty of Shimoda, which was 
negotiated by the Russian Vice-Admiral Evfimii Putiatin. Like Stirling, Putiatin had 
sufficient naval strength at his disposal to conduct a little ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of his own. 
As the only Western power to share a disputed border with Japan, Russia also had a 
unique territorial interest to resolve with the Japanese government. The treaty that Putiatin 
concluded therefore established the border between Russia and Japan as lying between 
the Kuril Islands of Etorofu and Urup. It also explicitly accorded mutual extraterritoriality 
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rights and the right for Russian citizens to engage in barter trade at the ports of Shimoda 
and Hakodate.161 
Unlike Putiatin, Jan Hendrik Donker Curtius, the Dutch Opperhoofden (chief factor) at 
Dejima in Nagasaki, had no naval forces to call upon. Instead, he raised the spectre of 
British imperialism to frighten the Japanese to the negotiating table. In 1856, when a visit 
by Bowring appeared imminent, he warned bakufu officials that, after China, Japan would 
be the next target for British imperial expansion unless the seclusion policy was relaxed. 
To avoid this outcome and demonstrate Japan’s willingness to cooperate with the West, 
he pressed the bakufu to negotiate a new commercial agreement with Holland before the 
British arrived. Reports of the fresh hostilities at Canton in early 1857 added to the sense 
of urgency among bakufu officials, as did the reappearance of Putiatin at Nagasaki in 
September. Fearful that the Russian would demand an entirely new commercial treaty, 
officials at Nagasaki signed a supplementary treaty with Donker Curtius on 16 October 
that relaxed limitations and controls over trade at Nagasaki. The 1857 Dutch 
Supplementary Treaty and the similar agreement made with Putiatin a week later 
represented the maximum that the bakufu was willing to concede. Unfortunately, as these 
treaties did not grant rights of free trade or residence, they were unlikely to placate the 
mercantilist aspirations of the Western trading powers for very long.162 
In the end, the application of some novel ‘gunboat diplomacy’ by an American diplomat 
eventually broke down Japan’s barriers to free trade. Townsend Harris was appointed 
American consul to the port of Shimoda under the (disputed) terms of the Perry 
Convention. He arrived in Japan during the summer of 1856 with orders from Washington 
to negotiate a full commercial agreement. As the first Western diplomat to reside within 
a short journey of the shogun’s capital at Edo for hundreds of years, Harris had a unique 
opportunity to dictate the terms of Japan’s new treaty relationship with the West, thereby 
solidifying his country’s influential position in Japan and assuring his own legacy for 
posterity. Time was of the essence, however, since success depended upon the absence 
of other plenipotentiaries, especially Bowring. Harris knew that his British colleague 
intended to visit Edo to negotiate a treaty as soon as possible, having met him in Hong 
Kong en route to his new post. The pair had continued to correspond after Harris reached 
Japan, so he probably had a decent idea of what Bowring planned for his own negotiations 
                                                
161 Auslin, op.cit., p.26-7. 
162 Beasley, Select Documents, op.cit., pp.27-30 & pp.128-30. 
 
 
63 
with the Japanese.163 Not long afterwards, however, Bowring was relieved of the 
responsibility of negotiating with the Japanese government due to the arrival of Lord 
Elgin’s expedition in China. Nonetheless, Harris knew that there was only a small 
window of opportunity in which to convince the bakufu to sign a commercial treaty before 
the inevitable arrival of a British plenipotentiary.164  
Fortunately for the U.S. government, Harris understood how treaty-port diplomacy in 
East Asia worked. After all, he had already negotiated a new trade agreement between 
the United States and Siam on his way to Japan in May 1856, albeit one that mirrored the 
terms of a commercial treaty that Bowring had already negotiated for Britain a year 
earlier. The strategically located kingdom of Siam had assumed greater regional 
importance for the British following their annexation of large parts of Burma at the end 
of the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1853. It was not long afterwards that the Foreign 
Office deemed the commercial pact made between Britain and the Siamese king in 1826 
as insufficient to protect British interests.165 The instructions that Clarendon sent in 1854 
therefore required Bowring to negotiate a new treaty with Siam as well as to find a 
convenient time to open commercial relations with Japan (and Cochinchina).166 Clearly, 
Bowring considered the former to be the priority, for he postponed his plans to go to 
Japan in favour of travelling to Bangkok to negotiate the eponymous Bowring Treaty. 
Signed on 18 April 1855, it replicated the treaty-port structure in China in many respects 
by opening all domestic ports to British merchants, permitting free trade throughout the 
kingdom, granting the right of permanent residence in Bangkok (within a stated limit), 
and placing British subjects under consular jurisdiction. In addition, Britain assumed de-
facto control over shipping and the import-export trade. Just over a year later, after much 
tiresome negotiation, Harris concluded a commercial agreement between the United 
States and Siam on very similar terms.167 This exhausting and bitter experience left the 
American convinced that ‘the proper way to negotiate with the Siamese is to send two or 
three men-of-war’.168 
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He viewed the Japanese in much the same way, writing in his journal that ‘no negotiations 
could be carried on with [the Japanese] unless the plenipotentiary was backed by a fleet, 
and offered them cannon balls for arguments’.169 With that option unavailable, Harris 
decided to threaten the Japanese with British and French gunboats instead. In a December 
1857 meeting with the chief bakufu negotiator, he suggested that Britain might seek to 
occupy Japan’s northern island of Yezo as part of its ongoing imperial rivalry with Russia. 
He then warned that Britain would declare war on Japan if it refused to open its doors, 
and stressed the likelihood that Britain would insist upon the free trade of opium at 
Japanese ports. Having deliberately depicted both Britain and France as imperial 
aggressors who had designs on Formosa and Korea respectively. By contrast, he 
portrayed the United States as a friendly power, uninterested in imperial aggrandisement 
in East Asia and willing explicitly to prohibit the opium trade in its commercial treaty 
with Japan. It was in Japan’s best interests, he argued, to set a precedent in its treaty 
relations with the West by negotiating such an agreement with the United States. If it did 
so, he promised he would be able to reduce the number of British and French ships that 
would visit the country from fifty to two or three!170 These warnings stoked deep-rooted 
fears among the Japanese that British imperialist expansion threatened its future 
sovereignty. Although the bakufu negotiators were deeply reluctant to concede any 
further commercial privileges, they finally agreed a draft commercial treaty with Harris 
in February 1858. On the cusp of a great diplomatic success, Harris soon grew frustrated 
by Edo’s continued indecision over whether to sign his treaty. Meanwhile, events in 
China threatened to undermine all his hard work.  
Harris had greatly exaggerated the prospect of a British imperial conquest of Yezo, but 
he was right to warn that Britain and France intended to base negotiations in Japan on the 
terms of their revised treaties with the Qing dynasty. The instructions issued to Lord Elgin 
prior to his departure from England in April 1857 demonstrated the extent to which 
British objectives in China continued to shape policy towards Japan. Elgin was instructed 
to proceed to Edo only once treaty revision in China was complete, and then to negotiate 
a commercial treaty there on terms ‘at least as favourable’ as those obtained in China 
(although the use of military force was proscribed).171 The orders issued by the French 
government to Baron Gros in May 1867 mirrored Elgin’s in almost every respect, and he 
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was even provided with a copy of the British envoy’s instructions for reference. Gros was 
explicitly instructed to liaise with Elgin before proceeding to Japan, to act in concert with 
him to negotiate a treaty there, and to use the Chinese treaties as a guide for what both 
the British and the French governments expected them to achieve.172  
Interestingly, Gros was not instructed to demand the right for French missionaries to 
proselytise within Japan. The section relating to missionaries in Gros’s instructions was 
crossed out because, as a note in the margin explained, it would be dangerous to raise the 
question. According to Richard Sims, the decision not to raise this issue was the direct 
result of a recommendation by an anti-clerical French merchant named Charles Deprat 
who had lived in Nagasaki for four years. It was clearly made without any consultation 
with the Missions Étrangères, which demonstrated the limited extent to which the French 
government was willing to prioritise religious affairs in Japan.173 Given that British and 
French desires for a commercial treaty with the Japanese were in all other respects 
identical, the Quai d’Orsay probably accepted that pressing religious issues would not 
only upset the Japanese but also risk a rift with the British. The Americans obviously did 
not consider this much of priority either, since Harris’s draft treaty made no mention of 
missionaries and only included provision for the free exercise of religion and erection of 
places of worship.174 
As previously mentioned, the progress of the Anglo-French expedition in China was 
critical to Harris’s chances of securing his own commercial treaty with Japan first. Unless 
he could convince the Japanese to sign a treaty before Elgin and Gros arrived on their 
shores, it was highly likely that the revised treaties with the Qing dynasty, which 
demanded extensive access to the Chinese interior and the legalisation of the opium trade, 
would form the basis for British and French negotiations in Japan. The departure of the 
allied force to the mouth of the Peiho River in April 1858 signalled that his time was 
beginning to run out. When news arrived three months later that treaty revision had been 
concluded at Tianjin, Harris frantically informed the bakufu negotiators of the punitive 
terms imposed upon the Qing dynasty and urged them to sign the draft treaty at once.175 
This last-minute warning about the consequences of further prevarication proved 
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sufficient. On 29 July 1858, Edo finally gave way and signed the Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce between the United States and Japan.176  
Despite stressing the anti-imperial credentials of the United States during his negotiations 
with the bakufu, the Harris Treaty bore almost all the hallmarks of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
in China. It opened the ports of Hakodate, Nagasaki, and Kanagawa to American trade 
and residence from 4 July 1859, with Niigata or another port on the Japan Sea to follow 
on 1 January 1860 and Hyōgo from January 1863. Foreigners were also granted residence 
in Edo from 1 January 1862 and in Osaka from 1 January 1863. It granted the United 
States diplomatic and consular representation in Edo and the open ports, as well as 
freedom of travel throughout Japan to the highest ranking diplomatic representative. It 
also included extraterritorial protection under consular jurisdiction, freedom of worship 
for American citizens, and included a clause for treaty revision after 4 July 1872. 
Significantly, the treaty expressly prohibited the importation of opium, as Harris had 
promised.177  
Lord Elgin reached Edo in the middle of August, where he found Putiatin and Curtius 
already waiting. Just as Harris had anticipated, it soon became apparent that the British 
envoy would accept the American treaty as a fait accompli. Elgin, who had travelled 
aboard a solitary ship rather than at the head of a substantial fleet, was eager to return to 
China as soon as possible. He was also reluctant to enter into tedious negotiations with 
the Japanese when a commercial treaty already existed that, though neither as detailed 
nor as generous as the Treaty of Tianjin, provided an adequate foundation for future 
commercial relations. Following a short period of negotiation, during which the Dutch 
and Russian plenipotentiaries also concluded agreements on 18 and 19 August 
respectively, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed on 26 
August 1858. The British agreement mirrored the Harris Treaty in almost every respect, 
except that it placed the responsibility for preventing opium smuggling firmly in the 
hands of the Japanese authorities. Elgin also made sure to include the ‘most favoured 
nation’ clause that Harris had so inexplicably omitted from the American treaty.178 
Baron Gros was absent from these negotiations, despite his orders to act in concert with 
Elgin in Japan. Whilst the latter had decided to sail for Edo Bay almost immediately after 
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the conclusion of treaty revision in China, Admiral de Genouilly was adamant that his 
mission to punish Vietnam for the persecution of Catholics should take precedence over 
Gros’s diplomatic excursion to Japan. The admiral duly took a squadron of 14 ships and 
3,000 men to the Indo-China coast, leaving Gros marooned in China with a paltry force 
of three vessels. Instead of travelling with Elgin, therefore, who Gros thought was only 
going to Japan to make a preliminary reconnaissance, the French envoy chose to remain 
in China until his British colleague returned. He was still waiting on 1 September, when 
de Genouilly launched a successful invasion of the Vietnamese city of Tourane in the first 
phase of France’s conquest of Indo-China.179 Elgin returned to China the following day 
with a treaty in hand, leaving Gros to proceed with his meagre force to Japan alone. His 
reception was noticeably cooler than that afforded to Elgin, which Gros blamed on his 
miserable fleet and the lack of any lavish gifts to present to the shogun.180 Nonetheless, 
after five relatively straightforward negotiating sessions, Gros concluded the Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce between France and Japan on 9 October. Although it largely 
mirrored the other treaties, Gros was unable to secure a reduction in wine duty from the 
luxury tariff of 35 per cent to a more amenable 20 per cent. This compared unfavourably 
with Elgin’s success in reducing duties on cotton and woollen fabrics to 5 per cent. On 
religion, the Japanese would not budge from the provisions made in the Harris Treaty and 
refused to consider any rights of propagation whatsoever. Whether the Frenchman could 
have secured better concessions had he negotiated in concert with his British colleague is 
a matter for debate, but in any case Gros departed Japan pleased with his work.181  
 
The ‘unequal treaties’: a template for all Asia 
At a stroke, the five Ansei Treaties (named after their Japanese era name) signed by the 
bakufu in the summer and autumn of 1858 had conceded the same sovereign rights to 
Western states that the Qing dynasty had fought for almost two decades to retain. Japan’s 
system of seclusion, which was every bit as incompatible with the principles and 
protocols of Western treaty diplomacy as China’s system of imperial tribute, had finally 
collapsed. It is telling that this did not happen until the long-term future of British trade 
had been secured in China, even though the Foreign Office first issued instructions for a 
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commercial treaty with Japan as early as 1845. Despite the British government’s 
commitment to extend free trade across East Asia, it clearly did not consider trade 
relations with this notoriously secluded empire as a priority after the Opium War. There 
was little enthusiasm for such a project among British officials in China either, who were 
conscious of the difficulty and expense of attempting to open a country that many 
believed lacked commercial potential.  
The protection of British interests in China continued to demand attention and resources 
in the years after the Opium War, as British officials grappled with Qing intransigence, 
the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion, and a growing rivalry with Russia in East Asia. 
Given these more pressing matters, it was enough for Lord Clarendon to reinforce 
Britain’s commitment to the extension of free trade in East Asia by instructing Bowring 
to open commercial relations with Japan, Siam and Cochinchina whenever convenient. 
In this context, the Foreign Secretary viewed the dispatch of the Perry Expedition to Japan 
as a welcome experiment to profit from at a later date. Though his ‘wait and see’ approach 
allowed the United States and other Western powers to take the lead in opening relations 
with Japan, British officials in China carefully monitored the outcome of these 
negotiations to ensure that their rivals were seeking nothing more than the extension of 
the China treaty pattern to Japan. With the exception of Putiatin’s 1855 agreement, which 
also included clauses relating to the delineation of the Russo-Japanese border, the series 
of pacts agreed between 1854 and 1857 followed this pattern closely. Before Bowring 
had a chance to improve upon them, however, the outbreak of a new war in China ensured 
that a commercial treaty with Japan remained low on the list of priorities until treaty 
revision with the Qing dynasty was settled. 
France was even less interested in opening relations with Japan during this period. Trade 
with Japan was of limited interest either to French merchants or to the French 
government, while most French naval commanders were more concerned with pursuing 
military glory in other parts of East Asia than engaging in painstaking negotiations with 
the stubborn Japanese. The Quai d’Orsay’s passive attitude was reflected by the fact that 
it only issued instructions for a commercial treaty with Japan upon Clarendon’s 
recommendation, and by its willingness to conduct negotiations in Japan in concert with 
Britain until Bourboulon demanded the freedom to act alone. Drouyn’s terms for a treaty 
with Japan also matched Clarendon’s in almost every respect, and even his attempt to 
secure the right for French missionaries to proselytise freely in Japan was later abandoned 
in the name of political expediency. For Napoléon III, the persecution of Catholics 
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elsewhere in East Asia remained a higher priority throughout the 1850s than extending 
their right to spread the faith in Japan. 
If the French government had no religious, commercial, or strategic interest in Japan then 
why did the Quai d’Orsay desire a commercial treaty with Japan at all? This decision was 
shaped in large part by the importance that Napoléon III placed on France’s status as a 
European great power. The restoration of French prestige in Europe had consumed 
successive French regimes since Napoléon Bonaparte’s humiliating defeat at Waterloo in 
1815, but for obvious reasons it was particularly important to his nephew. The advent of 
the Second Empire therefore accelerated a militant approach towards East Asia that had 
already resulted in the dispatch of significant naval forces to the region during the 
1840s.182 By associating France with the British expedition to China and dispatching a 
large naval fleet to Vietnam thereafter, the emperor was sending a message that he would 
not allow the British a free rein in East Asia. The negotiation of a commercial treaty with 
Japan was an extension of this policy, as the instructions issued to Gros in 1857 made 
clear:  
The Emperor’s government has been for a long time convinced that France cannot 
continue to remain in the rear of those nations who have already been looking to 
assure for their trade access to a rich and populous country and that the moment 
has come to put itself in this respect on an equal footing with the Powers who 
have already gone ahead on this path’.183  
French motives in Japan and across East Asia were therefore significantly different to 
those of Britain. It was not commercial or ideological impulses relating to free trade that 
led France to play a leading role in the extension of the East Asian treaty-port system in 
China and Japan, but Napoléon III’s desire for the treaty powers – Britain in particular – 
to respect France as a great power of the first rank. As the leader of a nation that had long 
considered itself to be the champion of European culture and civilisation, the emperor 
also felt a responsibility to demonstrate to uninitiated East Asian nations the difference 
between Anglo-American mercantilism and the cultural, economic, and moral values of 
the French Enlightenment.184 These pretensions of a ‘civilising mission’ were of no great 
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concern to the British government, as long as French activity did not hinder the extension 
of free trade or undermine Britain’s dominant position in the region. 
While Britain and France focused on treaty revision in China, other Western powers took 
the lead in attempting to establish trade relations with Japan. Despite several efforts to 
negotiate a commercial treaty, however, the United States, Russia, and the Netherlands 
only managed to secure limited trading privileges between 1854 and 1857. Indeed, it was 
no coincidence that the bakufu only agreed to drop its seclusion policy once and for all 
when the theoretical threat posed by the Anglo-French fleet became a reality in late July 
1858. Fundamentally, the bakufu signed the first ‘unequal treaty’ with Harris when it did 
because the highly punitive terms imposed upon the Qing dynasty by Britain and France 
demonstrated the futility of military resistance to their demands for trade.185 British and 
French foreign and commercial policy priorities in China therefore delayed Japan’s entry 
into the treaty-port system until the summer of 1858, sixteen years after its imposition in 
China. There was no reason to expect that these priorities, which included threats to the 
China trade, geopolitical and commercial rivalries in East Asia, crises in Europe, and 
upheaval in the British and French empires, would not continue to take precedence over 
Japanese affairs in the years to come. 
Regional and global contexts not only played a pivotal role in determining when the 
treaty-port system was established in Japan, but also shaped how the treaty powers 
interacted with each other within it. Whilst British leadership was often a fait accompli 
in China and other parts of East Asia, the near absence of British gunboats in Japanese 
waters during the early to mid-1850s sparked competition between the other Western 
powers to be the first to negotiate a commercial treaty with Japan. At the same time, the 
process of dealing with the notoriously cunning bakufu officials fostered a sense of 
collaboration between the Western plenipotentiaries. After all, as in China, they were all 
dealing with a hostile government that considered them equally ‘barbarous’. Moreover, 
the successive negotiations carried out by Perry, Putiatin, Stirling, Curtius, and Harris 
created the perception of concerted action even when none existed, putting the bakufu 
under huge pressure to agree to new treaty precedents. Collaboration and competition 
therefore defined treaty-power relations in Japan from the very beginning, as they had 
done in China. This duality was neither dictated by nor dependent upon the hegemonic 
presence of Britain alone, but part of the dynamic of Western informal imperialism in 
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East Asia. It was therefore likely to continue to dominate interactions between the 
Japanese treaty powers after the ports opened to trade. 
If treaty-power relations in Japan imitated those in China, what can be said of treaty-port 
diplomacy? In their initial forays into Japanese waters, Commodore Perry and Vice 
Admiral Putiatin followed the same model of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ adopted by Western 
diplomats and naval commanders across East Asia during the mid-nineteenth century. As 
in China, there was no question of negotiating with the Japanese government on terms of 
diplomatic equivalence, as was commonplace in Europe. It was instead a question of 
compelling the bakufu to accept the terms demanded for a commercial treaty, if possible 
by peaceable means but if necessary by the threat of military force. This demonstrated 
how deeply the diplomatic practices of the Chinese treaty-port system had seeped into the 
collective consciousness of all Western diplomats in East Asia – even those who were 
self-confessed opponents of Western empire-building like Harris. ‘Gunboat diplomacy’ 
was therefore clearly not an exclusive feature of British and French diplomatic practice, 
but a fundamental characteristic of Western treaty-making during the mid-nineteenth 
century.  
There one crucial difference between the coercive techniques applied in China and Japan 
was that the latter’s relative geopolitical insignificance meant military action was rarely 
an immediate possibility. This fact reduced the potency of a threat that was already 
contingent on whether the Japanese really believed that foreign governments were willing 
to resort to force of arms in the first place. Thus, whilst Commodore Perry and Vice 
Admiral Putiatin used naval strength to secure concessions in the traditional way, Curtius 
and Harris were forced to adopt a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Their efforts to persuade 
the Japanese to make commercial concessions while simultaneously threatening them 
with theoretical British gunboats worked well at the time because they knew for certain 
that the British were on their way. But after the conclusion of the commercial treaties in 
1858 and the completion of treaty revision in China, the Anglo-French fleet departed from 
East Asia. Even Britain and France only retained a limited naval force in the region, and 
their fleets were often stationed in more strategically important ports elsewhere in China 
and Southeast Asia. Like Harris, the first British and French representatives in Japan – 
both ‘China hands’ schooled in traditional ‘gunboat diplomacy’ – would have to adapt 
their diplomatic methods to these isolated conditions after the treaties came into force. 
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Events in China were clearly critically important to the timing and the tenor in which 
Japan was opened to commerce, but in what way did Chinese contexts shape the structure 
of the treaty-port system established in Japan? For example, did Japan’s ‘unequal treaties’ 
mirror those imposed upon its near neighbour the same year? The historian Michael 
Auslin did not think so. He argued that the commercial treaty Siam negotiated with 
Britain in 1855 provided a more appropriate model for Japan’s treaties because it was the 
product of negotiation and not imposed after a humiliating military defeat. By choosing 
negotiation over military resistance, Auslin believed that Japan was able to avoid the 
punitive treaty settlement imposed upon China and ‘determine the treaty structure 
itself’.186  
This analysis suggests a sense of Japanese autonomy that simply did not exist. Of course, 
it was true that Japan’s ‘unequal treaties’ were less punitive than those signed by China 
in 1858. From the perspective of the Chinese, Siamese, or Japanese governments, there 
was certainly a significant psychological difference between the imposition of a ‘treaty 
of defeat’ on a beaten nation and a ‘negotiated treaty’ in which the threat of force, but not 
force itself, was used.187 Yet Harris’s ‘negotiated treaty’ was undeniably still the product 
of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ of the traditional imperialist type, albeit in modified form. The 
extent to which the bakufu could really use negotiation as a strategy to determine the 
treaty structure in any significant way is therefore highly debateable, and this is clear 
enough from the fact that the Foreign Office expressly ordered Elgin to negotiate the same 
commercial privileges in Japan as those that were imposed upon the Qing. In the end, 
Elgin accepted Harris’s treaty as a model not because the Japanese had haggled better 
terms from the American, but because Harris had been careful to ensure his treaty 
replicated the minimum requirements Britain desired from treaty revision in China. As 
far as the prohibition of opium was concerned, Elgin’s distaste for the belligerent policy 
Britain had pursed in China and desire not to replicate it in Japan probably determined 
his decision to accept this clause more than anything else.188 In any case, and even though 
he was pressed for time, Elgin still made sure to bring Harris’s treaty in line with his 
orders by introducing a ‘most favoured nation’ clause, lowering tariffs on cotton and 
woollen products, and clarifying the clause for treaty revision.189  
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Having witnessed its near neighbour succumb to British gunboats, it was quite logical for 
the bakufu to agree to negotiate with Western powers instead of attempting to resist them 
militarily. But this had little bearing on the underlying structure of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
that Japan signed in 1858, or the extent to which Japan surrendered its sovereignty to 
Western imperial powers by doing so. In fact, all of the ‘negotiated treaties’ signed by 
Siam in 1855 and Japan in 1858 included provisions that opened domestic ports to foreign 
commerce, removed state monopolies over trade, introduced a fixed tariff on imports and 
exports, accepted the introduction of extraterritoriality, and granted rights of foreign 
residence and travel. Hence, even when Western powers negotiated with East Asian 
countries instead of bombarding them, they still expected and required acceptance of 
many of the principles and precedents of the treaty framework imposed in China after the 
Opium War. Auslin’s assertion that ‘China was less a model for Japan’s treaties with the 
West than another Asian nation’,190 is therefore misleading in the context of why the 
treaty-port system was originally created in East Asia, what it actually stood for, and what 
was expected of the nations who entered into it, whether willingly, grudgingly, or indeed 
under duress. 
 
Conclusions 
The introduction of the treaty-port system to Japan was not an isolated event. 
Fundamentally, it was defined by developments elsewhere in East Asia, especially the 
involvement of Britain and France in China. As in China, the Ansei Treaties created a 
whole new group of ‘enclave empires’ in East Asia, within which the same dynamics of 
collaboration and competition that existed in the Chinese treaty ports were established in 
Japan. As in China, the political economy created by the treaty-port system would lead to 
a similar influx of Western commercial and cultural practices that would fundamentally 
change the political and societal fabric of Japan after the ports opened in 1859. And as in 
China, Western governments were convinced that a ‘semi-civilised’ Asian nation like 
Japan would benefit from the introduction of the Western system of international relations 
and free trade.  
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This was not a uniquely British view, but a predominant attitude among all of those who 
sought to end Japan’s self-enforced seclusion.191 Indeed, the Western plenipotentiaries 
who visited Japan before the treaties were signed were so accustomed to the China treaty-
pattern and the application of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ that the introduction of political and 
economic control by way of ‘unequal treaties’ had already become almost a ‘habit of 
mind’.192 For them, Japan’s centuries-old system of seclusion, like China’s system of 
imperial tribute, was a relic of a bygone age and a symptom of civilisational decay. 
Whether the bakufu liked it or not, it would have to accept the imposition of the same set 
of ‘unequal treaties’ that had wreaked havoc in China, with equally catastrophic 
consequences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Contention and Coercion: The Opening of Japan, 1859 
 
For a brief moment in 1858, Japan was the centre of Western attention in East Asia. In 
stark contrast to their negotiations in China, the talks that Lord Elgin and Baron Gros 
conducted during their short stay in Japan were productive and cordial. Within weeks of 
their arrival, five new commercial treaties had been concluded to the apparent satisfaction 
of all parties. The British and French fleets soon departed again for Chinese waters, where 
more pressing matters awaited, leaving the bakufu to begin preparations for the opening 
of trade in July the following year. Both Elgin and Gros interpreted the cordiality with 
which they had been treated by the Japanese and the relative ease with which the treaties 
had been concluded as positive indicators of a fruitful commercial relationship with 
Japan. It was impossible for them to foresee just how much attitudes within the country 
would change over the year to come. 
Although of monumental importance to Japan, the conclusion of the Ansei Treaties was 
a minor event for the British and French governments. In the lead-up to the opening of 
Japan to trade, attention in London and Paris was primarily focused upon events in Italy, 
where a war between France and Austria had broken out over the political future of the 
peninsula. In addition, the British government was still heavily preoccupied with 
managing the aftermath of the 1857 rebellion in India. At the same time, any hopes that 
the revised treaties with the Qing dynasty would bring stability to the Chinese treaty-port 
system were soon dashed by a surprising turn of events at Tianjin. While a new political 
crisis in China unfolded, the British and French representatives in Japan were left to 
enforce the Ansei Treaties without much in the way of material or moral support from 
home. With resistance to the treaty-port system seemingly bearing fruit elsewhere in East 
Asia, their task was to prove more difficult than anyone could have envisaged a year 
earlier. 
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Preparations 
The news of Lord Elgin’s successful treaty negotiations with Japan reached London in 
November 1858, where it was received with satisfaction by the Foreign Office. British 
merchants were equally pleased and, contrary to Foreign Office expectations, began to fit 
out ships for trade with Japan well before the exchange of treaty ratifications.193 Indeed, 
commercial transactions between British firms in Shanghai and Japanese merchants in 
Nagasaki started not long after Elgin left Japan in the summer of 1858, even though 
British officials in China were concerned about a repeat of the smuggling and lawlessness 
that had accompanied the opening of the Chinese treaty ports in 1842. They could do 
nothing to stop British merchants from establishing themselves at Nagasaki and 
Hakodate, however, since the ‘most favoured nation’ clause in the Stirling Convention 
guaranteed Britain the same limited trading rights at these ports as those granted to Russia 
and Holland in 1857.194 In any case, the fact that British merchants were keen to get a 
head start on their commercial rivals at Japan’s new treaty ports demonstrated their 
confidence in its potential for trade. 
The press also welcomed the opening of commercial relations with Japan. In September 
1858, The North China Herald celebrated the ‘extraordinary advance’ that Elgin’s treaty 
represented from what it called, with a thick slice of sarcasm, the ‘truly magnificent 
Convention’ signed by Admiral Stirling in 1854.195 The Times was even more positive, 
praising Elgin in November for bringing a ‘political revolution’ to a ‘hitherto jealously 
exclusive empire’.196 Several highly positive accounts of Japan were also published in the 
Chinese and British press by some of those who had accompanied Elgin to Edo in 1858. 
These eyewitness reports probably contributed to the British sense of optimism about the 
country by depicting it as a modern-day Eden with a heavenly climate, bountiful land, 
and captivating scenery. An editorial in The Times on 10 November expressed doubt that 
Japan was quite as innocent as all that, as well as concern that the importance of the 
Japanese trade had been similarly overstated. Although the terms of Elgin’s treaty were 
most satisfactory, there was a risk that British merchants would undermine the nascent 
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Japan trade through ‘inconsiderate expectations and unreasonable consignments’.197 The 
newspaper therefore stressed the need to place Britain’s new diplomatic and consular 
establishments in Japan ‘in the hands of soberminded, energetic men, armed with full 
powers to repress the licentiousness of evil-disposed Europeans’.198 
The editor of The Times was presumably satisfied by the appointment of Rutherford 
Alcock as the first British consul-general to Japan on 21 December 1858. Alcock was a 
classic example of the mid-nineteenth century ‘man on the spot’ diplomatist. Born in 
1807 and aged fifty when he arrived in Japan, he had started his career as a surgeon before 
entering the British consular service in China in 1844 after a bout of rheumatic fever 
limited the use of his hands. He had served as consul in Amoy, Foochow, Shanghai, and 
Canton prior to his appointment in Japan, and was therefore well-versed in the tenets of 
treaty-port diplomacy. Although he hated the opium trade and was critical of the way in 
which the treaties had been foisted upon the Qing dynasty, he believed that commercial 
agreements once signed must be fulfilled. To that end, he was at times willing to risk his 
own career by advocating coercive measures in response to China’s calculated resistance 
to treaty stipulations. In 1848, for example, when a local Qing official refused to punish 
a crowd of Chinese sailors who had attacked three British missionaries near Shanghai, 
Alcock threatened to withhold customs duties from British ships and use the presence of 
a British sloop-of-war to blockade 1,400 Chinese grain junks from sailing north. The 
threat succeeded: the rioters were punished and the Qing official removed from office. 
On that occasion, the Foreign Office approved of Alcock’s conduct even though he had 
not consulted the British plenipotentiary in Hong Kong.199 Yet such approval was always 
very much dependent upon whether such measures achieved success. As Alcock’s 
biographer put it, the Foreign Office approach was often: ‘Do it at your peril, leaving us 
to applaud or repudiate according to the event.’200 
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Alcock’s conviction about the necessity of taking a firm line with East Asian governments 
also applied to Japan. When Sir John Bowring first received orders to revise Admiral 
Stirling’s convention and negotiate a commercial treaty there, Alcock hoped that the 
British plenipotentiary would bring a squadron large enough to insist upon a full 
commercial treaty on the Siam model, ‘and if necessary knock Yeddo about their ears’.201 
Yet though he sometimes sailed close to the wind in his dealings with the Qing, Alcock 
never pushed matters too far. During his stint in China, he had also displayed courage, 
independence, decisiveness, and ‘set the standard for consular activity’.202 His strong 
ethical principles, disdain for the unscrupulous and unruly behaviour of British merchant 
adventurers, and, above all, philosophy of ‘firmness and determination combined with 
patience and persistence’ in dealing with Eastern officials also made him a natural choice 
to lead the new consular mission to Japan.203 As the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs explained to the House of Commons in February 1859, the 
Foreign Office had considered it advisable to appoint Alcock to this position because he 
was respected and well known for his successful efforts to promote trade in East Asia.204 
Despite enjoying the confidence of the Foreign Office, Alcock’s voluminous 
correspondence often bore the tone of a man who was tired of life in East Asia and 
believed that his hard work and long service deserved greater recognition and a posting 
closer to home.205 He therefore bitterly regretted his appointment to Japan, especially in 
the capacity of consul-general rather than that of diplomatic agent as the treaty stipulated. 
In a private letter to Edmund Hammond, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, Alcock complained in February 1859 that this arrangement would put his country 
in an inferior position, since East Asian governments were often deeply sensitive to 
differences in rank and title between foreign representatives. On top of what he saw as a 
banishment to ‘the most outlying region in the world’, he interpreted the withholding of 
a diplomatic title at the end of a long term of consular service in China as a direct snub. 
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As was the wont of someone who often resorted to melodrama in private correspondence, 
Alcock fatalistically resigned himself to either ‘die in these regions where so many have 
gone before me…or be expended, as naval stores are expended’.206 He nonetheless 
accepted the position and agreed to take up residence in Edo at the head of a small British 
consular mission to the shogun’s capital.207 
Although events in China continued to take precedence, British interest in Japan was 
clearly rising as the date set for the opening of the ports approached. The same could 
hardly be said of France, despite the fact that the new French commercial treaty with 
Japan had been welcomed with ‘lively satisfaction’ by Napoléon III.208 In stark contrast 
to the excited reaction of the British merchant community to the opening of a new market, 
their French counterparts showed very little interest in Japan even after the French 
commercial treaty had been ratified.209 Moreover, while the American, British, and 
Chinese English-language newspapers, discussed the new commercial treaties at length 
between the summers of 1858 and 1859, the official organ of the French government, Le 
Moniteur Universel, only published one sober article on Baron Gros’s negotiations during 
the same period.210 Another indicator of French apathy was the Quai d’Orsay’s decision 
to dispatch only one consular representative to Japan, which contrasted unfavourably with 
the Foreign Office view that consular establishments staffed by British subjects were 
necessary at all three new treaty ports.211 The fact that Gustave Duchesne de Bellecourt 
was not appointed consul-general until 8 June 1859 – a little over two months before the 
ports were due to open to French trade – further demonstrated a lack of urgency with 
regard to Japanese matters.212 
Born in 1817, Bellecourt was almost ten years Alcock’s junior. After stints in 
Copenhagen and Frankfurt, he had gained some knowledge of East Asia when he was 
appointed secretary to the French legation to China in April 1857. Although clearly less 
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experienced than his British counterpart, his opinion on Japanese matters was valued by 
Count Alexandre Walewski, the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who understood 
little about Japan.213 Before drafting Bellecourt’s new instructions, Walewski asked Quai 
d’Orsay officials to clarify the commercial arrangements at the new ports and queried the 
extent to which the French government should accommodate the wishes of Catholic 
missionaries. Walewski understood that it was important to cooperate with the Societé 
des Missions Étrangères de Paris, whose missionaries were the only Frenchmen with a 
decent working knowledge of Japanese. At the same time, he was equally aware that the 
bakufu was deeply hostile to the presence of missionaries in any shape or form, let alone 
as paid officials of a foreign government. He was therefore worried that it would be 
difficult for any French missionary ‘to change his ecclesiastic costume for that of a 
linguist’.214 These concerns were not unfounded, as Eugène-Emmanuel Mermet de 
Cachon, who interpreted for Baron Gros during the treaty negotiations, had already 
written privately that he believed the conclusion of the commercial treaties heralded the 
beginning of ‘complete religious freedom for Japanese and foreigners’.215  
Caught between two conflicting impulses, Walewski settled on a messy compromise. He 
made it explicitly clear to Bellecourt that he was not to demand any religious freedoms 
beyond those already stipulated in the treaty. Conversely, he stressed that France would 
not abandon its right to protect missionaries from threats or direct harm. Bellecourt was 
to watch out for any attempts by missionaries to carry out religious propagation within 
the Japanese interior and take measures when necessary to moderate their religious zeal. 
Above all, he was to seek advice from home if anything happened that might imperil the 
lives of missionaries or result in a rupture with Edo.216 Conscious of how much Walewski 
wanted to avoid complications in Japan over this issue, Bellecourt sought assurances from 
the Hong Kong mission of the Missions Étrangères after he arrived in Shanghai during 
the summer of 1859. He was promised that the society would only cater for the needs of 
foreign Catholics within the boundaries set by the treaty. Reassured, Bellecourt appointed 
one of the society’s missionaries as his new interpreter.217 
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Religious matters aside, Bellecourt was simply instructed to ensure the full 
implementation of the treaties and to remain entirely aloof from political affairs.218 By 
contrast, the instructions issued by the Foreign Office in March 1859 empowered 
Rutherford Alcock to shape Britain’s early political relations with Japan. The then British 
Foreign Secretary, the Conservative Lord Malmesbury, was clear that he did not expect 
everything to go smoothly at first, but he hoped that the new consul-general’s experience 
in China would stand him in good stead when it came to implementing the terms of the 
new treaty. Given the increasing concern within the Foreign Office about Russian 
activities in East Asia, Alcock was also asked to obtain intelligence on Russian operations 
on the Amur River, and to dissuade the bakufu from ceding any territory to the Russians. 
At the same time, Malmesbury warned Alcock not to commit Britain to the defence of 
Japanese territory, as neither the government nor the public had any appetite for further 
entanglements in East Asia. In addition, Alcock was instructed to adopt a patient and 
inoffensive approach with the Japanese, to make allowances for their ‘ignorance and 
timidity’, to maintain friendly relations with the other foreign agents, and to avoid 
competing with them for influence at the shogun’s court. Malmesbury made it explicitly 
clear that Britain’s interests in Japan were purely commercial, that the British government 
did not ‘aim at paramount influence in the councils of Japan’, and that the Foreign Office 
had ‘no intention of interfering with the social institutions of that country’.219 
Malmesbury was clearly confident enough in Alcock’s judgment and ability to entrust 
him with much more latitude and responsibility than Walewski was prepared to grant 
Bellecourt. The wider remit of Alcock’s instructions also indicated that the Foreign Office 
considered Japan of some strategic and commercial importance, albeit to a much lesser 
degree than China. By contrast, the Quai d’Orsay was interested in little more than 
securing the same commercial privileges in Japan enjoyed by other foreign nations. 
Walewski therefore saw no reason to entrust Bellecourt with any greater political 
responsibility than that customarily assigned to a consul-general anywhere else in the 
world. In effect, Bellecourt’s instructions constituted little more than a ‘combination of 
naïve assumptions and limited aims’.220 Although Alcock and Bellecourt were of equal 
consular rank on paper, this was belied in reality by the scope and tone of their 
instructions, the differences in their age and relative experience in East Asia, and the 
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disparity between the resources allocated to their respective consular establishments in 
Japan. Moreover, even though Malmesbury had warned the new British consul-general 
not to compete with foreign representatives for influence in Japan, it was unlikely that 
that a man of Alcock’s experience and background would be content to play second fiddle 
to the French, Dutch, and American representatives. The nature of treaty-port diplomacy 
and the fact of British naval and commercial superiority within the East Asia treaty-port 
system made it almost inevitable that Alcock would attempt to establish a leading role for 
himself in Japan regardless of his official rank. Bellecourt, on the other hand, appeared 
to have little choice but to follow the Englishman’s lead. 
 
First encounters 
All five of the Ansei Treaties stipulated that the three Japanese ports of Kanagawa, 
Nagasaki, and Hakodate would be opened for commercial purposes to nationals of 
Britain, France, the United States, Holland, and Russia by the summer of 1859.221 Given 
the admiration that the Western plenipotentiaries had expressed for the Japanese during 
the treaty negotiations the previous year, there seemed little reason for any of the new 
men in Edo to anticipate much difficulty in opening the new ports by the agreed date.222 
Little did they know that the conclusion of the treaties the previous summer had 
precipitated a political crisis in Japan that would define relations between the bakufu and 
the treaty powers for the next decade. 
This upheaval was rooted in aspects of Japanese politics relating to the structure of the 
Tokugawa state, which had changed little since Tokugawa Ieyasu established the 
shogunate in 1603 following victory in the Battle of Sekigahara three years earlier. That 
battle had ended a complex struggle for power between competing feudal lords, or 
daimyō, and led to a significant redistribution of feudal fiefs across Japan, with much of 
the land belonging to those lords who had opposed Ieyasu (the tozama [outer] daimyō) 
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added to Tokugawa territory or awarded to its vassals (the fudai [hereditary] daimyō). 
Tokugawa dominance fostered a ‘hereditary resentment’ in many of the tozama domains, 
such as the great western han of Satsuma and Chōshū, which remained largely 
independent of the authority of central Tokugawa government throughout the Edo period 
(1603-1868).223 Their potential for rebellion against the bakufu was constrained, however, 
by an obligatory system of alternate residence known as sankin-kōtai, which was 
instituted in 1635 for tozama lords and extended to all daimyō in 1642. This obliged the 
daimyō to reside in Edo during alternate twelve-month periods, while the daimyō’s family 
and some officials had to live permanently at the lord’s mansion in Edo. In addition, while 
the quasi-independent han were not taxed directly, they had to contribute to the defence 
of the country and the preservation of the military and political structure of feudal power 
in Japan known as the bakuhan system.224  
The policy of seclusion instituted to protect Japan from the perceived dangers of Western 
trade and religion during the seventeenth century became a fundamental part of this 
elaborate system of security. It was the patriotic duty of all Japanese officials, including 
the daimyō, to uphold this ancestral law in order to preserve the country from corruption 
and defeat.225 This remained a simple enough task when there was only a narrow gap in 
naval and military technology between Japan and the West. However, it became 
increasingly difficult as the newly industrialised Western maritime powers encroached 
ever further into East Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century – a period when 
many daimyō domains were increasingly beset by financial and political pressures. 
Despite this, the shogunate became more resolute in its determination to restrict 
intercourse with foreigners, culminating in the 1825 edict instructing the daimyō to expel 
any ships that attempted to enter Japanese waters from foreign countries with which Japan 
maintained no trade relations. In the same year, Aizawa Seishisai, a nationalist writer 
from the Mito school of ‘national learning’ (kokugaku), which blended Confucian and 
nativist scholarship to assert the superiority of Japan’s imperial institution over that of 
China, wrote the Shinron (New Thesis). This pamphlet linked two important philosophies 
for the first time: sonnō (‘revere the emperor’) and jōi (‘expel the barbarians’). The former 
rejected the influence of Chinese ideas on Japanese society by depicting Japan as the true 
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‘Middle Kingdom’ and advocating a return to an idealised past when Japanese imperial 
rule had been synonymous with political stability. The latter urged much-needed 
economic and administrative reform in order to facilitate the manufacture of the arms and 
ships necessary to protect Japan’s ‘Divine Realm’ from the polluting presence of 
foreigners.226  
Shinron was not an attack on the political authority of the bakufu per se, but it explicitly 
linked the shogun’s legitimacy to his ability to enforce expulsion and thereby justify his 
full title of seii taishōgun, or ‘barbarian-subduing generalissimo’. According to this line 
of thought, failure to expel the barbarians amounted to a failure to show due reverence to 
the emperor in Kyoto. These ideas proved influential, and in 1842 the daimyō of Mito 
established an academy to foster practical Western learning under a charter which 
explicitly linked two phrases that would later became a rallying call for Japanese anti-
foreign fanatics: sonnō-jōi (‘revere the emperor, expel the barbarians’).227 By the 1850s, 
the leaders of the expulsion, or jōi, movement had accepted that Japan’s technological 
inferiority rendered interaction with foreign countries inevitable. Nonetheless, they were 
increasingly convinced that war, or at least the risk of it, was necessary to protect the 
independence of Japan from Western powers. As a result, they objected to the conclusion 
of any commercial treaties until significant domestic military reform had taken place so 
that Japan would be able to resist Western demands more effectively. Even if delay meant 
war, they reasoned that defeat was a lesser risk than the certainty of the corruption that 
the introduction of Western trade and religion would bring about.228  
On the other side of this debate was the kaikoku (‘open the country’) party, closely 
connected to the Rangakusha (Dutch scholars) who had been studying the West since the 
lifting of the ban on the import of Western books in 1720. Adherents to this school of 
thought were also cognisant of the threat posed to Japan’s independence by Western 
encroachment and the importance of protecting the nation from pernicious foreign 
influences. However, the greater knowledge of world conditions gained from their studies 
made them starkly aware of the extent of Japan’s weakness and its total inability to resist 
the West militarily. Like the jōi party, they agreed upon the need to improve national 
defences in order to ‘expel the barbarian’, insomuch as that meant asserting Japan’s 
                                                
226 Beasley, Select Documents, op.cit., pp.9-10 & p.36; Jansen, op.cit., p.203-4 & p.280; 
and Tsuzuki, op.cit., p.25 & pp.33-5. 
227 Jansen, op.cit., p.280. 
228 Beasley, Select Documents, op.cit., pp.15-7. 
 
 
85 
independence of action. Yet kaikoku supporters believed war with the West should be 
avoided at all costs, while some even saw the opening of ports as desirable as it would 
expedite the adoption of the Western military techniques that Japan needed to protect 
itself. Most saw trade with the West as only a temporary expedient while Japan carried 
out the economic and military modernisation necessary to regain its full independence.229  
The Perry Expedition brought these competing arguments to a head in 1853. It also 
sparked an immediate crisis within the bakufu’s ruling council, or rōjū, as it wrestled to 
find a suitable response to the American’s demands for a commercial treaty.230 Desperate 
to establish a national consensus, rōjū leader Abe Masahiro took the unprecedented step 
of circulating copies of Perry’s ultimatum to all daimyō in Japan, calling upon fudai and 
tozama alike to submit their views. Though well-intentioned, this move fundamentally 
weakened the bakufu’s ability to conduct foreign affairs by giving ‘de-facto legitimisation 
to the idea of a civic realm’.231 Invited to comment and criticise Edo’s policy, the 
responses submitted by the daimyō also illustrated the breadth of division within Japan. 
Of the sixty-one replies received, nineteen advocated the opening of ports to trade, 
nineteen urged the rejection of Perry’s demands, fourteen stressed the need to avoid war, 
seven advocated the adoption of temporary measures of accommodation, and two agreed 
to obey whatever the bakufu decided.232 
These divisions only became more entrenched in the years that followed, culminating in 
the refusal of the Emperor Kōmei, a staunch advocate of jōi in its strictest form, to 
sanction the Harris Treaty in 1858. This assertion of imperial power was the result of 
dedicated lobbying by powerful anti-foreign lords in Kyoto such as Tokugawa Nariaki of 
Mito. It represented a significant blow to bakufu prestige and led conservatives in Edo to 
call for the appointment of a tairō, or Regent, a position only filled during times of crisis. 
As Marius Jansen put it, ‘consultation as a tactic had failed, and the bakufu now shifted 
to dictatorial commandism’.233 Ii Naosuke, the head of one of Japan’s leading fudai 
families, was appointed tairō on 4 June 1858. His first act was to settle a succession 
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dispute over a replacement for the ailing shogun Iesada in favour of his own candidate. 
This upset the ‘reforming lords’ of western Japan who wanted a greater say in the political 
future of the country and a rapprochement between the bakufu and the imperial court (a 
philosophy that became known as the kōbu-gattai [‘Court-Bakufu unity’] movement). 
They had favoured the selection of Hitotsubashi (Tokugawa) Keiki, the son of Nariaki 
and a young man of excellent ability. Ii however suspected a Mito plot to control the 
bakufu and nominated Iemochi from the traditional house of Wakayama (Kii) instead. He 
then turned his attention to foreign affairs.  
Conscious of events in China and anxious to avoid a similarly disastrous war with the 
West, Ii instructed his negotiators to sign the Ansei Treaties without waiting for imperial 
sanction from Kyoto. Naturally, the jōi group attacked this decision as contradictory to 
everything it stood for, but the fact that Ii’s only motive for opening the ports was political 
necessity also dismayed the kaikoku party. Ii was actually deeply prejudiced against the 
‘contamination’ of traditional Japanese society through the adoption of Western ideas and 
techniques, and this made him determined to limit the freedom of foreigners at the new 
ports as much as possible. Above all, Ii stood for conservatism and the right of the bakufu 
to determine policy independently of either the court in Kyoto or the great feudal lords. 
His determination to restore strong central leadership in national affairs led to the ‘Ansei 
Purge’ of the powerful lords who had lobbied in Kyoto, as well as of the court nobles, 
officials, scholars, and increasingly politicised lower-ranking samurai class who had 
supported them. His opposition to opening Japan to further trade and deeper foreign 
relations also led to a clash with other rōjū and maritime defence officials who supported 
the military reform and trade liberalisation favoured by the lords of Mito and Satsuma. Ii 
quickly secured control over the rōjū by forcing its former head to resign and filling the 
council with his supporters. He then abolished the position of maritime defence official 
and replaced it with the post of foreign magistrate, breaking the influence of the maritime 
defence officials who had negotiated the commercial treaties in 1858.  
Ii’s dictatorial methods had a number of important political consequences. They 
confirmed the proponents of jōi as an opposition party and brought them into closer 
alliance with sonnō adherents due to their shared belief in the supremacy of the emperor 
as the ultimate arbiter of foreign relations and political power. The bakufu, by contrast, 
was determined to restrict Western trade to parts of Japan under its direct control, both to 
maintain its prerogative to dictate foreign policy and prevent the enrichment of its most 
powerful hereditary enemies. Despite his disdain for foreign intercourse, Ii’s decision to 
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open the ports completed the association between elements of the kaikoku movement and 
the sabaku (‘support the bakufu’) party. A delineation of Japanese politics into three 
separate groups therefore took place. On the one extreme was the bakufu regime in Edo, 
now committed to a kaikoku policy of sorts. In the middle was the kōbu-gattai party 
consisting largely of great tozama lords, which still supported the structure of the bakufu 
but wanted political reform within it and greater influence over policymaking. On the 
other extreme were the court nobles and lower-ranked samurai at the imperial court in 
Kyoto, whose fanatical sonnō-jōi policy called for the complete abrogation of the 
commercial treaties and total expulsion of foreigners. This polarisation of political forces 
was to prove disastrous for Japan’s foreign relations. While the emperor was eventually 
pressured by Ii into giving his reluctant approval to the Ansei Treaties in February 1859, 
this was granted upon condition that the bakufu committed to overthrowing them as soon 
as it had achieved parity with the West in military strength. Thus, by the date set for the 
opening of the ports, the bakufu was publicly committed to the repudiation of the same 
commercial agreements it had promised Western treaty-powers to implement in full. 234 
This volatile political climate provided the backdrop to Japan’s entry into the treaty-port 
system. The new British consul-general was, of course, entirely unaware of the political 
machinations that had taken place within Japan before his arrival in Nagasaki in early 
June 1859, a month before the official opening of trade. It was there that Alcock received 
a warning that the Japanese government had decided to construct a settlement at 
Yokohama, a small village just south of the official post town of Kanagawa designated 
by the treaties, on a reclaimed island that was only accessible via two guarded exits. After 
his arrival in Edo on 26 June 1858, Alcock, whose long experience in China made him 
decidedly wary about trusting ‘oriental’ peoples to honour treaty agreements, 
immediately understood that the bakufu was attempting to isolate foreigners at Kanagawa 
in the same way in which the Dutch traders had been penned into Dejima for centuries.235   
Alcock’s instincts were correct. Although Ii Naosuke had been forced to accept the 
necessity of signing the commercial treaties, he wanted to control the presence of 
foreigners within Japan. Yokohama was therefore to become a second Dejima, where 
foreigners could be absorbed and quarantined from the Japanese population. Efforts made 
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by Townsend Harris to oppose the construction of this settlement in the six months prior 
to the opening of trade had proved fruitless.236 When Alcock arrived in Edo, therefore, he 
was presented with Yokohama as a fait accompli. In the end, Alcock and Harris secured 
a site for their respective consulates at the stipulated location for the treaty port in 
Kanagawa. Despite this, even the British government admitted there was little to prevent 
British merchants, who had ignored a British consular notification asking them not to 
occupy buildings on the site, from continuing to operate at Yokohama for the foreseeable 
future.237  The bakufu had won the first battle in its new war against the treaties.  
Although Alcock successfully exchanged the ratified copies of Britain’s commercial 
treaty with the shogunate on 11 July, many further obstacles to trade were raised in the 
weeks after the ports opened. The bakufu restricted direct dealing between Japanese 
merchants and foreigners over the most popular export products, including silk, and 
obstructed the conclusion of commercial contracts between the two. It also decided to 
issue new coinage in order to pre-empt an expected run on Japanese gold as a result of 
the stipulation in the treaties granting foreign merchants the right to demand the ‘weight 
for weight’ exchange of Japanese currency. The new currency raised the price of Japanese 
goods by 200 per cent overnight, resulting almost immediately in the suspension of all 
commercial transactions at the new ports. There was uproar amongst consuls and 
merchants alike until Edo backed down and withdrew the new currency.238 Even so, 
bakufu officials continued to deal with the foreigners in an uncooperative and duplicitous 
manner. Within a few weeks, Alcock was convinced that a power struggle had taken place 
in Edo in the year since the treaties were first signed. Unfortunately, it now seemed like 
the victorious party was determined to do all it could to resist their implementation.239  
To compound matters, reports arrived from China at the end of July that Qing forces had 
successfully repulsed an Anglo-French fleet at the Taku forts near Tianjin. This joint 
naval force had been attempting to force a way up the River Peiho so that the newly 
appointed British and French ministers could exchange ratified copies of the Tianjin 
treaties with the Qing emperor in Beijing. Unfortunately, the British commander of this 
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fleet, Rear-Admiral Sir James Hope, drastically underestimated the defences that guarded 
the entrance to the Peiho, which had been significantly strengthened since they were 
easily overcome by Elgin and Gros the previous year. When Hope attempted to break 
through the river barriers on the morning of 25 June 1859, a devastatingly accurate 
barrage from the forts tore his ships apart.240 French losses were minimal by comparison, 
as Admiral de Genouilly had prioritised operations in Vietnam instead of allocating a 
large squadron for what was supposed to be a diplomatic mission.241 Nonetheless, this 
unmitigated, humiliating military disaster shattered the sense of invincibility that had 
characterised British naval action in China up to that point.242 It also undid in one day all 
the work done by Elgin and Gros over eighteen months in China.243 In effect, it rendered 
the Tianjin treaties dead letters less than a week before Japan was due to open its doors 
to foreign trade. Within a few weeks of this news arriving in Japan, Alcock had sensed a 
hardening of Japanese attitudes towards the treaties. Just as events in China had frightened 
the bakufu into signing them in the first place, the debacle at the Peiho appeared to have 
emboldened Edo to attempt to repudiate them.244 
When Bellecourt arrived in Shanghai on 31 July 1859, he found a city in a state of 
tumult.245 Inspired by the victory at the Peiho, the indigenous population was agitating 
against foreigners. As a result, French residents of the city refused to allow the departure 
of the only French warship stationed to protect their safety and property. Eager to reach 
Japan as soon as possible, Bellecourt considered sailing in a commercial vessel until 
Cachon warned him that this would seriously damage French prestige in Japan. After all, 
no Japanese mandarin would dare set foot on a commercial ship to receive a political 
officer, and the bakufu might even interpret such a request as a deliberate slight.246 
Bellecourt had no choice, therefore, but to remain in Shanghai until calm had been 
restored, although he was kept informed of Japanese affairs by the British consul, who 
                                                
240 A printed copy of Hope’s full report of the incident can be found in: The Nautical 
Magazine and Naval Chronicle, for 1859: a journal of papers on subjects connected with 
maritime affairs, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp.536-42. 
241 Brizay, op.cit., p.60. 
242 Stephen Platt, Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story 
of the Taiping Civil War, (London: Atlantic Books, 2012), p.49. 
243 Bernard Brizay, Le sac du palais d’été: l’expédition Anglo-Française de Chine en 
1860 (troisième guerre de l’opium), (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, 2003), p.64. 
244 See AD, CPJ59/1, Bellecourt to Walewski, No. 3, 22 August 1859. 
245 AD, CPJ59/1, Bellecourt to Walewski, No. 1, 1 August 1859. 
246 AD, CPJ59/1, Bellecourt to Walewski, No. 2, 11 August 1859. 
 
 
90 
maintained a regular correspondence with Alcock.247 By the time the Frenchman finally 
arrived in Edo on 6 September, Alcock and Harris had been struggling to enforce the 
treaties for over two months. In his first meetings with Japanese officials, Bellecourt 
immediately found that his lack of plenipotentiary powers put him at a disadvantage 
compared to his British and American colleagues.248 Though the ratified French treaties 
were exchanged with satisfactory pomp and ceremony at the end of September, 
Bellecourt quickly sensed that the feudatory princes were strongly opposed to commercial 
relations. Typically, he believed that such hostility would only be overcome by adopting 
a firm attitude, by acting with the other foreign representatives, and, above all, by 
maintaining at least a semblance of naval strength in Japanese waters at all times.249  
Bellecourt was undoubtedly following his colleagues’ lead by advocating this forceful 
approach. Over the summer, Alcock and Harris had become increasingly frustrated not 
only with the impediments to trade at the ports but also their own treatment at Edo, where 
they were held as virtual prisoners and often subjected to abuse and attack when they 
went out. Alcock was sensitive to the fact the Foreign Office would not welcome a new 
complication in East Asia, but he could not change the habit of a lifetime. Believing that 
the bakufu needed a suitably ‘energetic demonstration’ that its open disregard of the 
treaties would not be tolerated forever, he submitted a strongly worded protest to the 
foreign magistrates in early August.250 This had little impact, however, and attacks on 
foreigners at the ports and the capital continued throughout the autumn, culminating in 
one on Alcock himself in early November.251 Even Harris, who had remained more 
disposed towards the Japanese than his British colleague, was not immune to this 
treatment. During an audience with the shogun in early November, he was treated with 
such incivility by bakufu officials that he later submitted a vociferous letter of protest and 
demanded an apology, again to little effect.252 
By contrast, when a Russian officer and sailor were murdered by anti-foreign fanatics at 
Yokohama in August, Edo reacted very differently. Instead of the dilatory and evasive 
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approach it had adopted with Alcock, Harris, and Bellecourt, the bakufu immediately 
accepted Russian demands for a public apology, the dismissal of the Kanagawa governor, 
and the execution of those responsible. The reason for this seemed clear enough to the 
men on the spot: unlike any of the other treaty powers, Russia had dispatched a significant 
naval fleet to Japan to exchange treaty ratifications.253 The Russian naval commander was 
therefore granted meetings with the rōjū without difficulty, while the other foreign 
representatives struggled even to secure an audience with the foreign magistrates. To 
Bellecourt, this indicated that Russian military prestige ‘had a more imposing effect on 
the Japanese than the mercantile preoccupations of England and the U.S.’254 It certainly 
seemed no coincidence that the landing of three hundred Russian marines to guard their 
naval commander at Edo brought about an improvement in the behaviour of the Japanese 
government, even if the size of the Russian force made Alcock deeply apprehensive about 
Russia’s ambitions in northern Japan.255 The return of bakufu obfuscation and anti-
foreign violence after the departure of the Russian fleet reinforced Bellecourt’s conviction 
that a permanent naval force was necessary to protect foreigners in Japan.256  
By this point, Alcock knew enough about Japan’s oligarchic system of government to 
realise how difficult it would be to implement the treaties in full.257 Yet he also blamed 
the poor state of commerce on certain members of the British merchant community, 
whose unruly behavior at the treaty ports was frequently used by the bakufu to justify 
further infractions of the treaties.258 Nonetheless, the commercial situation had 
deteriorated to such an extent by the beginning of December that Alcock considered ‘all 
Treaties recently concluded with Japan [to be] virtually annulled’.259 This sentiment was 
shared by Bellecourt, who declared in similarly dramatic fashion that ‘the Treaties no 
longer exist’.260 Tired of sending notes and making indirect representations, Alcock 
demanded a direct audience with the foreign magistrates in order to discuss how to resolve 
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the myriad problems over trade. His French and American colleagues, who did not require 
much encouragement, readily accepted an invitation to follow suit.261  
Over the course of a four-hour interview with the foreign magistrates on 7 December 
1859, it gradually became clear to Alcock that the bakufu had absolutely no interest in 
improving relations with the treaty powers. This was the final straw for the proud British 
diplomat, who was now certain that Edo’s unwillingness to execute the treaties was 
attributable to ‘a sinister influence derived from the knowledge of events in China’.262 
Alcock was confident that preparations would already be underway in Europe for the 
dispatch of another Anglo-French naval expedition to punish the Qing dynasty for the 
outrage at the Peiho. He therefore left the foreign magistrates in no doubt about what the 
arrival of a substantial joint fleet in Chinese waters would mean for Japan if the treaties 
were not respected. ‘I said in our last interview that there were two ways of settling affairs 
between nations,’ he wrote to the magistrates a few days later, ‘the one was reason, with 
Treaties and Diplomatic Agents for the instruments; the other war, where the instruments 
are fleets and armies’.263  
After struggling against bakufu efforts to negate the terms of the commercial treaties for 
six months, Alcock had clearly run out of patience. For a man of his background and 
experience, it was hardly surprising that he returned to the tried and tested coercive tactics 
that had served him so well in China. Unlike in China, however, there were no British 
gunboats in Edo Bay to back up his threats, so Alcock was forced to resort instead to a 
sort of ‘phantom gunboat diplomacy’ in the hope that theoretical threats alone would 
change Japanese attitudes. Following his acrimonious meeting with the shogun in 
November, Harris also shared Alcock’s opinion that the time had come to point out to the 
bakufu what was at stake. In fact, the American went even further than his British 
colleague by threatening the bakufu with what it feared more than any Western gunboat: 
the loss of the right to conduct foreign affairs. ‘You have wiped out the Treaties,’ he 
thundered during his own meeting with the foreign magistrates, ‘prepare for war, because 
since we now understand the pernicious influence of the Daimios, it is to them that we 
will demand redress for the violation of the Treaties’.264 He also threatened to sever all 
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relations with Edo if the situation did not improve within five days, and warned the 
magistrates that if the bakufu could not protect the treaty powers they would instead 
demand new treaties from the Mikado265 himself, who appeared to be ‘the true 
emperor’.266 
The bellicosity of the British and American representatives put Bellecourt in a bind. On 
the one hand, he agreed that only the fear of concerted and forceful action would compel 
the bakufu to implement the treaties. On the other, he was acutely aware that the Quai 
d’Orsay did not want him to interfere in political affairs, and that it would certainly not 
approve of him threatening military action. Before his own meeting with the foreign 
magistrates, therefore, Bellecourt resolved to chart a course between these two 
contradictory imperatives. ‘I shall be prudent,’ he assured Walewski, ‘but I cannot 
separate myself entirely from my colleagues, because, it must be said, no distinction of 
nationality is made in Japan.’267 In the end, Bellecourt reiterated the arguments made by 
his British and American colleagues, but was careful not to threaten the Japanese so 
directly. In response, he received solemn assurances that the situation would improve, 
although he felt no more confident than his colleagues that these promises would be kept. 
After making their feelings abundantly clear, however, all they could do was wait and see 
what effect their communal action would have.268  
 
The entente under strain 
Whilst it seemed to the foreign representatives as if matters in Japan had reached a critical 
point by the end of 1859, neither the Foreign Office nor the Quai d’Orsay viewed their 
travails as a matter of great concern. Instead, they were more concerned about the 
aftermath of the inconclusive war that France and Austria had fought on the Italian 
peninsula during the summer of 1859. This conflict had been engineered from the outset 
by Napoléon III to further his foreign policy objectives, which included the 
dismantlement of the 1815 peace settlement, the restoration of France’s natural frontiers 
on the Alps and the Rhine, and the pacification of Europe through its reconstruction on 
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the basis of nationalities assembled in loose (con)-federal structures too weak to challenge 
French supremacy. Following the Anglo-French victory over Russia in the Crimean War 
(1853-1856), Napoléon III believed that military intervention to liberate the northern 
Italian possessions that the Austrian Empire had acquired at the Congress of Vienna in 
1815 would continue the process of restoring France as the pre-eminent power in 
Europe.269 
The uncertain outcome of the Franco-Austrian War, which had commenced in April with 
a string of French victories before coming to a halt on 8 July 1859 with the surprise 
conclusion of the Villafranca armistice, demonstrated the inherent risks of such an 
adventurous foreign policy. Napoléon III’s Italian adventure not only failed to achieve its 
principal objective of ejecting the Habsburg Monarchy from the Veneto, but also 
unleashed an uncontrollable nationalist fervour among the Italian population, diminished 
the power of the Pope, left the future of Nice and Savoy unclear, and almost provoked a 
wider European conflict. Most importantly, it shook the foundations of the loose Anglo-
French entente that had been established during the Crimean War by reawakening 
longstanding suspicions in London that Napoléon III aspired to emulate his famous uncle 
and become ‘the master of Europe’.270 It certainly worried the Prime Minister Lord 
Palmerston, who had returned at the head of a stable and unified Liberal Government in 
July 1859 following a brief period of Conservative rule. Although initially sceptical that 
Napoléon III would contemplate a direct conflict with Britain, by the autumn Palmerston 
was convinced that the emperor’s efforts to strengthen his navy meant that his ‘formerly 
declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain dormant and has not died away’.271 
Relations between Britain and France were therefore already at a low ebb when news of 
the Peiho debacle arrived in Europe in mid-September 1859. Napoléon III was outraged. 
The death of French marines, however few, on Chinese soil was an insult and loss of 
prestige that could not be endured, especially given the embarrassing circumstances under 
which they had been deployed. The war with Austria had been fought in part to restore 
French military prestige and pre-eminence in Europe, yet the pitifully small French force 
that had taken part in the operation at the Peiho had exposed the disparity in British and 
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French naval strength in China. Despite this embarrassment, Count Walewski saw an 
opportunity to advance French interests in East Asia. The Foreign Minister recommended 
immediately that France demand both the payment of a large monetary indemnity and the 
cession of Chinese territory for use as a French naval base. The emperor equivocated 
between seizing this tempting opportunity to secure a Hong Kong-style base for the 
French Navy and holding back from doing anything that might risk a rupture with Britain 
in China. In the end, he decided that it was impossible to restore pride and to protect 
French commercial, strategic, and religious interests at the Chinese treaty ports unless his 
military forces were placed on an equal footing with the British there. The Foreign Office 
was therefore informed that the French government intended to dispatch a significant 
naval fleet to China to seek reparation for the loss of French life, if necessary by 
occupying Qing territory.272 
In London, the British political establishment was deeply concerned about the long-term 
geopolitical consequences of the Peiho debacle. The treaty-port system across East Asia 
largely depended upon the security provided by British gunboats, and Admiral Hope’s 
defeat risked undermining commercial confidence in the ability of the Royal Navy to 
protect British trade and deter attacks on foreigners at China’s treaty ports. The former 
Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon warned his old friend and colleague Edmund 
Hammond, who continued to serve as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
that ‘the disgrace of being beaten by the barbarians’ also constituted a dangerous loss of 
prestige that would fuel anti-British feeling in India.273 The British Cabinet was also 
struggling to understand how its hitherto invincible naval forces had suffered such a 
devastating reverse. While many believed that Hope had overestimated British naval 
strength and mismanaged the operation, Hammond and Palmerston suspected foul play 
by Russia. After all, the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Gorchakov, had recently 
informed the British ambassador in St Petersburg that the Qing dynasty considered all 
foreign treaties abrogated except for the one with Russia, which had already been 
ratified.274 When Palmerston then received intelligence that a group of Russian officers 
had been dispatched to China the previous winter, he became convinced that the Russians 
had not only constructed the Peiho batteries but also manned them during the action!275 
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There was also dissension within the Cabinet as to whether or not the conduct of the 
Chinese at the Peiho actually constituted a breach of the unratified Treaty of Tientsin. 
This was a decision that would have potentially lasting political consequences for 
Palmerston’s Liberal Government. After all, the imposition of the treaty-port system in 
China had been justified by the champions of liberal progress on the Qing dynasty’s 
refusal to accept the principles of so-called ‘international law’.276 To sanction a new war 
against the Qing on the basis of a casus belli that also breached these principles was 
therefore a significant political risk. Even so, Palmerston was adamant that the 
government had a patriotic duty to ‘resent this outrage in some way or other’.277 
Before any definitive decision had been made, news filtered in from Paris that the French 
were determined to go to war with China regardless of what Britain decided. This left the 
Cabinet with little choice but to dispatch a military expedition to China as well. The 
maintenance of national prestige and honour alone was enough for those who were 
already in favour of taking active measures against the Qing, such as Palmerston and his 
Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell. Under the circumstances, Hammond also thought 
it much better for Britain to maintain the lead in China rather than cede it to the French, 
and he hoped that joint action between Britain and France would help ‘to soften much of 
the asperity which has lately prevailed in the relations between the two countries’.278 At 
the same time, the French clamour for war was a source of concern for Palmerston, who 
worried that Napoléon III had ulterior motives in dispatching such a large naval force to 
Chinese waters. After all, France was already engaged in a pre-colonial war in Vietnam, 
and had only very recently suspended a conflict with Austria in Italy that also seemed 
motivated by territorial aggrandisement. Whichever way the Prime Minister looked at it, 
the scale of the French force was certain to hamper British efforts to control the process 
of treaty ratification and threaten Britain’s preponderant role in Chinese affairs.279 
Decisive measures were therefore required to ensure that British interests were not 
subsumed to French ones. First, despite the significant and unnecessary expense this 
would incur, Russell thought it ‘absolutely essential’ that there was parity – if not British 
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superiority – between the two expeditionary forces.280 Second, any spoils from the 
campaign had to be shared equally. Third, it was critical that a genuine attempt was made 
to secure treaty ratification and the Qing emperor’s acceptance of the Tianjin treaties 
before hostilities commenced. Thus, although Napoléon III wanted to declare war on 
China immediately, Palmerston insisted upon presenting Beijing with an ultimatum in the 
hope that this would avert the trouble and expense of a lengthy military expedition.281 
These conditions did little to alter the enormous size of the combined British and French 
fleet that departed for China towards the end of 1859, which consisted of 41 men-of-war 
and 143 transports carrying a huge arsenal of field artillery, cavalry horses, tens of 
thousands of British, French and Indian troops, and thousands more support personnel.282 
In the end, the 10,000 British troops and 4,000 colonial troops from India significantly 
outnumbered the 8,000 Frenchmen.283 In April 1860, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros were 
again appointed to head the diplomatic mission and instructed to ratify the treaty at 
Tianjin, force the emperor to apologise for the attack at the Taku forts, and secure the 
payment of a large indemnity for the costs of the war.284 
For the first time since the establishment of the treaty-port system in China, a treaty power 
other than Britain had committed to taking independent military action against the Qing 
dynasty. The French decision to intervene aggressively in China severely hampered 
Britain’s independence of action, forcing London to commit to a war of questionable 
legality, efficacy, and expense. It is clear, then, that rivalry in China was beginning to 
play a significant role in shaping Anglo-French relations. It drew the attention of the 
British and French governments throughout the latter half of 1859 and well into 1860, 
even though important matters of war and peace in Europe were still being settled. The 
China crisis also led to important changes in British and French policy towards the treaty-
port system in other parts of East Asia. The disaster at the Peiho demonstrated that forcing 
an East Asian government to negotiate a commercial treaty did not automatically mean 
that its stipulations would be respected or implemented. The Western diplomats at the 
Peiho had faced a dilemma over how to compel the Qing emperor to abide by the 
commercial treaties. For them, the choice seemed a binary one: submission or resistance. 
In the end, Hope’s defeat had not only damaged the myth of British military supremacy 
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in East Asia but also forced the British and French governments to incur enormous costs 
in order to avenge it.285 This contradicted the whole purpose of the treaty-port system, 
which was designed to secure Western trading nations the profits of a formal empire 
without its expense.  
There was no doubt that the China trade was worth fighting for, but that did not mean that 
the British and French governments automatically approved of the coercive measures 
adopted by their representatives at the Peiho. It was a tactic that was unlikely to win 
approval from home very often unless great commercial or political interests were at 
stake. That was unlikely ever to be the case in Japan, where the very limited expectations 
of the Foreign Office were evident from Hammond’s reaction to the arrival of Alcock’s 
first dispatches from Edo in the autumn of 1859. Although these letters were filled with 
complaints about the difficulties that had arisen since the ports had first opened, 
Hammond was so happy with the incremental progress that had been made in Japan that 
he asked Lord Wodehouse, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, to write to Alcock to express the government’s ‘most handsome and unqualified 
approval of all that he has done’.286 Hammond also recommended that Alcock be 
promoted into the diplomatic service on a raised salary, in part to put him on an equitable 
footing in Japan with Harris but also to recognise his good service to the government. On 
8 December 1859, Russell informed Alcock officially that the Queen had appointed him 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.287 By contrast, Walewski did 
not respond to Bellecourt’s first dispatches until the end of December, when the consul-
general was simply told that the Quai d’Orsay was sympathetic to his predicament but 
that it was to some extent inevitable. Bellecourt was also informed of the new China 
expedition, which Walewski hoped would demonstrate the strong desire of the British 
and French governments to implement the treaties made with East Asian states.288 
Hammond remained positive about the situation in Japan even after more dispatches 
arrived from Alcock in November. He advised Wodehouse to not be disheartened about 
Japanese affairs, since ‘things were going on there unnaturally smoothly, and it was not 
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to be expected that difficulties should not arise’.289 This relaxed attitude began to change 
after Alcock’s dispatch detailing the explicit threats he had issued to the bakufu at his 
meeting with the foreign magistrates on 7 December 1859 finally arrived in London the 
following February. In a testy response, Lord Russell informed Alcock that he had 
overstepped the mark by threatening the Japanese with war. He was to soothe differences 
instead of making peremptory demands, and to bear in mind that the Japanese were 
probably justified in resenting the conduct of certain Europeans at the ports.290 Thanks to 
the more cautious tone he had adopted with the Japanese, Bellecourt avoided a similar 
reprimand. Instead, the Quai d’Orsay empowered him to deal with political problems in 
Japan by promoting him to the diplomatic rank of chargé d’affaires.291 Édouard 
Thouvenel, the new French Minister for Foreign Affairs, also wrote to the Navy Minister 
to ask for French warships to call into Japanese ports whenever possible, and for the 
British and French admirals in Chinese waters to dispatch a ship alternately to Japan to 
ensure a permanent naval presence there.292 Like Alcock, Bellecourt was also warned not 
to exceed the strict limits of his remit.293 Clearly, both Russell and Thouvenel wanted to 
avoid another war in East Asia at all costs, and the slap on the wrist that the former issued 
to Alcock revealed much about how the disaster on the Peiho had altered attitudes on the 
use of ‘gunboat diplomacy’:  
If the grievances are not redressed and war is not made, the character of the British 
Government is in some degree impaired; if war is made to enforce the observance 
of a Commercial Treaty, we run the risk of engaging in protracted hostilities, and 
of earning a reputation for quarrelling with every nation in the East.294 
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Conclusions 
1859 was a year in which the reckless French military intervention on the Italian peninsula 
rekindled British fears about Napoléon III’s foreign policy ambitions. It was also a year 
of crisis in China, where an unexpected and embarrassing naval disaster demonstrated the 
pitfalls of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. These seismic political and military developments began 
to put a strain on the cooperative relationship established between Britain and France 
during the Crimean War. They also dominated the attention of the Foreign Office and the 
Quai d’Orsay for months, relegating Japan to the bottom of the list of priorities. Such 
indifference can also be explained by the difficulties in communicating with this distant 
outpost, given that dispatches to and from Japan took the best part of three months to 
reach their destination. The British and French representatives there were therefore left 
alone to implement the commercial treaties in the face of determined bakufu resistance. 
Events in China, where military resistance to the treaty-port system appeared to have paid 
dividends, only encouraged Edo to do all it could to subvert the treaties. 
After six months of intractable difficulties over trade, murderous attacks on foreigners, 
and prison-like conditions in Edo, the foreign representatives decided to threaten the 
bakufu with war. This was a gamble, but one they were willing to take given the volatile 
political situation that confronted them. As the first to issue an overt threat, Alcock took 
the biggest risk. Though he had not yet received official confirmation about how London 
planned to respond to the Peiho debacle, he was certain that the British government would 
dispatch another significant naval force. He thus had no qualms about threatening Edo 
with gunboats bound for Beijing, despite his government’s instructions to be patient. 
Unfortunately, this plan backfired. The Foreign Office did not expect Japan to be 
successfully opened to trade overnight, and many of Alcock’s complaints were 
discounted as the inevitable teething problems faced by a country long closed to foreign 
intercourse. Requests for greater naval support from time to time were understandable, 
but Alcock was not to risk a repeat of the Peiho debacle in Japan. Though Bellecourt 
avoided a similar rebuke from Walewski, who seemed happy to let the British to take the 
lead in Japan, it was also made clear to him that the application of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ 
would not be tolerated. Despite obvious indications that creating new ‘enclave empires’ 
was going to be as problematic in Japan as it had been in China, Alcock and Bellecourt 
would have to find a new way to compel the bakufu to embrace the ‘unequal treaties’. 
  
 
 
101 
CHAPTER 3 
 
United in Adversity: The Challenge to Collective Diplomacy, 1860-
1861 
 
By early 1860, it was becoming increasingly clear to the beleaguered foreign 
representatives in Japan that the bakufu was determined to resist the imposition of the 
treaty-port system in any way possible. Edo’s deliberate attempts to roll back the treaties 
had forced Alcock to discard the gradualist approach preferred by the Foreign Office in 
favour of the coercive tactics he had often employed to good effect in China. 
Unfortunately for the British minister, the swift repudiation of this policy in London 
undermined the potency of a threat that was already rather hollow given the absence of 
British gunboats in Japanese waters. The words of caution dispatched to Bellecourt from 
the Quai d’Orsay made it clear that the French government was equally unwilling to 
commit significant naval resources to defend the Japanese treaty-port system. With 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ out of the question, the treaty-power representatives had to find a 
different way to compel the bakufu to take their threats seriously. 
While they grappled with this quandary in 1860, the security situation at the treaty ports 
continued to deteriorate. This inevitably created tensions between the British, French, and 
American representatives over the best way to respond to the bakufu challenge. Personal 
ambitions also contributed to an atmosphere of mistrust between the men on the spot, 
whose competing visions for the future disguised an underlying struggle for control over 
the nascent ‘enclave empires’ in Japan. Matters came to a head at the beginning of 1861, 
when an explosive dispute erupted between Alcock and Harris that threatened to rip apart 
the system of collective diplomacy which underpinned treaty-power relations in Japan. 
Meanwhile, the uneasy partnership that had been forged between Britain and France 
during the Crimean War was finally beginning to fragment over issues of trade and 
geopolitics. With London and Paris at loggerheads over European affairs and distracted 
by their joint military operations in China, the isolated and increasingly terrorised British 
and French representatives in Edo were forced to unite to prevent the total collapse of the 
Japanese treaty-port system. 
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Tensions in Europe 
After a year in which events in Europe and China had put Anglo-French relations under 
considerable strain, Britain and France entered 1860 as increasingly uneasy international 
partners. This was despite efforts by Lord Palmerston to reduce tensions by authorising 
the Radical Member of Parliament Richard Cobden, a long-standing opponent of 
Palmerstonian politics, to open discussions with Paris over a commercial treaty in 
October 1859. It was Cobden himself who had originally suggested such an initiative in 
the belief that a free-trade agreement would reduce arms spending and improve 
diplomatic relations. At the time, Cobden was concerned that Palmerston was recklessly 
stoking a war scare with France by investing heavily in armaments while publicly 
professing his friendly feelings towards the emperor. He had a point, for Palmerston had 
deliberately accentuated Anglo-French rivalry upon his return to office in 1859 in order 
to justify high levels of defence expenditure at a time when his Chancellor, William 
Gladstone, was advocating more austere economic policies. British fears about the 
emperor’s redevelopment of a French naval base at Cherbourg were real, however, and 
the arms race it stimulated was primarily motivated by the mutual desire of both 
Palmerston and Napoléon III to retain independence of action on the international stage 
after the unpredictable events of 1859.295 
Unhappily for Cobden, the treaty that he concluded with his French colleague Michel 
Chevalier in January 1860 did little to improve Anglo-French relations in the short term. 
It was attacked by protectionists in Britain and manufacturers in France as a political 
arrangement to smooth tensions following the war in Italy. It was also criticised by the 
British political class as ‘unsound in principle, doubtful as a political measure, ill 
contrived as a commercial arrangement and quite indefensible as regards its fiscal 
consequences’.296 The Liberal statesman Earl Grey and former Conservative Prime 
Minister Lord Derby were so opposed that they actually discussed preventing Parliament 
from approving it, only to decide at the last minute that the potential consequences for 
British trade were too great.297 In July, Cobden wrote to the Foreign Secretary Lord 
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Russell to complain bitterly about the way the British public had been poisoned against 
the treaty by ‘professional monomaniacs’ in the press, ‘who find it easier and more 
profitable to blow a lighted fire than to light a new one’.298 His continued opposition to 
what he saw as the Liberal Government’s unnecessary and politically ruinous defence 
expenditure failed to convince Russell, however, who accused Cobden of wishing to see 
Britain ‘unarmed’ and placed ‘at the mercy of France’.299 In fact, Palmerston’s 
determination to address any potential French threat to British naval superiority fitted into 
his foreign policy of ‘pragmatic checks and balances’.300 While a commercial agreement 
would undoubtedly provide a useful counterweight to increasing Anglo-French tensions 
over foreign policy disputes, it did not in any way dissuade the Prime Minister from 
preparing for a possible armed conflict. In other words, the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 
1860 did not provide enough tangible assurances of mutual good faith to bring about an 
immediate reduction in Anglo-French tensions, even if it may have helped to avert a war 
over the long term.301 
These tensions reached new heights after Napoléon III announced publicly on 1 March 
1860 that he intended to annex Nice and Savoy. He justified this move as necessary to 
protect France’s border, when it was in reality the direct result of his failure to convince 
the European concert to convene a congress to settle the political future of Italy.302 
According to Lord Clarendon, it provoked immediate irritation and mistrust in the 
emperor across the continent, ‘setting all the Powers of Europe a-thinking how and when 
they shall be able to coalesce against him’.303 Palmerston and Russell were particularly 
aggrieved by the fact that the emperor had declared so many times that the war with 
Austria was not motivated by territorial ambitions. As firm supporters of the Italian cause, 
neither were prepared to allow such an overt threat to Italian independence to pass 
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unchallenged.304 At the end of March, therefore, Russell delivered a highly charged 
speech in Parliament in which he suggested that Britain and other European powers might 
have to work together to prevent France from annexing further territory in the future.305 
During a private meeting with the French ambassador in London soon afterwards, 
Palmerston stated bluntly that Britain was prepared to fight a war with France ‘fearlessly 
either with others or singly if forced upon us’.306 
Despite these strong words, Napoléon III pressed ahead with the annexation of Nice and 
Savoy on 14 June 1860, finally regaining the ‘natural’ French border with the Alps that 
his uncle had lost in 1813.307 This provocative move reinforced concern in London that 
French territorial ambitions extended to other parts of the European continent and even 
beyond.308 For decades, Britain’s foreign policy priority had been the maintenance of the 
concert of Europe and the protection of the treaties that created it. Whilst Napoléon III 
believed that the great powers had a responsibility to revise those treaties in response to 
emerging nation-state formations, his annexation of Nice and Savoy was interpreted by 
many in London as an attempt to strike down the 1815 settlement in an act of pure 
adventurism.309 It was a decision that finally convinced large sections of British society 
that Napoléon III was determined to redraw the map of Europe. Even so, Palmerston 
decided not to intervene to protect the political status quo. Put simply, the Prime Minister 
was unwilling to risk a war with a country that he still considered to be the leading power 
in Europe. His anti-French rhetoric during this period was therefore mostly for show, a 
‘rather feminine’ and ‘invariably personal’ policy that Clarendon disparaged as 
attributable to Palmerston’s rage ‘at finding that Louis Napoleon is a more artful dodger 
than himself’.310 
As David Brown has pointed out, Palmerston’s French policy during 1859 and 1860 was 
a cautious mix of ideal- and realpolitik.311 Although potentially popular at home, a 
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conflict with France in 1860 might easily have led to the collapse of the emperor’s 
ostensibly liberal constitutional government, removing from power a known quantity 
with whom Palmerston had a longstanding personal relationship. That would likely upset 
the balance of power in Europe in favour of the autocracies and risk the inauguration of 
a new regime in Paris that was less inclined to work with Britain to contain them. Above 
all a pragmatist in foreign policy, Palmerston’s apprehension about Britain’s ebbing 
world power and influence compelled the ‘gunboat diplomat’ to choose his battles more 
selectively during the 1860s.312 As far as he was concerned, the preservation of peaceful 
relations with France was still the best guarantor of the international relevance and 
influence of both countries and it was therefore in Britain’s interests to try to keep on 
good terms with France as long as possible.313 At the same time, the emperor’s actions in 
1860 definitely instilled a sense of wariness and doubt that coloured British attitudes 
towards France throughout the following decade, even when mutual interest compelled 
the two countries to work together in far-flung parts of the world such as Japan. 
Despite the tensions over European affairs, there was little immediate evidence in 1860 
of any divergence in Anglo-French policy towards the Japanese treaty-port system. Both 
governments paid little attention to the warnings issued by Alcock and Bellecourt about 
the incendiary political situation in Edo during the first six months of treaty relations. As 
previously mentioned, the urgency of these warnings was also lessened by the fact that 
dispatches from Japan took between two to three months to reach Europe. In London at 
least, attention was more focused on stopping unscrupulous British merchants from 
manipulating the Japanese currency. Such opportunistic behaviour seemed to offer a more 
obvious explanation for the stoppage of trade that Alcock and Bellecourt had reported at 
the end of 1859. It also revived unpleasant memories of the early days of treaty relations 
with the Qing dynasty, when unruly British traders in Canton had provoked constant 
ruptures with the local authorities and intractable difficulties between London and 
Beijing. Anxious to avoid a repeat in Japan, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Edmund Hammond took the unusual step of writing publicly to the East India and 
China Association (EICA) to ask its members to put a stop to this behaviour. In response, 
the association secretary expressed regret about what had taken place and pledged to urge 
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those in Japan not to conduct themselves in a manner that might lead to disputes or 
violence.314  
Hammond also received several private letters from prominent representatives of the 
China and Japan trade, who were angry that certain unscrupulous individuals had 
discredited the entire mercantile community in Japan.315 One of these was Hugh Hamilton 
Lindsay, the son of a former director of the East India Company and director of the China-
based British trading firm Lindsay & Co.316 A few days after the EICA publicly 
disavowed the currency speculators, Lindsay wrote privately to Hammond to suggest that 
the time had come for Alcock to make full use of the power and authority at his disposal 
to deport British subjects who proved themselves unworthy of consular protection. As for 
the currency difficulty, it could be resolved immediately if the bakufu matched the 
exchange rate of gold and silver in Japan to international rates.317 Lindsay’s advice proved 
highly influential. A few days after his letter was received, the Foreign Office issued new 
instructions to Alcock urging him to issue rules and regulations to uphold peace and order 
at the treaty ports, and to inform the bakufu that it could stop currency speculation at any 
time by harmonising the value of gold and silver with the international market.318 The 
unmistakeable similarities between these orders and Lindsay’s recommendations 
demonstrated the extent to which prominent merchants influenced Britain’s Japan policy 
at the time. Yet their optimistic belief that the problems at the ports could be resolved 
through better consular regulation and the public condemnation of dishonest traders was 
painfully naïve. Meanwhile, Alcock’s dire warnings about the incendiary political 
situation in Japan were ignored. 
As no French merchants had been involved in currency speculation, the Quai d’Orsay 
was naturally less concerned about the controversy than the Foreign Office. Nonetheless, 
the Foreign Minister Édouard Thouvenel informed the British ambassador in Paris, Lord 
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Cowley, that the French Navy would gladly cooperate in the suppression of foreign 
disorder in Japan.319 The need to offer the Japanese treaty ports greater protection was 
accepted by both ministries, even if they remained unconvinced that the situation in Japan 
was quite as serious as Alcock and Bellecourt made out. In any case, Hammond had 
already asked for British warships to call more frequently on the Japanese treaty ports 
following the arrival of Alcock’s earliest dispatches at the end of 1859.320 Just a few 
weeks later, however, the Permanent Under-Secretary had received a dispatch from 
Admiral Hope informing him that a British vessel had been stationed almost permanently 
in Japan since the opening of trade. This appeared to suggest that further naval 
reinforcements were unnecessary, especially as Hope also asserted that the constant 
presence of foreign warships in Japan was more likely to exacerbate tensions than 
alleviate them.321  
By contrast, Alcock remained convinced that long periods without a foreign warship in 
Japanese waters simply emboldened the bakufu to violate the treaties.322 He and 
Bellecourt both agreed that the presence of Western gunboats had a great moral effect on 
the regime in Edo, and that the treaty-power representatives needed greater protection 
from their respective naval forces.323 The growing insecurity at the treaty ports was 
evidenced by a spate of assassinations during the first two months of 1860, including that 
of two Dutch captains in Yokohama and a Japanese linguist outside the British legation 
in Edo. Alcock reacted by asking Hope to allocate a British man-of-war to the Japan 
station on a permanent basis, but this request received short shrift from the admiral, who 
replied that every vessel at his disposal was required for the operations in China planned 
for the summer. Hope remained deeply sceptical about the need to divert his forces to 
Edo. He pointed out to the Admiralty that all the anti-foreign attacks to date had been 
committed when foreign warships were moored in Japanese ports, and that many of them 
had not been politically motivated.324 In any case, Hope’s operational priority was the 
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protection and maintenance of British trade in China, which was still being regularly 
threatened by the intransigence of the Qing government and frequent attacks by anti-Qing 
rebels such as the Taiping in central and southern China. By the beginning of 1860, he 
was also heavily preoccupied with preparations for the arrival of the Anglo-French naval 
fleet dispatched to exact revenge for the Peiho disaster. Moreover, the fact that he had 
managed to secure access to coaling stations near Nagasaki (albeit with some 
difficulty325) seemed to contradict Alcock’s view that the bakufu would ‘far too gladly 
see us encounter defeat in China, to entertain for a moment any proposition to place in 
our hands additional means of success’.326 
Whilst Hope remained unconvinced that Japan warranted greater attention, opinion in the 
Foreign Office became more sympathetic to Alcock’s point of view after his early 1860 
dispatches on the perilous situation in Edo arrived in London. On 25 April 1860, just two 
months after Russell had reprimanded Alcock for his bellicose attitude towards the 
bakufu, the Foreign Secretary asked the Admiralty to send a naval force to protect the 
British community in Japan. Convinced that the isolated Alcock also required some moral 
and material support, he requested a squadron of sufficient size to demonstrate to the 
authorities in Edo that continued disregard of treaty stipulations might involve serious 
consequences. It seemed that Russell now appreciated that the insecurity in the Japanese 
treaty ports stemmed from something more complex than the dishonesty of a few British 
merchants. That said, he was not prepared to jeopardise the joint expedition in China 
unless absolutely necessary. He therefore amended Hammond’s draft letter to the 
Admiralty to make it clear that the squadron should only be sent to Japan if Hope felt that 
he could spare the ships from China.327 In Paris, the arrival of reports from Bellecourt that 
the foreign representatives were unable to venture out of their Edo legations without 
risking insult and injury convinced Thouvenel to ask the French Navy to visit Japan more 
frequently as well.328 
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The change in attitudes at the Foreign Office was probably the result of the political 
pressure that was heaped on Lord Russell after Alcock’s early dispatches were published 
in Parliament during the spring of 1860. Given the government’s recent failure to bring 
stability to the Chinese treaty-port system, Alcock’s accounts of a similarly unstable 
situation in Japan provoked righteous anger on the opposition benches. Conservative MPs 
launched scathing attacks on the government for its inability to control the unscrupulous 
conduct of British merchants at the Japanese treaty ports, and for its failure to take 
Alcock’s warnings about the perilous political situation in Japan more seriously.329 On 4 
May, Russell was forced to come to the despatch box to reassure the House that warships 
would be sent to Japan as soon as they could be spared from China, and that British 
subjects would then be afforded all necessary protection. He stressed the optimistic tone 
of the more recent dispatches that had arrived from Edo, as well as the inevitability of 
encountering problems while attempting to open a new country to foreign trade.330 
Russell’s response was a straightforward and factual confirmation in public of what he 
believed in private: that the difficulties in Japan were not altogether unsurprising given 
the circumstances, nor intractable in the long term. 
Much like those in charge of foreign affairs back in London and Paris, Admiral Hope was 
also convinced that the situation in Japan was not as bad as Alcock made out. The sporadic 
anti-foreign attacks at the Japanese treaty ports probably seemed tame to him compared 
with the volatile situation at Canton, where the foreign community was regularly besieged 
by the hostile local Chinese population, or Shanghai, where the Taiping rebels launched 
another offensive in August 1860. Nonetheless, Hope assured the Admiralty in July that 
he would send an imposing force to Japan as soon as his hands were free in China, but he 
also made it clear that he thought ‘temper and patience’ alone would ‘tide through the 
difficulties’.331 Despite the arrival of another letter from Alcock later that month 
describing the virtual imprisonment of foreign representatives in their legations and the 
systematic isolation and restrictions on all foreigners at the ports, it appeared that the 
British minister’s increasingly shrill complaints about the lack of protection in Japan 
would continue to fall on deaf ears.332 
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Tensions in Japan 
The relative indifference in London and Paris to the plight of the British and French 
representatives in Japan stemmed from a failure to appreciate that the domestic upheaval 
taking place there threatened every foreigner in the country. Compared to the 
revolutionary convulsions ripping apart the Qing dynasty, it is easy to understand why 
Alcock and Bellecourt’s warnings were not taken seriously, especially since the men on 
the spot themselves barely grasped the extent to which the opening of trade had catalysed 
political and economic instability within Japan. The equal exchange of coin during the 
first year of trade had resulted in financial catastrophe for the bakufu, destroying its 
bullion monopoly and draining Japan of its gold. Attempts to stem the flow by debasing 
the value of gold and silver led to astronomical commodity price rises that hit the lower-
ranking samurai the hardest, since they were reliant upon fixed rice stipends that did not 
keep pace with rising consumer prices. This was exacerbated by the trade deficit created 
by Western demand for Japanese products, which also raised fears within the bakufu 
about potential shortages in Edo’s domestic market. In April 1860, the disruption caused 
by foreign trade led the bakufu to restrict the direct sale of five primary goods, including 
raw silk, which led to predictable complaints from foreign merchants. The climate of fear 
that these crises created also led to the hoarding of rice and further taxes on an already 
over-burdened peasantry. It was thus no surprise that anti-foreign attitudes within all 
sections of Japanese society were hardening by the first anniversary of the opening of 
trade, while resentment continued to grow among those who blamed the bakufu for the 
catastrophic effects brought about by the commercial treaties.333  
These economic difficulties partly explained the sustained attempts by the bakufu to 
restrict trade in every way possible short of openly breaching the treaties. Yet of even 
greater influence was the ongoing political crisis within Japan, which was evidenced by 
the assassination of the tairō Ii Naosuke at the gates of Edo Castle on 24 March 1860. 
The attack was carried out by a group of radical anti-foreign samurai from the Mito 
domain who were enraged at Ii’s decision to sign the commercial treaties without imperial 
sanction and by the exile of their lord Tokugawa Nariaki, a figurehead of the jōi 
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movement, during the ‘Ansei Purge’. The removal of the dictatorial tairō from power 
seriously weakened the bakufu’s ability to make domestic and foreign policy, as the rōjū 
were faced with the extremely difficult challenge of countering the growing clamour in 
Kyoto for the complete abrogation of the treaties while simultaneously satisfying the 
strident calls from the treaty-power representatives for their full implementation. In an 
attempt to unite the country, they sought to re-engage with the kōbu-gattai movement by 
proposing a marriage between the emperor’s sister and the new shogun. Sensing an 
opportunity to further advance the restoration of imperial power over policymaking, 
influential figures in Kyoto urged the emperor to refuse permission for the marriage 
unless Edo formally pledged to expel the foreigners. The virulently anti-foreign Emperor 
Kōmei readily agreed.  
This decision put the rōjū in a bind. To accede to the emperor’s demand would risk a 
disastrous war with the West. On the other hand, the bakufu shared Kyoto’s desire to 
restrict any further extension of foreign trade across Japan, albeit for different reasons. 
As previously mentioned, the Ansei Treaties stipulated that new treaty ports were to be 
established at Niigata on 1 January 1860 and Hyōgo on 1 January 1863, while the cities 
of Edo and Osaka were also due to open to foreign residence on 1 January 1862 and 1863 
respectively. Many bakufu officials had long been concerned about opening Hyōgo and 
Osaka due to their proximity to the newly politicised imperial capital at Kyoto. They also 
feared that opening Osaka to foreigners would enable the powerful merchants and daimyō 
operating in the city to monopolise international exchange and thus corner domestic trade. 
Rather than agree to the emperor’s impossible demand for the immediate expulsion of 
foreigners, therefore, the rōjū instead promised to seek to postpone the opening of the 
remaining ports and cities mandated by the treaties for a period of up to ten years. As 
Michael Auslin has demonstrated, this proposal was entirely consistent with Ii Naosuke’s 
policy of undermining the treaty settlement first negotiated with Harris.334 It was certainly 
enough to overcome Kyoto’s objections to the marriage proposal, which was agreed in 
October 1860. As a result, the bakufu became more committed than ever to the abolition 
of the commercial treaties.335 
Alcock and Bellecourt had very little understanding of these internal political 
machinations and their impact upon bakufu policy. This is hardly surprising given their 
                                                
334 Auslin, op.cit., p.65. 
335 Ibid., pp.61-5; and Beasley, op.cit., pp.47-54. 
 
 
112 
quasi-imprisonment in Edo, where the only information they received came from bakufu 
officials whose aim was to delay the implementation of treaty stipulations. These officials 
consistently portrayed all other parties in Japan as deeply hostile to foreigners and Edo 
alike, but it was obvious after Ii’s assassination that a dangerous factional struggle was 
underway at the top of the bakufu. This realisation provoked a deep sense of foreboding 
at the foreign legations that a civil war was a very real prospect. More worryingly, it 
appeared that most of the anti-foreign attacks since the opening of trade had been 
premeditated attempts by Mito to embroil the bakufu in a collision with the treaty powers. 
Notwithstanding the very real danger that they might be attacked by anti-foreign fanatics 
at any moment, Alcock and Bellecourt continued to suspect that the bakufu was also 
exploiting the situation to strengthen the barriers to trade.336 Since Alcock had no faith in 
Hope to furnish his superiors with an accurate account of Japanese affairs, he took the 
risky step of writing directly to the First Lord of the Admiralty to explain the political 
significance of Ii’s death and his fears that Mito would order a general massacre of 
foreigners. Alcock claimed to be reluctant to weaken Britain’s military position in China 
or to burden the Admiralty with the protection of all foreigners in Japan, but he made no 
attempt to disguise his feelings of isolation and neglect in the face of such intractable 
difficulties and threats.337 
Whilst Bellecourt and Alcock were alive to the growing threat that internecine strife 
posed to every foreigner in Japan, there was much the two still did not understand about 
the political crisis that was gripping the country. In fact, the situation was considerably 
worse than they envisaged, since they had no idea at this point that the bakufu had already 
agreed to expel all foreigners within a decade. What was becoming clear was that Edo’s 
ability to enforce the treaties across Japan was much weaker than anyone could have 
imagined when they were first signed. Even so, it is important to stress that it was still in 
the interests of all the treaty powers that the shogun remained in power. As Richard Sims 
has pointed out, though the foreign representatives understood very quickly after their 
arrival in Japan that the relationship between the shogun and the emperor was a complex 
one, the bakufu was the only legitimate authority in Japan that had a legal obligation to 
the treaty powers.338 This explains why Alcock and Bellecourt had little choice but to 
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consider Edo’s request to postpone the opening of the remaining ports and cities when 
the proposal was put to them during the summer of 1860. 
The senior councillors on the rōjū made a deliberate decision to negotiate the 
postponement in two stages: first, by eliciting the support of the American representative 
Townsend Harris; then, by submitting a formal request to Alcock. This was a smart move, 
as Harris was still more sympathetic than his British and French colleagues to the bakufu’s 
claims that better commercial relations were impossible until internal resistance to the 
treaties had been overcome. Understandably reluctant to see the treaty settlement he had 
brokered torn apart, Harris agreed in May 1860 to voluntarily limit the export of three of 
the five goods that had been restricted by the Japanese government the previous month. 
In anticipation of a formal request from the bakufu for postponement, he also wrote to 
Washington at the beginning of August to request discretionary permission to close Edo 
to trade if the British and French representatives agreed to do the same. This emboldened 
the senior councillors to broach the indefinite postponement of opening any new ports 
and cities in their meeting with Alcock at the British legation. His response lacked the 
menace that had characterised his audience with the ministers of foreign affairs six 
months earlier. Alcock explained how the economic and political difficulties since the 
opening of trade could be overcome by ending government interference, expanding trade, 
and letting prices find their natural level.339 He also made it clear that it was impossible 
for Japan to return to isolation, though he did not reject the request for postponement out 
of hand.340 Instead, he promised to consult with the other representatives before referring 
home for guidance.341 
There were several reasons why Alcock did not reject the postponement proposal outright 
less than a year after he had threatened war if the bakufu did not implement the treaties 
in full. The first, of course, was that an aggressive response would probably have incurred 
the wrath of the Foreign Office again. Secondly, Alcock’s experience of the daily dangers 
he faced in Edo inclined him to agree with the bakufu that it was too early to consider 
opening the capital to foreign residence. Thirdly, Alcock’s personal relations with the 
individual bakufu officials had improved markedly since Ii’s demise, to the extent that he 
was increasingly confident of establishing relationships of trust similar to those he had 
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cultivated in China.342 When some of these officials came to him with a proposal to 
overcome internal opposition to trade, therefore, Alcock was at least willing to grant them 
the benefit of the doubt. Fourth, postponement offered Alcock a perfect opportunity to 
replicate the diplomatic triumph secured by Harris earlier in the year, when the first 
Japanese embassy to the West had arrived in the United States to exchange treaty 
ratifications in Washington.343 He therefore made postponement contingent on the visit 
of a Japanese embassy to Europe to plead its case. However, by far the most significant 
reason why the British minister did not immediately reject postponement was that he was 
in daily anticipation of a news from China, where he expected a swift and decisive Anglo-
French victory. Alcock was certain that the crushing success of the joint expedition would 
demonstrate the futility of attempting to resist the ‘unequal treaties’ more effectively than 
anything he could do or say in Edo. He therefore expected all bakufu restrictions on trade 
to crumble as soon as Qing resistance had been decisively overcome, rendering the issue 
of postponement a moot point.344 
Bellecourt only received word of the postponement proposals when Harris informed him 
of them in mid-September. Already irritated by his discovery from a bakufu source that 
Alcock had been attempting to organise a Japanese embassy to Europe without consulting 
him, Bellecourt’s immediate reaction was one of anger and suspicion.345 In his opinion, 
the only reason why the bakufu desired postponement was because it had failed to 
anticipate that most foreign merchants wanted to take up residence in the capital as soon 
as possible. While these merchants would certainly face grave difficulties and dangers in 
Edo, Bellecourt argued that ceding to the bakufu demands would only reduce Western 
influence in Japan still further. He therefore promised Thouvenel that he would do all he 
could to see the treaties honoured.346 For the first time, Bellecourt’s opinion on a matter 
of political importance had differed substantially from that of Alcock, even though he 
shared his British colleague’s confidence that a visit to Edo by the Anglo-French fleet in 
China would go some way to resolving the difficulties they faced. By the end of the year, 
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the French chargé was also increasingly convinced that Alcock was more interested in 
advancing British commercial interests in Japan than in maintaining a common front.347 
Prior to the summer of 1860, a consensus had existed amongst the Western treaty powers 
(with the notable exception of Russia) concerning the necessity of concerted action in 
Japan. By mid-1860, however, cracks were beginning to appear in this loose alliance, as 
Alcock and Bellecourt began to disagree on policy and Harris began to commit himself 
more overtly to the bakufu cause. The American’s support was useful to the regime in 
Edo, but not enough on its own to postpone the opening of the remaining ports and cities. 
The legal framework of the treaty-port system dictated that this would require the 
agreement of all the men on the spot, not least Alcock. After all, if the representative of 
the most powerful treaty power in East Asia recommended postponement to his home 
government, then his French and Dutch colleagues would have little choice but to do the 
same. When a Prussian mission arrived in September to negotiate a new commercial 
treaty with Japan, Edo sensed an opportunity to bring the British minister on side. After 
first refusing to negotiate with the Prussian envoy, bakufu ministers met privately with 
Alcock to offer him a quid pro quo: a commercial treaty with Prussia in exchange for 
consent to defer the opening of the remaining ports and cities.348 Unfortunately, the 
progress of events in China had made Alcock less inclined to consider postponement than 
he had been in the summer. 
The operation at the Peiho had started well, with the allied forces capturing the Taku forts 
with ease in mid-August and proceeding to Tianjin by the end of the month. It quickly 
became apparent, however, that the two Qing commissioners who were dispatched to 
negotiate a peace settlement were not actually plenipotentiaries of the emperor. On 7 
September 1860, therefore, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros made the fateful decision to press 
onwards to the gates of Beijing and ratify the treaties there. Less than two weeks later, a 
British negotiating party operating under the protection of a white flag was taken hostage 
en route to the imperial capital. This provoked a rapid military response from Elgin. Two 
days after the hostages were taken, a small allied forced launched a decisive assault on at 
the city of Tungchow (Tongzhou), just outside the imperial capital. The devastating 
display of modern firepower that followed obliterated the imperial army defending 
Beijing and threw the Qing government into disarray, leaving the path to the imperial 
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capital clear. On 5 October, an advance detachment of British infantry and French cavalry 
entered the celebrated Summer Palace on the outskirts of Beijing. Finding it empty, 
military discipline quickly broke down and the palace was ruthlessly plundered. When 
fifteen of the twenty-six British hostages captured by the Qing were found dead, a 
clamour for revenge erupted among the allied ranks. With many calling for the sacking 
of the city and the slaughter of every mandarin in it, Elgin felt he had little choice but to 
order the destruction of the Summer Palace as the only way to punish the Qing dynasty 
instead of the Chinese people. Ignoring the protests of Gros, on 18 October 1860 Elgin 
watched on as the British army methodically burned the priceless eight-hundred-acre 
palace complex to the ground. The Qing emperor immediately capitulated and ratified the 
treaties at the end of the month. After years of intense resistance, overwhelming military 
force had finally compelled him to accept the treaty-port system once and for all.349 
A more cautionary message to the Japanese about the consequences of violating treaty 
stipulations was hardly possible, yet the significant delay in news arriving from China 
ensured the outcome of the expedition remained unclear to Alcock throughout the 
autumn. The unexpected complications that Elgin encountered en route to Beijing were 
also problematic, as the longer the British fleet was tied up in China, the longer Alcock 
would have to wait an imposing flotilla to visit Japan. He was therefore reluctant to 
discuss Edo’s proposal over the Prussian treaty until he was sure that the treaties had been 
ratified in Beijing. He was also not the only one who expected events in China to influence 
attitudes in Japan. After receiving news that Elgin was preparing to withdraw the British 
armed forces from Peking in early November, Hope finally dispatched a squadron of three 
warships to join the British man-of-war already stationed in Japanese waters at the 
beginning of December.350 The admiral was confident that this respectable squadron 
would do some good in Edo and that the China campaign had already achieved the desired 
effect.351 Hope’s sentiments were echoed by Captain John Hay, who commanded the 
paddle frigate HMS Odin on the East Indies and China Station. Like Hope, Hay was 
certain that the peace recently concluded with the Chinese government would improve 
relations between Britain and Japan.352 
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Like Admiral Hope, the commander of the French naval forces in China, Vice-Admiral 
Léonard Charner, often had other priorities in East Asia than Japan. This was particularly 
true at the end of 1860, when French attempts to secure a colonial foothold in Vietnam 
were on the verge of total collapse. The 1858 invasion and occupation of the Vietnamese 
city of Tourane by Admiral de Genouilly had proved disastrous, with heat, disease, and a 
lack of supplies forcing the French to withdraw from the city. Genouilly had then turned 
his attention southwards to the fishing village of Saigon, which offered a more promising 
deep-water port. The village was occupied following a brief struggle on 17 February 
1859, but this attack attracted fierce criticism back in France and Genouilly was replaced 
later that year. His replacement Admiral Page was instructed not to seek territorial 
concessions in Vietnam but simply to secure a treaty that guaranteed religious liberty and 
permitted French consuls to be stationed at Vietnamese ports. Before he could carry out 
these instructions, however, his squadron was ordered to China to form part of the joint 
operations at the Peiho. The small French garrison left behind in Saigon was immediately 
besieged by a Vietnamese force and cut off from all contact with the outside world 
between March 1860 and January 1861. Charner’s priority after the completion of the 
China campaign was therefore to send reinforcements to this garrison, which was 
successfully relieved in February 1861.353 This explains why only two French warships 
were dispatched to Japan at the end of the Chinese operations, and why their commander 
left Edo less than a day after he met with the rōjū on 27 December.354 
The British and French squadrons that steamed into Edo Bay in December 1860 may have 
been smaller than Alcock and Bellecourt had hoped, but they were still confident that this 
display of naval power would have a beneficial effect. Harris, on the other hand, poured 
scorn on the suggestion that the presence of foreign naval forces alone would change 
Japanese attitudes towards the treaties, as well as the idea that the outcome of the 
expedition in China would serve as an example to the bakufu. He continued to urge his 
sceptical colleagues to be patient with Edo and assured them that the return of the 
Japanese embassy from Washington would do much to improve relations.355 What the 
American minister did not mention, of course, was that the reason why the arrival of 
British and French warships had so little impact in Edo was that he had been providing 
                                                
353 Spencer C. Tucker, Vietnam, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 
p.29. 
354 Medzini, op.cit., p.26-7. 
355 Ibid., p.27. 
 
 
118 
advising the bakufu throughout the autumn on how to overcome the opposition of his 
colleagues to postponement. After its failure to convince Alcock to agree to the quid pro 
quo agreement in October, the bakufu had been faced with the difficult prospect of 
agreeing to another commercial treaty with Prussia on the same terms as the Ansei 
Treaties. Fortunately for the rōjū, a direct intervention by Harris helped to avert this 
damaging outcome. At a private meeting on 24 November, Harris advised the senior 
councillors that, if they wanted to secure postponement, they should omit Osaka and 
Hyōgo from the proposed Prussian treaty altogether. This suggestion, which was made 
without prior consultation with the other treaty-power representatives, allowed the bakufu 
to maintain the façade that it was committed to extending trade with the West while 
simultaneously restricting all foreigners to the existing treaty ports. In other words, Edo 
could present the new treaty to the imperial court in Kyoto as an unwelcome but strictly 
temporary deviation from the overarching strategy of expelling the foreigners.356 The 
agreement signed between Japan and Prussia on 24 January 1861 therefore fundamentally 
altered the treaty settlement that Harris had worked hard to establish in 1858. Whether he 
realised it or not, he was now helping the bakufu maintain its boundaries with the West.357 
On 1 January 1861, Alcock penned a lengthy assessment of the political situation in 
Japan. Entirely ignorant of the intrigues of his American colleague, the British minister 
believed that it was his own dogged representations to Edo that had finally convinced the 
bakufu to agree to the Prussian treaty. As far as postponement was concerned, he was 
convinced that allowing free ingress of foreigners to the shogun’s capital would result in 
a disastrous general massacre, but that any delay to the opening of the other ports would 
greatly damage trade. Despite the bakufu’s intense desire to secure postponement, Alcock 
remained optimistic that perseverance would eventually overcome all resistance to their 
opening. The formerly bellicose British minster was also now certain that ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ would be ‘a far more costly game here than in China and more uncertain in 
its final results, so far as ultimate commerce is concerned’.358 After a period of relative 
calm, things seemed to be progressing as well as could be expected. Little did Alcock 
know that the biggest crisis in Japan’s short history of treaty relations was about to break 
out. 
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A community divided 
In the early hours of New Year’s Day 1861, a bakufu messenger reported to Townsend 
Harris that a group of disenfranchised Mito samurai was planning to massacre every 
foreigner in Yokohama and Edo. Declaring itself unable to guarantee their safety 
anywhere else, the bakufu requested all the foreign representatives to withdraw to the 
protection of Edo Castle. Alcock and Bellecourt were initially sceptical about this latest 
threat, given that it had surfaced at precisely the time when Edo was pursuing more 
restrictive measures to circumscribe foreign influence in Japan. Sensing a trap, Bellecourt 
warned Alcock about the dangers of allowing the bakufu to sequester the diplomatic corps 
in Edo.359 Alcock agreed wholeheartedly. After all, it was not the first time that the bakufu 
had attempted to gather all the representatives in one spot, and he did not put it past Edo 
to simulate a popular uprising in order to strengthen the case for postponement.360 
Whatever its source, the rumours were deeply unwelcome. If the threat was real, then a 
war between Japan and the treaty powers was guaranteed. If not, this was a blow to 
Alcock and Bellecourt’s hopes that that the presence of foreign warships in Japanese 
waters would change attitudes in the capital.  
Either way, Alcock was not prepared to take any chances. He immediately requested the 
temporary detachment of two British warships – one at Yokohama and one at Edo – until 
the rumours had died down.361 Unfortunately, the commander of the British squadron in 
port was unwilling to delay his departure for Hong Kong any longer than necessary. Much 
to Alcock’s annoyance, he steamed out of Edo Bay on 8 January.362 A week after the 
squadron’s departure, Hendrik Heusken, the Dutch secretary at the American legation, 
was assassinated.363 This shocking event finally convinced Alcock that the inability, or 
unwillingness, of the bakufu to protect foreigners at the treaty ports was inextricably 
linked to the political machinations taking place within Japan’s complex system of 
                                                
359 AD, CPJ59/3, Bellecourt to Thouvenel, No. 63, 3 January 1861. 
360 HCPP, 1861, Vol. LXIX.361, [2829], pp.1-3, Alcock to Russell, No. 1, 1 January 
1861; and TNA, FO391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 1 January 1860. 
361 HCPP, 1861, Vol. LXIX.361, [2829], pp.3-4, Alcock to Jones, 1 January 1861, 
enclosure 1 in Alcock to Russell, No. 1, 1 January 1861. 
362 HCPP, 1861, Vol. LXIX.361, [2829], p.4, Jones to Alcock, 3 January 1861 and p.5, 
Alcock to Jones, 4 January 1861, enclosures 1 & 2 in Alcock to Russell, No. 2, 4 January 
1861; and BLO, Kimberley Papers, MS. Eng. c. 4001, Alcock to Wodehouse, 8 January 
1861. 
363 For a complete account of the incident, see Reinier H. Hesselink, ‘The Assassination 
of Henry Heusken’, Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Autumn, 1994), pp.331-51. 
 
 
120 
government. ‘Our chief danger lies with the fact that the ostensible Government is an 
Imperium in Imperio,’ he wrote to Hammond on 26 January, ‘there are Daimios within 
the Council who follow out their own views, while the Ministers are set up to play 
propriety and profess nothing but good will.’364 On top of dealing with the duplicity of 
the bakufu administration itself, the representatives also had to contend with internecine 
feuds between the daimyō, some of whom were prepared to sacrifice foreigners as part of 
a strategy to damage the regime in Edo. The British minister was no longer very optimistic 
about the future of trade with Japan. Indeed, given the disproportionate cost in self-
respect, national prestige, and armaments that upholding the treaties was likely to incur, 
he was beginning to regret the fact that Britain and Japan had ever entered into 
commercial relations in the first place. He warned Hammond that the government would 
soon have to decide whether to force another Asiatic regime to respect treaty obligations, 
or to abandon any attempt to maintain diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan 
for the foreseeable future.365 
It was difficult to see how Alcock could compel the bakufu to respect the treaties, but the 
British minister was not willing to throw in the diplomatic towel just yet. With the very 
survival of the treaty-port system at stake and no British naval forces to protect it, Alcock 
had little choice but to put his faith in the power of collective diplomacy. Gathering his 
four colleagues together at the British legation on 19 January, the British minister argued 
that the only way to put an end to the intimidation without risking war was for them to 
withdraw temporarily to the safety of Yokohama, where foreign troops could protect the 
whole community until Edo promised to implement the treaties. This proposal secured 
the strong support of Bellecourt, who was pleased that his British colleague was finally 
taking a tougher line with the bakufu, as well as the Dutch consul-general J. K. de Wit.366 
The Prussian envoy Count Eulenburg stated that if he were in the same position as his 
colleagues he would also withdraw from the capital, but that he could not do so without 
risking an indefinite delay to the signing of the Prussian commercial treaty. Nonetheless, 
he pledged to inform the bakufu officially that he entirely supported their decision to 
withdraw their legations to Yokohama.367 
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The only diplomatic representative who rejected Alcock’s proposal was Harris, who 
blamed Heusken’s death on his own carelessness for leaving the legation at night. 
Convinced that the representatives would never be allowed to return to Edo and that any 
attempt to occupy Yokohama with foreign troops risked war, Harris declared that he 
would remain in the Japanese capital alone. The conference was therefore adjourned 
without the unanimous verdict in favour of withdrawal that Alcock had hoped for.368 Two 
days later, the representatives met again to finalise their plans. After waiting for over an 
hour for Harris to appear, the others proceeded without him. Frustrated, Alcock argued 
that the separation of Harris from his colleagues was likely to compromise their joint 
action and encourage the bakufu to continue resisting the pressure they were trying to 
exert upon it.369 The French and Dutch agents agreed that Harris’s isolation in the capital 
would reduce the impact of their withdrawal policy, but having already come to the 
conclusion that their position in Edo was now untenable, they resolved to press ahead 
regardless. Each pledged to prepare an official letter of protest to the Japanese 
government to be delivered simultaneously upon their arrival at Yokohama.370 
In his private correspondence to Hammond, Alcock revealed the full extent of his anger 
at Harris, whose obsequiousness and opportunism he attributed to the personal vanity and 
misplaced pride that was so typical of American diplomats in the Far East: 
 
Unfortunately, Mr. Harris had the usual premier game in the East to play – peace 
at any price – well knowing that others would fight the battle – and pay the cost. 
The one triumph of his diplomatic career was to have opened Japan to commerce, 
and he has always plumed himself on his influence with the Japanese. Assure 
delusion on his part…for he has received more slights and injuries than have ever 
been offered to me.371  
Whatever Harris’s personal flaws, Alcock had critically underestimated his American 
colleague, whose Damascene conversion from vociferous critic to staunch defender of 
the bakufu took everyone by surprise. Even after Alcock and Bellecourt withdrew their 
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respective legations to Yokohama on 27 January, they remained incredulous that Harris 
would rather isolate himself in Edo than unite with them to oppose bakufu duplicity. 
However, just as the American had warned, the bakufu was initially relieved that it no 
longer had responsibility for the safety and security of the representatives in Edo. This 
outcome has led the historian Grace Fox to denigrate Alcock’s withdrawal policy as a 
‘foolish act’.372 In retrospect, this simplistic assessment did not fully take into account 
what Alcock was trying to achieve by quitting the capital, and why Harris deliberately 
chose to remain there alone. It appeared to ignore the fact that the American’s motives 
were not purely political but also personal, driven by a desire to thwart what he saw as a 
barefaced attempt by the British minister to establish himself as the most influential 
diplomatic representative in Japan – a role that Harris still jealously coveted for himself. 
In fact, Harris’s status as the ‘dean of the diplomatic representatives in Japan’ had been 
under threat ever since the arrival of his seasoned British colleague in 1859.373 Although 
their early relationship had been cordial and constructive, Alcock had been dependent at 
the time upon the American’s help and experience to build political contacts with the 
bakufu. Indeed, it was so obvious to Bellecourt that Alcock was ‘cultivating’ Harris to 
gain greater knowledge about the political situation in Japan that he mentioned explicitly 
it in a dispatch to Thouvenel at the end of 1860.374 What Bellecourt did not realise was 
that the British minister was only following Harris’s lead while he formulated his own 
view of political affairs in Japan. As soon as Alcock began to suspect that there was more 
to the bakufu’s resistance to the treaties than met the eye, his relationship with Harris 
began to deteriorate. By the beginning of 1861, he was also much less reliant on the 
American for political intelligence than a year before. Meanwhile, Harris continued to 
believe that he enjoyed a ‘special relationship’ with the bakufu, making him resistant to 
any course of action that might threaten his perceived influence in Edo. After Heusken’s 
death, Harris realised that his colleagues were no longer willing to follow his lead or agree 
with his policy. This left him with a choice between following Alcock out of Edo or 
deliberately undermining his diplomatic strategy. Stung that Alcock had supplanted him 
as the ‘doyen of the diplomatic corps’, Harris plumped for the latter.375 
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So bitter was Harris towards Alcock after this affair that he engineered an unedifying 
public spat in the weeks after the British minister’s withdrawal from Edo. The dispute 
began innocuously enough on 22 January when Alcock sent Harris a summary of the two 
conferences and asked him to verify what had been discussed.376 The response that Harris 
returned two weeks later was deliberately obnoxious. After reiterating his arguments 
against withdrawal from Edo, he suggested that his colleagues had retired to Yokohama 
out of fear for their personal safety. He vociferously defended the bakufu and its 
commitment to the treaties, rejected the premise that the government of a semi-civilised 
country like Japan could be held accountable for assassinations carried out by individuals, 
and declared that the withdrawal of his colleagues would provoke another war in East 
Asia. ‘I would sooner see all the Treaties with this country torn up,’ he thundered in 
conclusion, ‘and Japan return to its old state of isolation, than witness the horrors of war 
inflicted on this peaceful people and happy land.’377  
As he was drafting this explosive letter, Harris would have been fully aware that few 
among the British merchant community welcomed the arrival of Alcock and his 
temporary British legation to Yokohama. It was no secret that the British minister blamed 
many of the difficulties with trade at the treaty ports on the opportunistic and unruly 
conduct of what he described disdainfully in private as the ‘lawless class of filibusters, 
under the guise of merchants, Europe disgorges on our coasts’.378 It was also common 
knowledge that Alcock was embroiled in a very public controversy over his decision in 
January 1861 to deport a British merchant named Michael Moss for injuring a Japanese 
police officer during an altercation on a Kanagawa street the previous November.379 With 
tensions in Yokohama at boiling point, there can be little doubt that Harris’s hysterical 
letter was deliberately calculated to inflict maximum reputational damage upon Alcock 
at a moment when his judgement and competence were already under severe scrutiny. 
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Indeed, according to The North China Herald, there were so many copies of Harris’s 
letter in circulation ‘that any scruples we may have entertained at publishing…a private 
letter, are overcome by the belief that the writer seeks to give it publicity’.380  
Alcock was naturally infuriated by Harris’s suggestion that he had fled Edo to avoid 
assassination. Acutely aware that his reputation was at stake, he penned an extensive 
riposte that methodically dismantled Harris’s argument over sixty-four pages of foolscap. 
He began by accusing Harris of a deliberate attempt to mislead those not fully cognisant 
of the political situation in Japan by claiming that the foreign representatives had lived in 
Edo in safety for nineteen months. After all, had Harris forgotten an incident in late 1859 
when he had been assaulted outside his legation and in fear of his own life? Alcock then 
chastised the American for misrepresenting his colleagues by claiming that they left Edo 
out of fear for their personal safety when this decision was actually motivated by a desire 
to withdraw ‘from a false and derogatory position as Diplomatic Agents – one rendered 
untenable with due regard to the interests and dignity of their respective nations’.381 He 
also pointed out that Harris was the only foreign representative who had ever directly 
threatened to use war to restore the Mikado to supremacy. Thus, if anyone had changed 
their views on the bakufu’s commitment to the treaties, it was the American.382 Alcock’s 
letter did not end war of words, however, with Harris returning fire in a second note a 
few days later in which he strenuously rejected the ‘absurd charge’ that he had threatened 
the bakufu with war.383 In the end, Alcock decided to put a stop to further ‘endless and 
pointless’ discussion by ceasing any further communication at the end of February.384 
The foreign community in Japan was rapt by this ‘ministerial sparring’, as The New York 
Times correspondent put it.385 Given the hostility towards Alcock at Yokohama, it was 
hardly surprising that most merchants took the side of his American rival. By contrast, 
Bellecourt backed his British colleague to the hilt. At the centre of the ugly dispute, he 
explained to Thouvenel, was Harris’s bitterness at his inability to convince his colleagues 
to support his optimistic view of the bakufu. This was clearly evidenced by the 
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American’s refusal to sign Alcock’s official report of the first conference simply because 
it omitted a remark made by the Prussian envoy concerning his so-called ‘special 
relationship’ with the Japanese government.386 Like Alcock, Bellecourt resented Harris 
for insinuating that the other representatives had only withdrawn from Edo out of fear for 
their safety. Although Bellecourt was anxious to avoid getting directly involved in what 
was a regrettable quarrel between the two most experienced diplomats in Japan, he made 
it clear that his decision to follow Alcock out of the capital was entirely justified by the 
untenable position of the foreign representatives there.387 
After a period when Bellecourt had started to question Alcock’s commitment to 
implementing the treaties, the Harris incident brought the two representatives closer 
together. With no French warships in Edo Bay, Alcock took great care to see that 
Bellecourt departed the capital with due pomp and ceremony by allowing his colleague 
to accompany him to Yokohama on board HMS Encounter. Alcock also allocated 
Bellecourt four rooms in his hotel to ensure that the temporary British and French 
legations were of equal size and standing, and that both were well protected by a 
detachment of British troops surrounding the building.388 After playing second fiddle to 
his American colleague for so long, the removal of Harris from the diplomatic scene 
elevated Bellecourt to the status of one of the two most influential foreign representatives 
in Japan. The French minister revelled in his new role over the following month, as he 
and Alcock held a series of meetings with an envoy of the bakufu to discuss the conditions 
under which they would agree to return to Edo. By threatening to invoke the clause in the 
treaty allowing the right of travel into the interior of the country, they extracted a formal 
invitation from the shogun for their return, the promise of greater safety for the legations, 
an arrangement for a public reception upon their arrival, and a series of other guarantees 
relating to trade and the treaties.389 On 2 March 1861, just five weeks after their departure, 
Alcock and Bellecourt steamed triumphantly back across Edo Bay. With the sound of a 
royal salute from the bakufu’s batteries ringing in their ears, they hoisted the British and 
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French flags over their respective legations once more.390 Alcock could not hide his 
delight that his American rival had been proved such a ‘bad prophet’ by predicting that 
he would never return to the city without ‘a fleet and an army – bloodshed and rapine’.391 
However, only time would tell whether his confidence that ‘a check has been given to the 
“fight at any price” people’ was well-founded or dangerously misplaced.392 
 
Conclusions 
January 1861 was an important date in the early history of treaty-port diplomacy in Japan. 
This was the moment when the collaborative system of diplomacy that had steadfastly 
opposed bakufu efforts to subvert the ‘unequal treaties’ since Japan opened to trade began 
to crumble. Without a doubt, Harris’s decision to enter into splendid isolation in Edo 
torpedoed any chance of bringing the collective diplomatic pressure of the treaty powers 
to bear upon the bakufu. So desperate was the American to preserve his diplomatic legacy 
that he was willing to recklessly discard the diplomatic principles that underpinned the 
treaties he had helped to negotiate. By doing so, he unwittingly played into the hands of 
the bakufu, which had been attempting to divide the treaty powers ever since the ports 
first opened to trade. Little did Harris realise that the postponement policy, like Ii’s policy 
of belligerence before it, was not an innocent attempt to overcome internal opposition to 
Western trade but a smokescreen created by the bakufu to destroy the Ansei Treaties. 
Thanks to the American, the bakufu had at last succeeded in putting ‘barbarian’ against 
‘barbarian’, throwing the entire future of Japan’s ‘enclave empires’ into doubt. 
At the heart of the acrimonious row between Harris and Alcock was an intensely personal 
battle for leadership of the Japanese treaty-port system. When disaster struck Edo in early 
1861, opinions had diverged significantly over how best to enforce the treaties. With 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ out of the question and the Anglo-French campaign in China failing 
to deter anti-foreign aggression, Alcock had challenged his colleagues to put their faith 
in the power of British-led collective diplomacy. For a brief moment, Harris’s refusal to 
follow the other representatives to Yokohama threatened to undermine this policy. 
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However, by the time of his triumphant return to Edo, Alcock was confident that he had 
finally developed an effective diplomatic strategy to deal with bakufu intransigence. 
Forced into a choice between his British and American colleagues, Bellecourt acted in 
the best interests of his country. By siding with the British minister, he also managed to 
increase his influence in Japan without the need for more warships or soldiers. In stark 
contrast to the increasingly fractious Anglo-French relationship elsewhere in the world, 
Alcock and Bellecourt had managed to unite in adversity in pursuit of a common goal. 
Their diplomatic strategy may have cost them the support of an experienced colleague, 
but this seemed a price worth paying for improved safety and security at the ports, not to 
mention more control over the future development of the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan. As 
Alcock and Bellecourt settled back into their Edo legations, now protected with 
detachments of British and French soldiers, it seemed like their calculated gamble had 
paid off handsomely. They were wrong. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Compromise and Concession: Alcock, Bellecourt and the London 
Protocol, 1861-1862 
 
Neither Rutherford Alcock nor Duchesne de Bellecourt appreciated the danger that they 
faced upon their return to Edo. Indeed, their confidence that the withdrawal policy had 
fundamentally altered the bakufu’s attitude towards the treaties was reinforced by the 
friendly manner in which they were welcomed back to the Japanese capital by the 
bakufu.393 In fact, far from moving towards an acceptance of the Ansei Treaties, Edo was 
determined to demonstrate to its domestic opponents that it was making progress towards 
their complete abrogation. The illusion that the withdrawal policy had fundamentally 
stabilised Japan’s foreign relations was shattered by a shocking incident during the 
summer of 1861 that forced Alcock and Bellecourt to accept the need for a fundamental 
reassessment of Anglo-French policy in Japan. 
The lengthy delay in dispatches from East Asia reaching Europe ensured that the British 
and French governments were at least two months behind events in Japan. Attention in 
London and Paris was therefore still focused on the outcome of the joint expedition to 
Beijing at the beginning of 1861, accounts of which had been trickling in since the 
previous summer. The demolition of the Summer Palace by the Anglo-French 
expeditionary force in October 1860 proved highly controversial, and the political fallout 
from this notorious example of Western ‘gunboat diplomacy’ would have lasting 
repercussions. Nonetheless, it did little to curtail Napoléon III’s adventurous foreign 
policy, the dogged pursuit of which continued to irritate London until the outbreak of the 
American Civil War brought Anglo-French relations back from the brink. With so many 
international crises to contend with during 1861 and 1862, events in Japan were once 
again relegated to the bottom of the list of British and French foreign policy priorities. 
This continued indifference was to prove critical to bakufu efforts to dismantle the treaty-
port system once and for all. 
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The price of civilisation 
Arriving just in time for Christmas 1861, the news of the destruction of the Summer 
Palace put Palmerston in a festive mood (if not a very Christian one). He wrote 
immediately to Lord Russell to express his delight that the palace had been burnt to the 
ground and satisfaction that Elgin had doubled the value of the indemnity that the Qing 
emperor was to pay for the privilege.394 Above all, the Prime Minister was relieved to see 
the increasingly unpopular and hideously costly war brought to an end.395  Unfortunately, 
his attempts to convince Queen Victoria that the treaty would never have been signed had 
the Summer Palace not been razed did little to disguise the fact that its destruction was a 
public relations disaster. Aside from The Times newspaper, which suggested that Lord 
Elgin had been too easy on the Chinese,396 the rest of the English press largely lamented 
the destructive conclusion to the war.397 The reaction of the government’s critics in 
Parliament was also decidedly hostile, with one member of the House of Lords 
condemning it as ‘an act of vandalism’ akin to the burning of the library at Alexandria or 
the sacking of Rome.398 
The reaction in France, where press freedom was strictly controlled and public criticism 
of the government heavily suppressed, was less overtly critical but still predominantly 
negative. In general, the public showed little interest in the outcome of this far-flung 
military expedition, the necessity of which had never really been explained. The much 
lower loss of French life compared with recent conflicts in the Crimea and Italy also 
reinforced the impression that this had not been a high-risk operation. The glory of victory 
had also been tarnished by the wanton looting of the Summer Palace, and rumours 
abounded within the corridors of power in Paris that the commander of the French land 
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forces had pillaged his way to Beijing for personal enrichment.399 Opponents of the 
Second Empire also used the sacking of the Summer Palace to attack the behaviour of the 
French army and, by association, the foreign policy of the French government. The most 
effective critique was issued by the author Victor Hugo on 25 November 1861, who noted 
the hypocrisy of justifying the destruction of a modern wonder of the world on 
commercial progress and the ‘civilising mission’.400 As far as Napoléon III was 
concerned, however, the French expeditionary force had not only secured a glorious 
victory for France but also exacted suitable revenge upon the Qing dynasty for the Peiho 
debacle in 1859. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the ransacking of the Summer Palace 
was exactly what the emperor had in mind when he spoke of making sure France was 
heard and respected everywhere in the world.401 There was also no hiding from the fact 
that the constant presence of watchful British diplomats and military commanders had 
thwarted any chance of annexing Chinese territory. Despite the huge economic, political, 
cultural, and human cost of taking part in the expedition, France had failed to improve 
significantly its commercial and political position in the Chinese treaty-port system. 
Although both the British and French governments fully supported the destruction of the 
Summer Palace as a necessity, this shocking conclusion to a brutally one-sided campaign 
left them open to accusations that they were more interested in conquering China than 
defending free trade there. Ironically, this was exactly what Lord Palmerston had hoped 
to avoid by acting in concert with France in the first place. The campaign had also signally 
failed to strengthen Anglo-French relations in East Asia, and it added weight to the feeling 
in London that combined military operations with France in distant foreign outposts were 
best avoided altogether. Though a narrow strategic success in the sense that it finally 
achieved treaty ratification, the final act of the Opium Wars cast a long shadow over 
British and French relations with China for the remainder of the nineteenth century and 
beyond. It was therefore no surprise that the British government was keen to avoid any 
further risky foreign entanglements with France in the immediate aftermath of this 
campaign. In fact, 1861 marked the beginning of a period in which Palmerston began to 
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robustly oppose Napoléon III’s energetic foreign policy rather than simply distancing his 
government from it. 
In the end, it was not the outcome of the China expedition that confirmed Palmerston’s 
worst fears about the emperor’s expansionist ambitions, but French attempts in early 1861 
to extend the mandate of an all-French expeditionary force that had been dispatched to 
Syria the previous summer to protect Roman Catholic Maronites in Lebanon. Palmerston, 
famously described by his early biographer Philip Guedalla as ‘the last candle of the 
eighteenth century’,402 had never forgotten Napoléon Bonaparte’s plan to hobble British 
influence in the Middle East by dismembering the Ottoman Empire and turning the 
Mediterranean into a ‘French lake’.403 Convinced that Napoléon III was once again 
following in his uncle’s footsteps, the Prime Minister believed that Syria would become 
a French province unless Britain took a decided stand.404 At a great power conference in 
Paris on 19 February 1861, therefore, the British ambassador Lord Cowley was instructed 
to refuse the French request for an indefinite occupation. Napoléon III was disgusted at 
the lack of trust in France displayed by Britain and the other European powers at this 
conference, but he had little choice but to withdraw his troops from Syria in June 1861.405 
Palmerston’s fears over French ambitions in Syria were well founded, as ‘Napoleon III 
certainly dreamt of a second Algeria in the Lebanon’.406 Undeterred by the controversial 
outcome to the China expedition, the emperor remained committed to restoring France to 
the first rank of great powers, even when this created geopolitical headaches in parts of 
the world within Britain’s sphere of influence. However, the Syria intervention hardened 
Palmerston’s resolve to use the diplomatic mechanisms of the European concert to 
restrain the emperor’s grandiose ambitions and contain French aggrandisement wherever 
in the world it raised its head.407 At the same time, he had no intention of provoking a war 
with France, which was at least ‘a known quantity’ compared to the emerging nation-
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state formations that were beginning to challenge the traditional status quo in Europe and 
the Americas.408 Indeed, Palmerston was acutely aware that the outbreak of the American 
Civil War in April 1861 posed a much greater potential threat to British commercial and 
colonial interests than any French grandstanding in the Near or Far East.409 In a changing 
world, Napoléon III’s Second Empire remained the closest approximation to an ally that 
Britain had. 
Japan was a prime example of the way in which the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay 
worked together even when Anglo-French relations were under strain in other parts of the 
world. The most obvious reason for this was that there was as yet no evidence of any 
French grand design that might challenge Britain’s preponderant position there. This was 
evidenced by the pains that the French government took to avoid sending any policy 
recommendations to Edo without prior reference to London. Hence, even though 
Bellecourt had made it quite clear that he opposed any alteration to the treaties, 
Thouvenel’s immediate reaction upon learning of the bakufu’s postponement proposal in 
early January 1861 was to enquire how the Foreign Office intended to respond.410 As the 
British government was still dealing with the fallout from the China campaign and loath 
to risk further complications in East Asia, Thouvenel was informed that budgetary 
considerations made insisting upon the opening of the new ports difficult. As it seemed 
likely that both London and Washington were inclined to accept postponement, 
Thouvenel informed Bellecourt that it would be unwise for France to adopt a contrary 
position.411 
With attention in London focused almost exclusively on Syrian affairs in February, Japan 
barely warranted a mention in the corridors of power in Whitehall until Alcock’s 
dispatches relating to the assassination of Heusken and the collective withdrawal from 
Edo arrived in late March. These ‘very disagreeable’ reports made Palmerston very 
concerned that Britain would again be forced to ‘inflict some severe retribution’ on an 
East Asian government.412 Before any decision was taken about how best to respond, the 
Duke of Somerset, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, received a letter from Admiral 
Hope explaining that he had already answered Alcock’s request for greater naval support 
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by detaching a British gunship to Edo with discretionary orders to remain there as long 
as necessary.413 Even so, Somerset suggested to Russell that it might be preferable if 
Alcock did not return to the capital, since Yokohama offered a much better anchorage 
and could be easily defended from any sudden attack. Russell was less knowledgeable 
about Japan’s treaty ports than Somerset, but he was still unprepared to surrender 
Britain’s right to station a diplomatic representative in Edo even if Alcock chose not to 
exercise it.414 He therefore approved the withdrawal policy on the condition that Alcock 
upheld all the rights conferred by the treaty. He also gave his strongest indication yet that 
he was willing to consider postponement by asking Alcock specifically whether or not he 
thought it desirable to insist upon the full implementation of the treaties.415 By the end of 
April, news had arrived of Alcock’s triumphant return to Edo, which was soon followed 
by further letters from Hope reporting the British minister’s improved relations with the 
bakufu thereafter.416 These ‘highly satisfactory’ reports led Russell to hope that ‘no 
further difficulties will intervene to impede the development of trade with Japan’.417 
Unfortunately, this optimism was to prove disastrously misplaced. 
 
Relations reassessed 
Back in Japan, the bakufu was desperately attempting to secure Alcock and Bellecourt’s 
support for the dispatch of a Japanese embassy to Europe to plead the case for 
postponement. In fact, it was this imperative that motivated Edo to make strenuous efforts 
to cultivate better relations with the two representatives during the spring of 1861, rather 
than the success of the withdrawal policy as Alcock believed. In the end, they both 
decided that an embassy might educate the Japanese about the economic and military 
strength of Britain and France compared to the United States, thereby detaching the 
bakufu from its dependence upon Harris and deterring (or at least deferring) anti-foreign 
violence in Japan. Once the bakufu had received assurances that an embassy would not 
be refused,  it bakufu submitted an official request to all the treaty-power representatives 
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in May for a seven-year postponement to the opening of the two remaining ports and 
cities.418 Alcock, who had spent much of the spring of 1861 in Hong Kong dealing with 
a legal challenge from Michael Moss relating to his deportation from Japan, did not 
receive this news until he arrived in Nagasaki at the end of May. He reasoned that it would 
be better to return to Edo over land rather than by ship, since it was more important than 
ever to gain an insight into the true state of the country now that a bakufu mission was 
heading to Europe to argue that there were ‘insuperable obstacles’ to the opening of more 
ports to trade.419 The trip proved an eye-opener, as the strict limits that were placed on 
Alcock’s freedom of movement, as well as the strenuous efforts that were made to prevent 
him entering the imperial capital of Kyoto, illustrated both the limits of bakufu power and 
the antagonistic rivalry that still existed between the Mikado and the Tycoon.420 Alcock 
therefore returned to Edo at the beginning of July with a clearer understanding as to why 
the bakufu was so keen to prevent further extension of Western trade to Osaka and Hyōgo 
– two commercially prosperous ports where shogunate influence was already distinctly 
limited. He also felt a greater appreciation of the significance of the emperor’s refusal to 
ratify the treaties in terms of the future of Western relations with Japan.421  
Like Alcock, Bellecourt was also no longer content to rely upon bakufu ministers for 
political information. In the British minister’s absence, therefore, he had been secretly 
building a network of native informants to help him compile a detailed list of the daimyō, 
their revenues, and their position within the Japanese government. This intelligence 
seemed to confirm on paper what Alcock had observed in person: that the shogun’s 
legitimacy as supreme sovereign of Japan was questionable at best; and that there was 
more to daimyō resistance to the treaties than met the eye. ‘It is very difficult for us to 
know who are our friends and who are our enemies in this mosaic of almost independent 
principalities that make up the Empire of Japan,’ Bellecourt explained to Thouvenel in 
April, ‘One therefore wonders again if the Western powers would not have more certainty 
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in their relations with this Empire by concluding separate treaties with the great feudatory 
princes rather than with the current government, which seems not…worthy of the 
beneficial laws of its title.’422 After two years of grasping in the dark, the British and 
French representatives were finally beginning to build a clearer picture of how the 
introduction of foreign trade had catalysed an domestic political crisis in Japan. Another 
indication of this were the disturbing rumours that Bellecourt received in April that a 
political revolution was underway in Kyoto.423 Yet by the time Alcock returned to Edo 
on 4 July there had not been any attacks on foreigners in the city for over six months – a 
reduction in anti-foreign violence that seemed to justify Anglo-French confidence that 
better relations with the bakufu equated to greater security for foreigners. Unfortunately, 
appearances could be deceiving. 
At around midnight on 5 July 1861, the British legation at Tōzenji temple was attacked 
by a band of Mito samurai. Alcock was fortunate to escape with his life, but his newly-
arrived Secretary of Legation, Laurence Oliphant, and the British consul in Nagasaki, 
George Morrison, were seriously wounded. Outraged once more by the bakufu’s inability 
to protect the legation and convinced of ‘the impossibility of our relations being 
maintained on their present footing’, it was nevertheless difficult to see what Alcock 
could really do to respond.424 The failure of his Japanese guard to deter the attack 
undermined the entire premise of his withdrawal policy, which had been predicated on a 
belief that the bakufu was unwilling, rather than unable, to put an end to anti-foreign 
violence. It was now crystal clear that Edo was simply incapable of preventing attacks on 
foreigners – an argument, of course, that the rōjū had been making for some time as a 
justification for postponement. The bakufu ministers wasted no time in hammering home 
this point at a meeting with Alcock in mid-July by blaming the attack on the domestic 
instability brought about by Western trade, abdicating all responsibility for it, and 
warning that there was no way to prevent further terrorism unless all foreigners – 
ministers and merchants alike – were effectively imprisoned within their homes.425 
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Alcock’s private correspondence to Hammond reveals the extent to which this committed 
‘gunboat diplomat’ was forced to adapt to the constrained circumstances of his current 
position. If the bakufu was too weak or indifferent to prevent the anti-foreign daimyō 
from provoking a rupture with the treaty powers, then there was little point in the 
representatives making matters worse by uselessly sacrificing their lives and those of 
other foreigners too. At the same time, he was loath to withdraw from Japan altogether, 
since that would force the British government to commit to a military response. Instead 
he needed to buy time for the Foreign Office to formulate a response, which meant 
preventing any further attacks on foreigners in the interim. ‘The undertaking is not easy 
under any circumstances,’ Alcock explained, ‘and will prove impracticable if the Admiral 
fails in his part.’426 It was indeed Admiral Hope, not the bakufu ministers, whom Alcock 
primarily blamed for the attack. In a highly unusual step, he wrote privately to Russell to 
complain bitterly about the impossibility of Britain maintaining its position in Japan 
unless the admiral, who ‘up to this time…seems to have been utterly absorbed in China, 
and resolutely to have refused any thought or care for Japan’, afforded the Japanese treaty 
ports greater protection than had hitherto been the case.427  
Alcock was aware that this was an unpalatable problem to present to the Foreign Office. 
Nonetheless, it was a problem that he felt Hope’s refusal to heed his consistent warnings 
about the insecurity of foreign life in Japan had alone created. Naturally, Hope strongly 
refuted the ‘violent onslaught’ that Alcock had made against him at the Foreign Office as 
‘the shabbiest proceeding which ever has come under my notice’.428 He too excused the 
Japanese government from responsibility, however, instead blaming Alcock’s 
carelessness and refusal to permit the bakufu to organise the defence of the British 
legation as it saw fit. Nonetheless, when the admiral finally arrived on Japanese shores in 
August he avoided any direct rift with Alcock in the belief it would be inappropriate to 
the time and circumstances. He also accompanied the British minister to two critical 
meetings with the bakufu foreign magistrates on 14 and 15 August. For once, they were 
not accompanied by a retinue of bakufu censors and subordinates, which meant they could 
speak freely about the political problems that the bakufu faced. For the first time, they 
confessed the supremacy of the emperor over the shogun, before reiterating their claim 
that the only way to placate their enemies and overcome domestic obstacles to foreign 
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trade was by postponing the opening of any new ports for seven years. In addition, they 
requested British assistance in pressuring a Russian squadron to leave the island of 
Tsushima, where it was rumoured the Russians were building permanent 
establishments.429 Such candour convinced Hope that ‘matters are by no means in such a 
desperate state as will probably be represented’.430 
Like Hope, Alcock was pleased that he had finally established confidential relations with 
two influential members of the rōjū. Unsurprisingly, however, he viewed the general 
political situation very differently to the British admiral. In a confidential dispatch to the 
Foreign Office, he reiterated his view that relations between Japan and the treaty powers 
had reached crisis point, and that a false step by the representatives could easily provoke 
civil war or a war against the treaty powers.431 He also told Hammond that the time had 
come to decide whether the bakufu was fighting for its existence or colluding with the 
enemies of trade. On the whole, Alcock believed the former to be the case, which meant 
that there was a certain identity of interests between the treaty powers and Edo in ensuring 
the safety of foreigners in Japan. Unfortunately, in Alcock’s opinion the only options now 
open to the British government were to drift on in a state of passive resignation, beat a 
retreat while still possible, or enforce every treaty stipulation even at the risk of a 
potentially disastrous war. Having concluded that none of these options were satisfactory, 
he saw little choice but to accept postponement under three conditions: greater security 
at the open ports; the absence of overt obstructions to trade; and an indemnity for those 
injured during the legation attack.432  
Why, when Alcock finally had Admiral Hope by his side and British warships in Edo 
Bay, did the British minister decide that conditional postponement was the only way to 
preserve the treaty-port system in Japan? According to Michael Auslin, Alcock was 
willing to abet the bakufu’s efforts to limit trade because he recognised that ‘Japan 
occupied in British thinking a crucial position as a stable buffer state close to Britain’s 
major territorial interests’, which made it ‘antithetical to British strategy directly or 
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indirectly to destabilize Japan or to use the military to extend trading rights’.433 While it 
is possible that Alcock believed this to be the case, nothing in his official or private 
correspondence suggests that the British government attached such immense geostrategic 
importance to Japan at this time. On the contrary, Alcock frequently apologised to his 
Whitehall correspondents for writing lengthy dispatches on Japan when he knew they 
would be more focused on other European and global affairs.434 That is not to say that 
Japan was of no geostrategic or commercial importance to Britain at all – it certainly was 
important that British traders and warships maintained access to the country’s natural 
resources and to its relatively prosperous and rapidly growing trade. Yet this was hardly 
evidence that Japan occupied a ‘crucial position’ in British geopolitical thinking, and even 
the genuine threat that the Russian presence in Tsushima posed to British commercial and 
strategic interests across the wider region – not least to Britain’s lucrative China trade – 
does not alone explain why Alcock opted to support postponement at this time.435 
Unfortunately, Auslin’s assessment over-exaggerates both the importance of Japan to 
British policymakers in London, whose interests in the country were predominantly 
economic, and the freedom of action of Western diplomats on the spot, whose relative 
independence in no way equated to omnipotence over policymaking. Even though the 
political situation in Japan appeared more critical to Alcock than ever, all the evidence he 
had received from home since taking up his position indicated that there were no 
circumstances short of a general massacre of foreigners under which the British 
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government would support a war with Japan, particularly after the domestic criticism the 
China campaign attracted. The preservation of the Japanese treaty-port system was 
simply not important enough to justify a full-scale conflict with a country whose 
commercial potential, not to mention geopolitical significance, was minute. Furthermore, 
it is highly improbable that Admiral Hope would have ever supported an aggressive 
response to the postponement proposal. Nothing he had done or said indicated that he 
considered the situation in Japan to be anywhere near as serious as Alcock did, or that he 
would ever sanction aggressive measures there unless forced to do so, which Alcock did 
not have the power to do. 
Another factor that is often overlooked when considering Alcock’s volte-face was his 
determination to protect his legacy. Ever since his appointment to Japan, Alcock’s letters 
bore the tone of a man who soon expected to retire to Europe after many years of labour 
in the Far East. In his final letter to Lord Wodehouse, who was replaced as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs by Austen Henry Layard in August 1861, Alcock 
was looking forward to finally escaping from his ‘frightful place of exile’, having left his 
successor a good inheritance by opening the ports, establishing trade, and arranging the 
visit of a Japanese mission to Europe.436 Following the attack on the legation, however, 
the British minister was less upbeat. Fearing that ‘a long career of success in the East may 
have its nemesis’, Alcock advised Russell to avoid ‘violent efforts to remove covert 
restrictions…be content with maintaining a political position in Yedo…and keep the 
doors open at the Ports’ until it became more politic to expand trade.437 For the remainder 
of what he hoped would be the closing chapter in his Eastern career, he resolved to place 
Britain’s relations with Japan ‘on a better and more hopeful if not more solid basis, than 
they have ever yet been’.438 It is clear, therefore, that Alcock’s decision to support 
postponement was at least in part motivated by a desire to ensure his seventeen-year 
career in East Asia did not end with the destruction of the treaties he had been sent to 
Japan to protect. 
Finally, although Auslin may well have had a point when he argued that Alcock ‘saw that 
the bakufu’s boundaries were crucial to the entire structure of the Japanese state’,439 it is 
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important to stress that the British minister had little choice but to recommend a 
concession he had staunchly opposed in the past. After all, it was now demonstrably clear 
that his diplomatic efforts to compel the bakufu to implement the treaties had completely 
failed. His primary motive following the attack on the legation was therefore simpler than 
Auslin’s complex assessment would suggest: to buy enough time for the Foreign Office 
to determine how best to proceed. His reluctant decision to support conditional 
postponement was essentially a pragmatic response to his restricted circumstances and 
limited power. It was better to maintain the status quo, unsatisfactory as it was, and 
strengthen the bakufu in its struggle against the enemies of foreign trade than to risk civil 
war by insisting upon immediate implementation of the treaties. 
As ever, this meant securing the support of the other treaty-power representatives in Edo, 
which he attempted to gain by dispatching a note to his American, Dutch, and French 
colleagues asking for their views on the state of affairs and their recommendations for the 
future.440 Their responses differed markedly. Bellecourt, promoted to minister 
plenipotentiary in June 1861, believed that agreeing to a ‘dangerous postponement’ of 
seven years would only encourage those hostile to foreign relations to demand further 
concessions in the future.441 The intelligence he had gathered on the daimyō and their 
position within the Japanese state only added to his doubts that the bakufu would ever be 
able to enforce the treaties in parts of Japan not under its direct control.442 Yet with the 
bulk of the French fleet in East Asia diverted to Vietnam once more,443 Bellecourt was 
acutely aware of the weakness of his position. He was also in favour of the treaty-power 
representatives deciding how best to bolster Edo’s position together.444 Unfortunately, 
though Harris claimed he was willing to cooperate with his colleagues in order to improve 
relations with the bakufu, he refused outright to take part in a general conference to 
discuss the matter. The Dutch consul J. K. de Wit, while sympathetic to the plight of the 
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bakufu, decided to remain at Yokohama until his government decided how to proceed.445 
The failure to re-establish collective diplomacy prior to Hope’s departure from Japan in 
late September left Alcock and Bellecourt with little option but to spend the winter of 
1861 flitting between Edo and Yokohama in the hope of avoiding another crisis before 
instructions on the postponement question arrived from home. It was during this period 
that Alcock, fed up with the ‘want of trustworthy and direct means of information through 
officers of our own’, recruited the fifteen-year-old Alexander von Siebold as a 
supernumerary interpreter.446 Despite his tender years, Siebold was uniquely qualified for 
this position due to the fluency in Japanese he had acquired through living in Nagasaki 
with his father, the famous German Japanologist Phillip von Siebold, since Japan first 
opened to trade. In a letter to Hammond justifying the additional expense, Alcock 
expressed confidence that Siebold was worth ‘all the other interpreters put together sent 
out from Europe’.447 It was to prove a most prescient assertion. 
 
A problem deferred 
While the future of the treaty-port system in Japan hung in the balance, the British and 
French governments were deeply preoccupied with the progress of the American Civil 
War. Despite Palmerston’s determination to remain aloof from the civil strife that was 
tearing the United States apart, he began to take an increasingly pro-Southern line 
following the string of Confederate military successes in the early part of the war. In 
expectation of a permanent schism between the two warring parties, the British 
government recognised the Confederacy as a belligerent in May 1861. This incendiary 
move provoked increasingly bellicose statements from Washington that raised fears in 
London of an imminent attack on Britain’s Canadian possessions.448 The Northern 
blockade of the Southern ports, announced in July 1861, also directly impacted the British 
and French textile industry, which depended upon Southern cotton. This mutual economic 
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interest brought the British and French governments closer together again, with Lord 
Lyons, the British ambassador in Washington, adamant that the preservation of peace 
depended on Anglo-French unity.449 The British and French governments agreed to adopt 
a joint approach to American affairs, but in mid-October Palmerston rejected Anglo-
French mediation in the conflict on the basis that want of cotton alone would not justify 
interference in what was essentially a domestic dispute. Unlike France, Britain had a 
merchant marine and colonial possessions bordering the United States to protect.450 
Palmerston was soon faced with a diplomatic crisis that threatened to drag Britain into 
the war regardless. On 7 November 1861, two Confederate envoys charged with soliciting 
the support of Europe for the Southern cause boarded the Trent, a British passenger ship 
bound for England. The next day officers of the Union vessel San Jacinto, acting without 
orders from Washington, stopped and boarded the Trent in the Bahama Straits and 
arrested the two envoys. The news of this insult to the British flag reached Europe at the 
end of the month. With war between Britain and the Union looking increasingly likely, 
the French government had to decide whether it would actively intervene. In the end, 
Thouvenel decided to send a strongly-worded note in support of the British position that 
the boarding of the Trent breached international law. This note played a critical role in 
Washington’s decision in December to release the two envoys and acknowledge that the 
San Jacinto had acted without authorisation. While it was certainly not in France’s 
strategic interests to incite a war between Britain and the United States, the British 
reaction to Thouvenel’s seemingly decisive intervention was universally positive. After 
years of increasing tension and mistrust, Anglo-French relations were finally on the 
mend.451 
The peaceful resolution of the Trent Affair owed much to a shared desire in London and 
Paris to avoid a potentially disastrous entanglement in the American Civil War at a time 
when British and French forces were already committed to a military intervention in 
Mexico. During a six-year civil war between liberal and conservative parties for control 
of the Mexican state that made events in Japan seem tame, both antagonists had become 
deeply indebted to creditors in Britain, France, and Spain. The final straw for the three 
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European governments was the suspension of foreign debt payments for a period of two 
years by liberal leader Benito Juárez following his election as president in July 1861. On 
31 October 1861, a tripartite convention was signed in London that led to the dispatch of 
a British, French, and Spanish expeditionary force to Mexico to compel the government 
to honour its debts.452  
As in China, Palmerston sanctioned the Mexican intervention to ensure that France did 
not have free rein in a part of the world where Britain also had substantial economic 
interests. Napoléon III, as usual, had more substantial ambitions in mind, having been 
convinced by Mexican conservatives who escaped to Paris that there would be popular 
support for the restoration of a monarchy under a European prince. Like Palmerston, 
Napoléon III was a firm believer in the superiority of constitutional monarchy over 
republicanism. The idea of a Catholic monarchy in Mexico that would counter the threat 
posed by North-American Protestantism seemed a good way to placate the Catholic lobby 
in France, which was still angry at the outcome of events in Italy. Furthermore, with the 
United States crippled by war and unable to enforce the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, this seemed 
a perfect opportunity for France to install a friendly regime on the American continent, 
thereby bypassing the Union blockade that was causing so much damage to the French 
cotton industry.453 In mid-October 1861, therefore, the emperor informed the French 
ambassador in London that he preferred the restoration of monarchy in Mexico to keep 
the country out of American hands and open it to European commerce and influence.454 
Russell, who was sceptical about the veracity of the statements of the Mexican refugees 
in Paris, doubted that the Americans would accept a monarchy in Mexico under any 
circumstances. By contrast, Palmerston was willing to roll the dice to see whether it was 
possible to facilitate the creation of a constitutional monarchy in a continent dominated 
by dysfunctional republics by offering Britain’s moral support should the arrival of the 
joint expedition spark a spontaneous popular uprising against the republican 
government.455  
Alcock’s reports of the attack on the British legation in Japan reached the Foreign Office 
in early October 1861, while preparations for a possible war with the United States and 
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an armed intervention in Mexico were in full swing. They came as a shock to Russell, 
who had thought that all matters of contention over the treaties in Japan had been 
resolved. Given his ignorance of the political situation there, one can understand why 
Russell decided to await the return of Oliphant, whom Alcock had sent back to England, 
to hear a full account of the assault on the British legation before sending out fresh 
instructions.456 In the interim, Thouvenel was informed that the Foreign Office would not 
permit Alcock to cede anything to the Japanese without satisfactory equivalents, an 
approach the that was immediately replicated in Paris.457 On 28 October, Oliphant arrived 
with Alcock’s recommendations on the postponement question. Russell’s first reaction 
was to send the British minister’s complaints about Hope’s negligence to the Duke of 
Somerset. The First Lord, who resented the critical tone of Russell’s letter, replied to say 
that he considered Hope’s conduct to have been exemplary throughout, especially his 
prudent refusal to engage in a war of words with Alcock following the attack.458 His letter 
provoked a stinging riposte from the Foreign Secretary:  
Poor Mr Alcock writes in fear of assassination and asks for ships – Adml. Hope 
(who has forty under his command) returns him an answer that if ships are to be 
kept in Japan till assassination ceases to be a practice they will never come away! 
This may be a good joke, but I do not wonder that Mr Alcock did not see the fun 
of it.459 
Russell’s anger was understandable. Like Alcock, he believed that the attack on the 
legation could have been avoided had Hope paid more attention to Japanese affairs. 
Instead, he was now faced with another diplomatic crisis in East Asia at precisely the time 
when other events demanded his full attention. Against this background, Russell decided 
at the end of November to approve Alcock’s recommendation for postponement, as long 
as it was accompanied with certain concessions. He also granted Alcock considerable 
leeway as to how to implement these conditions, stressing only that there were to be no 
concessions without equivalents, that he was to maintain and if possible enlarge trade, 
and that he should discuss his instructions with the other treaty-power representatives 
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first.460 As soon as these orders had been executed, Alcock was then to proceed home on 
leave.461 Unsurprisingly, Thouvenel reserved judgement on the postponement question 
until he learned of London’s decision. On 28 November, less than twenty-four hours after 
news of the Trent Affair arrived on his desk, Thouvenel informed Bellecourt that he 
would not oppose postponement either.462 With war between Britain and the United States 
now a real possibility, and difficulties mounting in Europe over Italy, the papacy, and 
Austrian activities in Herzegovina,463 Thouvenel had more important preoccupations than 
Japan. Like Russell, he was content to leave it up to the men on the spot to find a way out 
of their predicament. 
Alcock did not receive Russell’s instructions until 12 February 1862. Two days later, he 
sent a confidential memo to his Dutch and French colleagues informing them that he had 
been instructed neither to restrict nor to curtail trade. Alcock interpreted these instructions 
as strictly as possible. As it was ‘well-nigh impossible’ to abandon Hyōgo and Osaka, he 
felt he could only support a delay in the opening of Edo and Niigata.464 Even this would 
require the bakufu to offer redress for the legation attack, to agree to the opening of 
Tsushima and a port on the Korean coast, and to secure public recognition of the treaties 
by the emperor or the anti-foreign daimyō. He also speculated as to whether the entire 
matter might be better settled by the other treaty powers taking a lesson out of Russia’s 
book and acting with ‘firmness and determination’ in dealing with the bakufu, although 
he acknowledged that no diplomatic agent could take such a decision without authority 
from home.465 Alcock’s harsh attitude differed markedly from his resolution the previous 
year to recommend postponement for all the ports, especially since Russell’s instructions 
made no mention of separating Hyōgo and Osaka from Edo and Niigata. In fact, they 
specifically granted Alcock the permission to defer the opening of all four ports and 
cities.466 His new proposals pleased Bellecourt and de Wit, both of whom believed that it 
                                                
460 HCPP, 1862, Vol. LXIV.1, [2929], p.72-3, Russell to Alcock, No. 13, 23 November 
1861. 
461 HCPP, 1862, Vol. LXIV.1, [2929], p.72, Russell to Alcock, No. 12, 11 November 
1861. 
462 See Sims, op.cit., p.28. 
463 Case, op.cit., p.195. 
464 See Beasley, W. G., ed., Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-1868, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1955), Document 36, pp.211-6. 
465 Idem. 
466 See ibid., footnote 2, p.212. 
 
 
146 
was impossible to delay the opening of Hyōgo and Osaka.467 Bellecourt was also 
delighted at the return of a semblance of unity in Edo, even if Harris remained isolated in 
Edo ‘like a badger in a hole’.468 At the end of February, the Frenchman informed 
Thouvenel that neither he nor Alcock had any faith in the bakufu’s promises, and that he 
considered it necessary for the representatives to ‘use quite firm language, one could even 
say quite emphatic, to make a serious impression on the enemies of foreigners’.469 
Given that Alcock and his colleagues were so determined to concede as little as possible 
to the bakufu in February, it seems surprising that the British minister was prepared to 
agree to an unconditional five-year postponement to the opening all four ports and cities 
just a few weeks later. In his official correspondence, Alcock justified this change of heart 
on information that he acquired from the rōjū Kuze Hirochika during two confidential 
interviews on 12 and 16 March 1862. According to Alcock’s official dispatch of 17 
March, he had become convinced during these meetings that opening Hyōgo and Osaka 
would precipitate immediate civil war, and that it would be impossible to secure the 
proposed equivalents for the deferral of Edo and Niigata either. Alcock also claimed to 
have been struck by how quickly the bakufu agreed to pay a large indemnity for the 
wounds inflicted upon Oliphant during the legation attack, and by the fact that Edo had 
offered to send its most senior interpreter to assist the bakufu embassy in Europe. 
Although it was not certain that a postponement of five years would improve the situation, 
there was simply no other way to enforce the treaties except by force. In any case, as he 
had been unable to execute Russell’s instructions to the letter, Alcock had suspended 
negotiations and started preparations to return home on leave.470 
Though the reasons Alcock gave in his official correspondence for backing full 
postponement were plausible enough, they do not tell the full story as to why he changed 
his mind so quickly. It is true that the bakufu had already put him in a conciliatory mood 
before the meetings with Kuze by punishing some of those responsible for the Tōzenji 
attack and allocating a commanding site for a new British legation in the capital. Yet this 
took place before he had even received Russell’s initial instructions in February, let alone 
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met with the rōjū the following month.471 The suggestion by William Beasley and Grace 
Fox that these developments had any significant influence over his decision is therefore 
questionable.472 In order to understand what really led to Alcock’s change of heart it is 
necessary to delve into his private correspondence with Hammond, which reveals how 
two developments within the space of a week shattered the British minister’s confidence 
in his ability to avoid major concessions on the postponement issue. 
Shortly after Alcock had dispatched his confidential memorandum of 14 February to his 
Dutch and French colleagues, he had received news that a group of Mito samurai had 
attempted to assassinate Andō Nobumasa, a rōjū with whom Alcock had established a 
close relationship, outside the Sakashita gate of Edo Castle. Alcock realised immediately 
that the loss of this highly influential figure, who was heavily wounded in the 13 February 
attack, was likely to paralyse the bakufu and make it less disposed to compromise over 
postponement. During the same week, Alcock also discovered that Admiral Hope was 
withdrawing all British ships from Japan, in addition to the marines who had been 
guarding the legation in Edo since the previous summer, in preparation for the outbreak 
of war between Britain and the United States. The fact that Japan was not shielded from 
the impact that the Trent Affair had on the deployment of Royal Navy forces worldwide 
apparently came as a shock to the British minister, who criticised Hope’s decision to leave 
Edo unprotected as ‘sheer madness’ in a letter to Hammond on 19 February.473  
The removal of all British forces from Edo meant that, within a week of receiving 
Russell’s instructions, Alcock had not only lost his most sympathetic ear on the rōjū 
council but also his ability to negotiate with the bakufu from a position of strength. 
Moreover, the continued lack of unity between the treaty-power representatives in Edo 
only compounded what was already a weak negotiating position, leaving the British 
minister resigned to the near impossibility of leveraging better terms for postponement. 
Thus, while Alcock’s official account of his meetings with Kuze justified his 
recommendation for an unconditional deferral on the weakness of the bakufu and the risk 
of provoking civil war, he was clearly powerless to demand anything better. Alcock’s 
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dispatch was therefore not only an admission of his personal failure to compel the bakufu 
to uphold its treaty obligations, but of the failure of collective diplomacy to protect the 
future of the Japanese treaty-port system. This is evidenced by the fact that Alcock’s 
capitulation in turn forced Bellecourt to acknowledge during his own meeting with the 
rōjū that the postponement question would have to be resolved in Europe, even though 
he continued to insist to Thouvenel that the bakufu should at least provide proof of its 
good faith before the Quai d’Orsay acceded to deferral.474 Unfortunately for the French 
minister, the departure of Alcock and the chief bakufu interpreter Moriyama Takichiro 
for Europe on 23 March 1862 reduced his role to that of detached observer. 
Back in Europe, the British and French governments were much more concerned with the 
progress of the military expedition to Mexico than the impending arrival of the Japanese 
embassy. Following the Spanish occupation of Veracruz in late December 1861, the 
emperor decided to dispatch further troops to Mexico at the beginning of 1862. 
Palmerston was unconcerned by this development, which he interpreted as a fair response 
to the Spanish manoeuvres. While he stopped short of ordering British marines to 
facilitate regime change in Mexico, the Prime Minister was also increasingly convinced 
by the merits of the emperor’s monarchy scheme, which he told Russell in mid-January 
would be a ‘great blessing’ that would prevent whichever side prevailed in the American 
Civil War from absorbing Mexico into its territory.475 Everything appeared to be 
proceeding to plan until 19 February, when Napoléon III publicly disavowed the French 
admiral who had negotiated the Convention of La Soledad, an agreement that recognised 
the Mexican Republican government and reinforced the principle of non-intervention in 
Mexican domestic affairs. Furious at being used as cover for a French invasion, Britain 
and Spain withdrew their troops in April. Unshackled from the constraints of the tripartite 
convention, France declared war on Mexico on 20 April 1862.476 
Under these circumstances, the arrival of the Japanese embassy in Europe at the beginning 
of April was an unwelcome distraction, particularly as there was some confusion over 
which country it would visit first. After the withdrawal of Queen Victoria from official 
duties to mourn the death of Prince Albert at the end of 1861, the British government was 
keen to delay the reception of the ambassadors as long as possible.477 When it finally 
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became clear that the embassy would initially come to France, Thouvenel sought the 
views of the Foreign Office with regard to the issue of postponement.478 He was informed 
that Hammond doubted whether the ambassadors had sufficient authority to treat on the 
matter, and that Russell in any case preferred to await the return of Alcock before entering 
into formal negotiations.479 As a result, when Thouvenel received the ambassadors in late 
April he merely echoed Bellecourt’s stance in Japan by highlighting his dissatisfaction at 
the state of affairs at the treaty ports and stressing the French government’s determination 
not to agree to any concessions without equivalents.480  
Once it became obvious to the Japanese that definitive resolutions on postponement could 
only be made across the Channel, the embassy decamped to London to await Alcock’s 
arrival. The British minister reached Europe in late May, ahead of his dispatches 
conveying his recommendations on postponement. For that reason, Thouvenel did not 
learn of Alcock’s new policy position until the two men met in Paris on 27 May. After 
this meeting and a conference with the emperor the following day, Alcock informed 
Hammond by letter that a ‘perfect understanding’ had been established with the French 
government, which had agreed to support his recommendations on postponement if 
Russell adopted them as well.481 This represented a significant change of heart for 
Thouvenel, whose understanding of the situation in Japan had hitherto been exclusively 
shaped by Bellecourt’s dispatches. These were no substitute for a face-to-face meeting 
with the experienced British minister, however, who had little difficulty in convincing 
Thouvenel that anything other than postponement would risk another far-flung military 
entanglement of questionable utility.482   
Even so, it was telling how quickly Thouvenel discarded the views of his own 
representative in favour of those advanced by Alcock. Despite the concerns Bellecourt 
had consistently raised about postponement, the Foreign Minister clearly had no intention 
of opposing the British on an issue of such minor importance. Thouvenel’s decision 
reinforced Alcock’s confidence that the British government would also choose 
concession over contest, especially, as he explained to Hammond, ‘considering how small 
our commercial interests [in Japan] really are, and how averse the country will be to any 
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policy provoking collision’.483 So it proved. Within a week of his return to England he 
had negotiated a formal agreement with the Japanese known as the London Protocol. This 
agreement, signed on 6 June 1862, ceded the bakufu a five-year deferral to the opening 
of the two ports and cities (until 1 January 1868) in exchange for full implementation of 
the remaining clauses of the treaty and the removal of all obstacles to trade in the existing 
treaty ports.484 Against all the odds, the bakufu had pulled off a stunning diplomatic 
victory. 
 
Conclusions 
A far cry from the policy of ‘no concessions without equivalents’ that Russell had 
outlined the previous autumn, the London Protocol, which was swiftly followed by 
similar agreements between the Japanese embassy and France, Holland, Prussia and 
Russia, has been accurately described as a face-saving measure to maintain British 
prestige in East Asia by avoidin an embarrassing withdrawal from Japan.485 It was also 
compelling evidence, as argued by Michael Auslin, of the lengths that Britain and France 
were prepared to go to avoid further military entanglements in East Asia after the heavy 
criticism that followed the Chinese campaign.486  That said, there can be little doubt that 
the primary factor in the decision to agree to postponement was the outbreak of two 
separate but interrelated crises in North America. The American Civil War and the 
Mexican intervention were of much greater importance to the wider economic and 
geopolitical interests of Britain and France than the minor issue of trade with Japan. As a 
result, when Alcock, whose influence over Anglo-French policy towards Japan far 
exceeded that of his French colleague, explained that the treaty powers faced an 
unpalatable choice between forcing the issue or buying time in the hope that matters 
would improve, Russell and Thouvenel immediately opted for the latter course.  
Given the circumstances in which the London Protocol was negotiated, Michael Auslin 
was right to temper his description of this agreement as ‘the highpoint of Tokugawa 
diplomacy’ with the caveat that the Japanese also benefitted from ‘international 
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conditions beyond their control’.487 In 1861 and 1862, these ‘international conditions’ 
were shaped by the messy consequences of British and French military interventions in 
China, Syria, and Mexico, as well as the global impact of the American Civil War. Unless 
these international contexts are considered, it is impossible to understand why Britain and 
France were willing to make treaty concessions to the Japanese less than two years after 
their combined forces went to war to enforce similar commercial rights in China. 
Although it was becoming increasingly clear that the imposition of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
would be no more straightforward in Japan than it had been in China, neither Britain nor 
France could risk another military intervention in East Asia when their hands were tied 
elsewhere. Instead, they hoped that Alcock was right when he argued that postponement 
offered a third way between war and withdrawal. Unfortunately, the ink was hardly dry 
on the London Protocol before two incidents took place in Japan that completely 
undermined the premise that postponement would bring stability to the treaty-port 
system. 
  
                                                
487 Idem. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
The Expulsion Conundrum: Bellecourt, Neale and the Richardson 
Affair, 1862-1863 
 
By the time Rutherford Alcock departed Japan in March 1862, he had indisputably 
established himself as the leading Western diplomat in Edo. His absence on leave for 
almost two years was therefore significant, as it left a leadership vacuum in the Japanese 
capital. The time when Townsend Harris would have sought to reassert his former 
position had long since passed, with the U.S. minister himself leaving Japan in May 1862. 
Harris’s departure, in addition to the increasingly devastating civil war that was raging 
back in his homeland, accelerated the transformation of the United States from one of the 
most influential of the Japanese treaty powers to one of the more peripheral. With Harris 
and Alcock gone, Duchesne de Bellecourt and J. K. de Wit became the two most 
experienced man on the spot in terms of time served. Even so, Britain’s preponderant 
economic and military position in East Asia guaranteed that Alcock’s inexperienced 
successor would retain great influence over how the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan were 
managed in his absence. This naturally led to tensions with the more seasoned Bellecourt 
over the direction of policy, which, as ever, was left very much to their discretion. 
The man appointed to succeed Alcock was Lieutenant-Colonel Edward St John Neale, 
the British Secretary of Legation in Beijing. Like Alcock, Neale was a veteran of the 
Carlist War in Spain (1833-1839) who had entered the British consular service after 
serving in that conflict. He was described by the famous Japanophile and diplomat Ernest 
Satow, who arrived in Japan as a student interpreter to the British legation at Edo in 
September 1862, as ‘an old warrior who…, gossip said, regarded Sir. R Alcock, formerly 
attached to the Marine Brigade of Portugal in the quality of surgeon, with no friendly 
feelings’.488 According to Satow, Neale also ‘did not understand the circumstances 
amongst which he was thrown’ when he became chargé d’affaires in Edo during the 
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summer of 1862.489 Though Neale had first joined the British consular service back in the 
1830s, he did not reach East Asia until his appointment to Beijing in 1860. Compared to 
Alcock, therefore, he was much less experienced in dealing with Asiatic regimes like the 
bakufu. Unfortunately, Neale had more to contend with during his short tenure than 
anyone could have expected. After all, by the time he left Japan at the end of 1863, the 
very foundations of the treaty-port system were beginning to crumble. 
 
The Richardson Affair 
It was not long after Neale’s arrival that his naïveté became clear. After the attack on the 
British legation in mid-1861, Alcock had withdrawn to the safety of Yokohama again, 
only returning to Edo when necessary to discuss important matters with the rōjū. Neale 
dismissed the rationale behind that decision, and brought the legation back to the capital 
in June in the expectation that a guard of thirty British marines and more than five hundred 
bakufu samurai would prove sufficient to keep him safe. He was wrong. On the night of 
26 June 1862 (the lunar anniversary of the first attack), two British sentries guarding 
Neale’s quarters were fatally wounded by a disgruntled member of the guard assigned by 
the bakufu to protect the legation.490 The return of anti-foreign violence in Edo after a 
one-year respite was a significant blow to Alcock’s efforts of avoiding a direct rupture 
between Britain and Japan. Moreover, unlike the attack the previous year, the perpetrator 
was not affiliated to any daimyō but with the bakufu itself. In the aftermath, Neale 
demanded that Edo investigate the incident and punish those responsible. When no 
response was forthcoming, he had little choice but to withdraw to Yokohama and await 
instructions from London.491 In the meantime, Admiral Hope, who was critical of Neale’s 
decision to return to Edo in the first place, recommended to the Admiralty that his fleet 
should support Neale’s demands for redress.492 If that failed he would open 
communications with the Mikado at Kyoto, blockade Japan’s southern ports, and destroy 
Edo’s forts until the bakufu relented.493 
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To be fair to Neale, it was becoming increasingly difficult for even the most experienced 
treaty-power representatives to understand the complexity of the political upheaval taking 
place within Japan. Alcock’s decision to support postponement had been predicated on 
assurances he had received from Andō Nobumasa and Kuze Hirochika, the two most 
influential members of the rōjū, that it was the only way for the bakufu to overcome the 
difficulties brought about by the introduction of Western trade. Within a few months, 
however, both of these men had been replaced. The reasons for this were not immediately 
clear to Bellecourt, who had received a series of contradictory reports during the summer 
relating to the political machinations taking place in Kyoto. In mid-June, he heard 
rumours that tozama lords led by Shimazu Hisamitsu, father of the Satsuma daimyō and 
effective head of the Satsuma domain, had entered the imperial city to seek the emperor’s 
sanction for the removal of the shogun and a return to seclusion. Bellecourt was then 
informed a few weeks later that a court noble was coming to Edo to discuss expulsion 
with the rōjū, only to receive intelligence in August from the missionary Mermet de 
Cachon, who was living in Hakodate, that the daimyō were increasingly opposed to the 
bakufu and more open to relations with foreigners than previously thought. Unsure how 
to interpret these conflicting accounts, it was at least clear to Bellecourt that the power of 
the Mikado was reviving.494 
What Bellecourt did not yet fully understand, and the reason why the reports from Kyoto 
were so contradictory, was that there were two political forces in the city competing for 
influence over the imperial court: the kōbu-gattai reforming lords; and the sonnō-jōi 
extremists. The former had been pardoned by Andō and Kuze for their support for 
Hitotsubashi Keiki in the 1858 shogunal succession dispute, but they were still denied 
access to the shogun’s councils. They had therefore secured the dispatch of an imperial 
envoy to Edo to oversee the appointment of reformist leaders to influential positions 
within the bakufu. It was the pressure of these developments that led to the resignations 
of Andō and Kuze, both of whom were closely associated with Ii Naosuke and had sought 
to maintain bakufu control over national policy. Despite some resistance by the fudai and 
other bakufu officials, the presence of Shimazu and the large retinue of Satsuma retainers 
who accompanied the imperial envoy to Edo in July ensured that a triumvirate of 
reformist leaders, one of whom was Keiki himself, were installed at the top of the bakufu 
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by the end of the summer 1862.495 After securing his objective, Shimazu and his escort 
departed for Kyoto in mid-September. It was at this point that Japan’s internal and 
external crises finally collided. 
On 14 September 1862, a British merchant named Charles Lennox Richardson went 
riding with three companions along the tōkaidō, the main road between Edo and 
Kanagawa, where they soon encountered Shimazu’s entourage en route to Kyoto. At the 
small village of Namamugi, half way between Kanagawa and Kawasaki and well within 
the treaty boundary, they were suddenly attacked by several of the Satsuma retainers. 
Richardson was hacked to death, while two other men were severely wounded. Mrs 
Borrodaile, the only woman in the party, narrowly escaped unscathed and rode back to 
Kanagawa to raise the alarm. Against Neale’s orders, Captain Vyse, the British consul in 
Kanagawa, led the chargé’s mounted escort out of Yokohama to search for Richardson’s 
body. Bellecourt, by contrast, immediately led his own mounted guard out of the port to 
help retrieve the murdered man. Neale was incensed by Vyse’s act of insubordination, 
but he had little time to react before the arrival later in the evening of Rear-Admiral 
Augustus Kuper, Hope’s successor as Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies and China 
Station.496 Kuper’s presence spurred demands from an outraged merchant community that 
the commanders of all foreign vessels in port land forces to surround and seize Shimazu 
and his retainers, who were known to be staying less than two miles from Yokohama. 
Despite intense pressure from these merchants, and indeed Vyse, Neale rejected their 
demands as premature and tantamount to an unjustifiable act of war.497  
In a dispatch to Thouvenel written the day after the incident, Bellecourt claimed to have 
offered his wholehearted support to his British colleague during the pandemonium. 
According to this report, Bellecourt’s response to the entreaties of the foreign community 
was to state that the foreign powers had no rights to demand anything from Satsuma, that 
it was the duty of the bakufu to prevent such attacks, and that, as with previous acts of 
anti-foreign violence, it was for the governments in Europe to decide how best to respond. 
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This support, Bellecourt asserted, was offered despite his personal view that Neale’s 
initial response to Richardson’s murder was both indecisive and insensitive to the 
heightened feelings of the merchant community, not to mention his irritation at the 
resentful demeanour that Neale had adopted towards him since the incident.498 Despite 
these minor annoyances, Bellecourt’s dispatch gave the impression that he had fully 
supported Neale’s view that it would be dangerous to pursue the vengeful course 
demanded by the merchants. Yet a private letter that Neale wrote to Lord Russell on 16 
September painted a very different picture of Bellecourt’s attitude in the immediate 
aftermath of the murder. In this note, Neale solicited Russell’s sympathy for the pressure 
that he had had to endure while resisting a course of action that both the mercantile 
community and his French colleague had attempted to force upon him. The French 
minister’s ‘predilections to propose acts of retaliations and defiance towards the Japanese 
Authorities,’ Neale alleged, ‘has caused me much embarrassment and anxiety to 
oppose’.499 The letter is clear evidence – never highlighted before in any history of this 
period – that Bellecourt deliberately enflamed the passions of the bloodthirsty mob that 
assembled in Yokohama on the night of Richardson’s murder to pressure Neale to take 
military action against Satsuma.  
Although careful to disguise his actions from the Quai d’Orsay, the tone and content of 
Bellecourt’s dispatches since arriving in Japan explains why he did so. The French 
minister had never been convinced that Alcock’s policy of appeasement towards the 
bakufu was the best way to enforce the treaties, and had frequently advocated a more 
punitive approach to Edo’s efforts to shirk its obligations. As long as Alcock had 
remained in Japan, however, he had little choice but to defer to his more experienced and 
influential colleague. With the latter’s departure in spring 1862, the French minister 
automatically assumed the unofficial title of ‘doyen of the diplomatic corps’. While this 
status granted him a degree of respect and deference among the foreign merchant 
community,500 as far as the bakufu and the other treaty-power representatives were 
concerned, Bellecourt’s experience still counted for less than the power and influence that 
Neale wielded. Regardless of his longevity of service, the simple fact was that 
Bellecourt’s authority in Edo remained constrained by the limited naval support he was 
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afforded in comparison to his British colleague, the ‘sluggish’ growth of French 
commerce since the ports opened, and the fact that there were still hardly any French 
merchants in Japan.501  
By contrast, Britain controlled two-thirds of Japan’s import and export trade at the time 
of the Richardson Affair, despite all the obstructions to trade that the bakufu had raised 
at the treaty ports. Thus, whether Bellecourt liked it or not, Neale automatically became 
the most influential treaty-power representative in Edo as soon as he set foot in Japan. 
With the chargé unwilling to defer to Bellecourt’s assessment about the best way to 
compel the bakufu to honour its treaty obligations, it would appear that the French 
minister instead seized the opportunity provided by Richardson’s murder to stoke the 
flames of an already incendiary situation in the hope of provoking the robust response he 
had long advocated. If Neale’s account is accurate, Bellecourt deliberately encouraged a 
retaliatory attack that Satow believed would have resulted in the slaughter of the foreign 
community and the dispatch of another joint naval expedition at the cost of many 
European and Japanese lives.502 While it is fruitless to speculate as to whether or not 
events would have unfolded this way, Bellecourt’s actions indicated a degree of 
recklessness that ill-befitted a man in his position, especially as he was prepared to 
undermine his colleague at a time of acute crisis in order to promote his own policy. One 
thing at least was certain: the Anglo-French partnership that had held Japan’s treaty-port 
system together since 1859 was under unprecedented strain. 
Neale’s refusal to send out his escort to retrieve Richardson’s body and his rejection of 
the measures advocated by the merchant community made him deeply unpopular in 
Yokohama. This was accurately reflected in a witness statement by a local merchant that 
accused Neale of letting ‘the wounded shift for themselves, and the dead remain where 
he was, rather than make a move towards recovering both’.503 This criticism was unfair, 
for the very same merchant had also overheard Neale say that it was ‘perfect madness, or 
words to that effect, to send a handful of men against five or six thousand armed men 
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thirsting for blood’.504 From the outset, it was clear that the chargé was determined not to 
make a bad situation worse, and he did well to stand firm in the face of extreme pressure. 
His policy of ‘extreme caution’ at least found some support in the pages of The North 
China Herald,505 while in Satow’s opinion Neale displayed ‘the cool bearing which might 
be expected from a man who had seen actual service in the field’.506 
Despite his inexperience in Japan, Neale had managed to keep his head while all around 
were losing theirs. Nonetheless, there were several reasons why relations between Britain 
and Japan were now in crisis. First, the Richardson Affair destroyed any residual hope 
that the London Protocol would make any difference to the bakufu’s ability to implement 
the treaties at the open treaty ports. Second, aside from the brutal murder of a British 
subject in broad daylight, Richardson and his party had been attacked within the limits 
permitted for the free and unimpeded movement of foreigners. This represented a direct 
challenge to the treaty structure that the protocol had been designed to preserve. Third, 
Neale was incensed that the foreign magistrates had only contacted him on the day of 
Richardson’s murder to request that British subjects did not travel on the tōkaidō, not 
only because this request arrived too late for him to notify the British community in time 
but also because it proved that they had been powerless to prevent Shimazu’s retinue from 
leaving Edo despite the danger.507 Finally, the fact that the attack was perpetrated by one 
of the most powerful daimyō in Japan also raised difficult questions as to who should be 
held responsible. The Japan Herald was in no doubt that the bakufu was primarily 
accountable, but it had also received rumours that the rōjū had requested help from the 
treaty powers in curbing the influence of the anti-foreign daimyō. If these were true, then 
surely redress should be demanded from Satsuma as well.508 
This argument bore striking resemblance to that made by Neale in a private letter to Lord 
Russell. Although Neale believed a display of naval force and the seizure of bakufu 
steamers would be sufficient to secure an indemnity without provoking war, he also 
suggested that punishing Satsuma would help the beleaguered regime in Edo to recover 
its poise.509 Determined to play things by the book, however, Neale was happy to leave it 
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to the Foreign Office to decide how best to respond, not least because he had not yet 
received London’s response to the second attack on the British legation. He therefore 
informed Russell that he would pursue a defensive policy in his relations with the bakufu 
until he received further instructions.510 This decision left Bellecourt with little choice but 
to await London’s verdict too, since he had no right to demand a different course of action. 
The pace of events duly slowed, as news of Richardson’s murder took two months to 
reach London.511 As a result, both Neale and Bellecourt spent the winter of 1862-3 
holding the fort in Yokohama. During this period, the British chargé held several 
meetings with panicked bakufu representatives desperate to mollify British anger but 
powerless to arrest and punish the Satsuma men who had carried out the murder. By the 
end of October, Neale was convinced that the bakufu was unable to take punitive action 
against Satsuma, and that the members of the rōjū were doing their best under difficult 
conditions.512 It remained to be seen whether the British government took a similar view. 
 
London reacts 
The Foreign Office did not receive Neale’s report concerning the second attack on the 
British legation until mid-September 1862. It arrived after a difficult summer in which 
Palmerston’s government had been forced to defend accusations from across the Atlantic 
that, by allowing the dispatch of an ironclad warship built on Merseyside to the Southern 
states, Britain had breached its neutrality in the American Civil War.513 This issue 
complicated the ongoing dilemma within Palmerston’s Cabinet as to whether Britain 
should offer to mediate between the two contesting parties in an attempt to end a war that 
was severely damaging the British cotton industry.514 Meanwhile in Mexico, the 
humiliating military defeat inflicted on Napoléon III’s expeditionary forces at Puebla on 
5 May 1862 demonstrated just how difficult it would be to establish a puppet monarchy 
there. It also convinced Palmerston, who had been confident that the emperor would 
succeed in establishing some central authority in Mexico, that it would be impossible to 
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pacify such a hostile population. Indeed, the Prime Minister now believed that the 
emperor would have to pull his forces out sooner rather than later.515 An even more 
pressing matter for London at this time was the growing instability in the Balkans 
following Christian uprisings against Turkish rule in Herzegovina the previous year. 
British efforts to resolve this issue peacefully during a conference of great power 
ambassadors in Constantinople in August and September 1862 were hampered by the 
French representative’s insistence upon what Palmerston called ‘inadmissible 
conditions’, but which were actually evidence that Napoléon III still hoped to convince 
Austria to evacuate the Veneto in exchange for new possessions in the East.516 ‘The 
French really are the most difficult people to have anything to do with,’ Palmerston wrote 
angrily to Russell at the end of August, ‘[they] seem to think that they are entitled to be 
the dictators of the whole world’.517  
In fact, the emperor was struggling to even dictate to his own government. In mid-October 
1862, a full-blown crisis erupted in Paris over the emperor’s policy in Italy. After the 
unification of the peninsula in March 1861, Napoléon III had been left with a dilemma 
over the Pope’s continued occupation of Rome in the face of demands from Italian 
nationalists to surrender the city. Constrained by the need to placate his Catholic 
supporters and his pious wife, he was unable to evacuate the French garrison that guarded 
the city without a guarantee from the Italian nationalists that the Pope would not be 
attacked. By contrast, his Foreign Minister Thouvenel favoured the immediate 
withdrawal of the French troops and disassociated himself from the emperor’s proposal 
for the European concert to guarantee the Pope’s sovereignty over the Eternal City. 
Matters came to a head following a failed attempt by the nationalists to march into Rome 
at the end of August 1862, when the Italian government again demanded the evacuation 
of the French forces.518 The emperor’s reaction was to dismiss Thouvenel and replace 
him with Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys, a decision that paralysed Paris for days as other so-
called Italianissimes in the French government threatened to resign in protest.519 A 
compromise was eventually brokered and talks soon resumed in Turin to strike a bargain 
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between the Kingdom of Italy and the papacy.520As far as relations with Britain were 
concerned, the new Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys made it clear that, aside from the 
Roman question, his political views mirrored those of the British government in every 
respect, especially in the Near East.521 
With political turmoil engulfing Europe and the Americas, the news of the second attack 
on the British legation in Japan was received with irritation. ‘If the Japanese were in 
England I think we would make them commit the happy despatch,’ Hammond wrote half-
jokingly to his Parliamentary colleague Henry Layard after reading Neale’s report.522 By 
this point, the Permanent Under-Secretary was sick of the sight of the Japanese 
ambassadors and had no desire to re-enter negotiations with them over yet another 
infraction to the treaties, a feeling he believed was shared by the other courts of Europe.523 
It was also clear to Hammond that this latest assault was not as serious as the first, even 
if it was an unpleasant indication that the bakufu guards could no longer be depended 
upon. The demands issued by the Foreign Office were therefore limited to a £10,000 
indemnity for the families of the murdered marines and increased security at the 
legation.524 That attitude changed when reports of Richardson’s murder arrived at the end 
of November, especially after The Times published a full account of the incident alongside 
an eyewitness report that attacked Neale for his conduct.525 Russell dismissed this 
criticism and instead commended Neale for the ‘judgement and forbearance’ he had 
displayed in resisting the retaliatory measures demanded by the merchants.526 
As usual, it was the newly knighted Sir Rutherford Alcock who shaped Whitehall’s 
response to the Richardson Affair.527 He first heard of the incident while in the process 
of drafting a memorandum for the Foreign Office in response to the second legation 
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attack.528 The deliberate assassination of a British merchant by one of the most powerful 
daimyō in Japan, coming as it did so soon after the attack on the legation by one of the 
bakufu’s own men, confirmed that Alcock’s appeasement strategy had utterly failed to 
change attitudes in Edo towards the treaties. On the contrary, the British minister now 
believed that the London Protocol had either emboldened those who sought to oppose the 
treaties, or forced the bakufu’s opponents to institute a campaign of bloodshed and 
violence in order to make peaceful relations with the treaty powers impossible. Either 
way, he considered all the concessions in the protocol to be null and void.529 However, 
Alcock found it ironic that Hope was now advocating coercive measures when it was the 
admiral’s refusal to station British vessels at the treaty ports that had contributed to the 
parlous state of affairs there in the first place. He nonetheless rejected Hope’s 
recommendation that Britain alone should attempt to coerce the bakufu, which he 
believed would endanger every legation at Edo and provoke the destruction of the treaty 
ports. The admiral, Alcock argued, had been misled by his experiences of fighting the 
Chinese, who were already a conquered people. By contrast, the Japanese would fight 
fiercely for their independence. ‘Add to this another fact,’ Alcock wrote in a passage of 
his memorandum that Russell highlighted, ‘that the other Treaty Powers, if not acting in 
concert, would inevitably neutralize our best efforts’.530 This outcome was all the more 
likely given rumours that Robert H. Pruyn, who replaced Harris as U.S. minister to Japan 
in April 1862, would follow in the footsteps of his obstinate predecessor by remaining in 
Edo as long as he remained untouched by anti-foreign violence. ‘Whichever way our 
efforts may tend, therefore,’ Alcock declared, ‘some concerted action with other Treaty 
Powers is essential.’531 
The importance of this point should not be underestimated. Alcock understood better than 
anyone in London how treaty-port diplomacy worked. Having tried and failed over a 
three-year period to build a consensus between the diplomatic representatives in Edo, he 
knew that coercive measures against either the bakufu or the daimyō would be ineffective 
without the support of all the treaty powers. Alcock agreed that Richardson’s murder 
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demanded redress, for without it no foreigner’s life was safe in Japan. Even so, his 
recommendation for punitive military action against Satsuma was made on the proviso 
that it would be taken with the consent of the other treaty powers and, if possible, in 
concert with them. At the very least, their cooperation was necessary to ensure the 
protection of the treaty ports and to check any hostile movement against the legations in 
Edo. Above all, and regardless of whatever measures the government decided to take, 
Alcock was certain that the status quo was no longer tenable. With Britain’s treaty 
relations with Japan resting on ‘quicksand’, nothing short of the formal ratification of 
treaties by the ‘only titular or recognized sovereign of Japan – the Mikado’ and ‘the 
abolition of the Tycoon’s monopoly of the foreign trade’ through the opening of the 
remaining ports would ensure the survival of the treaty-port system in Japan.532 In 
addition, some of the major daimyō ports should be opened ‘with their declared 
concurrence’.533 With these few strokes of his pen, the British minister swept away a 
fundamental tenet of the ‘unequal treaties’: the principle that the Tokugawa shogun was 
the supreme temporal sovereign of Japan. This memorandum was the first official 
acknowledgement within the Foreign Office that the bakufu’s totalitarian control over 
Japan’s foreign policy, which it had jealously guarded from the daimyō and the Mikado 
for centuries, was beginning to crumble. 
As previously mentioned, Alcock’s views were hugely influential in London by this time. 
However, the possibility that war with Japan would result from the reparations to be 
demanded in response to Richardson’s death led Queen Victoria to insist upon hearing 
the opinion of the entire Cabinet.534 In a note to Russell dated 5 September, the Duke of 
Somerset argued that the government should punish Satsuma rather than the bakufu and 
thereby avoid disruptions to trade with Japan. This mirrored the view put forward by 
Alcock, although Somerset made no mention of the British minister’s recommendation 
to take concerted action with the other treaty powers or his wider arguments about the 
future of the treaty-port system. Palmerston nonetheless agreed that Somerset’s strategy, 
with its underlying premise that the central government in Japan was too weak to punish 
Satsuma itself, was the best way to avoid further atrocities. For his part, the Chancellor 
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William Gladstone argued that a short and limited operation was necessary to avoid 
accusations of hostility against either the Japanese state or the nation as a whole.535 
All three ministers seemed to have been heavily influenced by the opinion of Brigadier-
General Charles Staveley, the Commander of British Troops in China and Hong Kong, 
who thought that it would be easy to punish Satsuma without provoking a wider war with 
the bakufu.536 Neale was therefore instructed at the end of December to demand a formal 
apology and an indemnity of £100,000 from the bakufu, and to treat directly with Satsuma 
to secure a £25,000 indemnity and the trial and execution of Richardson’s murderers. In 
both cases he was authorised to call upon Admiral Kuper to adopt measures of reprisal or 
blockade should either party refuse the demands. As far as cooperation with the other 
treaty powers was concerned, Neale was simply told to communicate his orders to his 
colleagues and to work with Kuper and the other naval commanders to guarantee the 
safety of foreigners during any coercive operations.537 These instructions represented the 
very minimum that Alcock had recommended in his November memorandum. While 
Russell’s dispatch formally acknowledged a distinction between the bakufu and the 
daimyō for the first time, it still did not mention the need to secure imperial ratification 
of the treaties or to remove the bakufu’s monopoly on trade. It was also clear that there 
would be no China-style joint military expedition by the treaty powers to demonstrate to 
the anti-foreign daimyō that resistance to the ‘unequal treaties’ was futile. Instead, any 
coercive action against Satsuma would be strictly limited and carried out by British forces 
alone, even though Alcock had warned that this would achieve little in isolation.  
The British government was not entirely insensitive to the importance of collective action, 
however, as it also asked the Quai d’Orsay if the French Navy could dispatch 
reinforcements in tandem with those being sent to Japan by the Admiralty. Drouyn readily 
agreed to this request, which he immediately forwarded to Justin de Chasseloup-Laubat, 
the Minister of the Navy, two days before Neale’s instructions were sent out.538 The 
response he received was equally positive, as Chasseloup-Laubat also thought that the 
appearance of the French flag in Edo would demonstrate the solidarity of interests that 
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existed between the treaty powers. Even so, he only instructed the new commander of the 
French naval forces in China, Admiral Benjamin Jaurès, to detach a solitary vessel from 
his division to accompany the British squadron. Moreover, Drouyn informed Bellecourt 
that this was the only measure the French government would take in response to the 
growing political crisis in Japan.539 Despite Alcock’s belief that the situation in Japan had 
become untenable, the British and French governments still believed that it was possible 
to deter further infractions to the treaties by simply reinforcing their naval presence at the 
ports. At a time when other international crises still dominated the international agenda, 
neither was prepared to commit the time and resources necessary to institute the 
fundamental change that Alcock now considered essential. 
 
The threat of expulsion 
On the other side of the world, tensions between Kyoto and Edo had reached boiling 
point. When Shimazu left Edo in September 1862, he had been confident that his 
successful installation of the kōbu-gattai lords to important positions within the bakufu 
would bring about the reform that the tozama daimyō desired. Unfortunately, his absence 
from Kyoto had allowed jōi extremists to increase their strength at the imperial court, as 
he discovered when he arrived back in the city. Not long afterwards, his involvement in 
the Richardson Affair compelled him to abandon the city again to begin preparations for 
the possibility of British reprisals against his own capital at Kagoshima. This allowed the 
fanatically anti-foreign retainers of the Chōshū, Satsuma, and Tosa domains, the so-called 
‘men of high purpose’, or shishi, who remained in Kyoto to secure the dispatch of another 
envoy to Edo to demand the immediate expulsion of foreigners.  
By this time this envoy arrived in December, Hitotsubashi Keiki and his colleague 
Matsudaira Keiei had already secured an agreement for the shogun to visit Kyoto the 
following spring. They had also relaxed the sankin-kōtai regulations of alternate 
residence that had so effectively restricted the freedom of the tozama. As the streets of 
Edo emptied of daimyō and their retainers, it seemed as if the very foundations of bakufu 
power were beginning to drain away. In this atmosphere, Keiki and Keiei began to discuss 
the resignation of the shogun as the only possible way to avoid embroiling Japan in a 
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ruinous war with the treaty powers. Ironically, the arrival of Kyoto’s envoy provided 
some respite, as his instructions had been tempered at the last minute to give the bakufu 
discretion over the method and timing of expulsion. With sufficient breathing space to 
seek a compromise, the bakufu formally assented to the policy of expulsion on 24 January 
1863, albeit in typically vague terms. Yet when Keiki arrived in Kyoto to prepare for the 
shogun’s visit it rapidly became clear that conciliation was impossible. On 29 March, 
Keiki and his colleagues were forced to make a commitment to the imperial court that the 
bakufu would begin to effect expulsion within twenty days of the shogun’s return to Edo. 
Under further pressure, the date was fixed for 25 June 1863.540 
Threatened in the latter part of 1862 by persistent threats of an impending attack on 
Yokohama by anti-foreign fanatics, Bellecourt and Neale were aware of the growing 
antagonism between Edo and Kyoto, even if they did not fully understand the myriad 
forces that were inspiring it. Matters became clearer at the end of January 1863, when 
bakufu officials met separately with both men to inform them that the shogun was going 
to Kyoto – an event unprecedented in 230 years of Tokugawa rule – to dissuade the 
emperor from insisting upon the immediate closure of Yokohama. For Bellecourt, this 
was confirmation that the constitutional struggle he had long anticipated between the 
temporal and spiritual emperors of Japan had finally begun. Reports from the French 
missionary Mermet de Cachon that the bakufu was stockpiling munitions in preparation 
for the outbreak of war with the treaty powers were no less troubling.541 The plot 
thickened at Neale’s meeting with the bakufu representatives on 28 January, when he was 
asked whether or not Britain would come to the shogun’s aid should he fail to convince 
the emperor to postpone expulsion. The British chargé, aware that his government would 
never approve of intervention in a civil war, instead suggested to Russell that the Royal 
Navy dispatch an imposing British naval force to Hyōgo or Osaka so that direct 
negotiations to secure the emperor’s public sanction for the treaties could begin.542 
A few days later, the construction site for the new British legation in Edo was burnt down 
by a group of Chōshū shishi. This added to the febrile atmosphere of impending crisis at 
Yokohama, leading Neale to request immediate naval reinforcements from Admiral 
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Kuper.543 Despite this, Neale remained sanguine about his relations with the bakufu, 
having misinterpreted the closure of the tokaidō to daimyō traffic in January as evidence 
of Edo’s determination to protect foreigners. In fact, this was primarily motivated by the 
need to avert a further clash between the treaty powers and the lords evacuating the capital 
after the relaxation of sankin-kōtai.544 Neale was largely sympathetic to the bakufu’s 
plight, as he realised that it was caught between balancing the demands of the treaty 
powers on one side with those of the anti-foreign faction on the other. Although he feared 
that Edo was beginning to succumb to the latter, the continued growth in British trade at 
the ports led him to declare in February that Britain’s relations with Japan presented ‘no 
serious cause for discouragement’.545 His confidence was bolstered by the arrival of the 
end of March of Admiral Kuper at the head of a squadron of British gunboats, with 
Admiral Jaurès not far behind.546 
By this point, Neale had received London’s instructions regarding the Richardson Affair, 
He interpreted these orders as cautiously as possible in the hope of avoiding the disastrous 
consequences of taking coercive measures against the bakufu. After all, as he explained 
to Russell, the foreign community had most to lose from such an outcome, and it would 
destroy the shogun’s chances of defeating the anti-foreign clique at Kyoto. Instead, ‘the 
hardest blows’ should be directed against Satsuma so as to strengthen Edo’s hand in its 
struggle against the fanatical party in Kyoto, and the bakufu should be given every 
possible chance to comply with Britain’s demands for an apology and an indemnity.547 
That said, when he presented these demands to the bakufu, he did not flinch from pointing 
out the dire consequences that would follow should it fail to respond positively within the 
twenty-day time limit he set.548 Despite such fiery rhetoric, it soon became obvious that 
Neale’s bark was worse than his bite. 
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The departure of the shogun for Kyoto at the end of March had been deliberately timed 
to pre-empt the presentation of London’s demands by creating a power vacuum in Edo. 
Simultaneously, the arrival of accurate reports that the shogun had finally agreed to 
expulsion left Neale with little choice but to extend his deadline on 24 April by another 
fifteen days.549 Neither Kuper nor Neale had any clue as to what the answer from Edo 
would be, but the growing evidence of preparations for war was a source of great 
anxiety.550 Kuper had also received troubling reports that Satsuma and other powerful 
daimyō were secretly accumulating large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition from the 
Americans, but he was more concerned about what would happen in Yokohama if Neale 
failed to induce the bakufu to comply with Britain’s demands. ‘I think that Her Majesty’s 
Government have very much underrated the strength of the Japanese as a nation’, he 
warned the Duke of Somerset, ‘should the matter now in hand unfortunately result in 
hostilities, I fear that I should be able to make but very little impression with the force at 
my disposal.’551 
Neale and Kuper’s warning about the dangers of embroiling Britain in the revolutionary 
crisis that was engulfing Japan echoed the arguments made by Alcock before Russell’s 
instructions went out. Like Alcock, these men had spent enough time on the spot to know 
that any attempt to punish the bakufu for the crimes of the anti-foreign daimyō when it 
was already under extreme pressure to expel foreigners would probably unite the entire 
country against the ‘barbarian invasion’ and result in a general massacre at the treaty 
ports. Moreover, the fact that the U.S. minister Robert Pruyn still appeared to be working 
at cross purposes to his colleagues only increased the likelihood that unilateral British 
military action against Edo would be interpreted as an attempt to conquer Japan.552 In 
order to avoid this outcome, and in the absence of any prospect of concerted military 
action by all the treaty powers, it was therefore imperative that the daimyō directly 
responsible for Richardson’s murder was seen to bear the brunt of Britain’s wrath. Despite 
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the bakufu’s myriad deficiencies, it was also critical that it was supported as far as 
possible in its existential struggle against sonnō-jōi fanatics.  
Bellecourt and Jaurès entirely concurred with this strategy at a crisis summit with their 
British counterparts in early May. Whatever differences of opinion had existed between 
the British and French representatives in the immediate aftermath of Richardson’s death 
had been dissipated by mid-April, when Bellecourt received orders from Paris directing 
him to work ‘in perfect accord’ with the policy pursued by the British government.553 
Aware that the squadron at Kuper’s disposal was insufficient to guarantee the safety of 
Yokohama against attack, Bellecourt believed, perhaps the first time since his arrival in 
Japan, that the presence of a significant French naval force in Edo Bay granted him real 
influence. As a result, he and Jaurès hoped to preserve peace by convincing Neale and 
Kuper to entrust the punishment of Satsuma to the bakufu and relax their ultimatum for 
military action. They were forced to abandon that plan, however, when they received 
definitive proof that the shogun had promised the emperor to expel foreigners. Instead, 
they agreed with Neale and Kuper to offer Edo the support of their combined naval forces 
to help quell anti-foreign resistance to the treaties – a proposal that bore striking 
similarities to the solution that the bakufu representatives had suggested to Neale at the 
end of January.554 This offer was made during two lengthy meetings with the bakufu 
envoys on 4 and 5 May, during which Neale agreed to extend his ultimatum until the 
shogun’s return.555 At a further meeting on 25 May, however, it was rejected on the basis 
that the bakufu could not accept foreign aid at such a sensitive time. After a series of 
further delays that forced Neale to reveal his knowledge of the expulsion order, Edo 
eventually promised to begin payment of the indemnity on 18 June.556 
The bakufu’s decision to reject the offer of Anglo-French aid should not detract from the 
fact that neither the Foreign Office nor the Quai d’Orsay had authorised such an initiative, 
which far exceeded even the most liberal interpretation of Neale and Bellecourt’s 
instructions. This attempt at ‘gunboat diplomacy’, albeit a nuanced version of it, 
constituted a significant risk for both the British and French representatives, but perhaps 
more so for the latter given his government’s reluctance to interfere in Japanese politics 
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or to commit significant naval resources to the country. It also indicated the unity of 
purpose that Japan’s political crisis had instilled in Neale and Bellecourt, not to mention 
the lengths that they were willing to go to avert war. The fact that they unsuccessfully 
attempted to convince their American and Dutch colleagues to offer military assistance 
to the bakufu as well demonstrated their commitment to the principles of collective 
diplomacy that were so important to the effective functioning of the treaty-port system.557 
Whether their superiors in London and Paris would see it that way was another matter, 
but neither Neale nor Bellecourt were prepared to risk the consequences of inaction by 
waiting months to find out. 
It is impossible to know exactly what form of military intervention Neale and Bellecourt 
had in mind, since their proposal was never accepted by the bakufu. Some historians 
believe that it would have involved the dispatch of a joint naval force to support 
operations against Edo’s domestic opponents in Kyoto and the Inland Sea.558 As 
Bellecourt admitted to Drouyn, such an expedition would have certainly required further 
British and French reinforcements from China, and it is worth considering whether it was 
ever a realistic prospect. It is possible that the British and French representatives only 
offered the bakufu a way out of its predicament in order to test whether it was genuinely 
committed to fighting the anti-foreign party or secretly in league with it. A dispatch 
penned by Bellecourt after his meeting with Neale in early May adds weight to this theory, 
for it asserted that there were now only two ways to safeguard the rights and dignity of 
the treaty powers: either to reject further delay by the bakufu and enter into immediate 
hostilities with all Japan; or to compel Edo ‘to state its position clearly on the foreign 
question by offering it immediate and complete support against the opponents, whoever 
they may be, who are inducing it to break its commitments’.559 If the bakufu really wished 
to maintain peace with the outside world, Bellecourt argued, then it would surely prove 
as much by accepting this offer. Even if it did not, the underlying principle behind the 
proposal for military aid was that it would be better for the treaty powers, or Britain and 
France at the very least, to oppose anti-foreign extremism collectively than to leave it up 
to the British to tackle alone. 
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Unfortunately for Bellecourt, Drouyn did not agree that the situation in Japan warranted 
any change to the instructions he had issued at the beginning of the year.560 He already 
had more than enough in his plate with events in Europe, where a rebellion against 
Russian rule had erupted in Poland, and the United States, where the civil war continued 
to rage. As for the Mexico campaign, it was increasingly turning into a quagmire that was 
causing the French government ‘much embarrassment’ and ‘enormous expense’.561 There 
were also more pressing issues for the Quai d’Orsay in East Asia, such as the 
administration and protection of the provinces France now controlled in Cochinchina,562 
and security at Shanghai, where civil unrest continued to disrupt trade and threaten the 
safety of the foreign merchant community. Drouyn was therefore apoplectic to learn of 
Bellecourt’s determination to intervene in Japan’s domestic affairs, not to mention 
Admiral Jaurès’s decision to land 300 French troops in Yokohama and request a further 
battalion of reinforcements from Cochinchina thereafter. In a strongly worded letter, he 
completely rejected the principle of collective diplomacy that Bellecourt’s proposal 
represented. He repeated that the French government had only recommended the dispatch 
of one warship to Japan to demonstrate moral solidarity with Britain and the other treaty 
powers. Whatever Britain’s difficulties in Japan, Drouyn could not think of ‘a single 
reason that could justify an undertaking where the sacrifices…would so heavily outweigh 
any hypothetical advantages’, especially ‘when matters of such capital importance 
already dominate our attention and drive our policy’.563 Drouyn also attached a letter from 
William Seward, the U.S. Secretary of State, to Pruyn that lamented Britain’s use of 
coercion in its attempt to secure the indemnity.564 With Franco-American relations 
already highly complicated, Drouyn wanted to disassociate the French government 
entirely from what he saw as a policy of naked aggression.565 
Neale and Bellecourt’s proposal was nothing of the sort. If anything, it was the direct 
opposite: an attempt to support the recognised government of Japan against those whom 
the British and French representatives believed were trying to destroy it. It was therefore 
a credit to the Foreign Office’s understanding of Japanese affairs, compared to the State 
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Department in the United States and the Foreign Ministry in France at least, that Russell 
explicitly approved of Neale’s policy of supporting the bakufu against the daimyō as 
‘entirely in conformity with the views of H.M.G.’.566 Yet since the offer of British and 
French military aid was rejected by Edo, why did this not precipitate an immediate 
outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Japan? The reason is simple: at the very same 
meeting when the bakufu officials had declined military assistance, they had also pledged 
to pay the Richardson indemnity and offered assurances that the shogun would return to 
Kyoto to induce the emperor to accept the treaties.567 The whole point of offering the use 
of British and French naval forces in the first place had been to call the bakufu’s bluff on 
expulsion to pressure it into accepting Britain’s demands for compensation for the 
Richardson Affair. Edo’s rejection of that offer in exchange for acceptance of both the 
treaties and the indemnity therefore meant that Neale and Bellecourt had achieved their 
objective without having to follow through with their promise. Their calculated gamble 
appeared to have successfully paid off. 
Unfortunately, the political crisis that threatened to engulf the treaty powers in an 
internecine civil war was still far from over. The bakufu officials in Edo who pledged to 
pay the indemnity did so to avert an imminent clash with Britain. Naturally, such a policy 
was anathema to the sonnō-jōi fanatics in Kyoto, who expected expulsion to commence 
as promised on 25 June. To make matters worse, such was the division among the kōbu-
gattai lords in Kyoto over how to deal with the emperor’s demand for expulsion that there 
was no possibility of their taking decisive action to crush the anti-foreign party. Confusion 
reigned in Edo as a result, as some officials advocated refusal of the indemnity and 
initiation of immediate negotiations over expulsion, and others the direct opposite. In the 
opinion of the rōjū Ogasawara Nagamichi, who had been sent by Keiki from Kyoto to 
negotiate with Neale, the only option now open to the bakufu was to pay the indemnity 
as a preliminary to a negotiated settlement with the treaty powers over expulsion. After 
his arrival in Edo in late May, Ogasawara successfully convinced Neale to extend his 
deadline to 18 June, and conceded for the first time Britain’s right to demand recompense 
from Satsuma for Richardson’s murder. No sooner had he done so than orders arrived 
from Keiki, en route to Edo with the expulsion edict, not to pay the indemnity. Neale was 
notified of this news a few hours before the time fixed for payment of the first instalment 
of the indemnity. Outraged, he finally refused further negotiations unless full payment 
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was made. On 20 June, he instructed Kuper to make preparations for coercive measures. 
According to Satow, the admiral ‘did not know what to do’ and had ‘never seen a gun 
fired in action’, which if true helps to explain why he had always been so keen to avoid 
military action.568 Even so, war between Britain and Japan seemed imminent.569 
In a last-ditch attempt to avert hostilities by playing ‘barbarian’ off against ‘barbarian’, 
Ogasawara came to Yokohama on 23 June in the hope of convincing Bellecourt and 
Jaurès to intercede with the British on the bakufu’s behalf. Given that this request was 
made in conjunction with the presentation of the expulsion edict, it was hardly a surprise 
that the Frenchmen refused such a course. In any case, as Sims has accurately pointed 
out, Bellecourt was increasingly aware of the dangers of allowing the bakufu to separate 
him from his colleagues, as it had managed to do with Harris.570 Out of options, 
Ogasawara sent news to Neale during the early hours of 24 June that the Richardson 
indemnity, and indeed that requested by the British government for the second attack on 
the British legation, would be paid in full later that day. Once the first instalment of the 
payment was delivered to Neale early the same morning, Kuper was immediately relieved 
of the task of undertaking coercive operations.571 The threat of imminent war had been 
averted, but the foreign representatives still had to respond to the expulsion edict. It was 
a telling indictment of just how little appetite Ogasawara had for this policy that he 
counselled the representatives to reply to it in the strongest possible terms so as to produce 
a ‘profound impression’ on the minds of the most recalcitrant in Edo and Kyoto.572 At the 
same time, he was careful not to mention the fact that bakufu officials at the imperial 
capital had played an integral role in the decision to pursue expulsion in the first place, 
or that they had nominated June 25 as the date at which it was to commence.  
Despite the efforts of officials in Edo to convince Neale and Bellecourt of their 
determination to convince the Mikado to sanction the treaties, Ogasawara’s advice 
understandably provoked suspicion in Yokohama about the bakufu’s true motives. Neale 
for one now harboured fears that the shogun’s pledge to return to Kyoto to secure imperial 
sanction for the treaties was simply another delaying tactic to buy time for expulsion 
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preparations to be completed.573 Bellecourt could not decide whether the edict meant that 
the bakufu had now definitively decided to restrict the treaties or was simply defending 
itself against the actions of powerful daimyō seeking to diminish its power.574 Either way, 
the expulsion edict focused the minds of the treaty-power representatives, bringing them 
together on the morning of 24 June. With a unity that had not been apparent since the first 
year of treaty relations, the representatives of Britain, France, Holland, the United States, 
Prussia, and Portugal each issued a statement that day condemning the expulsion edict as 
tantamount to a declaration of war.575 After years of attempting to divide the treaty powers 
as a means to subvert the ‘unequal treaties’, in its desperation the bakufu, or at least those 
within it who prioritised avoiding conflict with the treaty powers over domestic stability, 
had finally united the fractious diplomatic community. This revival of collective 
diplomacy would have significant consequences for the Japanese treaty-port system over 
the coming year, when the treaty powers would be forced to confront the challenges of 
anti-foreign extremism head-on. 
 
The bombardment of Kagoshima 
Ogasawara’s payment of the Richardson indemnity largely settled the most pressing 
dispute between Britain and the bakufu, and the day set for expulsion came and went 
without any significant incident in Yokohama. As long as no forceful attempt was made 
to enforce expulsion, Neale and Bellecourt were confident that an attitude of ‘defensive 
expectancy’, together with the combined resources of the naval forces at their disposal, 
would prove sufficient to protect Yokohama for the foreseeable future.576 Little did they 
know, however, that the Chōshū domain, by this point completely under the control of 
the sonnō-jōi zealots, had already decided to interpret the expulsion edict literally.577 On 
25 June 1863, two of its European-made vessels duly opened fire on an American 
merchant ship as it attempted to pass through the Straits of Shimonoseki (an important 
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point of access to the Inland Sea for merchant vessels travelling from Shanghai to 
Yokohama). This attack was followed by further engagements with French and Dutch 
vessels over the coming days that provoked successful reprisal operations by the 
American and French navies in mid-July, although it was not long before Chōshū rebuilt 
their dismantled batteries and sealed the straits off the Western shipping once more.578  
The closure of the straits naturally caused consternation in Yokohama, where the new-
found unity of the treaty-power representatives was apparent from the unanimous 
declaration made by Neale, Bellecourt, de Wit, and Pruyn on 25 July to invite their naval 
commanders to take concerted measures to re-open them.579 Initially, this declaration 
appeared to indicate that the treaty powers were finally resolved to take a decisive stand 
against the jōi fanatics. In fact, it was made in an atmosphere of total confusion in 
Yokohama, where Neale and his colleagues felt ‘utterly unable’ to penetrate the bakufu’s 
motives.580 After all, only a few weeks earlier, Edo officials had assured the British and 
French diplomatic and naval representatives that the expulsion edict was to be considered 
‘null and void’, that commerce would continue at the treaty ports, and that the bakufu 
would appreciate the help of British and French naval forces to transport shogunate troops 
to Osaka as part of an expedition to urge the emperor to accept the treaties.581 Whether 
such declarations were sincere or part of some ‘mysterious plan’ remained unclear to 
Bellecourt.582 Admiral Kuper for one believed that, since the bakufu had acknowledged 
that it was ‘not in a position to go to war with us’, ‘the national force of Japan has been 
reduced to little or nothing’.583  
Faith in the Japanese government’s ability to uphold its pledges to the treaty powers was 
shaken further by Edo’s confession that it was not only powerless to stop Chōshū from 
closing the straits, but that it would be impossible to punish the domain if it had acted 
under direct orders from Kyoto. This placed full responsibility for the actions of the 
rebellious daimyō at the imperial court – a dangerous assertion given the growing doubts 
in Yokohama over the legitimacy of the shogun and the fact that the bakufu, through 
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Hitotsubashi Keiki, had played a critical role in drafting and delivering the expulsion 
edict.584 Bellecourt was now convinced that the bakufu was playing a ‘double game’ to 
delay a crisis with the foreign powers as long as possible to give the anti-foreign daimyō 
the time to prepare acts of violence that Edo could then support or disavow depending 
upon the outcome.585 It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion that the 
foreign representatives issued their proposal for a joint expedition, only to receive 
assurances from the bakufu days later that it was capable of punishing the daimyō after 
all.586 In such uncertainty, many of the treaty-power representatives were reluctant to 
follow through on their declaration without instructions from home. As a result, the ever-
cautious Neale decided in the end not to press for the launch of a joint naval expedition 
as long as trade and the treaty ports remained unmolested.587 
Neale was not so equivocal about the still unresolved issue of Britain’s demands for 
reparation from Satsuma. In mid-July, he instructed Admiral Kuper to ready his squadron 
to sail to Kagoshima. In the hope of discovering the ‘real sentiments and intentions of this 
Chief and other powerful daimios of this Empire’, Neale insisted that he and his legation 
accompany the flotilla of seven warships that arrived at Kagoshima on 12 August.588 
Three days later, after abortive negotiations with four Satsuma envoys, military action 
commenced when the Kagoshima batteries opened fire. The outcome of the bombardment 
that followed has been well documented by Satow, who witnessed it with the rest of the 
British legation. Hampered by poor weather conditions, the British suffered heavy losses 
in the face of fierce resistance from the Satsuma batteries. By the end of the day, tens of 
British sailors were dead, including the captain and commanders of Kuper’s flagship, and 
fifty wounded. The city of Kagoshima lay in flames, however, its batteries mostly 
destroyed.589 
Despite this awesome demonstration of British naval power, Neale and Kuper had failed 
to secure an indemnity for Richardson’s family and the trial and execution of the men 
responsible for his murder. In his published account of these operations, Satow criticised 
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the decision to withdraw the British force the next day instead of maintaining the 
bombardment until every Satsuma gun had been silenced. In his view, the departure of 
the fleet to the sound of gunfire allowed the Satsuma men to claim with some legitimacy 
that they had forced the British into ignominious retreat. Satow also attacked Neale for 
interfering too much in the conduct of the operations and for later asserting that the fire 
which destroyed Kagoshima had been accidental. In his private diary, Satow was also 
highly critical of Kuper for allowing himself to be pushed around by Neale, who had 
ordered the admiral to seize and burn the steamers. Satow believed that Kuper would 
never have fired a shot unless first fired upon, and that he had only engaged in the 
bombardment in the first place under extreme pressure from his captain and commander. 
To cap it all, Kuper had also refused Neale’s request to land men to take some guns as 
trophies of victory. ‘Everyone says [Kuper] is a very brave and cool man in action’, Satow 
observed wryly in his diary, ‘otherwise I should say he was just the opposite.’590  
Clearly sensing that he was likely to come in for some criticism for burning down 
Kagoshima, Kuper wrote privately to Somerset at the end of August to defend his actions. 
Having been forced to respond to the attack upon the British flag in appalling weather 
conditions, he had considered it advisable at the time to make the castigation as severe as 
possible. He therefore felt confident that the destruction of Satsuma’s arsenal and 
steamers was ‘a severe blow’ that would make other daimyō think twice about attacking 
a Royal Navy vessel again.591 Kuper was now also certain that diplomacy was failing to 
prevent the Japanese from implementing expulsion, which he suspected the bakufu had 
been ‘steadily and stealthily working [for] ever since the hasty treaty was made with 
them’.592 He believed that the time had come for all the treaty powers to unite to disarm 
Japan or abandon the country altogether, and that small expeditionary forces such as that 
sent to punish Satsuma were no longer effective. 
Kuper’s letter laid bare the truth that now confronted the treaty powers. Anti-foreign 
fanaticism in Japan could not be overcome by isolated acts of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ by 
individual Western nations. In fact, despite Neale’s attempts to justify the bombardment 
of Kagoshima as suitable recompense for Richardson’s murder,593 the attack on Satsuma, 
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like the failure of American and French gunboats to re-open the Straits of Shimonoseki, 
merely emboldened the Chōshū-led sonnō-jōi party in Kyoto. In September, it attempted 
to seize absolute control over the imperial court and restore the emperor to his ancient 
position as supreme sovereign. Although this plot was thwarted by the intervention of 
Shimazu and other kōbu-gattai lords, sonnō-jōi extremism continued to persist in the 
renegade domain. The purge of Chōshū leaders from Kyoto by Shimazu, with the tacit 
support of the emperor and his senior courtiers, did little to change attitudes in the 
imperial city towards expulsion in any case, and by the autumn of 1863 the pressure on 
the bakufu to begin carrying it out was building again.594 This led to a request, presented 
to the American and Dutch representatives on 26 October 1863, to open discussions over 
the closure of Yokohama. Understandably, this proposal was immediately rejected by all 
four foreign representatives.595 
The request to close Yokohama showed yet again that the bakufu was determined to 
escape its treaty obligations. After all, it came just weeks after Neale had addressed a 
‘friendly warning’ to the rōjū regarding the government’s ‘ominous and alarming silence’ 
at a time when it was increasingly clear that bakufu and daimyō alike were making 
military preparations to forcibly expel foreigners.596 Although Kuper expected to have 
ample warning of any direct attack on Yokohama, he was certain that the request to close 
the port would inevitably lead to further restrictions on trade. Unfortunately, as Kuper 
explained to Somerset, the British could no longer count upon their French colleagues to 
respond proactively to this latest threat to trade, as he had received intelligence that ‘the 
French authorities here have positive instructions from Paris to avoid a war with Japan to 
the utmost’.597 Kuper’s source was accurate, for Bellecourt felt so constrained after 
receiving Drouyn’s reprimand of 18 July that he not only refused to discuss the closure 
of Yokohama with the rōjū but also informed them that changes to the treaties could only 
be made in Europe. The bakufu therefore began immediate preparations to send another 
embassy to the West for that purpose.598 Bellecourt also protested vigorously against 
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Drouyn’s assessment of his policy, even though he accepted that he had overstepped the 
mark at the Quai d’Orsay. It was to little avail, however, as the French minister soon 
learned that he was to be replaced in Japan by Léon Roches, the then consul-general at 
Tunis.599 
Without the energetic support of his French colleague it was never likely that Neale, 
whose caution and conservatism always stood in stark contrast to his self-reliant and 
independently-minded predecessor, would alter the defensive policy he had pursued since 
the settlement of the Richardson indemnity. The surprise withdrawal of the expulsion 
edict by the bakufu in mid-November gave the British chargé hope that Edo had prevailed 
over its enemies in Kyoto and induced them to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards 
foreign relations.600 This welcome development was followed swiftly by an even more 
unexpected event: the opening of direct negotiations, under the good offices of the bakufu, 
with two envoys of the Prince of Satsuma. After three days of intensive talks, the envoys 
promised to pay the £25,000 indemnity for Richardson’s murder and to punish those 
responsible for his death.601 When Neale finally received this indemnity in mid-
December, he wrote to Russell in supreme satisfaction at what he termed the ‘final 
accomplishment of his instructions’, which he attributed to ‘patience and perseverance’, 
the ‘uninterrupted presence of a powerful British squadron’, and ‘the hard blows struck 
at Kagosima’.602 Kuper agreed that Satsuma’s desire to make peace on any terms so as to 
avoid another visit by the British fleet to Kagoshima was significant, though he cautioned 
that Britain’s position in Japan was not what it should be and that there were many more 
difficulties to encounter before it could be improved.603  
There can be little doubt that both Neale and Kuper remained wary about the future of 
the Japanese treaty-port system. Yet the positive sheen that they put on their assessments 
of the situation at the end of 1863 created a false sense of optimism in London that the 
chastisement of Satsuma had definitively silenced anti-foreign sentiments in Japan. This 
was evident in the dispatch Russell addressed to Neale on 11 January 1864, in which he 
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stated his satisfaction at ‘the termination of the pressing difficulties with Japan’ and 
expectation that commercial relations would now continue ‘without giving occasion for 
future collision’.604 In reality, the struggle for political supremacy in Japan was far from 
over. Of course, Neale and Kuper could not possibly have known that Shimazu had 
always opposed expulsion of the type advocated by the sonnō-jōi party as certain to lead 
to war with the treaty powers.605 Thus, while they hoped that the opening of negotiations 
with Satsuma’s agents at the end of 1863 was evidence that anti-foreign extremism had 
been definitively defeated, the actual situation was more complex.  
The bombardment had certainly demonstrated to Satsuma’s retainers the ‘irresistible 
superiority’ of British power and the futility of attempting to resist it.606 But what Neale 
and Kuper had failed to realise was that Shimazu had long desired trade with the foreign 
powers to strengthen his power and influence within Japan’s political system – an 
ambition that had always been thwarted by the bakufu’s monopoly on foreign trade. The 
apparent change in Satsuma’s demeanour was therefore not quite as significant as it may 
have first appeared, and it certainly had little effect on the determination of the fanatical 
party now holed up in Chōshū to implement full expulsion. However, it would be unfair 
to denigrate Neale and Kuper for failing to understand the intricacies of Japan’s internal 
strife at this time, or their understandable desire to draw the British government’s 
attention away from Kagoshima to the fact that the Richardson indemnity had been 
secured without disrupting what continued to be a very prosperous trade at the treaty 
ports. Yet their positive reports at the end of 1863, coupled with encouraging trade 
returns, greatly lessened the effect in Europe of their earlier warnings that commercial 
relations with Japan were deeply unstable. Thus, while it may have been clear to the men 
on the spot that the ‘unequal treaties’ stood on very shaky constitutional ground, there 
was little sign of any great concern in London and Paris that the treaty-port system was 
under imminent threat. 
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Conclusions 
In retrospect, 1863 marked an important watershed in the history of treaty-power relations 
with the Tokugawa bakufu. Contrary to Michael Auslin’s assertion that the Richardson 
Affair had ‘very little effect on treaty relations per se’ and that ‘there was no evidence 
that British officials considered this an extraordinary crisis or that treaty relations were 
threatened’,607 this incident and its aftermath opened the eyes of the men on the spot to 
Edo’s powerlessness to punish renegade daimyō and its inability to control the imperial 
court in Kyoto. It was also becoming increasingly obvious that the regime with which the 
‘unequal treaties’ had been made was itself complicit in efforts to restrict and eventually 
expunge those commercial agreements. By the close of 1863, this had created a deep 
sense of foreboding in Yokohama about the future of the Japanese treaty-port system. 
Quite rightly, the British and French naval and diplomatic authorities suspected that the 
only thing preventing its total collapse was the continued presence of their naval forces 
in Edo Bay. Yet while Anglo-French naval cooperation was sufficient to deter any 
immediate attempt at expulsion, it would never be enough to defeat the ideology behind 
anti-foreign fanaticism. For this reason, and to test the bakufu’s commitment to the 
treaties, the shogun was offered British and French military aid to fight his enemies. When 
this offer was declined, the men on the spot tried unsuccessfully to convince the other 
treaty powers to unite against the anti-foreign daimyō instead. 
Unfortunately for Bellecourt, he soon discovered that Drouyn was unwilling to 
countenance coercive operations in Japan of any kind. Given the substantial French 
military commitments elsewhere in the world at the time, this was understandable. 
Meanwhile, the British Cabinet was hopeful that the bombardment of Kagoshima would 
alone prove sufficient to deter further anti-foreign attacks. With Bellecourt hobbled and 
Neale unwilling to act on his own initiative, the idea of a joint naval expedition against 
Chōshū was quietly dropped. As the end of their tenure in Japan approached, it was hardly 
surprising that Neale accentuated his achievements or that Bellecourt lost the will to keep 
challenging bakufu attempts to restrict the treaties. By working together, they had at least 
averted a general massacre at the treaty ports and kept the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan 
going. By rekindling collective diplomacy in the Japanese treaty-port system, they had 
also bequeathed their successors a means to defeat sonnō-jōi extremism once and for all. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Expedient Alliance: Alcock, Roches and the Shimonoseki Expedition, 
1864 
The years preceding 1864 saw Anglo-French relations with Japan reach a crisis point. 
After much provocation, the Richardson Affair had finally convinced the British 
government that it was no longer willing to tolerate infringements of the ‘unequal treaties’ 
commercial treaty or allow attacks on British nationals at the treaty ports to go 
unpunished. Unfortunately, it was clear to Neale and Bellecourt by the time they left 
Japan that the independent military action that Britain had taken against Satsuma in 1863 
in retaliation for Richardson’s murder had not only failed to put an end to anti-foreign 
extremism but also exposed grave doubts about the bakufu’s commitment to the treaties. 
Despite this, both the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay were confident that the British 
naval engagement at Kagoshima had finally brought commercial stability to the Japanese 
treaty-port system.  
As he neared the end of his period of home leave in London, Sir Rutherford Alcock 
observed the unstable situation in Japan with growing alarm. With commerce imperilled 
and the treaty-powers disjointed, he realised a fundamental change in policy was 
necessary if the treaty-port system was to survive. The time had come to put the 
diplomatic framework that underpinned that system to the test: if Britain alone could not 
coerce the bakufu to recognise its treaty obligations, then a political and military alliance 
of all the treaty powers would have to do so instead. That meant convincing the new 
French minister to Japan, Léon Roches, and the other foreign representatives to defer to 
British leadership of the Japanese treaty-port system. This had been no easy task during 
Alcock’s previous stint in Edo, and there was little indication that it would be any easier 
this time around. It also meant managing the expectations of the British and French 
governments, both of which had no desire to be dragged into another messy war in the 
Far East. Above all, it meant finding a way to suppress anti-foreign fanaticism in Japan 
without sparking a disastrous civil war that could envelop the increasingly prosperous 
‘enclave empires’ at the treaty ports. In short, it would be no easy task. 
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The case for military action 
As a detached observer to the tumultuous events that had unfolded in Japan during his 
lengthy period of home leave, Alcock was forced to rely upon delayed diplomatic 
dispatches to interpret a complex and evolving situation. On 28 October 1863, the Foreign 
Office received Neale’s report of the expedition to Kagoshima, which included a 
recommendation that one thousand marines be assigned to Japan to seize and destroy any 
future defences erected by the daimyō.608 A few days later, Alcock submitted a 
memorandum to the Foreign Secretary Lord Russell in support of this proposal, which he 
argued should form the basis for a fundamental reassessment of Britain’s Japan policy. It 
was more obvious than ever that the daimyō were supporting expulsion because they 
viewed relations with the West as a threat to their feudal hegemony and resented the 
shogun’s monopoly on trade. The indecisive outcome of the Kagoshima expedition 
demonstrated that the only way to end instability in Japan was for a large military force 
to inflict a decisive defeat on this anti-foreign party and its sonnō-jōi philosophy.609 In 
private, Alcock also recommended using the same military force to coerce the bakufu into 
relinquishing its exclusive trading privileges and sharing them with the daimyō. Not for 
the first time, he argued that this would be the most effective way to bring about a gradual 
transformation of Japan’s feudal system of government into one more open to Western 
commerce. Above all, it was clear that any further attempts to defeat the anti-foreign 
faction with an inadequate force like that at Kagoshima would lead to protracted war and 
the ruin of Japan. ‘Everything depends upon what we do in the next six months,’ he 
explained to Hammond, ‘upon our putting forth in the very outset all the strength that will 
be required…to crush…the more violent faction of the Mikado’s anti-foreign party’.610 
Unfortunately for Alcock, the Prime Minister Lord Palmerston was not convinced that 
such measures were necessary. Unaware that anti-foreign dissent was spreading, he was 
hoping that the punishment of Satsuma alone would be enough to silence any further calls 
for expulsion. Palmerston therefore recommended that Alcock be told to wait and see if 
this became clear, and to continue enforcing the treaties in the interim.611 As Alcock 
prepared to return to Japan at the end of December 1863, his fears continued to grow that 
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the military action at Kagoshima had not calmed the political situation. News from Japan 
reported that the bakufu had been directly implicated in the severe curtailment of the silk 
trade at the treaty ports, while it had yet to explain its role in the Satsuma affair or to reply 
to Britain’s demands for reparation. Meanwhile, attacks against foreigners continued 
unabated. Indeed, the assassination of the French officer and commander of the French 
legation guard Lieutenant Henri Camus while riding in the outskirts of Yokohama on 13 
October was stark evidence that no one was safe from jōi fanaticism.612  
As ever, there were more pressing matters for the British and French governments to 
contend with than Japan. In November 1863, a dispute broke out between Denmark, 
Austria and Prussia over the constitutional future of the two duchies of Schleswig and 
Holstein. Consumed by the notorious complexities of the Schleswig-Holstein question, 
which Palmerston once described as ‘more intricate than any Sphinc’s Riddle, and more 
difficult to unravel than any Gordian Knot’, Lord Russell had no interest in reassessing 
Japan policy.613 He therefore dismissed many of Alcock’s policy recommendations and 
instead instructed the British minister simply to investigate the political and commercial 
situation upon his return. Russell at least agreed to dispatch the requested infantry 
regiment, but its use was to be strictly proscribed to the defence of Yokohama. If Kuper 
agreed, Alcock could land marines, destroy batteries and spike guns if they had been 
erected specifically to block foreign merchant shipping, but he had to prove the batteries 
had committed hostile acts before he doing so.614 What Russell did not realise was that, 
by issuing vague instructions and allocating infantry troops to Japan, he had provided 
Alcock with the tools necessary to implement his coercive strategy. 
Before his departure for Japan in late-December 1863, Alcock was instructed to visit the 
Quai d’Orsay to discuss Anglo-French relations in Japan with Droyn de Lhuys.615 During 
this meeting, however, the French Foreign Minister showed scant interest in discussing 
Japanese matters, other than to inform Alcock that he agreed with Russell’s instructions 
and that France would continue to cooperate with Britain in Japan. To Alcock’s surprise, 
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Drouyn was much more interested in complaining about Britain’s decision not to support 
Napoléon III’s calls for a European congress to be held to settle a number of outstanding 
issues on the continent.616 This proposal, which was put to the courts of Europe on 4 
November 1863, was the emperor’s attempt to reset French relations with the other great 
powers following damaging political crises in Italy and Poland. Much to his disgust, the 
British government opposed it from the outset as unworkable and likely to exacerbate 
European tensions rather than improve them. By the time Alcock met Drouyn in 
December, therefore, the emperor had abandoned all pretence at adhering to the Anglo-
French entente while seeking to revise the 1815 treaties.617 Although this did little to 
change French policy towards Japan per se, Drouyn made it clear to Alcock that French 
commitments in Mexico and Cochinchina made it unlikely that any further troops or ships 
would be assigned to the defence of the Japanese treaty ports. The British minister was 
unconcerned by this news, as he believed that the two or three French ships already in 
Japan, in addition to the company of the French 3rd Battalion Africa Corps that had 
recently been stationed in Yokohama, would provide sufficient support.618 What mattered 
was that the French government would continue to let Britain take the lead in Japan.  
Not long after Alcock had left Europe, the Foreign Office received reports from Neale 
that the bakufu had withdrawn the expulsion edicts and Satsuma had agreed to pay an 
indemnity for the Richardson Affair.619 Russell was delighted that his cautious policy 
appeared to be bearing fruit, and he hoped that there would be no further clashes involving 
British forces in Japan.620 He also chose to ignore Neale’s warning that the bakufu still 
had the power to block trade at will, and that the constant instability in Japan was still 
damaging commercial operations.621 In October 1863, Neale had also received worrying 
reports that bakufu officials were tacitly or even directly sanctioning the imposition of a 
system of terror on Japanese merchants in Edo in order to extort a large share of their silk 
and cotton profits (the value of which had risen astronomically).622 Moreover, even 
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though Neale had made it emphatically clear that any attempt to close Yokohama would 
fail, the bakufu had announced in December that it was dispatching yet another mission 
to Europe in the hope of negotiating this concession.623 
Yet Neale remained optimistic, especially after the regiment of British marines arrived 
from Hong Kong as requested. He believed that its presence alone would deter any further 
threats to the foreign settlement.624 Despite the obstacles to commerce erected by the 
bakufu, trade was ‘steadily flourishing’ at the treaty ports, and it was doubtful that either 
Edo or the daimyō would commit hostile acts while the Japanese ambassadors negotiated 
in Europe. While the closure of the Shimonoseki Straits by Chōshū was an irritant, it was 
not in Neale’s view that detrimental to British commerce. Preliminary preparations for 
war by one or all of the treaty powers may be necessary, but he recommended a cautious, 
expectant, and defensive policy, at least as long as trade continued to grow at its current 
rate.625 The commercial reports clearly indicated that Neale was right – imports and 
exports had both increased exponentially – yet a growing trade did not necessarily equate 
to a stable trade.626 Unfortunately, his optimism again gave Russell the mistaken 
impression that the chastisement of Satsuma had silenced anti-foreign fanaticism in Japan 
once and for all. 
 
When Alcock arrived in Yokohama on 2 March 1864, he found a dispatch waiting for 
him from Lord Russell.627 It informed the British minister in the strongest terms that he 
had no authority to direct British naval and military commanders to undertake military 
operations in Japan.628 Stung by rumours in London that Neale had directly interfered 
with the military action at Kagoshima,629 Russell was determined to prevent Alcock from 
similarly exceeding his remit, especially after he had so fervently supported aggressive 
measures before leaving London. Yet just as Alcock had feared, the situation in Japan 
was looking very grave. According to recent reports, the shogun and all two hundred and 
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sixty daimyō had gathered in Kyoto to decide if Japan should implement expulsion, and 
Alcock doubted that the moderate daimyō would have the strength to impose peace on 
those who favoured war. On the other hand, he had also received promising news that the 
military action at Kagoshima had achieved some positive results after all. According to 
intelligence provided by secret Satsuma agents in Nagasaki and Yokohama, the 
bombardment had served as a salutary and welcome lesson that expulsion was impossible. 
Apparently, the formerly antagonistic daimyō and his followers were now keen to 
embrace extended commerce with the treaty powers. This sign that the judicious 
application of military force could quell jōi fanaticism and strengthen the forces of 
moderation was exactly what Alcock was looking for. Yet with rumours suggesting that 
Yokohama could come under attack within a month, Alcock was still grateful that he 
could call upon the newly-arrived detachment of marines to mount a defence.630 
It was at this point that Alcock definitively expunged his former policy of compromise 
and concession. In an official dispatch to Russell, he recapitulated the arguments he had 
made prior to his departure from London the previous winter. Edo’s decision to send a 
second mission to Europe was final confirmation that the bakufu had no intention of 
implementing the treaties, especially as conciliatory measures such as the London 
Protocol had only encouraged demands for further concessions. With the emperor in 
Kyoto openly calling for expulsion, the shogun no longer capable, or willing, to guarantee 
the protection of foreigners or their assets, and treaty stipulations in open abeyance, the 
situation was now critical. Regardless of what the daimyō decided in Kyoto, nothing 
would remove the threat of an imminent attack on the foreign settlements. Alcock knew 
that Yokohama was especially vulnerable, and that it would be quickly overwhelmed if 
subjected to a concerted assault. All-out war between Japan and the West would then 
become unavoidable. To avoid that outcome, it was imperative for the treaty powers to 
strike the first blow.631  
Although determined to take decisive action, Alcock was aware that he needed 
indisputable evidence that jōi forces were ready to attack if he was to avoid censure in 
London and convince the other treaty powers to support his policy.632 He did not have to 
                                                
630 TNA, Russell Papers, PRO30/22/50, Alcock to Russell, 17 March 1864. 
631 HCPP, 1865, Volume LVII.543, [3428], pp.13-6, Alcock to Russell, No. 20, 31 March 
1864. 
632 TNA, FO46/44, No. 20, Alcock to Russell, 14 April 1864; and Hammond Papers, 
FO391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 14 April 1864. 
 
 
188 
wait long. By the end of April, he received reliable intelligence that the emperor and the 
shogun had decided to expel foreigners from Yokohama and that an imperial decree had 
been issued to prepare for war without delay.633 There were now only two choices open 
to the treaty powers: attack Chōshū, the most aggressive anti-foreign daimyō, and thereby 
silence calls for expulsion for good; or adopt a passive and expectant policy until the jōi 
forces attacked, accepting the consequent war that would certainly follow. For Alcock, 
the choice was simple. With the support of the other treaty powers Chōshū could easily 
be crushed, leaving the emperor and shogun too scared to contemplate any further hostile 
alliance.634  
On 1 May, Alcock informed Russell that the time had come to put Anglo-Japanese 
relations on a ‘more secure and less derogatory footing’.635 He reminded the Foreign 
Secretary that Neale had been instructed in November 1863 not to permit any further 
exclusion of commercial intercourse, while his own instructions required him to ensure 
the treaties were respected. The Kyoto conference gave ample evidence that these 
requirements were not being fulfilled. Furthermore, Alcock had proof that neither the 
emperor nor the shogun had disavowed Chōshū’s aggression, which meant he had the 
right to destroy Chōshū’s batteries. Most importantly, Alcock had a responsibility to 
protect Britain’s trade in Japan. The political crisis that had enveloped Japan had been 
damaging the silk trade in Yokohama for many months, while reports from the British 
consul in Nagasaki confirmed that the blockade at Shimonoseki had also had a ruinous 
effect on trade at that port.636  
Alcock clearly felt confident that his independent policy was justified. None of the other 
problems he had encountered upon reassuming his duties – Chōshū’s wanton aggression, 
the exclusion of foreigners from Edo, the unrelenting attacks on foreigners – were critical 
enough to warrant risking Russell’s ire.637 He had therefore bided his time, and waited 
for a suitably watertight justification that could be used to make his case officially and 
openly. The categorical pledge by both Mikado and Tycoon to expel foreigners was more 
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than enough, while the case for an immediate military response was further validated by 
the curtailment of trade and the indefensibility of Yokohama. Yet Alcock was well aware 
of the political consequences that would entail should he take unilateral measures. After 
all, the Kagoshima bombardment, like the burning of the Summer Palace in Beijing 
before it, had provoked intense criticism in Parliament of the government’s entire Japan 
policy.638 Alcock followed these debates closely and understood better than most the 
difficulties that the government faced from opposition MPs who were clamouring for the 
retrenchment of Palmerston’s free trade ideology.639 The independent coercion of Chōshū 
in such a febrile political climate would have been extremely risky. However, if military 
action were to be taken collectively with the other treaty powers, it would be difficult for 
Palmerston’s detractors to decry the return of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in the defence of free 
trade.640 Although this alliance would take time to assemble, Alcock was confident that 
his long experience and powerful influence within the diplomatic community would 
secure the necessary support. Unfortunately, his longstanding colleague and fellow 
advocate of aggressive measures, Duchesne de Bellecourt, was soon to be replaced by an 
unknown quantity, Léon Roches. Alcock would now have to convince the newly arrived 
French minister that it was in his interests, and that of France, to support a coercive 
military expedition against the renegade Chōshū domain. 
 
Alliance in Japan 
Léon Roches received his nomination to replace Bellecourt as French minister 
plenipotentiary in Japan in October 1863.641 Following Bellecourt’s removal for his 
aggressive response to the 1863 expulsion edict, Roches could be in little doubt that the 
Quai d’Orsay desired a more cautious Japan policy that would not jeopardise French 
interests in more strategically important regions.642 Given Roches’s flamboyant character 
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and colourful background, it seems strange that this ‘handsome swashbuckler’ was 
selected for the task.643 According to Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Drouyn appointed Roches 
primarily because he wanted a minister who, unlike Bellecourt, would not be easily led 
by the British into unnecessary commitments in Japan. Roches seemed to fit the bill: he 
had the experience and the confidence to act independently and to consider wider French 
geopolitical interests when making policy.644 
Soon after Roches assumed his duties on 27 April 1864, he asked Bellecourt to delay his 
departure so that the new minister could get a clear idea of why the bakufu had refused 
his request for an introductory audience with the shogun. A meeting was eventually 
agreed after fifteen days of arduous negotiation, during which time the bakufu ministers 
had stopped just short of intimidation in their attempts to force Roches to retract his 
demand.645 After this inauspicious start, Roches realised he had entered a hornet’s nest. 
He quickly became sympathetic to Alcock’s point of view, especially as the sonnō jōi 
rhetoric reminded him of the anti-foreign sentiment he had encountered during his time 
serving the French consular service in northern Africa. It was also clear to Roches that 
the embassy to Europe was nothing more than another attempt by the bakufu to temporise 
until Japan was ready to implement expulsion. With the foreign community surrounded 
by obvious preparations for that purpose, Roches agreed with Alcock that something had 
to be done. On the other hand, he did not believe that France should have to do it. In a 
dispatch to Drouyn, he questioned whether the value of French interests in Japan really 
justified the military expense of a naval expedition. There was another solution: France 
could obtain the same advantages if Britain, who had far more to lose, did all the work.646  
Within days of his arrival, Roches had already demonstrated an understanding of how to 
exploit the diplomatic framework of the Japanese treaty-port system. Unlike the clumsy 
attack on Satsuma the previous year, the successful chastisement of Chōshū was highly 
likely to benefit all the treaty powers. It was therefore in Roches’s interest to support 
Alcock’s proposal, which would secure maximum advantages for France at a minimal 
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cost. With this in mind, Roches began to think of a way to support a British expedition 
without having to commit any military forces to it. Unfortunately, he had little time to 
formulate a coherent plan before events took over. On 12 May 1864, Alcock addressed 
identical letters to the American, French, and Dutch representatives setting out the policy 
he intended to adopt. The British minister was keen to make the most of the military force 
he had at his disposal and launch the expedition without delay. A few days later, therefore, 
all four men met at Alcock’s residence to discuss his proposal. Alcock assured his 
colleagues that he was prepared to take overall responsibility for the deployment of 
military forces (a detail he conveniently omitted in his letters to Russell), and that the 
moral support of the other treaty powers would alone suffice. Though they did not have 
to commit military resources to the expedition if they did not feel comfortable doing so, 
their unanimous support was at least required if the expedition was to succeed. Before 
Roches had a chance to respond, the American and Dutch ministers enthusiastically 
committed to the expedition. Confronted by the unanimous support of his colleagues, 
Roches suddenly became evasive. When pressed for a commitment, he made the 
following remarks, which he later deleted from his draft dispatch to Drouyn: 
I remarked that the lack of special instructions from my government and my 
inexperience in Japanese affairs imposed a reserve on me that would necessarily 
influence my decision. However, pressed by my colleagues, I declared that I 
believed myself authorised exclusively to give my moral support to measures 
aimed at bringing about the faithful execution of the treaties by the Japanese 
government.647  
By omitting these sections in his official correspondence, Roches portrayed himself to 
the Quai d’Orsay as unflappable and guarded in the face of intense pressure when he had 
actually buckled under it. By orchestrating proceedings so that the American and Dutch 
representatives presented Roches with a fait accompli, Alcock had conjured the prospect 
of a magnificent allied flotilla steaming out of Edo Bay without a French flag in sight. 
This was too much for the patriotic Frenchman, whose ‘natural inclination towards bold 
measures’ trumped the risk of incurring Drouyn’s wrath.648  Pressed to make a definitive 
decision on the spot, Roches attempted to play for time by revealing the limits of his 
instructions. By doing so, however, he severely limited his freedom of action, as it would 
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be very difficult to withhold French moral support for joint action now that his colleagues 
knew he had the power to grant it. After this baptism of fire, Roches hoped at least to 
delay his colleagues long enough to see if the rōjū was willing to make any concessions 
over Yokohama.649  
When Roches finally met with the rōjū in late May, it was immediately clear that further 
negotiation with the bakufu would no longer be possible. He was curtly informed that 
Japan had never wanted relations with foreigners because the people hated them. Now 
that foreign trade had devastated the Japanese economy, the only remedy was the closure 
of Yokohama. Roches was also warned that if this request was not respected, the bakufu 
would be unable to protect foreigners.650 This gross violation of diplomatic protocol 
finally convinced Roches that the bakufu was determined to force the foreign powers out 
of Yokohama. As soon as he returned to Yokohama, therefore, he agreed to sign a joint 
protocol with his three colleagues that formalised the resolution for communal action. At 
the end of May, a note identique was also drafted to communicate this joint commitment 
to the bakufu officially.651 Roches took great pains to justify this decision to Drouyn. The 
circumstances were grave and a pledge of moral support did not contravene his 
instructions. The allied expedition would bring equal advantages to each power without 
a French military commitment.652 He did not mention the pressure that Alcock had 
exerted on him from the moment he set foot in Yokohama, which had left him with little 
room for manoeuvre. The fact that Bellecourt delayed his departure until 28 May, just 
after Roches had signed the protocol, suggests that the departing French minister also 
played a role in ensuring Roches sanctioned Alcock’s plan.653 Whether he did or not, one 
thing was clear: Roches, who had often been master of his own destiny during his 
diplomatic career, had staked his reputation on another man’s gamble.654 
With his coalition secured, Alcock began to look to the defence of Yokohama, which 
would be extremely vulnerable if and when the expeditionary force departed for the 
Shimonoseki Straits. He immediately sent for further military reinforcements from Hong 
                                                
649 AD, CPJ59/11, Roches to Drouyn, No. 3, 19 May 1864. 
650 AD, CPJ59/11, Roches to Drouyn, No. 4, 25 May 1864. 
651 See enclosures 1 & 2 in HCPP, 1865, Volume LVII.543, [3428], pp.50-4 Alcock to 
Russell, No. 44, 25 May 1864. 
652 AD, CPJ59/11, Roches to Drouyn, No. 4, 25 May 1864. 
653 AD, CPJ59/11, Roches to Drouyn, No. 5, 30 May 1864.  
654 See Lehmann, op.cit., pp.281-3.  
 
 
193 
Kong and compelled the bakufu to erect barracks in preparation for its arrival.655 Although 
Edo asked for the expedition to be postponed to allow the bakufu time to punish Chōshū 
itself, Alcock was no longer listening.656 Instead, he informed Russell about the contents 
of the note identique and declared his intent to take military action unless this final act of 
diplomacy brought immediate concessions from the bakufu.657 Seemingly ready to accept 
the consequences that would come from disregarding Russell’s orders, on 26 May Alcock 
wrote to his immediate superior at the Foreign Office, the Permanent Under-Secretary 
Edmund Hammond, to justify the case for military action. Since the daimyō had forsaken 
diplomacy, he declared, it was time for a trial of strength. Although the French could not 
commit to any military operations and the Americans had no ships, Alcock believed that 
the British naval force would alone be sufficient to silence Chōshū’s guns. Anticipating 
censure, he remained defiant: 
We are slowly, but surely, drifting – not exactly into a war – but something very 
unlike peace, and a conflict more or less partial…In this state of mind and political 
morality, there is but one style of argument that can avail.658 
This was the last private letter that Alcock sent to Hammond, a regular correspondent, for 
almost three months. Between 25 May and 23 August 1864, he also only penned one 
official dispatch to the Foreign Office.659 Similarly, the dispatch that Roches sent to 
Drouyn on 3 July 1864 would also be his last until 17 August.660 Very few historians have 
remarked upon these anomalies, and even fewer have discussed the similarities between 
them.661 Having crossed the Rubicon by disregarding their respective orders, it is a likely 
indication that the two men had jointly agreed to no longer communicate with their home 
governments. They would instead present the military expedition to the Foreign Office 
and the Quai d’Orsay as a fait accompli before either had time to formulate a response. 
For the first time since the negotiation of the Ansei Treaties in 1858, collective diplomacy 
backed by naval strength had returned to Japan. 
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Alliance in Europe 
Back in Europe, the British and French governments were still deeply preoccupied with 
the Schleswig-Holstein question. On 1 February 1864, war finally broke out between 
Denmark and the Germanic powers over control of the duchies. At the time, Napoléon 
III, who was still furious at the British government for killing off his congress proposal 
the previous year, adopted a policy of ‘studied abstention’.662 Ironically, the emperor’s fit 
of pique allowed Drouyn to block several efforts between December 1863 and March 
1864 to submit the Danish dispute to a European conference. Although Britain was 
pledged to support the London Protocol of 1852, which affirmed that Schleswig and 
Holstein were part of the Danish federation, Palmerston and Russell watched helplessly 
as the Prussian and Austrian forces stormed up the Danish mainland during the summer 
of 1864. It was not long before Denmark capitulated, and the Treaty of Vienna, signed on 
30 October 1864, formally ceded the two duchies to the joint administration of Austria 
and Prussia.663 
Unsurprisingly, neither Russell nor Drouyn saw any need to devote attention to Japan for 
much of this period, and it was only when Alcock informed the Foreign Office of the 
undesirable prospect of a second Japanese embassy to Europe that their focus returned to 
Japanese affairs. The bakufu was well aware that this mission to obtain the closure of 
Yokohama was doomed to fail, but it hoped that such failure would demonstrate the 
futility of expulsion to the anti-foreign party. In addition, Edo wanted to use the embassy 
as cover for the purchase of arms and ships from Europe. 664 As usual, when Drouyn heard 
news that the embassy’s first port of call would be Paris, he immediately sought the 
opinion of the Foreign Office. Russell replied that the envoys would not be welcomed in 
Britain, that Yokohama would never be closed, and that concerted foreign opposition to 
the Yokohama proposal would strengthen the shogun’s hand against the jōi 
fundamentalists. Drouyn immediately agreed to adopt the same policy, and also promised 
not to sell the ambassadors any military hardware.665 
                                                
662 Echard, op.cit, p.204. 
663 Ibid., pp.204-10. 
664 TNA, FO46/43, Alcock to Russell, 21 February 1864; and Hammond Papers, 
FO391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 21 February 1864. 
665 HCPP, 1865, Volume LVII.543, [3428], p.7, Cowley to Russell, No. 8, 20 March 
1864; p.7, Russell to Cowley, No. 9, 23 March 1864; p.11, Russell to Cowley, No. 13, 20 
April 1864; and p.11, Cowley to Russell, No. 14, 22 April 1864. 
 
 
195 
As expected, the embassy made little progress in Paris. In fact, all that the six conferences 
held in Paris between 7 May and 10 June achieved was an indemnity for the murder of 
Lieutenant Camus, and a bilateral agreement known as the Paris Convention that, among 
other things, committed the French Navy to help the bakufu force open the Shimonoseki 
Straits within three months of the ambassadors’ return.666 Liberated from his usual 
reliance on out-dated official dispatches, Drouyn was able to bluff and bludgeon the 
inexperienced Japanese into these concessions.667 Meanwhile in London, Russell 
continued to reject any ‘fruitless’ discussion of further concessions.668 By mid-June, this 
had produced the desired effect and the ambassadors announced their preparations to 
return home.669 Their mission had completely failed to buy Edo time. In fact, the joint 
military measures that they had agreed with the French government rendered the bakufu 
even more vulnerable to jōi attack.670 From an Anglo-French perspective, however, both 
parties were satisfied that their refusal to consider the Yokohama proposal would send an 
effective message to Edo. Like Alcock and Roches in Japan, Russell and Drouyn had 
coordinated their policy when expedient and in the interest of both countries. 
Unfortunately, this cooperative strategy was based on a mistaken belief that 
forthrightness alone would deter the anti-foreign fanatics.671 The foreign ministers still 
did not fully understand the jōi philosophy, nor the fact that the humbling of Satsuma in 
1863 had completely failed to discourage it.  
Anglo-French confidence that this latest bilateral effort would finally establish security 
for all the treaty powers in Yokohama proved short-lived. On 13 July, Russell received 
dispatches from Alcock containing reports of the bakufu’s determination to expel 
foreigners, his subsequent justification for military action, and his application for military 
reinforcements from Hong Kong. These reports caused such concern that the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Henry Layard queried whether the 
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government should abandon Japan altogether as a field for trade.672 Misunderstanding the 
limited nature of Alcock’s proposed scheme, Lord Palmerston considered ‘a permanent 
occupation of a military position in [the Inland Sea]…out of the question’.673 Russell was 
far from convinced that such measures were necessary either, but he was unsure as to 
how strongly to respond. In the end, he sent Alcock two dispatches, both dated 26 July. 
The first acknowledged the worsening political situation in Japan but refused to accept 
that the outcome of events in Kyoto constituted an imminent threat to trade. Rather than 
any invasion of the interior or establishment of forts and garrisons, Alcock was to put in 
place measures to bolster the security of Yokohama and establish an understanding with 
the other treaty powers.674 The Foreign Secretary’s second letter was more explicit. He 
‘positively enjoined’ Alcock not to undertake military operations in the interior of Japan, 
and pointed out that the Order in Council issued earlier that year, which prevented British 
shipping from entering the Straits of Shimonoseki, was all that was necessary to prevent 
further incidents in the straits.675 
The French translation of Russell’s instructions were shared with the Quai d’Orsay. They 
contained the interesting observation, later deleted, that Britain’s prudent reserve 
vindicated French policy in East Asia and demonstrated the wisdom of the manner in 
which Drouyn had conducted his meetings with the Japanese ambassadors.676 After 
explaining the gulf in opinion between Neale and Alcock’s interpretations of the situation 
in Japan to the Navy Minister Chasseloup-Laubat, Drouyn advised Admiral Jaurès to act 
with extreme reserve in Japan and to ascertain what degree of solidarity could be 
established between the treaty powers.677 Drouyn still believed that the Paris Convention 
was sufficient to deter further aggression from Chōshū and, like Russell, preferred 
prudence to Alcock’s risky and potentially expensive gambit.  
No sooner had Russell sent off his cautionary instructions than further dispatches arrived 
in London containing the note identique. To say that Hammond was unimpressed with 
Alcock’s private letter of 26 May would be an understatement. ‘It would be a good thing 
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if he would only allow us to drift into war,’ he fulminated to Russell on 3 August, ‘but on 
the contrary he sets sail and steam for that object.’678 Although furious at Alcock’s 
determination to throw caution to the wind, Hammond knew it was already too late to 
stop the expedition. He therefore advised the Foreign Secretary that, if such a collision 
was inevitable, it would at least present an opportunity to denounce the 1862 London 
Protocol and open direct communication with the Mikado through Satsuma or another 
daimyō favourable to foreigners.679 A few days after Russell received this confidential 
advice, he took the drastic step of officially recalling Alcock from his post. In a terse 
dispatch, the Foreign Secretary flatly rejected the idea that an attempt to drive foreigners 
out of Japan was imminent. There was nothing in the recent dispatches to justify such a 
claim, while Satsuma’s friendlier demeanour of late also suggested all was well. Russell 
went on to question why free passage of the Inland Sea was even necessary for foreign 
trade while Osaka remained closed and the emperor locked in seclusion at Kyoto.680 
Hammond was out of London on holiday at the time this dispatch went out, but the 
decision to recall Alcock and disavow his policy bore all the hallmarks of a Permanent 
Under-Secretary who demanded absolute loyalty from his subordinates and had ‘no 
further use for a man who failed him’.681 While there is no definitive proof that Hammond 
ordered the recall, it is hard to believe that this increasingly powerful and dictatorial figure 
did not some say in the decision. After all, by this time he was personally superintending 
the work of four political departments within the Foreign Office, including the one 
responsible for China, Japan and Siam. Given his notoriously ferocious temper, it is 
highly unlikely that Hammond would have tolerated such flagrant insubordination from 
a diplomat in Alcock’s position, as his angry note to Russell on 3 August appeared to 
suggest.682 
Further evidence that Hammond had reached the end of his tether with the belligerent 
British minister can be found in a testy private letter he penned to Alcock two days after 
the recall order went out. As Keith Neilson and T. G. Otte have pointed out, Hammond 
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often used private correspondence with the senior heads of mission abroad to elaborate 
on instructions or information contained in the official dispatches.683 On this occasion, he 
wanted to give Alcock an uncensored dressing down over his decision to launch a punitive 
expedition without special instruction from home. The British minister was warned in no 
uncertain terms that the government, Parliament, and country were very strongly opposed 
to attempts to coerce a country to trade. Even if such measures were successful, they were 
immoral and likely to result in a protracted and costly war. Hammond did not doubt that 
the merchant community and the other treaty-power representatives would approve of 
Alcock’s plan, but he believed that it had exposed Britain’s entire military force to attack 
and jeopardised a lucrative trade.684 The difficulties in Japan were normal for any country 
new to international commerce, and Alcock was assured that things would have been very 
difficult had there been a telegraph to Japan. Unfortunately, there was now nothing to be 
done but await the results of the expedition and hope for the best.685  
Hammond’s strongly-worded reprimand illustrated first-hand how much attitudes in 
Whitehall had changed in the two decades since ‘gunboat diplomacy’ was first used in 
the Far East. It also demonstrated the extent to which the Permanent Under-Secretary, 
rather than the Foreign Secretary, controlled the levers of British foreign policy in East 
Asia by the mid-1860s. Given the questionable legacy of previous British military 
interventions in the region, Hammond was clearly determined to avoid another costly 
conflict on the far side of the world – particularly one that had been launched without his 
express authority. Though he confessed a few weeks later to feeling sorry for Alcock, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary remained convinced that the recall was necessary.686 For the 
‘autocrat of the Foreign Office’,687 such unsanctioned adventurism was simply 
intolerable. 
In Paris, Drouyn was ‘somewhat disconcerted’ to read Roches had lent his moral support 
to Alcock’s plan.688 He approved of Roches’s restraint in the face of pressure from the 
other representatives, but warned that any repressive action would incur a grave 
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responsibility. Roches should therefore disregard any resolutions made by his colleagues 
and only act if the French mission was directly threatened. Like Russell, Drouyn had 
completely misread the actual situation in Japan. He still believed that the representatives 
could develop commercial relations with friendly Japanese ministers and continued to 
hope that the Paris Convention would bring about a change in attitude. In other words, it 
was better to be cautious than adopt a policy that would ‘make war to prevent war’.689 
Drouyn also agreed with Alcock’s recall, and warned Russell that the most recent reports 
indicated the expedition’s departure was imminent.690 He then took the extraordinary step 
of sending a telegram to inform Roches of the news and that ‘the British government 
persists with us in a pacifistic policy’.691 
Put simply, Drouyn and Russell were not prepared to consider the fundamental 
reassessment of Japan policy that Alcock and Roches believed was in order. Instead, 
mutual disapproval of the expedition had actually brought the two ministers closer 
together. On 18 August, therefore, both addressed new dispatches to their respective 
representatives. To Alcock, Russell stated that the French government was already 
satisfied with the punishments it had inflicted upon Chōshū. The bakufu clearly intended 
to chastise Chōshū itself and was constructing barracks to station British troops. In any 
case, there was no need for hostility because the Japanese would be deterred by the 
augmentation of Britain’s forces.692 To Roches, Drouyn explained that both he and 
Russell were completely opposed to Alcock’s plan, and that the British could not 
understand why Alcock had ignored his precise instructions.693 Distracted by Europe and 
disinterested in Japan, Russell and Drouyn did not understand how Japan’s domestic 
tumult imminently threatened Yokohama. Ignoring the men on the spot, they devised 
their own, defensive strategy for Japan. When it became clear Alcock’s policy imperilled 
it, they took immediate, and in Russell’s case, drastic action to thwart it. In the end, it was 
too little, too late. 
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The final hurdle 
Alcock knew that there was only a small window of opportunity for the expedition to take 
place before London and Paris had time to respond, but he could do nothing until the 
bakufu replied to the note identique. As he waited, a dispute erupted between Roches and 
Jaurès that threatened to derail everything. The day after the protocol was signed, Roches 
received word from Commander de Franclieu, the French naval commander in 
Yokohama, that the company of the French 3rd Battalion Africa Corps stationed in the 
port was to be sent back to France on 11 June. Roches bluntly told Franclieu to ignore 
this order, as it would significantly nullify the moral force of the joint protocol he had 
signed only a day earlier. The inexperienced Franclieu was easily intimidated and 
accordingly suspended the redeployment, even though his commanding officer, Jaurès, 
was awaiting the arrival of the company in Shanghai.694 When Jaurès found out he was 
incensed that Roches had dared to intervene in troop movements, and irately reported the 
incident to Chasseloup-Laubat. In the admiral’s opinion, nothing had changed in Japan to 
warrant the continued presence of the company. To make matters worse, Roches appeared 
to have abandoned the policy of abstention and pacification that he and Bellecourt had 
advocated during the Satsuma crisis. Instead, Roches was backing a British plan that 
would drag France helplessly into war. Jaurès had no idea why Roches was supporting 
this bellicose course, but he thought he knew what Alcock was up to. The British minister, 
he alleged, had been disappointed upon his return to Japan to find that the Kagoshima 
engagement had not secured Britain more influence with the Japanese. This latest scheme 
was designed to put that right.695 Jaurès decided to head to Japan at once to bring back 
the troops in person and discover what the diplomats were playing at.696  
As previously mentioned, Roches sent no dispatches during this period, so the reports 
Jaurès made to Chasseloup-Laubat are the only reliable accounts of what happened after 
the admiral arrived in Japan. By 26 June, Jaurès had already ensured the company of the 
3rd Battalion had been removed from Japan. However, he did not accompany them to 
Shanghai and remained in Japan to take stock. Perplexed as to why Alcock thought it 
necessary to station 15,000 troops in Yokohama, Jaurès pressed Roches for further 
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information. Roches replied that Alcock intended to request French support in the event 
of any military action, but he assured the admiral that he would do nothing without fresh 
instructions from home.697 This was far from the truth. Roches knew that Jaurès had 
exerted significant influence on French policy in Japan during Bellecourt’s tenure. His 
unannounced arrival while the foreign representatives anxiously awaited the reply to their 
note identique posed a clear danger to French participation in the entire scheme. To 
prevent further interference at this critical juncture, Roches kept Jaurès in the dark about 
his plans. Without clear information on what exactly the British were planning, Jaurès 
resorted to conjecture that, ironically, echoed Roches’s original reasoning. If there was to 
be some form of military collaboration, it might be preferable for France to support 
Alcock. After all, it would not be hard in Japan, ‘the easiest region in the world to hold 
down’, and France could secure great influence without the deployment of large forces.698  
It was only after the bakufu replied to the note identique on 30 June that Jaurès finally 
realised an offensive expedition was imminent.699 This was not the type of bilateral 
cooperation that he had in mind. Roches, still unwilling to be completely honest, thought 
British military action would be ‘useful’. Jaurès strongly disagreed – this plan would lead 
to a general war. The Japanese should instead be given time to adapt to international trade 
and relations. In any case, as his instructions strictly proscribed the offensive use of 
French forces, the French Navy would remain in Yokohama to defend the settlement if 
the expedition went ahead.700 It was at this point that Roches decided to commit French 
forces to the expedition without the admiral’s permission, which he acheived by ensuring 
that the joint memorandum issued in response to the bakufu’s unacceptable reply to the 
note identique contained an official determination to attack Chōshū’s batteries unless the 
bakufu guaranteed trade security within twenty days.701 Jaurès was stunned. Now that 
Roches and the other diplomats had made this official, he would have to submit to a policy 
that he clearly did not support. To refuse an official declaration by the four treaty powers 
would have brought disaster upon the French mission in Japan, jeopardized the security 
of the entire foreign community, and completely compromised French honour. Jaurès 
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could only reassure Chassloup-Laubat that the action would be limited to the rebel 
domain and that under no circumstances would he declare war on Japan.702 Roches, 
meanwhile, had surmounted the dangerous obstacle posed by the admiral’s unwanted 
presence, but taken a huge risk in the process. He had hidden his desire to commit French 
forces to the expedition with a supply of half-truths to keep Jaurès in the dark. Having 
misled both Jaurès and Drouyn, he was now on seriously thin ice. 
Despite his fury at being duped, Jaurès received short shrift from Roches, who justified 
his policy to the admiral in an unrepentant letter dated 20 July. It was all very well for 
Paris to instruct its agents to maintain treaties and keep the French flag flying high, but 
the duplicitous Japanese made it exceptionally difficult to adhere strictly to such orders. 
The bakufu had done nothing while treaty rights were violated and foreign shipping was 
fired upon. No diplomatic agent could remain immune to such provocation. Moreover, 
when the other treaty powers decided to take military action in the interest of all foreign 
nationals, he could not alone turn a blind eye. In any case, he had acted within the strict 
limits of his orders until the bakufu had made it clear that the foreign settlements were 
under imminent threat.703 This letter was as much a justification to the French government 
as it was to Jaurès. Roches knew he had exceeded his remit and risked the wrath of his 
superiors, but he was still convinced he was right. Whether Drouyn or Jaurès approved 
or not, the tricolore would be flown at Shimonoseki. 
After the joint memorandum was issued, Alcock decided to break his silence with 
London. As it was clear that the bakufu was unwilling, or unable, to guarantee commercial 
security in Yokohama, there was no other option but to take action against the jōi 
movement. Britain possessed the military power to do so independently but the 
bombardment of Kagoshima in 1863 demonstrated that such a course risked censure from 
home, criticism from the other powers, and an escalation in violence within Japan. For 
that reason, the four-party alliance he had secured was all-important, as the bakufu, 
emperor, and daimyō would not dare oppose an allied attack against Chōshū. It was also 
an act of cunning political calculation that would prevent the accusatory point-scoring 
that had become the norm amongst the Western powers in East Asia. His coercive alliance 
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was not only designed to remedy Britain’s commercial difficulties in Japan, but also to 
transform the geopolitics of the region and finally put a stop to the ‘invidious action of 
the United States – ever ready in the East to embarrass us with an ostentatious display of 
neutrality, while blaming all action as unnecessarily aggressive’.704 It was a risky policy, 
but if successful it would greatly increase British influence in Japan and beyond.  
Once the allied naval commanders had signed an agreement on 12 August to act in 
conformity with the memorandum,705 Alcock wrote to Hammond to make it clear that 
there would be no turning back.706 At this point Roches also sent another masterpiece of 
misinformation to the Quai d’Orsay. In a dispatch dated 17 August, he completely glossed 
over his lengthy dispute with Jaurès and dismissed the admiral’s deep reservations about 
the expedition as based on an out-dated assessment of the situation. He also claimed to 
have pressed his colleagues to consult the shogun about the expedition, and that a bakufu 
minister had confessed to him privately that the attack on Chōshū was indispensable (even 
though the Jaurès reports made clear that he was already committed to military action 
long before these discussions took place707). Roches also argued that it was necessary for 
France to take an active part in the expedition to stop Britain establishing a commercial 
monopoly in Japan. Since the Kagoshima affair, Satsuma had tried to attract foreign trade 
by developing intimate relations with Alcock. For France to maintain neutrality when 
Britain was already fully committed would have left the British free to engage in similar 
relations with a new daimyō, or even take possession of the Inland Sea. For this reason, 
Roches had insisted upon the insertion of a clause in the memorandum that guaranteed 
no treaty power could acquire territory after the expedition.708  
The sudden return of the Japanese embassy from Europe at the end of August threw 
preparations into turmoil, as the Paris Convention threatened everything that Alcock and 
Roches had been working for.709 The requirement for the bakufu to force open the straits 
with French support was a direct contravention of the emperor’s orders. It would be 
disastrous for Edo to agree to such a measure, while the unity that Alcock had strived so 
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hard to achieve would be destroyed if the convention were ratified, since France would 
be compelled to act independently.710 Worst of all, any further delay to the expedition 
would risk the arrival of orders from Europe forbidding it.711 Fortunately, as the bakufu 
understood that ratifying the convention would lead to immediate civil war, it was duly 
annulled on 25 August.712 Never one to miss a political opportunity, Roches portrayed 
the bakufu’s rejection of the convention as an insult against the French government, 
giving further justification for the allied squadron ‘to prove to Japan that one cannot insult 
the flags of Christian nations with impunity’.713 The representatives swiftly issued a new 
memorandum calling for the allied naval commanders to force open the straits.714 With 
the expedition confirmed, Alcock finally provided Russell with a full account of the past 
two months.715 Like Roches, he argued that the gap in dispatches was caused by the great 
uncertainty in Japanese affairs, which had made it difficult to explain the situation. He 
hardly needed to mention that military action was now a fait accompli. On 28 and 29 
August 1864 the die was cast, as the allied squadron of seventeen ships and 400 men 
steamed out of Yokohama.716 The survival of the treaty-port system depended upon its 
success; so too the careers of Alcock and Roches. 
 
Vindication 
After the arrival of a succession of reports from Japan, Russell and Drouyn finally realised 
what their respective ministers had been up to. In late August and early September, 
Chasseloup-Laubat received the first confused reports from Jaurès about Roches’s 
activities. Perturbed by this apparent change in diplomatic policy, he immediately sought 
clarification from the Quai d’Orsday.717 Stunned, Drouyn made it bluntly clear to the 
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Navy Minister that his cautious Japan policy had not altered one iota.718 Riled at Roches’ 
duplicity, Drouyn furiously castigated his minister in an official dispatched dated 1 
October: 
I do not admit, sir, that distance authorizes agents, as you seem to believe, to thus 
depart from the line of conduct which has been formally prescribed and, in 
reiterating my previous directions, I must remind you that you cannot depart from 
their strict observation without incurring the gravest responsibility.719 
Two weeks later, Chasseloup-Laubat forwarded further reports from Jaurès showing how 
the admiral had obeyed his orders, unlike Roches, whom he accused of causing the French 
Navy great embarrassment.720 At last, Drouyn had conclusive proof that Roches had 
personally committed France to military action. 
In London, Russell had heard nothing from Alcock since 27 June.721 In late September, 
the Admiralty forwarded Hammond a packet received from Kuper. The admiral had been 
assigned by Alcock to deliver two Chōshū samurai to their domain in a last-ditch attempt 
to avert hostilities.722 Hammond was perturbed by this news, and became even more 
concerned when French sources reported an attack on Kuper’s ships in the straits. 
Although he knew it was too late to avert the storm brewing in Japan, he continued to 
condemn Alcock’s conduct. To send ships to force open the straits was entirely 
unwarranted, and if violence erupted as a result there would be justifiable outcry in 
Britain, ‘for there can never have been a more wanton and unnecessary act of 
aggression’.723 Layard was also very anxious about Japan. He feared that Alcock would 
blunder his way into ‘a serious mess’, while the prudent French and Dutch ministers had 
‘very artfully left our ships to fight this battle’.724 Alcock’s recall could not come too 
soon. Officials in the Foreign Office might have been aghast at what was afoot, but one 
man in the British government was beginning to take a more nuanced view of events. The 
more that Lord Palmerston understood about Alcock’s policy the more he liked it. The 
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Prime Minister certainly thought it wise of Alcock to act in concert with the other powers, 
and he agreed with the British minister’s assessment that joint military action against the 
‘contumacious Daimio’ was the only way to remedy the commercial problems in 
Japan.725 The author of Britain’s policy of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ in East Asia was starting 
to admire the boldness of Alcock’s policy, not least its clever reliance upon the treaty-
port system. Whatever the eventual outcome, Alcock had guaranteed that the allies would 
stand or fall together. This was an important geopolitical success. 
More news arrived from Kuper in mid-October, including copies of the 22 June 
memorandum and Alcock’s orders to prepare for action.726 On 18 October, Admiral Grey, 
who was standing in for the Duke of Somerset at the Admiralty, wrote a panicked note 
warning Russell that the paucity of Britain’s fleet in Japan would undoubtedly expose 
Yokohama should the expedition go ahead. Even if successful, there would be significant 
loss and damage to the ships, and if open warfare broke out in Japan it would be six 
months before sufficient reinforcements could arrive.727 Palmerston was unmoved by this 
worst-case scenario. Believing that the combined allied force would prove too much for 
a single daimyō, he still thought it probable that the expedition would be a success.728 
When Alcock’s explanatory dispatches of late August finally arrived on 26 October the 
Prime Minister was further encouraged. Alcock had shown great ability in negotiating 
with the other powers and organizing his military forces. The successful chastisement of 
Chōshū, regardless of any losses suffered by the squadron, could not fail to have 
considerable and important effects. Alcock’s justification for his policy was also entirely 
reasonable, so the Prime Minister was increasingly convinced the decision to recall 
Alcock had been too hasty. After all, there was ‘some truth in the maxim that a vigorous 
thrust is a good parry’.729 
Back in Japan, Alcock and Roches were anxiously awaiting the outcome of the 
expedition. In the interim, Alcock received reports of the harsh criticism that his policy 
in Japan had attracted in Parliament.730 His response to his critics pulled no punches: 
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They see the deplorable evils, complications and wars which spring from our 
Eastern relations; but they cannot see from what causes these spring…We have 
forced ourselves – we and all Western nations, upon these rulers, and by force 
alone can we maintain ourselves, so long as the hostility of the will of these 
enemies to all intercourse with foreign nations continue.731 
In the end, Alcock was entirely vindicated. The expedition to force open the Straits of 
Shimonoseki was a resounding success. As was often the case during joint naval 
operations in East Asia, the allied squadron was dominated by British gunboats. Of the 
seventeen ships that made up the flotilla, eight were from the Royal Navy, four were 
Dutch, three were French, and the Americans had only two, one of which a chartered 
steamer. The squadron went into action at ten minutes past four on 5 September 1864. 
Within an hour, the principal batteries that lined the southern and northern coasts of the 
Strait had been silenced by a relentless pounding from the squadron, which had split into 
two smaller battlegroups. The following day, a land assault captured the remaining 
Chōshū guns and destroyed its batteries with relative ease and few losses. Within forty-
eight hours, the most vociferously anti-foreign daimyō in Japan had been brought to his 
knees.732  
Alcock and Roches triumphantly heralded the vindication of their policy, which brought 
about an immediate improvement in relations with Edo.733 The sudden news of Alcock’s 
recall quickly tempered the celebrations, however, even though it was not much of a 
surprise to the British minister. Even so, he was deeply disappointed that his twenty years 
of service had not proved him worthy of his government’s trust. He understood why the 
announcement of hostilities had provoked nervousness in London, where the pacifists in 
Parliament were politically strong. Though he appreciated that the British public was 
averse to such hostilities in far-flung regions, he had been sent out to avert a war. He had 
done so by way of a policy he had explicitly discussed in London with the Cabinet, which 
had then put the necessary military reinforcements at his disposal. As a result, Britain’s 
position in Japan had never been so good: civil war had been averted; the fanatics were 
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discouraged; and war against the treaty powers had been made almost impossible. Most 
importantly, commercial security had been established.734 Alcock’s breathtakingly 
defiant response demonstrated that he had no intention of being hung out to dry in the 
name of political expediency. The unanimous support of the Japanese community had 
given him encouragement, but there was a serious risk that his recall would threaten all 
the progress that had been made. As Roches explained to Drouyn, if the Japanese learned 
that Alcock was being punished for insubordination, it would give fresh encouragement 
to the anti-foreign party and dash any hopes that the emperor would finally ratify the 
treaties.735  
London first received news of the victory via a telegram from Kuper stating that the 
Japanese had received ‘a good licking’.736 Although naturally relieved by the mission’s 
success, Hammond continued to question its necessity. He also feared that victory would 
not soothe the angry passions of the House of Commons, where the government’s 
political opponents would continue to portray the expedition as an unacceptable attack 
upon a defenceless nation.737 Hammond refused to change his opinion even after Alcock 
reported news that Chōshū had launched an attempted coup d’état in Kyoto, which the 
British minister believed further justified his decision to take pre-emptive military action 
before Japan’s civil war could threaten Yokohama.738 ‘The existence of civil war in Japan 
is the strongest condemnation of the precipitancy of Alcock’s measures,’ Hammond 
wrote to Layard, ‘The utter failure of government in the country would probably have 
fallen to pieces of itself, and we should have reaped the benefit, without the risk and 
violence…of active interference.’739  
Although Alcock had few allies in the Foreign Office, he did benefit from the clear 
difference of opinion in the Cabinet. Alcock’s policy had been discussed at the highest 
levels of government during his period of home leave, and he evidently believed that 
military reinforcements had been allocated to enable him to implement it. Throughout 
1864, Palmerston had also proved unwaveringly willing to give the British minister the 
benefit of the doubt. Few histories have explored this issue in much detail, but it is 
important to consider why, if the Prime Minister wanted Alcock’s plan to play out, 
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Russell and Hammond did not. There are a few probable reasons. First, the Foreign Office 
would naturally have been unhappy at its agent taking matters into his own hands, even 
though Alcock had been proved right, as this would only encourage others to do so any 
time a difficult contingency arose. Second, Russell and Hammond had to deal with the 
political consequences of military action, whilst Alcock was unconstrained by such 
concerns. Russell and Hammond had a responsibility, first and foremost, to protect their 
department. Alcock’s independent actions made this difficult, but the recall of this 
renegade official safeguarded the Foreign Office against criticism should the expedition 
have proved unsuccessful. This was certainly why Alcock believed that he had been 
recalled. Finally, it seems likely that Alcock’s fundamental belief in the necessity of 
coercive military action to enforce free trade was simply political anathema to Russell. 
After the costly mistakes of the past, in particular the Arrow War in China, caution was 
his watchword. International support for Alcock’s plan only partially masked the fact that, 
once again, obstacles to free trade in East Asia had been overcome by gunboats rather 
than diplomacy.  
Back in Japan, there was little left for Alcock to do but ready his departure. He was 
delayed by another anti-foreigner attack in November, this time the murder of two British 
officers who had been sightseeing in Kamakura.740 Far from a sign that anti-foreigner 
violence had returned, however, the incident served only to validate the success of 
Alcock’s policy. The culprits were swiftly caught, tried, and executed by the bakufu 
authorities – the first time any samurai had been punished for acts of violence against 
foreigners.741 Alcock was delighted with this ‘last triumph’.742 As he began his journey 
back to London, the influx of his dispatches to the Foreign Office forced Russell to beat 
a qualified retreat. Alcock was informed his recall had been issued to discourage the 
interruption of trade through acts of hostility in the belief that the terms of the treaties 
were being observed. Since his dispatches had proved that trade had been almost entirely 
curtailed by the bakufu, Russell could now see how it had been astute to punish Chōshū.743 
In fact, the Foreign Secretary clumsily tried to convince Alcock that he had not been 
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recalled at all.744 Instead, he had simply been called home to explain the situation to the 
government more completely. Naturally, that order was never meant to imply the removal 
of him from his post!745 
In Paris, confusion reigned over how to respond to the success at Shimonoseki. After his 
dressing down of Roches of 1 October, Drouyn remained tight-lipped for over a month, 
unsure of what orders to issue. Once again, he waited to see what Britain would do first. 
In the wake of the unexpected military success he enquired whether Alcock’s prescriptive 
orders would be changed.746 The British ambassador Lord Cowley replied that Alcock’s 
orders were unchanged, but since the joint mission had already taken place there was no 
choice but to be conciliatory.747 Still Drouyn waited, until he received news that Alcock 
had received Queen Victoria’s approbation.748 Finally reassured, on 10 December Drouyn 
informed Roches that he now understood the motives behind the expedition. The French 
minister was told to maintain the cooperative relationship that he had established with the 
British minister, but he was also warned to maintain a pacific attitude in Japan.749  
The message was clear enough: despite the success of the allied expedition, Roches would 
not receive any commendation.750 It is easy to see why. Alcock had at least some support 
within the British Cabinet, who knew that military action was a possibility even if some 
disapproved of it. Alcock had consistently advocated his policy even before he departed 
London and could also legitimately point out that he was acting under instructions to 
require the bakufu and daimyō to observe the treaties. Roches, on the other hand, had 
been secretive about his deliberate decision to exceed the strict remit of his orders. He 
had caused embarrassment to Drouyn, and also misled an influential French naval 
commander. Regardless of Roches’ patriotic motivations, Drouyn did not believe that 
these transgressions warranted approbation. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Roches was 
much perturbed by his reprimand. He had obtained a much more important reward than 
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praise from Paris: independence of action. During Bellecourt’s tenure, Jaurès had often 
accompanied the diplomat to political conferences and played a significant role in 
negotiations with the bakufu ministers. Not long after the allied squadron returned from 
Shimonoseki, however, the admiral was told his presence was no longer needed. From 
this point on, Roches alone would take the lead on political matters.  
Alcock was philosophical when he learned of his approbation. It had all been so 
unnecessary. Sooner or later people would have to learn that when Britain imposed 
treaties upon Eastern nations by force they had to be maintained by force. Moderation 
and conciliation were all well and good, but without strength and resolve war was 
inevitable. It had happened three times already in China, and would have happened in 
Japan had he not arrived in time to avert it.751 After the dust had settled on the whole 
affair, Palmerston gave his final assessment: 
These Japanese events show how difficult it is to give with good effect positive 
and rational instructions to agents on distant stations and how necessary it is to 
expose a large amount of confidence in their judgement and discretion.752 
Russell stubbornly refused to accept this lecture, and irritably scrawled a riposte at the 
bottom of the letter: ‘The opinion of the Cabinet was that the instructions, as I originally 
drew them, gave too much discretion to Sir R. Alcock.’753 With the Prime Minister and 
his Foreign Secretary so consistently at odds, it is little wonder Alcock took matters into 
his own hands. The man on the spot had been proved right all along. 
 
Conclusions 
After years of stalled trade and confusion, duplicitous double-dealing by the bakufu, and 
anti-foreign outrage by jōi fanatics, 1864 marked the point when the treaty powers finally 
took the initiative in their relations with the Tokugawa bakufu. Leading this 
transformation was Sir Rutherford Alcock, whose two years away from Japan had 
brought clarity and perspective. He finally understood that Western nations were locked 
in an interminable battle with the jōi party that would ultimately come down to survival 
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of the fittest. Unwilling to be at the helm when expulsion took place, Alcock formulated 
a simple policy to extinguish this existential threat forever: provoke instability in the anti-
foreign camp to bring stability to the treaty ports. The difficulties of Kagoshima also 
taught him that Britain could no longer act alone, and that it was time for other treaty 
powers to accept responsibility for the security of the Japan trade. With a steely resolve, 
he united them under his leadership. 
The newly-arrived Léon Roches supported Alcock’s plan even though he was aware that 
the French government had no interest in active measures there. Roches was no fool – he 
understood that it was an expedient time to form an alliance with his British colleauge. 
With a strong partnership established between the two men, Anglo-French policy in Japan 
was more strongly unified that at any time since the early days of treaty relations. Even 
so, it remained a decidedly unequal partnership. Given preponderant Britain’s military 
power in the region and Alcock’s long-established role as doyen of the diplomatic 
community in Japan, Roches was forced into the unfamiliar position of following the 
leader. His susceptibility to self-aggrandizement led him to flout his authority and mislead 
his government and colleague. This ensured there would be no approbation for Roches, 
but it was a small price to pay for future independence of action.  
The formation of an Anglo-French alliance in Japan produced a diametrically opposed 
one in Europe. Neither Russell nor Drouyn understood enough about Japan to appreciate 
Alcock’s plan. Politically sensitive to any suggestion of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and 
preoccupied with another war in Europe, their disapproval would have scuppered the 
expedition had Japan not been so far away. It was fortunate in the end that their clumsy 
attempts to intervene did not have more serious repercussions. Paradoxically, the 
resounding success of the allied expedition in Shimonoseki was also the climax of Anglo-
French cooperation in Japan. Given no time to bask in the glory of his victory, the 
departure of Alcock left a gaping hole in Yokohama’s diplomatic community. Liberated 
by the removal of his more experienced colleague and free from the influence of the 
French admiral, Roches saw an opportunity to ensure he would never again have to defer 
to British policy. The consequences for the Japanese treaty-port system proved seismic. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
New Beginnings: Roches, Winchester and the New Anglo-French 
Relationship, 1865 
 
Over his five-and-a-half-year tenure as minister plenipotentiary in Japan, Sir Rutherford 
Alcock proved an astute survivor within the complex and often baffling atmosphere of 
crisis and political intrigue that typified the bakumatsu era. By outwitting the stubborn 
Townsend Harris, outlasting the hamstrung Duchesne de Bellecourt, and outmanoeuvring 
the inexperienced Léon Roches, Alcock was able to establish himself as the undisputed 
leader of the diplomatic corps at the Japanese treaty ports. He was therefore in a prime 
position by the summer of 1864 to assert British dominance over Japan’s flourishing 
‘enclave empires’, to unite the treaty powers against anti-foreign fanaticism, and to 
vanquish the prospect of forcible expulsion once and for all. Alcock’s foresighted 
decision to foster a network of Japanese interpreters during the early days of treaty 
relations was also beginning to pay off, as talented men such as Alexander von Siebold 
and Ernest Satow were becoming increasingly aware of how the imposition of the 
‘unequal treaties’ had catalysed domestic unrest within Japan. 
Unfortunately, Russell’s decision to recall Alcock in the immediate aftermath of the 
Shimonoseki expedition removed the man best placed to shield the treaty-port system 
from the political crisis that was enveloping the country. This decision was therefore ill-
judged and poorly timed, albeit unsurprising given the ferocious criticism that 
Palmerston’s ministry had endured in the wake of other costly naval expeditions in East 
Asia. Alcock’s removal created a leadership vacuum in Yokohama just when his 
colleagues had finally accepted that collective diplomacy was the best guarantor of future 
stability and commercial prosperity for all. It thus created the conditions for a return to 
the division and disunity that had characterised treaty-power relations for so long, and 
which Alcock had worked so hard to overcome. The departure of the last diplomat on the 
spot when Japan first opened its doors to Western trade in 1859 also marked the end of 
an era for Anglo-French relations. With the defeat of anti-foreign fanaticism eliminating 
the need to cooperate on political or economic matters as closely as Alcock and Bellecourt 
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once did, there was nothing to stop Roches from attempting to establish France as the 
most politically influential and commercially dominant treaty power in Japan. 
 
The Roches doctrine 
Prior to his departure from Yokohama, Alcock attempted to initiate what Grace Fox has 
termed a ‘new order’ in Western treaty relations with Japan.754 Following Chōshū’s defeat 
at Shimonoseki, the treaty-power representatives now had conclusive evidence of the 
bakufu’s duplicity over the expulsion order, its attempts to stop trade as a preliminary to 
the execution of that order, and its inability to uphold the treaties in the face of opposition 
from the emperor and daimyō. This evidence was presented to bakufu officials at a series 
of conferences during the latter part of 1864, when Alcock and his colleagues warned that 
they would enter direct negotiations with the daimyō and the imperial court in Kyoto 
unless Edo renounced its ambition to close Yokohama, secured imperial sanction for the 
treaties, and revoked the expulsion edict. Alcock also made it clear that the allied warships 
would remain in the Straits of Shimonoseki until Edo took responsibility for the actions 
of its so-called vassal, either by paying an indemnity for the Chōshū campaign or opening 
the port of Shimonoseki itself to Western trade.755 
By offering the bakufu a choice between paying an indemnity or opening a new port in a 
daimyō domain, Alcock was testing Edo’s commitment to ending any further opposition 
to foreign commerce in Japan. After all, if the bakufu was genuinely in favour of 
expanding trade across the country, then it would surely choose to open a new port in the 
territory of a defeated enemy rather than to cover the costs of inflicting that defeat. Alcock 
also believed that the chastisement of Satsuma and Chōshū ought to have strengthened 
the shogun to such a degree that he could now re-assert his authority over the imperial 
court and compel the emperor to ratify the treaties.756 He therefore hoped to secure 
imperial sanction for the treaties before he left Japan, thereby bequeathing a fine legacy 
to his successor. Unfortunately, the British minister was hampered by the lack of clear 
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instructions as to what form of compensation the Foreign Office preferred. In the end, he 
had to settle for a convention, signed on 22 October 1864, that still permitted the bakufu 
to choose between paying an indemnity of three million Mexican dollars in quarterly 
instalments or opening Shimonoseki or another port in the Inland Sea to Western trade.757 
Roches did not even wait until Alcock’s departure before beginning to undermine his 
legacy. He agreed with his British colleague that ratification of the treaties by the Mikado 
was necessary to safeguard foreign interests and prevent the sonnō-jōi party from 
justifying acts of anti-foreign aggression in the emperor’s name. Yet it did not take long 
before he started to question the methods by which Alcock was attempting to achieve this 
goal.758 This was evident from the very beginning of the negotiations that took place 
between the diplomatic corps and the bakufu once the Chōshū campaign had ended. At 
the first conference in late September, Roches dropped strong hints that he did not think 
direct negotiation between the treaty powers and Kyoto was the best way to secure 
imperial ratification of the treaties. Now that Edo had been strengthened by Chōshū’s 
defeat, he believed that the bakufu should be allowed to negotiate with Kyoto without 
external interference.759 
Despite this intervention, Roches was initially supportive of Alcock’s decision to offer 
the bakufu a choice between an indemnity and opening a new port.760 In mid-October, 
however, there was a decided shift in the Frenchman’s attitude towards the bakufu. On 
15 October 1864, Roches explained to Drouyn how, in addition to the exceptionally 
friendly welcome afforded to the representatives during their stay in Edo, the rōjū had 
demonstrated their full commitment to the treaties by pledging to send an ambassador to 
Kyoto to secure imperial ratification. It had also taken responsibility for the actions of 
Chōshū, whose territory would now be ‘imperialised’. Roches was flattered by the private 
assurances he had received from the rōjū of their ‘consideration and trust’ in him. He felt 
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similarly proud that France had been treated equally by the bakufu throughout the 
Shimonoseki crisis despite the material superiority of the British forces in Japan and 
Alcock’s long period of service in the country. Most important of all, the promise that 
restrictions on trade in Yokohama would be lifted had led to the immediate release of 
thousands of balls of silk in the days following the conference. ‘Short of events that 
cannot be rationally predicted, peace is assured with Japan,’ Roches declared 
confidently.761 
The historian Richard Sims has identified this dispatch as an important turning-point that 
provided ‘the first definite sign of the emergence of a special relationship between Japan 
and France’, or more accurately, between the bakufu and Léon Roches.762 As Sims has 
also pointed out, this relationship has received much attention over the years from 
historians, although research was hampered by the fact that Roches was ‘by far the most 
irregular correspondent and the most secretive’ of all the French representatives sent to 
Japan during the nineteenth century.763 It is therefore difficult to identify why Roches 
decided to enter into such a relationship at this time. Taken in isolation, the private 
overtures that the rōjū made to him seem little more than yet another attempt by the 
bakufu to play ‘barbarian’ against ‘barbarian’, a tried and tested but not very sophisticated 
tactic. Nonetheless, in the months that followed this conference Roches began to agitate 
for payment of the indemnity over the opening of a new port, in direct contradiction to 
the course recommended by Alcock. 
There are several possible explanations for this, the simplest of which is that Roches still 
had complete faith in the bakufu’s ability to execute the treaties, especially after 
Yokohama was re-opened to silk exports. He was probably swayed in this respect by the 
guarantees made to him by the rōjū in early October about future access to silkworm eggs. 
As Meron Medzini has pointed out, with the domestic silk industry in France in dire 
straits, it was important for the French minister to secure a steady supply of Japanese 
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silkworms with as little competition or interference as possible.764 Moreover, it is clear 
from the dispatch Roches that sent to Drouyn after the signing of the 22 October 
convention that he did not think that the opening of Shimonoseki was in the best interests 
of France. The port was not ideally suited to Western trade, while the cost and risk was 
unlikely to be counterbalanced by future commercial revenues. In an indication of what 
direction his thoughts were now turning, Roches also stressed that he intended to pursue 
‘an essentially pacific policy’ by building friendly relations with the bakufu and avoiding 
any course that might antagonise the Japanese population against it, such as pushing for 
the immediate opening of Osaka and Hyōgo.765  
It seems that this dispatch, written just after news of Alcock’s recall arrived in Yokohama, 
was Roches’s attempt to pre-empt the French government’s judgement on his own role 
in the Shimonoseki campaign by offering assurances that he was still fully committed to 
working peacefully with the recognised government of Japan. It is hardly surprising, 
therefore, that Roches became increasingly wedded to this policy after the arrival of 
Drouyn’s stern reprimand of 1 October. Even after Drouyn learned of the successful 
outcome of the Shimonoseki campaign and the transformation it had brought about in 
relations with Edo, he made it clear to Roches that he had no intention of altering the 
conservative policy he and his predecessor had advocated in Japan. Whilst Drouyn 
congratulated Roches for ensuring that the military action against Chōshū had remained 
localised, he also stressed the importance of avoiding any break in relations with the 
bakufu.766  
Given these orders, it was not difficult for Roches to convince Drouyn that an indemnity 
was preferable to the opening of Shimonoseki. It was also opposed by the Navy Minister 
Justin de Chasseloup-Laubat, who had learned of the British proposal in early January 
1865. He warned Drouyn that, while the British could afford the expense and resources 
necessary to protect a new port at the entrance to the Straits of Shimonoseki, France 
certainly could not. It would therefore be unwise to allow the British free rein to land 
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troops and erect military forts at a location considered to be ‘the strongest military 
position in Japan’.767 Drouyn took this advice on board, and immediately informed 
Roches that he did not consider opening Shimonoseki to be either in France’s political or 
commercial interest. What mattered, he wrote on 10 January, was not that Chōshū had 
expressed a desire to trade with the treaty powers, but that it was no longer able to block 
access to the Inland Sea. All that was necessary was to work together with the other 
powers to secure an indemnity and for Roches to ensure that France received 
compensation for the damage that the Chōshū forces had inflicted upon the French trading 
vessel that had been attempting to pass through the Straits during the summer of 1863.768  
The French government’s consistent conservatism with regard to Japanese affairs helps 
to explain why Drouyn gave Roches the green light to block Alcock’s scheme. The simple 
fact was that France had more to gain in the short term by accepting a cash indemnity 
than in opening a new treaty port in a domain that was still, after all, overtly hostile to 
Edo. Whilst the outcome of the Shimonoseki expedition had convinced Alcock of the 
need to fundamentally re-examine Britain’s treaty relationship with Japan,769 the Quai 
d’Orsay interpreted the proposal to open a new port in the Chōshū domain as nothing 
more than an attempt to strengthen Britain’s position within the treaty-port system. 
Drouyn was thus happy to support Roches’s view that the shogunate was entitled to the 
support of the treaty powers as the course most likely to maintain the status quo, and 
thereby deny the British further commercial and political influence. At the same time, 
this did not mean that Drouyn expressly sanctioned the policy that the French minister 
embarked upon following the Shimonoseki campaign. There is no evidence in the 
dispatches sent from the Quai d’Orsay that Roches was ever directed to establish a 
‘special relationship’ with the bakufu, or that the French government wished to deviate 
from the inherently risk-averse, non-interventionist policy it had pursued since Japan 
opened to trade.770 
In fact, this initiative was independently devised and implemented by Roches himself, 
when he decided to interpret his instructions to maintain peaceful relations with the 
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bakufu far more liberally than the Quai d’Orsay had ever envisaged. There has been much 
historiographical focus as to why Roches pursued this course, with many historians 
arguing that he had realised by this stage that the merchants he represented in Japan could 
not possibly compete with their British counterparts. Roches therefore hoped to 
circumvent Britain’s commercial advantage in Japan by cultivating closer political ties 
with Edo at a time when the bakufu was desperate for foreign assistance in the struggle 
against its domestic opponents.771 Other historians have highlighted a penchant for 
independent and energetic action that Roches himself regularly characterised as his 
‘politique personelle’. He first developed this diplomatic approach during the 1830s, 
when his flamboyant personality helped him to become the close confidante of a powerful 
Algerian amir named Abd al-Qadir.772 
According to Jean-Pierre Lehmann, these formative years in Algeria revealed that Roches 
was not a ‘conventional person’, so his later policy in Japan should be viewed in the 
context of his ‘charismatic personal attraction’.773 Spontaneity bordering on recklessness 
and a total commitment to the course of action he decided upon were other important 
personality traits, while his stints in Algeria and later as a diplomat in Morocco and 
Tunisia also revealed a ‘strong sense of a mission civilisatrice’ and his ‘ready admiration 
for and belief in “great leaders” as a rapid solution for complex political problems’.774 
Lehmann has further argued that, during his eight-year tenure as consul general to Tunis 
(1855-1863), Roches completely absorbed himself in Tunisian political affairs in order to 
influence the direction of progress and reform, all the while protecting French interests 
and maintaining the esteem and affection of Tunisia’s rulers.775 These were the roots of 
the policy that Roches pursued after his arrival in Japan, and they clearly motivated him 
to begin establishing close personal relationships with influential bakufu officials towards 
the end of 1864. 
                                                
771 See W. G. Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian: Japanese Travellers in America 
and Europe, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p.89; Fox, op.cit., pp.155-
6; and Medzini, op.cit., p.78. 
772 See Ericson, op.cit., p.330; Medzini, op.cit., p.180; and Sims, op.cit., p.65. Roches 
was equally fascinated by the last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu, and wrote a study of 
him after he left Japan. 
773 Jean-Pierre Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches – Diplomat Extraordinary in the Bakumatsu Era: 
An Assessment of his Personality and Policy’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 2 
(1980), p.277. 
774 Ibid., p.276. 
775 Ibid. p.283. 
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The fact that Roches only began to develop his ‘politique personnelle’ in Japan once 
Alcock’s departure had been confirmed is also important. Indeed, the foundations of what 
became his ‘special relationship’ with the bakufu did not become evident until the British 
minister was long gone. The point is one that many previous histories of this period have 
overlooked, but it is nonetheless of critical importance to understanding why Roches was 
initially so successful at implementing his policy. The dynamics of treaty-port diplomacy 
meant that the departure of the undisputed leader of the diplomatic corps created a 
vacuum in Japan that Roches was more than happy to fill. This was in many ways 
understandable, for Alcock and Roches were of the same generation (the former being 
only four months older) and had both entered their country’s diplomatic service during 
the mid-1840s. They were therefore not only of equal diplomatic rank but also equally 
experienced. To a man of Roches’s patriotic and vainglorious disposition, for whom 
personal and national aggrandisement were concordant diplomatic objectives, it was only 
natural to seek to fill the void created by Alcock’s departure.  
Yet while it is true that Roches was always ‘imbued with a strong sense of the mission 
civilisatrice’, it is also the case that he made no attempt to put this policy into action until 
after Alcock’s recall.776 To be clear, this is not to dispute Lehmann’s assertion that the 
origins of Roches’s close relationship with the bakufu can be traced to the private meeting 
that was requested by Takemoto Masao, the newly appointed minister for foreign affairs, 
in mid-August 1864. At this critical meeting, Masao revealed that the bakufu was willing 
to tacitly approve of the Shimonoseki campaign if Roches could guarantee that it would 
not result in any British territorial acquisitions.777 It is rather to stress the point made by 
Sims that, despite his misgivings over Alcock’s plan to secure imperial ratification of the 
treaties, Roches continued to work hand in glove with his British colleague until his recall 
became common knowledge in mid-October 1864. It was only at this moment, when 
Roches knew that Alcock would soon no longer be around to challenge him, that he began 
to respond actively to the bakufu’s overtures. The reasons for this are obvious. Although 
the Frenchman’s respect and admiration for Alcock remained undiminished until the very 
end of his tenure,778 it is unlikely that a man of Roches’s background and personality was 
ever comfortable with the diplomatic dynamic he encountered upon arrival in Yokohama. 
                                                
776 Lehmann, op.cit., p.306. 
777 Ibid., p.287; see also AD, CPJ59/12, Roches to Drouyn, No. 8, 17 August 1864. 
778 Roches paid tribute to his departing colleague at length in AD, CPJ59/12, Roches to 
Drouyn, No. 14, 15 October 1864 and No. 22, 26 December 1864. 
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After incurring Drouyn’s wrath for associating himself with the military expedition 
against Chōshū, Roches seized the opportunity provided by Alcock’s sudden recall to 
make sure he would never again have to defer to the other representatives on matters of 
policy. With no immediate replacement for Alcock forthcoming due to the abruptness of 
his removal, Roches was afforded a crucial window to stake his own claim for leadership 
of the Japanese treaty-port system and to readdress the commercial imbalance between 
Britain and France in Japan.  
He did not let it go to waste. By early 1865, Roches had successfully negotiated a series 
of agreements to supply the bakufu with the military equipment and techniques necessary 
to confront the daimyō, who were growing increasingly powerful through their illicit arms 
trade with unscrupulous American, British, and Dutch merchants. These included 
contracts to supply French engineers, machinery, and instructors for the construction of 
a naval dockyard at Yokosuka and orders for French guns and cannon to assist the bakufu 
in dealing forcefully with Chōshū, a policy that Roches strongly encouraged. Others 
included the establishment of a French school at Yokohama and moves to remedy Japan’s 
chaotic monetary system by founding a modern mint on the French model.779 The role of 
the French missionary Mermet de Cachon, whom Roches had encountered in Hong Kong 
while en route to Japan and immediately employed as his interpreter, was critical in this 
process. He was a friend of Kurimoto Joun, a bakufu official in Yokohama who had 
previously taught Cachon Japanese during his ill-fated tenure in Hakodate.780 Cachon 
facilitated a number of meetings during the autumn of 1864 between Roches and other 
senior bakufu officials, including two rōjū, who were strongly averse to making any 
concessions to the daimyō and open to the idea of strengthening the bakufu’s authority 
with French aid.781  
                                                
779 Beasley, Select Documents, op.cit., p.78; Ericson, op.cit., pp.17-27; and Lehmann, 
op.cit., pp.290-2. 
780 Cachon endured a difficult time in Hakodate prior to his departure in mid-1863, 
including two assassination attempts in response to his attempts to propagate Christianity 
(see Archives de la Societé des Missions Étrangères de Paris, Paris (MEP), J/569, Mermet 
to Libois, 25 February 1861). He had also run into trouble with his colleagues in the 
Missions Étrangères, one of whom criticised him for being too ‘impulsive and 
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him as ‘impossible to get on with’ (J/569, Furet to M. le Superieur, 20 November 1862). 
None of this mattered to Roches, who found Cachon’s linguistic skills to be of such 
critical importance that he urged Drouyn to appoint him officially to the French mission 
in Japan; see AD, CPJ59/12, Roches to Drouyn, No. 15, 31 October 1864. 
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In many of the transactions negotiated over the following months, the bakufu was directed 
to make use of the services of Paul Fleury-Hérard, Roches’s attorney and banker in Paris, 
who was described by Kurimoto as a ‘high official’ even though he had no direct 
connection to the French government. It is possible that Roches wanted a private banker 
to broker these arrangements out of a sincere desire to provide the bakufu with honest 
representation in Paris, or perhaps to ensure deniability should the French government be 
accused of attempting to monopolise the Japan trade. There was also suspicion at the 
time, never proven, that Roches was profiting from the deals that he had helped to 
broker.782 Either way, Roches wilful misrepresentation of the banker’s status during 
negotiations with the bakufu said much about his modus operandi. Further evidence of 
this was his decision not to inform Drouyn about his discussions in Edo until mid-January, 
after the bakufu had officially requested French assistance in the construction of the 
Yokosuka dockyard and ordered a supply of French arms.783 He was thus able to present 
Paris with a fait accompli, making it much more likely that his contracts would be 
approved, not least because he made no mention of the means by which he had 
encouraged the bakufu to finance them. Drouyn and Chassloup-Laubat did not disappoint. 
As far as they were concerned there was nothing in the treaties that prevented France 
from entering into the proposed agreements, and Drouyn knew that Fleury-Hérard had 
the necessary funds to pay for them.784 Both deals were duly approved in March 1865.785 
Whether Roches’s arrangements are sufficient evidence that a ‘special relationship’ 
already existed between him and the bakufu by 1865 has also been the subject of historical 
debate. For example, Lehmann has argued that Roches’s support for the bakufu at this 
time was not exceptional because all the treaty-power representatives were committed to 
helping Edo to honour its treaty obligations after the Shimonoseki campaign.786 While 
technically accurate, this argument overlooks the fact that Roches was the only diplomat 
in Yokohama to deliberately set himself apart from his colleagues in the months that 
followed Shimonoseki. In this sense Roches’s support for the bakufu was exceptional, for 
his ‘politique personnelle’ undermined Alcock’s diplomatic coalition in a uniquely 
damaging way. Similarly, Mark Ericson has asserted that the commercial agreements that 
Roches negotiated during late 1864 and early 1865 were of ‘questionable’ significance 
                                                
782 Ericson, op.cit., p.57. 
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784 See Drouyn’s comment at the top of idem., dated 15 March. 
785 AD, CPJ59/13, Drouyn to Roches, No.3, 18 March 1865. 
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since they did not differ substantially from those made with other treaty powers during 
the same period. These agreements included longstanding orders for three warships from 
the United States, the purchase of shipyard machinery by a bakufu mission to Holland in 
late 1864, and the request relayed by Alcock to London late in the same year for the 
supply of British military instructors.787 However, while it is certainly true that the 
American and Dutch representatives were happy to facilitate bilateral arms deals with 
Edo both before and after Shimonoseki, the contracts that they entered into were 
fundamentally different to those that Roches brokered because they were permissible 
under the treaties whilst his were not. Naturally, there was nothing in the treaties to 
prevent an individual treaty power from entering into a commercial contract to supply the 
Japanese government with any product it desired, as long as that contract did not 
contravene the principle of free trade or impinge upon the rights of other powers to 
unfettered access to Japan’s treaty ports. Whilst the arms contracts with the United States 
and Holland were limited to what the bakufu could afford to pay in cash or by credit, Edo 
offered to finance the construction of the Yokosuka shipyard through the direct shipment 
of silk to France. This was tantamount to the creation of a monopoly on the silk trade and 
therefore entirely contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the treaties.  
Despite this, Roches had no qualms about accepting the bakufu’s offer, other than to 
advise the rōjū to deal with private merchants rather than operate on a government-to-
government basis and to exchange silk for dollars with those merchants directly and 
privately.788 As this arrangement still involved bypassing the open market, it seems 
inaccurate to describe the agreements Roches negotiated with the bakufu over this period 
as insignificant, especially as they were negotiated without the prior knowledge of the 
French government. In short, while it may have been true that Roches’s ‘special 
relationship’ with the bakufu had not yet reached full fruition by the beginning of 1865, 
its foundations were already in place. In a very short space of time, the French minister 
had initiated a new diplomatic relationship with Edo that would have significant political 
repercussions during the remainder of his tenure in Japan. Without the express sanction 
of his conservatively-minded government, he had also demonstrated a willingness to take 
unprecedented measures to advance French commercial interests in Japan regardless of 
whether they undermined the treaties or damaged his relationship with the other 
representatives. With Alcock no longer around to keep his ambition in check, Roches was 
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eyeing a bigger prize: control of Japan’s lucrative import and export trade, and the power 
and glory that came with it. 
 
The Winchester doctrine 
Unfortunately for the British government, their man in Japan did not get wind of Roches’s 
activities in time to stop him. To be fair to Charles Winchester, the British chargé 
d’affaires in Alcock’s absence, he had been instructed to hold the fort in Yokohama until 
a successor for the British minister arrived, and he did not hesitate to take action to thwart 
Roches as soon as he heard about what the Frenchman was up to. Winchester’s suspicions 
were first raised in the early part of 1865, when he became increasingly anxious about 
the French, Dutch, American, Prussian, and Swiss representatives travelling to Edo to 
liaise with bakufu officials while he languished in port. Of particular concern was a visit 
of ‘some days’ to the capital by Roches in mid-February to discuss ‘private affairs’ with 
the Japanese government.789 Roches’s agreement regarding the Yokosuka arsenal had 
already been confirmed the previous month, but it was only after this February meeting 
that rumours of it reached Winchester. According to the reports he received, the bakufu 
had agreed to pay for French arms and machinery by consigning all the available 
silkworms and eggs to France, and as much silk as necessary to cover the contracts. These 
troubling reports convinced Winchester that the policy of staying away from Edo was no 
longer tenable, and he informed Edmund Hammond privately that he intended to travel 
to the capital himself to investigate the matter ‘cautiously and prudently’ with the Dutch 
agent, Dirk de Graeff von Polsbroek.790  
Upon their arrival, the two men demanded clarification as to whether or not the bakufu 
had entered into a monopoly trading agreement with France, to which the rōjū replied 
that no such arrangement was in place but that it reserved the right to use produce to pay 
for foreign goods in the future. The rōjū forewarned Roches about the complaints 
submitted by his colleagues, however, which led him to seek a face-to-face meeting with 
Winchester at the end of February. During this meeting, Roches explicitly denied that any 
monopoly arrangement existed or that he would ever deviate from common action in 
commercial matters. It was on this occasion that he first mentioned his ‘politique 
                                                
789 TNA, FO46/53, Winchester to Hammond, 28 February 1865. 
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personnelle’, which he assured Winchester was merely designed to increase his personal 
influence with the bakufu rather than to pursue any commercial schemes.791  
Roches was obviously concerned about how these rumours would be received in Europe, 
for he wrote to Drouyn immediately to argue that the French-led construction of a naval 
arsenal at Yokosuka would be no different to the military contracts the bakufu had entered 
into with the other treaty powers.792 Under pressure from his British colleague, Roches 
was compelled to confirm in writing what he had assured Winchester in person: that 
France had no plans to monopolise the silk trade.793 Despite this, Winchester continued 
to raise his concerns over the weeks that followed about this issue and the ‘known 
proclivity’ of the bakufu to seek to maintain its monopoly on foreign trade in any way 
possible.794 To make matters worse, in April he reported to Hammond that ‘the anxiety 
of the French for the money – the whole money and nothing but the money’ was making 
it extremely difficult for the other representatives to ensure that the bakufu’s decision to 
pay the Shimonoseki indemnity in lieu of opening a new port would not result in 
additional duties on foreign commerce.795 In the event, Roches’s insistence upon 
immediate payment scuppered Winchester’s hopes of reducing the indemnity in exchange 
for commercial concessions such as a reduction in tariffs or the opening of Hyōgo. 
Winchester was well aware that it was not in French interests to see Osaka opened, but 
as chargé d’affaires he could do nothing more than refer the matter back to London.796  
Despite his difference with Roches over the Shimonoseki convention, Winchester did not 
believe that the French minister was responsible for the schemes emanating from the 
French legation in Yokohama. ‘M. Roches is himself an amiable and honourable 
gentleman,’ he explained to Hammond at the end of April, ‘but he is so entirely in the 
hands of the intriguing priest that trust is out of the question.’797 In Winchester’s opinion, 
it was Cachon who was encouraging Roches to defer the unnecessary expense of opening 
of another port until France had cornered the silk trade, while the activities of Bellecourt’s 
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former translator, the Dutchman Franz Blekman, were also highly questionable.798 In the 
same letter, Winchester enclosed testimony procured by Satow from a member of the 
Japanese embassy to Paris in 1864. This source confirmed that the French had been 
contemplating such a project for some time, even though the other treaty powers were 
likely to oppose it. Winchester also reported the troubling disappearance of a private letter 
that he had sent on board a French frigate at the end of February warning the British 
consul at Nagasaki to keep an eye out for French movements of silkworm eggs. The 
mysterious interception of a recent edition of the Moniteur des Soies addressed to the 
British legation in Yokohama, which contained a report on the creation of a new French 
imperial factory in China for the purpose of developing French commerce in the Far East, 
caused further concern.799  
In an official dispatch sent in early May, Winchester shared further intelligence from the 
London and China Express on the factory scheme. By all accounts, this appeared to 
confirm Napoléon III’s ambition to recreate his domestic economic policy in the Far East 
by establishing a commercial organisation similar to the defunct East India Company. 
Although Winchester expected such a factory to fail miserably in China, where 
government officials never involved themselves in trade, he feared for its extension to 
Japan. His concerns were based on the proclivity of the bakufu and daimyō for 
monopolising trade for their exclusive benefit, the fact that only one fifth of the silk from 
China and Japan that was manufactured in France was actually shipped there directly (the 
remainder being sold in London with the additional cost of brokerage, commission, and 
cost of carriage), and the evidence that French officials in Japan feared that the opening 
of new ports would only further augment the cost of trade with Japan without increasing 
France’s share of it. The advantages of a French monopoly on the silk trade under these 
circumstances were obvious.800 
                                                
798 Blekman accompanied the 1864 mission to Paris, where he negotiated a series of 
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It is not exactly clear if Roches and Cachon intended to monopolise the entire Japanese 
silk trade, but given that the bakufu estimated the cost of the Yokosuka arsenal at 2.4m 
Mexican dollars over four years it is safe to assume that they would have cornered a very 
significant portion of it had their scheme succeeded.801 In the end, Roches and the bakufu 
were forced to abandon the scheme quietly after rumours of it provoked outrage in the 
merchant community in Yokohama and an official complaint about from Winchester.802 
However, the construction of a new French residence, barracks, and stores in Yokohama, 
the establishment of Cachon’s French school, and the arrival of guns and cannon 
accompanied by French military instructors over the next few months seemed to point to 
the continuing growth in French influence at Edo.803  
As he prepared to hand over command of the British mission in Japan towards the end of 
June, Winchester drafted a memorandum for his successor Sir Harry Parkes that 
explained the policy of each of the treaty powers and their representatives in Japan. Whilst 
he praised the ‘fairness and open dealing’ of the Dutch and acknowledged the ‘peaceable 
and legitimate’ interests of the United States, he warned that Napoléon III’s free-trade 
policy had led to a marked change in French activities in both China and Japan. Despite 
the theoretical commitment to the open market that this policy represented, Winchester 
believed that Roches, like many of his countrymen, could not separate the pursuit of 
French economic interests from the promotion of political influence. Hence, the silk 
monopoly scheme, the intrigues of Cachon, the opposition to the opening of new ports 
and new legation buildings at Edo, and above all ‘a specious support of the Tycoon’s 
interest as opposed to that of the Daimios’. Although Winchester held Roches in a high 
esteem, it was impossible for him to ‘sympathize with his consuming passion to override 
everything by his politique personelle’.804 
The mounting evidence of French intrigue and skulduggery was certainly troubling 
Winchester, but he confessed there was little he could do but continue to watch Roches 
closely to ensure he did not lead the bakufu any further down the garden path. He also 
implied that British policy was partly at fault for affording Roches an outlet for his 
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ambitions. Unlike in Turkey, British representatives in Japan were not empowered to 
provide the bakufu authorities with a supply of the military and civil experts to help 
modernise the country. This apparent unwillingness to provide expertise and training had 
perpetuated ‘a feeling of disquietude and distrust’ against the British that Winchester 
believed could be countered if London granted its representatives special powers to 
command the services of officers qualified to instruct the Japanese in ‘arts peaceful and 
military’.805 
The implication was clear: British policy in Japan was beginning to drift; allowing 
opportunists like Roches to stoke longstanding fears in Edo of an impending British 
imperial conquest in order to cultivate closer political links and lucrative commercial ties 
with the bakufu. That said, the British chargé was not averse to a little scheming of his 
own. At the end of April, he learned that agents of Chōshū had approached the British 
consul in Nagasaki to propose the dispatch of a mission to Britain to negotiate a 
commercial treaty and open Shimonoseki to trade. Winchester immediately saw an 
opportunity by which to leverage the bakufu into opening Osaka and Hyōgo – the only 
other commercial concession that would satisfy the daimyō. After assuring Hammond 
that he would be careful to exercise ‘caution and prudence’, Winchester promised to try 
to convince the bakufu not to risk a civil war by refusing to open the ports on the basis of 
‘short-sighted foreign advice’.806 
Charles Winchester had done the best he could to restrain Roches during his short tenure 
as chargé d’affaires in Edo, but his influence was distinctly limited by his diplomatic rank 
and stature. The fact that he was often compelled to refer to London on matters of policy 
also significantly hampered his ability to exploit the increasingly accurate intelligence he 
was being fed by talented translators at the British legation such as Ernest Satow and 
Alexander von Siebold. Given the extent to which Roches had successfully exploited the 
opportunity afforded by Alcock’s departure, the task of re-asserting British leadership 
over the Japanese treaty-port system that awaited Winchester’s successor would require 
a man of unique ability and character. The Foreign Office had the perfect choice in mind.  
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The Russell doctrine 
On 27 March 1865, Sir Harry Parkes was appointed to succeed Alcock as British minister 
to Japan.807 At the time, he was universally regarded by his compatriots as the outstanding 
British diplomat in East Asia. His fame owed much to the prominent role he had played 
in the Arrow War in China, particularly his capture, imprisonment, and torture by the 
Qing authorities while Chinese secretary to Lord Elgin during the march to Beijing in 
1860. He was rewarded for his services on that occasion with a knighthood in 1862 at the 
tender age of thirty-four, and Elgin himself described him as ‘one of the most remarkable 
men I have ever met; for energy, courage, and ability combined, I do not know where I 
could find his match; and this…makes him the man of the situation’.808 These exceptional 
qualities had been well known to the British government for some time, as Parkes had 
been involved in British diplomacy in China in some shape or form since the outbreak of 
the First Opium War in 1842.809 His long experience of defending Britain’s commercial 
interests within the Chinese treaty-port system certainly made him ideally qualified to 
succeed Alcock in Japan, and Palmerston considered him a ‘decidedly…able man’.810 His 
reputation for being no ‘trifler with Easterns’811 was also likely to please the British 
merchant community and diplomatic corps. According to Satow, Parkes came to 
Yokohama ‘invested with the prestige of a man who had looked death in the face with no 
ordinary heroism, and in the eyes of all European residents in the far east held a higher 
position than any officer of the crown in these countries’.812 Russell’s appointment of this 
iconic diplomat was therefore widely welcomed by all who shared a vested interest in the 
expansion of British commerce in Japan. 
If Parkes was so eminently qualified for the role of British minister in Japan, then why 
did Russell take so long after Alcock’s departure to appoint him to the position? The delay 
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related to the Foreign Secretary’s determination to get a handle on Japanese affairs 
following his embarrassing climb-down over the Shimonoseki expedition the previous 
year. This meant waiting until he had consulted Alcock face to face before making any 
further decisions. As a result, in January 1865 Russell asked Lord Cowley, the British 
ambassador in Paris, to inform Drouyn that he would make no recommendation on the 
Shimonoseki indemnity until after the British minister’s return.813 As this took a 
considerable amount of time, it was already March before Alcock was finally able to 
explain himself in person. Palmerston, for one, was convinced afterwards that Alcock had 
shown ‘by argument and facts that he was right in his views and policy’, although he 
reassured Russell that ‘we could not help being swayed in our course by the feeling and 
opinions, however erroneous they have proved, of Parliament and the public in this 
country’.814 In the end, despite expressing many times a desire never to return to the Far 
East, Alcock was ‘rewarded’ for his service in Japan with the position of British minister 
to China.815 The fact that Queen Victoria herself felt compelled to express concern about 
this appointment indicated just how controversial Alcock’s policy in Japan had been back 
home. Ironically, Russell was forced to defend his return to East Asia by informing the 
Queen that neither Palmerston nor the Cabinet had raised any fears about it. He also 
reassured her that Parkes had been selected as the new minister in Japan, ‘a position it 
may be remembered far more critical than the present position of Your Majesty’s 
Representative in China’.816 Although Russell later deleted this sentence from the final 
draft of his letter, it would appear that he shared many of the Queen’s doubts about 
Alcock. 
Further evidence of a lack of full confidence in Alcock’s policy was apparent in 
Whitehall’s response to a memorandum he had drafted upon his return to London 
regarding matters still pending in Japan at the time of his departure. In this document, 
Alcock argued that the defeat of the expulsion movement effected by the Shimonoseki 
expedition would not alone guarantee stability in Japan. ‘To complete the work and ally 
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until Russell promised to convey him to Peking on the public purse. See TNA, Hammond 
Papers, FO391/1, Alcock to Hammond, 7 March 1865; Russell Papers, PRO30/22/101, 
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816 TNA, Russell Papers, PRO30/22/15D, Russell to Queen Victoria, 20 March 1865. 
 
 
231 
the hostile spirit,’ he wrote, ‘the Daimios must also be conciliated and invited freely to 
share in the advantages of foreign trade’.817 While the shogun’s authority should be 
supported up to a point, the cessation of Edo’s monopoly on trade was now the priority. 
In order to press the bakufu into adopting a more liberal policy and to make it understand 
that survival depended upon acting in good faith with the treaty powers, it was crucial 
that the four-power alliance he had brokered the previous summer remained in place. He 
therefore recommended the ‘formal neutralization of the Japanese territory’ by the 
governments of the four powers concerned.818 Once this had been achieved, the treaty 
powers could concentrate on more practical measures such as the return of the 
representatives to Edo, improved security measures at the ports, and, above all, the 
opening of Osaka and Hyōgo to trade. In short, Alcock had produced a manifesto for the 
creation of an entirely new treaty-port system, whereby a formal alliance of treaty powers 
would take full and equal responsibility not only for the protection of the ports and trade 
but for reconciling the bakufu, Mikado, and daimyō on the subject of foreign relations.  
This went far beyond what the British government had envisaged for what was still a 
relatively insignificant commercial market in global terms. It was a telling indication of 
how wary Hammond and Russell were about Alcock’s recommendations that, aside from 
addressing matters of pressing urgency such as the Shimonoseki indemnity, they did not 
make any concrete decision about the contents of his memorandum until mid-July.819 The 
delay was partly the result of the need to establish whether the United States shared 
France and Holland’s preference for the indemnity rather than the opening of a new 
port.820 Yet Russell was also loath to risk further complications in Japan by implementing 
a fundamental change of policy without concrete evidence that it was necessary. As a 
result, the instructions sent out to Parkes at the beginning of April 1865 were deliberately 
vague. The new British minister was simply told to exploit the political and commercial 
advantages secured by Alcock the previous year, to cultivate cordial relations with the 
other treaty powers, and to pursue a firm but conciliatory policy towards the shogun and 
the emperor.821 Russell at least approved of Alcock’s request for British military 
                                                
817 TNA, FO46/53, Alcock to Foreign Office, ‘Memorandum on Japan and matters still 
pending’ & ‘Memorandum on Treasury letter of 21 February 1865’, 20 March 1865. 
Alcock’s emphasis. 
818 Idem. 
819 Hammond’s analysis of the memo and Russell’s reply thereafter can be found at the 
bottom of the document dated 15 and 18 July respectively; see idem, ff.389-90.  
820 HCPP, 1866, Vol. LXXVI.427, [3615], p.8, Russell to Bruce, No. 7, 30 March 1865. 
821 HCPP, 1866, Vol. LXXVI.427, [3615], pp.8-9, Russell to Parkes, No. 8, 8 April 1865. 
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instructors to train troops in Japan, but even this measure was resisted by Earl de Grey, 
the Secretary of State for War, who argued that ‘by training these troops by European 
methods we may be only teaching them how to fight against ourselves’.822  
At the end of April, the first rumours of French designs on the silk trade began to trickle 
into the Foreign Office. Russell’s initial reaction was sceptical. ‘It seems a cock and bull 
story’, he wrote succinctly on the cover of Winchester’s private letter of 28 February, 
which was then forwarded to Cowley.823 Yet concerns that Japan had become the latest 
target for Napoléon III’s expansionist ambitions began to build in the Foreign Office as 
more of Winchester’s reports reached London over the coming months. Perhaps most 
worrying was a ‘mischievous’ article on Roches’s activities by the Japan Commercial 
News that Winchester had convinced the editor to suppress. The article began with a 
warning that the French occupation of Acapulco, the presence of a fleet of forty vessels 
in the Pacific region, and Napoléon III’s apparent designs on the mineral wealth of 
Formosa (Taiwan) demonstrated that France was acquiring supremacy in every part of 
the world. For this reason, the policy of the French representative in Japan was a matter 
of concern, particularly his rumoured silk monopoly scheme, which was nothing more 
than an attempt to advance French trade at the expense of the other treaty powers. ‘It 
behooves our chargé d’affaires to keep a sharp look out and prevent France from 
interfering with British interests’, the article concluded, ‘Mon. Roches is a clever man 
and quite equal to any diplomacy required from him by his Government.’824  
The fact that Roches’s activities were causing such consternation among the British 
merchant community was bad enough, but the arrival in July of Winchester’s private letter 
regarding the disappearance of his letter to Nagasaki and the interception of his copy of 
the Moniteur des Soies was the final straw. Under Russell’s orders, Hammond forwarded 
this letter privately to Cowley ‘to speak to Drouyn’.825 Hammond’s view of the French 
as ‘shocking…clumsy rascals’ could only have been reinforced by the arrival the 
following week of Winchester’s dispatch on the creation of the French factory in China, 
                                                
822 The British Library, London (BL), Ripon Papers, Add MS 43512, De Grey to Russell, 
24 March 1865. 
823 TNA, FO46/53, Winchester to Hammond, 28 February 1865. 
824 See TNA, FO46/53, Winchester to Hammond(?), 13 March 1865, ff.329-30. The 
article was not exactly accurate, for although the French forces occupied Acapulco in 
June 1864, they were forced to abandon it on 14 December the same year as their forces 
in Mexico became increasingly stretched.  
825 TNA, FO46/54, Winchester to Hammond, 27 April 1865. 
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and his concerns about what this meant for British trade in Japan.826 Despite this 
increasing evidence of French duplicity, Russell was still determined to keep Paris onside 
on the indemnity question. After all, the Foreign Secretary knew that without French 
support there was little chance of securing the opening of Hyōgo and Osaka and the 
ratification of the treaties by the Mikado.  
By early July, the British government was engaged in negotiations with the other three 
treaty powers regarding the bakufu’s decision to opt for the indemnity but to delay 
payment of all but the first instalment. In response to Winchester’s fears that this would 
be akin to ‘the hanging of a millstone for five or six years around the neck of our own 
trade’, Russell took on board his suggestion that the powers should exploit the interval 
between the first and second payment to secure commercial advantages.827 He therefore 
proposed that two-thirds of the indemnity should be waived in lieu of the opening of 
Hyōgo and Osaka, imperial ratification, and the reduction of import duties to five per 
cent. If the bakufu did not agree, Britain would revert to a demand for full payment of the 
indemnity in 1866, and if this did not bring about the desired concessions it would then 
rescind the London Protocol of 1862 and require the opening of the ports in January 
1866.828 ‘It is but just,’ Russell wrote to Winchester towards the end of July, ‘that the 
great Daimios should partake of the benefits of a commerce which is so beneficial to 
Japan and so profitable to the Tycoon.’829 In the space of a few months, Russell’s opinion 
on Japan had shifted substantially towards Alcock’s point of view. 
That these decisions were taken after the arrival of Winchester’s private letters concerning 
Roches’s activities was no coincidence. The confirmation that Roches and Edo were 
plotting to undermine the treaties was clear evidence of bad faith on the part of the bakufu, 
just a few months after it had pledged to honour the treaties in full. On the other hand, 
news that Chōshū had requested permission to open Shimonoseki to Western trade 
confirmed Alcock’s assertion in 1864 that there was ‘a party of great weight and influence 
in the country which desires to commence a new era for Japan, in alliance with European 
                                                
826 TNA, FO519/192, Hammond to Cowley, 10 July 1865. 
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12 April 1865 (received 16 June). 
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power, an era of extended commerce and unrestricted intercourse’.830 Although talk of 
any alliance with the daimyō was more than Hammond ever considered, he too had 
suspected for some time that they objected to foreign trade because they did not share in 
its benefits.831 After the success of the Shimonoseki expedition, these measures initially 
no longer seemed necessary. Unfortunately, the intelligence arriving from Japan by the 
summer of 1865 appeared to suggest that the bakufu was retrenching into protectionism, 
just as Alcock had feared when he left Japan. This news spurred Hammond to finally take 
a detailed look at the former British minister’s March memorandum. After reading it over 
a dozen times, however, he was still at a loss as to how to deal with the political 
considerations it involved, in particular regarding the position of the daimyō in Japan’s 
system of government.832 Russell agreed that Alcock’s recommendations went too far and 
believed that his instruction to Winchester would contribute to the opening of Hyōgo.833  
Unfortunately, Russell’s powers of persuasion were not sufficient to convince Drouyn to 
support his policy. Just two days after he officially recognised the daimyō’s right to share 
in Japan’s trade, Russell found himself writing to Winchester again to inform the British 
chargé that the French government still preferred full payment of the indemnity to any 
commercial concessions, and that the matter would now have to be settled by the 
representatives in Japan.834 The official explanation given for French opposition to 
Russell’s proposal was the risk of provoking a war with Japan should the bakufu refuse 
to open Osaka or Hyōgo.835 In fact, Drouyn understood by this point that France had little 
to gain from insisting upon the immediate opening of the ports or from encouraging the 
bakufu to abolish its commercial monopoly. This would not only entrench further 
Britain’s economic dominance over the Japan trade but also risk jeopardising the 
agreements approved back in March to help strengthen the bakufu. Indeed, by the time 
that Russell put forward his proposal Roches’s request for an augmentation of French 
military forces in Japan to help train the shogun’s army was under consideration at Paris, 
while the French engineer selected by the shogunate to oversee the construction of the 
                                                
830 As reported by Alcock after a meeting with secret agents of Satsuma in Nagasaki en 
route to Yokohama in March 1864; see TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/1, Alcock to 
Hammond, 17 March 1864. 
831 See TNA, Russell Papers, PRO30/22/28, Hammond to Russell, 3 August 1864. 
832 See ff.389-90 in TNA, FO46/53, Alcock to Foreign Office, ‘Memorandum on Japan 
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833 Idem. 
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Yokosuka dockyard had already arrived to discuss the project with Chasseloup-Laubat.836 
Thanks to Roches, Drouyn was also under the impression that payment of the indemnity 
was in the bakufu’s best interests.  
It is also important to stress that attention in Paris at this time was primarily focused on 
how the conclusion of the American Civil War in May 1865 affected the ongoing Mexico 
campaign, in particular after Washington began to arm the Mexican rebels and issue 
threatening demands for France to evacuate its expeditionary force.837 The perilous state 
of Franco-American relations coupled with the growing fear of Prussian aggrandisement 
after the Second Schleswig War meant that Paris had nothing to gain from aggravating 
Britain over such an insignificant matter as Japan. As a result, Drouyn was reluctant to 
press the issue of the indemnity too forcefully with London, which explained why he 
suggested referring Russell’s proposal back to the representatives rather than rejecting it 
outright. With Russell equally unwilling to risk a rift with Paris over such a trifling matter, 
it was left to the men on the spot just as Drouyn had suggested.838 
The need to secure imperial ratification and the opening of the new ports was a matter 
upon which Russell and his two principal subordinates at the Foreign Office all agreed. 
Although it had been impossible to establish a common policy on the issue of the 
indemnity with the other treaty powers, they all had confidence that a man of Parkes’s 
experience would secure the support of his colleagues and wring these concessions from 
the bakufu. In August 1865, however, Hammond and Layard became convinced that 
Parkes should be instructed to proceed to Osaka at once, regardless of whether the other 
representatives agreed with Russell’s proposal on the indemnity or not. The trigger for 
this change in approach was a meeting that Layard held on 28 July with three Satsuma 
officers who had secretly travelled to Britain to buy steamers and develop foreign trade 
in their domain.839 They were introduced by Lawrence Oliphant, the former Japanese 
Secretary of Legation, who was now a Member of Parliament. Oliphant believed that it 
was now clear that the daimyō would never be satisfied until the bakufu abolished its 
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monopoly on foreign trade. Although he acknowledged that it would be impossible to 
fulfil Satsuma’s desire to enter into direct relations with Britain or to open his ports 
without Edo’s express consent, he suggested instructing Parkes to make the bakufu 
understand that it was in its interests to open ports in daimyō territory and not to block 
any attempt by them to do so.840  
Contrary to Hugh Cortazzi’s assertion that the Satsuma men ‘did not receive a very 
sympathetic hearing’ at the Foreign Office, Layard reported the details of this meeting to 
Hammond at once.841  These ‘very intelligent men’, he wrote, were ‘very anxious that we 
should communicate direct with the Mikado, who, they say, has clear power to bind the 
whole of Japan by treaties…Satsuma is very anxious to trade and would open to Loochoo 
[Ryūkyū] Islands at once if the Tycoon would not interfere’.842 This intelligence directly 
contradicted Edo’s assertion since the ports first opened in 1859 that it was unable to fulfil 
its treaty obligations due to the hostility of the Japanese people to the presence of 
foreigners in Japan. Hammond welcomed this confirmation of what he had long 
suspected, and agreed with the Satsuma men ‘that we should try to get at the Mikado 
through Osaka…which will be the Shanghai of Japan’.843 However, although now certain 
that Parkes should sail immediately to Osaka should the bakufu fail to pay the indemnity 
on time, Hammond thought it still best to wait and see how the discussions in Japan 
regarding the indemnity developed.844  
In mid-August, Hammond met with the Satsuma agents himself. In addition to further 
intelligence he had received regarding Chōshū’s overtures to the British in Nagasaki,845 
he believed that the Foreign Office now had enough proof of the bakufu’s duplicity to 
effect the fundamental realignment in Britain’s treaty relationship with Japan that he had 
long considered necessary. Hammond believed that ‘a great opportunity had opened’, 
‘but the way we must turn it to amount is by acting with the Daimios or the Mikado, and 
setting aside, I do not mean displacing, the Tycoon’.846 While negotiating 
separate arrangements with the daimyō would lead to civil war, Hammond believed that 
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the great lords ‘would probably be content with the substantial benefits of trade at their 
several Ports under the sanction of a general treaty with the Mikado’.847 He was confident 
that Holland and the United States would be supportive of this policy, but he worried that 
if the French got wind of it too far in advance they would ‘manipulate it for the purposes 
of intrigue and French glorification’.848 For that reason, he recommended not informing 
the other treaty-power governments of Britain’s change in policy until after Parkes’s 
orders had gone out. 
While Hammond was careful not to advocate a change of regime per se, his patience with 
the bakufu had clearly run out. Moreover, the growing evidence of French intriguing in 
Edo was an indication that Alcock’s four-power alliance was beginning to splinter. 
Hammond therefore believed that it was better for Parkes to act independently and 
without delay rather than give Roches any more time to corner the Japan trade. Russell 
was not willing to endorse this policy, however, and instead advised Layard to give Parkes 
a ‘wide discretion’ over how to proceed on the basis of the Satsuma intelligence.849 He 
also suggested asking Alcock to return to Yokohama to confer with Parkes about the 
situation, an idea that was strongly opposed by Hammond and Layard as likely to 
undermine Parkes.850 Hammond tried to convince Russell that Parkes was perfectly 
capable of handling the situation if furnished with instructions along the lines he had set 
out. However, the arrival of news that the bakufu had launched a pecuniary expedition 
against Chōshū and decided to send yet another mission to Europe reinforced the Foreign 
Secretary’s impression that there was little point in recommending concrete measures in 
a country where ‘tomorrow may ascertain the wisest policy of yesterday’.851 
With so many confusing and contradictory reports flooding into the Foreign Office, 
Layard’s views on what should be done lay somewhere between those of Hammond and 
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Russell. While the Parliamentary Under-Secretary appreciated that much would have to 
be left to Parkes’s discretion, he also believed that the best way to open Japan to trade 
was to use the daimyō to gain access to the Mikado.852 Despite this, Russell remained 
‘much against overdoing instructions to Parkes’, and stressed to Layard that Britain’s 
treaties had been made with the shogun – ‘that we, France, the United States and 
Holland have all held his to be the authority for making treaties – even Satsuma has said 
so’.853 Moreover, the Foreign Secretary was not about to risk a rift with Paris over the 
Shimonoseki indemnity without great care, as he had already informed Drouyn about his 
proposal and promised to do nothing more about it until hearing back from Japan.854 
Layard did not receive these instructions until he had already put together a draft for 
Parkes in line with Hammond’s policy. When he belatedly received Russell’s orders, 
Layard made one last attempt to change the Foreign Secretary’s mind by asking for 
clarification as to whether Parkes was to proceed to Osaka immediately if the bakufu 
refused to consider the indemnity proposal, and whether he was to act independently if 
unable to secure the support of his colleagues, as was likely in the case of France.855 
Russell’s reply was unequivocal: nothing further was to be done until Parkes reported 
back from Japan. Britain was bound to wait until the indemnity proposal had been 
discussed in Yokohama, and would only consider acting independently of the 
Shimonoseki convention if there was disagreement among the representatives. If the 
bakufu refused to pay, all agreements to postpone the opening of the ports would become 
automatically null and void in any case. Moreover, Drouyn believed that the bakufu could 
easily afford to pay up, and Russell found it suspicious to say the least that Edo was 
attempting to purchase ships and cannon from the treaty powers while simultaneously 
pleading poverty. On the issue of cooperation with France, he also left no room for doubt: 
‘It is a point no less of policy than of good faith to act as far as we can in conjunction 
with the French. If we cast them off they may arm, drill and instruct the Japanese to act 
against us. We must be very cautious.’856  
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The section of Layard’s draft instructing Parkes to insist upon the immediate opening of 
Osaka and Hyōgo, to proceed at once to Osaka with a significant fleet should the bakufu 
refuse, and to encourage the daimyō to take measures to induce the Mikado to ratify the 
treaties was therefore omitted from Parkes’s final instructions. Instead, he was simply 
asked to cooperate with the other representatives to ascertain the real state of affairs with 
regard to whether or not the extension of trade would threaten the shogun’s government. 
Furthermore, although Russell retained a paragraph relating to the contradictory 
declarations made by the Japanese as to whether or not the treaties were binding on the 
daimyō unless ratified by the Mikado, he deliberately inserted a sentence making it clear 
that Satsuma had ‘fully asserted the Treaty making power to reside in the Tycoon’.857 
Forced to admit defeat, Hammond accepted Russell’s decision while maintaining that his 
policy was the only viable long-term route to stability in Japan.858  
Although the instructions issued to Parkes were not quite as radical as Hammond desired, 
they still clearly constituted a significant shift in British attitudes towards Japan by 
officially calling into question the status of the emperor and the right of the shogun to 
conduct foreign affairs for the first time. Few, if any, historians of this period have 
highlighted the intensive debate between Russell, Layard, and Hammond over this policy 
during the summer of 1865. This is a mistake, as their discussions demonstrated 
unequivocally that Britain’s shift in Japan policy in the aftermath of the Shimonoseki 
expedition was set not by the personalities on the spot but by the British government.859 
The contrast with Roches’s very personal initiation of a new French policy in Japan could 
not be more stark.  
After receiving his instructions in October 1865, Parkes wasted no time in putting 
Russell’s proposal on the indemnity to the other representatives. Roches was initially 
opposed, but he soon realised that there was no changing Parkes’s mind and that 
confirmation of the treaties by the emperor might work in the bakufu’s favour in any case. 
On 30 October, the four representatives issued a declaration in favour of the proposal and 
agreed to put it to the bakufu. As the shogun and most of the rōjū were no longer in Edo, 
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having departed for Osaka in the summer to prepare for a punitive expedition against 
Chōshū, Parkes was able to justify what London had spent so long agonising over.860 At 
the beginning of November, he arrived in Osaka at the head of a commanding squadron 
to open negotiations with the rōjū.  
Denied the tactical advantage of using the distance between Kyoto and Edo to justify its 
delaying tactics and contradictory promises, the rōjū quickly acceded to all of Parkes’s 
demands. Anti-bakufu agitators at the imperial court at Kyoto initially refused to comply, 
however, and demanded the resignation of the rōjū responsible for the concessions. This 
provoked consternation in Osaka, leading the shogun to offer his resignation and Parkes 
to issue a strongly-worded rebuke. With the British minister’s patience running out, the 
imperial court was pressed into endorsing the treaties on 22 November 1865, although 
Kyoto continued to withhold approval for the opening of the new ports. It was at this 
point that Roches, who had remained aloof during the negotiations, intervened to broker 
a compromise. By drafting a note for the rōjū that convinced Parkes to accept imperial 
ratification of the treaties, tariff revision, and full payment of the indemnity in exchange 
for the continued closure of the ports until the date set by the London Protocol, Roches 
was able to postpone a crisis that threatened to engulf the bakufu and with it his entire 
policy.861 
Roches was careful to make no mention of his decisive role in delaying the opening of 
Osaka and Hyōgo to Paris, drawing Drouyn’s attention instead to the discreet relations he 
believed Parkes was cultivating with Satsuma and Chōshū. Despite his irritation over 
what he saw as Parkes’s jealousy regarding his own close relationship with the bakufu, 
Roches soon found himself working closely with his British colleague to thwart the 
bakufu’s efforts to renege on the promises it had made in Osaka. With its treasury 
increasingly depleted, the bakufu soon renewed its request to postpone payment of the 
indemnity almost as soon as the representatives returned to Yokohama.862 Parkes used 
this request as leverage to secure a series of commercial concessions from the bakufu over 
the following months, culminating on 25 June 1866 with the signing of a convention that 
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not only reduced the tariff on many exports and imports to five per cent but also removed 
many of the restrictions that Edo had introduced since 1859. The most important of these 
was the abandonment of the shogunate’s monopoly on trade and the centuries-old system 
of sakoku, or ‘closed country’. These were replaced with formal guarantees of the 
freedom of all Japanese merchants, daimyō, and daimyō retainers to trade and associate 
with foreigners at the ports without government interference, the right to employ foreign 
shipping in trade with the open ports, and the provision of passports for Japanese to travel 
abroad for study, trade, or as employees on board foreign ships.863 Within the space of 
less than a year, Parkes had secured almost all of the commercial concessions he had been 
empowered to seek, a stunning success that owed much to his refusal to take no for an 
answer from either the bakufu or his conniving French colleague. That he achieved this 
without abandoning the system of collective diplomacy bequeathed to him by Alcock was 
all the more remarkable. 
 
Conclusions 
Aside from the end of the American Civil War and some difficulties in the Near East, 
there were few domestic or foreign crises for the British government to contend with 
during 1865.864 As a result, for once the Foreign Office could concentrate on how best to 
protect British commercial interests in Japan, a country that appeared to be sliding 
inexorably towards civil war. The alarm in Whitehall at the unauthorised dispatch of 
Alcock’s joint naval expedition against Chōshū, launched on the basis of a policy that 
neither Russell nor his subordinates fully understood, forced the Foreign Secretary and 
his advisors to confront the challenges facing the Japanese treaty-port system. Despite the 
expedition’s apparent success, Alcock’s hopes of using the defeat of anti-foreign 
extremism as a platform to negotiate a more stable relationship between the treaty powers 
and Japan, and indeed the treaty powers themselves, was swiftly dashed by his 
ignominious recall. Denied the fruits of his own victory, Alcock was forced to vacate the 
scene before he could create the conditions necessary to institute the fundamental change 
he believed was necessary.  
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The vacuum of leadership that ensued was quickly filled by Roches, whose attempt to 
establish a ‘special relationship’ with the bakufu owed much to his personality and 
background as well as a desire to restore his reputation in Paris after the criticism he had 
received for associating himself with Alcock’s policy. To that end, the chastened French 
minister immediately set about dismantling his British colleague’s legacy by building 
political connections in Edo with a view to narrowing the commercial gap between 
Britain and France. On top of his nefarious schemes to monopolise the Japan trade, 
Roches’s willingness to mislead his contacts within the bakufu, to misinform his 
diplomatic colleagues in Yokohama, and, above all, to deceive his own superiors back in 
Paris further demonstrated the modus operandi of a diplomat for whom the ends always 
justified the means. For Roches, the chance to secure personal and national glory by 
supplanting British influence over Japan’s ‘enclave empires’ was too good to pass over.  
Standing in his path was Charles Winchester, a very capable agent who was hampered by 
the limitations of his powers and the absence of definitive instructions from home. Given 
these disadvantages, Winchester did well to make full use of the growing intelligence 
network at his disposal in order to scupper Roches’s silk monopoly scheme. The overtures 
to Winchester made by agents of Chōshū, coupled with the testimony received first-hand 
from Satsuma representatives in London, convinced Layard and Hammond that the best 
way to maintain Britain’s dominant commercial and political position in Japan was to 
bypass the bakufu altogether and open direct relations with the emperor. Russell’s 
decision to overrule his subordinates on such a substantive issue said much about his 
cautious style of diplomacy.  
In years gone by, the interventionist measures put forward in Alcock’s March 1865 
memorandum might have found a more sympathetic ear in Lord Palmerston, who may 
well have compelled his reluctant Foreign Secretary into approving a policy that had 
much in common with his preferred method of diplomacy. By the summer of 1865, 
however, Palmerston’s health was in rapid decline due to a bladder infection that would 
eventually lead to his death in October. Although this did not prevent him from winning 
an increased majority at a general election in July, it did lead to his gradual retreat from 
public life thereafter.865 As the octogenarian Prime Minister’s vitality ebbed away so too 
did the dynamism that had characterised his foreign policy for decades, and Russell’s 
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inherent aversion for decisive measures – not only in Japan but in foreign policy in 
general – came increasingly to the fore. The drift in policy that permeated through the 
Foreign Office as a result was felt by Winchester as far away as Japan, and it was palpably 
evident in Russell’s decision to reject Hammond and Layard’s recommendations in the 
summer of 1865 despite mounting evidence that the bakufu was colluding with the French 
to evade the treaties and maintain its monopoly on trade, particularly in silk.  
In fact, the troubling news from Japan only made Russell more determined to avoid direct 
intervention in Japanese domestic affairs, which he feared would risk a costly war that 
the French were well placed to exploit. The last thing the Foreign Secretary wanted at this 
time was to encourage Napoléon III’s ambitions in East Asia, especially while there still 
remained a possibility of using collective diplomacy to press the bakufu into granting the 
commercial concessions that Britain desired. It was a prudent policy, for Russell was not 
to know that Paris had no grand designs for Japan beyond the fulfilment of what Drouyn 
believed were legitimate commercial contracts to assist the bakufu in the process of 
modernisation. It was precisely because Britain already had significant commercial 
interests at stake that Russell was so unwilling to provoke a rift with the French unless 
absolutely necessary. In the end, his reluctance to intervene independently in Japan’s 
constitutional crisis was rewarded, as Parkes was able to secure almost everything Britain 
wanted without the need to resort to unilateral measures.  
Conversely, the fact that Japan was of such limited interest to Drouyn meant he paid little 
attention to the complex political developments taking place in the country, making it 
easy for Roches to convince his superior that it was in the bakufu’s best interests to pay 
the indemnity and to enter into hugely expensive commercial schemes. This juxtaposition 
between policymaking by government and policymaking by personality is important, as 
historians have often framed the policy differences that developed between Parkes and 
Roches during the final years of the Tokugawa shogunate as primarily the result of a clash 
of personalities. As this chapter has revealed, although Parkes certainly had the character 
to challenge his French colleague on matters of policy, his actions were always consistent 
with the instructions he received from home. By contrast, Roches would continue to act 
entirely on his own volition for the remainder of his tenure in Japan, with disastrous 
consequences for both himself and the bakufu. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
False Friends: Léon Roches and Sir Harry Parkes, 1866 
 
During the twilight years of the Tokugawa shogunate, the British and French 
representatives in Japan faced the difficult challenge of safeguarding their respective 
national interests while the regime that signed the ‘unequal treaties’ battled for its very 
survival. As ever, it was impossible to separate the domestic political and social upheaval 
that would eventually consume the bakufu from its treaty relationship with the Western 
powers, which had reached a definitive crossroads with the abolition of Edo’s monopoly 
on trade in the Tariff Convention of 25 June 1866. Following this success, Sir Harry 
Parkes hoped to guide the bakufu towards the creation of a more equitable treaty-port 
system that allowed the daimyō to share in the profits of foreign commerce. This policy 
brought him into direct conflict with Léon Roches, who became increasingly committed 
to protecting his political and commercial investments with Edo above all else. Given 
their unique personalities and thirst for leadership, it was not long before the uneasy 
accord between these two men gave way to rivalry and rancour, as each worked to thwart 
the other’s attempts to implement two very different visions for the liberalisation of 
Japan’s restrictive system of commerce. 
Despite the differences that developed between Parkes and Roches during this period, it 
was clear to both that Japan’s constitutional crisis had reached a critical phase. This was 
of little concern to their respective governments, however, which were as usual 
preoccupied with more pressing developments elsewhere. For France, a distant crisis in 
the Far East paled into significance compared to the challenge posed by Prussian 
expansionism in Europe, the ongoing Roman question, and the faltering campaign in 
Mexico, all of which led Napoléon III to question the viability of his entire interventionist 
foreign policy. Meanwhile in London, a change in political administrations led to a 
significant shift in British foreign policy priorities. The slow disintegration of the once 
close relationship between Britain and France in Japan therefore went largely unnoticed 
at home, leaving Parkes and Roches alone to battle for control over the treaty-port system 
and the power to shape the burgeoning ‘enclave empires’ contained within it. 
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Turbulent times 
Lord Russell’s decision not to abandon collective diplomacy in exchange for direct 
relations with the Mikado was one of his last as Foreign Secretary. Following Lord 
Palmerston’s death on 18 October 1865, he accepted an invitation from Queen Victoria 
to form a new government later that month. The new Prime Minister, who was no spring 
chicken himself at the age of seventy-four, faced a daunting task in holding together the 
loose coalition of Whigs, Peelites, and Radicals that Palmerston had so skilfully 
assembled over the past six years, especially since the Liberal Party’s victory at the 
general election earlier that year was widely considered ‘more a personal victory for 
Palmerston than for Liberalism’.866 The need to placate these disparate parties reduced 
Russell’s scope for substantial alterations to Palmerston’s Cabinet, making his most 
notable appointment that of Lord Clarendon as his successor at the Foreign Office. 
Having already served as Foreign Secretary during the 1850s, Clarendon was a safe pair 
of hands whose appointment was welcomed by Hammond as ‘merely a change of 
friends’.867 
The feeling of continuity was apparent in Clarendon’s Japan policy. Contrary to the 
assertions of Grace Fox, who has placed much emphasis on Clarendon’s role in 
developing a policy of neutrality towards Japan’s domestic conflict, the new Foreign 
Secretary simply distilled Russell’s cautious position into a definitive set of instructions 
for Parkes in the event of civil war.868 Admittedly, the impetus for this move was 
Clarendon’s decision to reverse his predecessor’s position and meet with Satsuma’s 
agents in late March 1866, a meeting that convinced him that such a conflict was an 
imminent prospect. Even so, Clarendon’s initial response was as cautious as that of 
Russell the previous year. Parkes was warned not to express an opinion for or against any 
contesting party or to seek any political influence in Japan, but simply to focus on 
developing commerce within the country. He was specifically precluded from negotiating 
separate trading arrangements with the daimyō, but free to encourage them to work with 
the bakufu and the emperor to put an end to Japan’s restrictive system of commerce. 
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Above all, Clarendon stressed that the British government’s policy in the event of civil 
war was to remain neutral while requiring all sides to strictly observe the treaties.869 
As usual, this official dispatch revealed little about what Clarendon actually discussed 
with the Satsuma men in March. Much more revealing was a private synopsis of the 
meeting sent to the Foreign Secretary by Lawrence Oliphant, who had acted as the middle 
man between the Satsuma party and the Foreign Office. This note, which was later 
forwarded to Parkes, alleged that all the principal daimyō were now hopeful that the treaty 
powers would ask the emperor to convoke an assembly of the great lords at Kyoto, where 
each would be invited to sign the treaties. Between this assembly and the exchange of 
ratifications with the foreign representatives, a delay of at least three months was 
necessary to allow for ‘deliberations’ to take place regarding new arrangements on the 
conduct of foreign affairs. Unless such arrangements were made, Oliphant had been 
assured that the daimyō would embroil Japan in civil war whenever another port was 
opened under exclusive bakufu control.870 This intelligence corroborated information 
Hammond had received privately from Parkes just a few days earlier that Satsuma was 
opposed to the opening of Hyōgo on the basis that the bakufu would gain control of all 
trade in the Inland Sea. It also supported the British minister’s theory that Edo was 
attempting to defer payment of the Shimonoseki indemnity in order to conserve resources 
ahead of an armed struggle with the daimyō and reactionaries at the imperial court.871 
With this fresh intelligence in hand, Hammond wrote a candid private letter to Parkes. 
Though it would ‘never do’ for foreigners to take an ‘active or ostensible part’ in 
promoting a discussion between the bakufu, daimyō, and emperor, he explained, Parkes 
could perhaps make ‘incidental remarks’ in conversations with the rōjū to demonstrate 
that ‘a way of escape is open to them from the difficulties of their position…which cannot 
be removed by perseverance in the narrow and selfish policy which they have hitherto 
pursued’.872 If the bakufu continued to deny there was any desire among the daimyō for 
reform, Parkes was authorised to state that he possessed categorical intelligence to the 
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contrary, but he was to be very careful about making ‘too zealous an interference with 
the internal movements of the Japanese Government’.873 He was also warned not to give 
Edo any clue as to the source of this intelligence for fear of endangering the Satsuma 
men, who had travelled overseas illegally and were already under close scrutiny from 
bakufu officials in London. 
While Hammond clearly accepted that the commercial and political situation in Japan 
could be improved if the bakufu agreed to share the fruits of trade, neither he nor 
Clarendon were prepared to ask the emperor to convoke a conference of the great daimyō. 
As far as Hammond was concerned, there were no guarantees that such overt interference 
in Japan’s domestic affairs would benefit British trade. In fact, it was more likely to have 
the opposite effect, as any changes to the structure of the Japanese state resulting from 
foreign intervention would be unacceptable to its people. Such caution was to prove 
prescient, for what no one in London knew at the time was that secret discussions were 
already underway in Osaka to negotiate Satsuma’s abandonment of the policy of kōbu-
gattai in favour of a formal alliance with Chōshū to overthrow the Tokugawa 
shogunate.874 This would be much easier to achieve were the treaty powers to compel the 
shogun to attend a meeting of all the daimyō at Kyoto, where he could be stripped of his 
powers once and for all. By eschewing the advice of the Satsuma delegation, therefore, 
Clarendon and Hammond insulated the British government against accusations of 
complicity in any attempted coup. 
The fact that Satsuma even considered asking the Foreign Office to intervene with the 
Mikado on its behalf indicated how little the Japanese understood about Britain’s foreign 
policy priorities. Even before Palmerston’s untimely demise, the ‘gunboat minister’ had 
become increasingly reluctant to enforce the policy of liberal interventionism that had 
characterised his years as Foreign Secretary. His successor as Prime Minister was even 
less likely to advocate such active measures, given that it was Russell who had borne the 
brunt of criticism as Foreign Secretary for interfering in the internal affairs of other 
countries – a foreign policy disparaged by Lord Derby during the Schleswig-Holstein 
debacle as ‘meddle and muddle’.875 As a matter of principle, therefore, it was extremely 
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unlikely that Russell would ever have agreed to direct intervention in Japan of the type 
requested by Satsuma.  
As ever, there were also more pressing issues for the Prime Minister to contend with than 
Japan. By the spring of 1866, his ministry was already beginning to falter over the passage 
of a new Reform Bill, which Russell had made the signature issue of his administration 
despite strong opposition from conservative members of his Cabinet such as the Duke of 
Somerset.876 After narrowly surviving weeks of rancorous parliamentary debate in April, 
the Bill was eventually defeated on 19 June by a Conservative motion. After concerted 
efforts to find a solution to the impasse failed, Russell and his government resigned just 
over a week later, bringing an end to seven years of uninterrupted Liberal rule. If British 
intervention in Japan’s impending civil struggle was already highly unlikely before the 
change of ministries, the return of a traditionally protectionist and isolationist 
Conservative administration led by Lord Derby rendered it virtually impossible.877 
While the British were preoccupied with domestic affairs during the first half of 1866, 
the French were focused on the deteriorating situation in Mexico. The military campaign 
there had gone from bad to worse in the two years since Napoléon III had installed the 
Habsburg prince Ferdinand Maximilian as emperor in 1864, with the French forces 
struggling to overcome the resistance of the comparatively small but intensely patriotic 
republican guerrilla forces. Maximilian had also proved himself an unpopular monarch, 
and his announcement in December 1865 that he could no longer afford to defray the 
costs of the French expeditionary force provided Napoléon III with the pretext he needed 
to announce the withdrawal of French troops at the beginning of 1866. At a time of 
increasing concern about the Prussian menace in Europe, the emperor could no longer 
risk antagonising a U.S. government that stood ready to reinforce the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ 
after the American Civil War had ended in May 1865. He attempted to disguise this 
admission of French weakness by claiming that the situation in Mexico was improving, 
but this was belied by the string of damaging defeats suffered by the imperial forces over 
the months that followed. With the Mexican Empire on the verge of total collapse, the 
monumental failure of the emperor’s Mexican adventure was clear for all to see.878 
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Unsurprisingly, the French government had little time to consider the situation in Japan 
during the early part of 1866, other than to approve of Roches’s role in securing imperial 
ratification of the treaties in Osaka.879 In early April, however, Drouyn was forced to turn 
his attention to Japanese affairs when Lord Cowley complained that Roches was 
encouraging the bakufu to believe that the treaty powers would agree to forego any further 
payments of the Shimonoseki indemnity if Edo agreed to turn Yokohama into a free port. 
According to Cowley, Roches had justified this move to Parkes on the basis that Drouyn 
himself had first mooted the idea of a free port during the visit of the Japanese embassy 
to Paris in 1864. In a testy dispatch, the Foreign Minister pointed out to Roches that 
circumstances had changed significantly since 1864, particularly in terms of the obstacles 
to foreign trade at the treaty ports. He also enclosed a translated summary of Parkes’s 
arguments against the free port proposal in order to make his disapproval crystal clear.880  
This intervention demonstrated Drouyn’s unwillingness to antagonise the British over 
Japanese matters. Yet this did not prevent him from acting to protect French interests 
whenever he considered it necessary to do so. One example of this was his reaction to 
Clarendon’s instruction that Parkes should encourage the daimyō to work with the bakufu 
to institute a less restrictive system of trade. Since the foreign representatives were only 
empowered to conduct relations with bakufu officials, Drouyn was worried that it would 
be difficult for Parkes to fulfil this part of his orders without undermining the government 
at Edo.881 His concern turned into alarm when two dispatches arrived from Roches 
complaining that Parkes’s pro-daimyō tendencies threatened both the authority of the 
bakufu and the maintenance of a collective policy of neutrality in Japan’s domestic 
conflict – a struggle he portrayed as an attempt by those who had murdered foreigners 
and opened fire on Western shipping to challenge the shogun’s legitimacy.882 Drouyn 
considered this assessment of the political situation as entirely fair, and he thought it 
equally important that Britain and France were in complete agreement over Japan 
policy.883 Fortunately, his concerns that Parkes was encouraging the daimyō to subvert 
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Edo’s authority were dispelled by Hammond, who assured the French ambassador in 
London that the British minister had been specifically instructed to act in concert with 
Roches.884 Hammond was equally confident that Parkes would act prudently vis-à-vis 
Japan’s political crisis, for the British minister had only recently expressed the view that 
‘far more may be effected through the Tycoon than through the Daimios’, whom he 
believed were incapable of putting aside their own jealousies in the national interest.885 
Reassured, Drouyn focused on organising the dispatch of a French mission militaire to 
instruct the shogun’s army. Desperate to strengthen its military forces, the bakufu had 
been unwilling to wait for London’s answer to its request in early 1865 for British military 
instructors. The British government had finally sanctioned a mission later that year, but 
by the time Parkes learned of this decision the head of a new bakufu delegation to Europe, 
Shibata Takenata,886 had already been authorised to accept a similar French offer. The 
British minister was not unduly concerned, however, as the shogun’s military bureau had 
also requested permission to send a group of young men to study military science in 
Britain. Parkes had no objection to such an initiative, as he believed that the only way the 
shogun could maintain his supremacy was by increasing his military strength.887 To that 
end, he also hoped to establish a small camp of instruction in Japan before the arrival of 
the French officers from Europe, but he was unable to make much headway before the 
bakufu submitted a formal application to Roches for a military mission consisting of over 
thirty artillery, cavalry, and infantry instructors.888 It was formally sanctioned by Marshal 
Randon, the Minister of War, in May 1866, albeit with half the number of instructors 
requested by the bakufu.889 
Roches was fortunate that this military mission was approved before the outbreak of a 
fresh crisis in Europe that would consume Drouyn’s attention for the remainder of his 
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tenure as Foreign Minister. The war that erupted between Prussia and Austria on 14 June 
1866 could not have been better timed for the Prussian leader Otto von Bismarck: the 
French were still engaged in Mexico and in no state to launch an opportunistic attack on 
the Rhine; the Russians were indebted to Prussia for the support that Bismarck had offered 
during the Polish uprising of 1863; and the British were focused on the threat that 
Napoléon III’s expansionist schemes posed to their international interests. For his part, 
the French emperor hoped that the war might also bring benefits for France. Yet he 
realised too late that French neutrality should come at a price, waiting until just days 
before the outbreak of fighting before attempting to secure last-minute guarantees from 
both sides. Though the British often assumed that the emperor favoured active measures, 
on this occasion he had hoped to frighten Austria to the negotiating table in order to secure 
concessions on Italy without the need for war. Once it became clear that a conflict was 
inevitable, he then anticipated a long and protracted one that would enable him to pressure 
both sides into revising the 1815 treaty settlement. This policy seriously underestimated 
the military capabilities of Prussia, whose decisive defeat of the Austrian forces at the 
Battle of Sadowa on 3 July 1866 plunged the Second Empire into crisis.890 
It was obvious to many in France that the emperor’s failure to intervene in the conflict 
had allowed Prussia to establish a position of dominance that seriously threatened French 
interests. In response to growing public pressure, the emperor ordered Drouyn to demand 
the restoration of the 1814 frontier as the price for French acceptance of Prussian 
aggrandisement. Naturally, Bismarck had no intention of ceding any German territory to 
France, and when rumours of his refusal reached Paris, Napoléon III attempted to deflect 
the blame by sacrificing his Foreign Minister. Yet the damage was already done. After 
the capitulation of the Austrians and the dissolution of the German Confederation at the 
end of August, the emperor was forced to accept Prussia’s victory without any of the 
territorial concessions he had sought.891 This disastrous outcome was compounded by the 
looming problem of the evacuation of French troops from Rome, which was scheduled to 
take place by mid-December 1866.892 Since the Italians had regained the Veneto without 
the need for French help, Napoléon III was now in the peculiar position of being the only 
sovereign in Europe standing in the way of Italian unification. Having failed to anticipate 
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the rise of a powerful new adversary on his north-eastern border, his continued 
commitment to papal sovereignty now risked antagonising France’s south-eastern 
neighbour as well. Meanwhile, his puppet regime in Mexico was hurtling towards 
collapse as advancing republican forces closed in on Mexico City during the autumn of 
1866. With the Second Empire besieged on all sides by the burgeoning nationalisms the 
emperor had helped to unleash, the last thing on French minds was East Asia, least of all 
Japan.  
 
Warning signs 
While the emperor and his new Foreign Minister, Lionel de Moustier, grappled with these 
converging crises in Paris, Roches was free to pursue his ‘politique personelle’ with 
impunity. Indeed, by the summer of 1866 his influence with the bakufu was such that it 
was beginning to drive a wedge between the French minister and his British colleague. 
The problem was not simply one of personalities, although this was certainly a significant 
factor according to the renowned British diplomatist Algernon Bertram Mitford,893 who 
wrote in his memoirs that ‘Parkes and Roches hated each other and were as jealous as a 
couple of women’.894 It was also that Roches’s increasingly partisan support for the 
bakufu began to undermine Parkes’s efforts to encourage the shogunate to open up 
Japan’s system of commerce. These tensions only began to emerge after the conclusion 
of the Tariff Convention, for Roches had supported the tariff negotiations in the hope that 
an agreement would improve Parkes’s attitude towards the bakufu.895 Yet the policy he 
pursued behind the scenes both before and after the convention was signed demonstrated 
that his primary goal in seeking to ‘liberalise’ Japan’s system of trade was to find a new 
means by which to corner the Japanese market for France. 
Roches could take some satisfaction from the fact that French trade with Japan had 
improved significantly since his arrival in 1864, but Britain still controlled over two-
thirds of the Yokohama trade by the end of the following year. He therefore remained 
determined to use his political connections in Edo to increase the amount of silk shipped 
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directly to France even after the abandonment of his silk monopoly scheme in early 1865. 
When commercial restrictions on silkworm eggs were finally lifted in the middle of that 
year, Roches spotted another opportunity to create an exclusive French trading 
relationship with the bakufu – this time in a way that would not breach the treaties. His 
latest scheme involved the establishment of a commercial company consisting of two 
trading associations: one of French merchants in Paris; the other of an equivalent number 
of Japanese merchants in Yokohama. Together they would enter into commercial 
relations, outside of official channels, by exchanging information about their respective 
markets and pooling their capital. This would enable merchants of both countries to turn 
a profit from the Japanese market and provide the bakufu with the means to strengthen its 
control over trade in the open ports. The fact that France was already the primary 
destination for Japanese silk made it easy to convince influential officials in Edo to 
approve this scheme, especially as the bakufu was already so reliant on French support 
for the shipyard project. Fleury-Hérard was duly appointed to help organise the project in 
Paris and to send someone with knowledge of French companies to Japan, while Shibata 
was instructed to liaise with the French banker to make all necessary arrangements.896 
The import-export company proposal was the latest example of Roches’s determination 
to address the continuing trade imbalance between Britain and France in Japan by 
whatever means possible. He knew that the bakufu would gladly support a scheme that 
would not only increase its share in the profits of foreign trade but also deny them to the 
daimyō. The main challenge was to convince Drouyn to rubberstamp a scheme that 
contradicted the Quai d’Orsay’s traditionally conservative policy in Japan. To complicate 
matters, he also had to consider the opinion of Armand Béhic, the Minister of Commerce, 
Agriculture and Public Works, as the company would need the support of both ministries 
to access credit from official sources in Paris. Roches therefore sent a carefully crafted 
dispatch to Drouyn that appealed to the sensibilities of both ministers, not least by 
creating the impression that it was the rōjū who had approached him with the proposal 
when it was actually the other way round.897 He also highlighted the bakufu’s decision to 
accept an invitation to participate in the Paris Exposition in 1867, the agreements it had 
already entered into for the construction of the Yokosuka shipyard and a new mint, and 
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who first suggested the idea to the bakufu; see Ericson, op.cit., pp.87-8 & p.117, footnote 
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its stated ambition to improve the country’s agriculture and industry as evidence of a 
desire to modernise the country.898 The establishment of an import-export company was 
consistent with this ambition, which Roches believed was being held back by 
inexperience, a lack of credit, and the mistrust of the native people – all problems that 
could be addressed by the creation of a powerful foreign company to work with a similar 
association of approved Japanese merchants. In short, this was an unmissable opportunity 
to corner the Japanese export trade, especially in silk, as well as to boost French imports 
to Japan. ‘If such a project is feasible,’ Roches added with typical panache, ‘Japan would 
be for us what China is for England…a French market.’899 
The most important passages of this dispatch were those where Roches argued that the 
company would not impede free trade because it would facilitate commercial transactions 
between merchants rather than between governments. These passages were all underlined 
by Drouyn, and were probably instrumental in securing the French government’s 
approval for the scheme in December. Béhic was particularly enthusiastic about the 
project, so much so that he introduced Fleury-Hérard to several major financiers in Paris 
over the months that followed. The proposal was eventually taken up by the Société 
Générale, a financial corporation established in 1864 to promote the development of 
French industry and commerce through the creation of joint-stock companies. It duly 
established a committee of company officials, export merchants, prominent bankers, and 
members of the Paris Chamber of Commerce to consider the way forward.900 In May 
1866, this committee reported back to the Board of Directors at the Société Générale that 
Paul-Jacques Coullet, a deputy manager of the Messageries Impériales and nephew of 
Béhic, was being dispatched to Japan to investigate the commercial conditions in the 
country. Critically, Coullet was also authorised ‘to negotiate with the Japanese 
Government an agreement guaranteeing the important profits of commerce’.901  
There was no mention of any negotiating priorities in Coullet’s official letter of 
authorisation, however, which simply stated the committee’s ambition to develop 
                                                
898 The bakufu initially rejected invitations to send a delegation to the Paris Exposition, 
but were belatedly stirred into organising an official presence for the occasion when it 
transpired that Satsuma had already agreed to send their own party. See Andrew Cobbing, 
The Japanese Discovery of Victorian Britain: Early Travel Encounters in the Far West, 
(Folkestone: Japan Library, 1998), p.20. 
899 AD, CCY/4, Roches to Drouyn, 17 October 1865.  
900 A complete list of the founding members of the administration committee of the 
import-export company can be found in CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes33/18. 
901 Quoted in Ericson, op.cit. p.92. 
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commercial relations with Japan through the establishment of a Compagnie Française 
d’Exportation et d’Importation backed by 60 million Francs of capital. The letter further 
authorised Coullet to negotiate in the committee’s name, but he was instructed to refer all 
treaties and matters of importance back to Paris. Coullet was also furnished with two 
letters of introduction for Roches – one from Béhic and one from Fleury-Hérard – which 
revealed much about their contrasting expectations for the company. According to 
Béhic’s letter, Coullet had been sent to Japan to explore opportunities to develop new 
markets for French industry and commerce. By contrast, Fleury-Hérard’s letter stated 
explicitly that Coullet was coming to Japan not only to broker commercial agreements 
with Japanese merchants, but also ‘to negotiate certain special items with the local 
government’.902 It would appear, therefore, that the founders of the import-export 
company hoped to monopolise certain aspects of the Japan trade under the noses of the 
British. Given Béhic’s family connection to Coullet and his role in bringing the committee 
together in the first place, it also seems likely that the Minister of Commerce had at least 
some inkling of what Roches, Fleury-Hérard, and his associates were up to. 
Although Parkes was entirely unaware of these developments, he grew increasingly 
concerned during the Tariff Convention negotiations that the French were determined ‘to 
leave no stone unturned that will extend their position’ in Japan.903 In April 1866 – well 
before any word of the import-export scheme could have reached Japan – he already 
sensed a ‘disposition on the part of our French friends to monopolize arrangements that 
might minister to their influence’.904 At the same time, Parkes was confident that he was 
making progress in his own relations with Japan’s ruling classes, which improved 
significantly after he successfully asserted the right to receive visits from representatives 
of the daimyō at the British legation. It was not long before he received delegates from 
Satsuma han, who invited him to visit their capital at Kagoshima at his earliest 
convenience. Given the shogun’s prolonged absence from Edo, Parkes was now 
convinced that a power struggle was underway in Kyoto, and that significant 
constitutional changes, such as the centralisation of power through the creation of a 
chamber of daimyō, were a real possibility. Although he was sceptical that the daimyō 
could ever unite in the national interest in this way, he was determined to find out more 
about their intentions. He therefore insisted upon visiting Satsuma’s Edo residence in 
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904 Idem. 
 
 
256 
mid-May despite stiff opposition from the rōjū, before resolving to visit Kagoshima as 
soon as the convention negotiations were complete.905  
The fact that Parkes was keen to build bridges with the daimyo did not make him 
insensitive to the dangers of offering them any encouragement in their struggle with the 
bakufu. The arrival of Hammond’s letter detailing Satsuma’s request for the treaty powers 
to intervene in Kyoto therefore caused him considerable alarm. He advised Hammond to 
take the views of the Satsuma agents in London with a grain of salt, for they did not speak 
for all the great lords. He also rejected the premise that imperial ratification of the treaties 
meant that the treaty powers now had direct access to the Mikado, and doubted that an 
appeal to the emperor by the foreign representatives would have any significant effect. 
Such problems were better worked out by the daimyō themselves, he argued, and it was 
intensely dangerous to give the great lords the impression that the treaties were somehow 
invalid without their approval. Parkes was now even more determined to meet with as 
many of the daimyō as possible, not only to discover whether they were genuinely 
committed to observing the treaties but also to explain to them personally that Britain had 
no intention of interfering in Japan’s system of government.906 
Far from favouring the daimyō as Roches alleged, therefore, Parkes remained mistrustful 
about their intentions during the first half of 1866. In fact, he became increasingly 
convinced as the year wore on that a large proportion of the daimyō desired a say in the 
confirmation of the treaties because they were deeply opposed to the opening of Hyōgo 
and Osaka.907 There was therefore little need for him to adjust his approach towards the 
bakufu upon receiving Clarendon’s instructions on the neutrality policy, or even after the 
arrival of Hammond’s private note urging him to press Edo to relinquish control over 
foreign trade. After all, by the time these instructions arrived Parkes was just days away 
from concluding the Tariff Convention, which he hoped would prove that the bakufu had 
finally abandoned its commercial monopoly. Parkes had not only received repeated 
assurances on this point from the rōjū during the negotiations, but also learned that agents 
of Satsuma were now free to come and go in Yokohama as they pleased. In his opinion, 
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the complete opening of Japan to foreign intercourse was only a matter of time, regardless 
of how willingly the bakufu implemented the convention in the months to come.908  
Despite Parkes’s efforts to distance himself from the Satsuma plot, the perception 
continued to grow within Japan that the British legation had adopted a pro-daimyō policy. 
This was thanks in large part to a series of articles on British policy that appeared in The 
Japan Times between March and May 1866. These articles, which were published 
anonymously by Satow without Parkes’s knowledge, were later translated into Japanese 
and distributed across the country. They argued that direct relations between the treaty 
powers and the Mikado was the best means to facilitate trade with all of Japan’s domains, 
and that the constitution of the Japanese government should be remodelled into a 
confederation of daimyō.909 The similarity to the proposals put forward by the Satsuma 
agents in London was no coincidence, for Satow had assiduously cultivated close 
relations with influential samurai from Satsuma, Chōshū, and other daimyō domains since 
the bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki. Many of these samurai believed 
passionately that the shogun was nothing more than the emperor’s principal vassal and 
that he should not be regarded by foreigners as the sovereign of Japan. Although Satow 
was probably unaware at this stage that Satsuma and Chōshū had already entered into a 
formal alliance to overthrow the Tokugawa, he felt motivated to write these articles out 
of his self-confessed hatred for ‘despotic institutions’.910 The mistake made by the 
Japanese at the time and successive generations of Japanese historians ever since was to 
associate Satow’s views inextricably with those of Parkes.911 In reality, the British 
minister had absolutely no intention of defying the wishes of his government by 
interfering directly in Japan’s constitutional crisis in the way that his subordinate desired.  
As Fox has correctly stated, the influence of these articles upon the policies of both the 
bakufu and the daimyō should not be underestimated.912 They provoked such suspicion 
in Edo that Roches was asked at the end of July to follow Parkes to Nagasaki to counter 
any impression of Western sympathy for the daimyō cause, an invitation which the French 
                                                
908 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 27 June 1866. 
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minister eagerly accepted.913 By this time, however, Parkes was already well on his way 
to Kagoshima, having intercepted a letter from Hammond at Nagasaki detailing Roches’s 
complaint about his so-called pro-daimyō tendencies. ‘He has never found in me an 
advocate of the opening of Daimio ports,’ Parkes replied indignantly, ‘If report speaks 
truth Roches has a more direct interest than his colleagues in the maintenance of the 
Tycoon’s supremacy, as a considerable amount of machinery and materiel for an arsenal 
was contracted for by Shibata when in France and the advances of money obtained from 
the Tycoon do not yet cover the shipments made upon these contracts.’914 Though 
increasingly angry and distrustful of his meddling French colleague, Parkes remained 
focused on uncovering the real cause of Satsuma’s continued opposition to the opening 
of Osaka. With the outbreak of hostilities between Chōshū and the bakufu seemingly 
imminent, he also hoped to convince the Prince of Satsuma to intervene to prevent all-
out civil war.915 
 
The plot thickens 
Parkes’s visit to Kagoshima in late July proved much more revealing than first 
anticipated. Following a series of private conversations with Satsuma officials, he 
discovered that the emperor had only agreed to ratify the treaties after receiving 
guarantees from the shogun that no more ports would be opened. He also learned that the 
bakufu was striving to prevent an assembly of the daimyo, who were only opposed to the 
opening of Osaka out of fear that the shogun would deny them the commercial advantages 
they currently enjoyed in the city. After Parkes had digested this startling intelligence, he 
urged the Satsuma ministers to pursue amicable negotiations with a view to bringing 
about the constitutional reforms they desired. He was reassured that the daimyō were not 
seeking a change not to seek a change of dynasty but merely a change in system that 
would give them a voice in the management of Japan’s national affairs and legislation.916  
                                                
913 AD, CPJ59/14, Roches to Drouyn, No. 69, 27 August 1866. See also Sims, op.cit., 
p.51. 
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Though Parkes had no way of knowing whether this was true, he gleaned enough 
intelligence from private conversations with other daimyō during the voyage back to 
Yokohama to substantiate a charge of bad faith against the bakufu. Time and time again, 
Parkes was told that imperial ratification had been conditional on the omission of Hyōgo 
and Osaka from the treaties, and that the bakufu had issued explicit instructions that these 
ports would never be opened. Equally troubling were the reports he received from the 
daimyō that Roches was advising Edo to use military force to suppress their calls for 
constitutional reform. This policy was causing considerable apprehension throughout the 
han, even amongst daimyō who supported the bakufu. Roches revealed his true intentions 
to Parkes during an impromptu meeting in the Straits of Shimonoseki, when he asked the 
British minister to join him in offering to mediate Chōshū’s surrender to the shogun – an 
invitation that Parkes felt compelled to decline.917 As the British minister explained to 
Hammond upon his return to Yokohama, Roches’s support for the bakufu was now overt:  
He sent for Satsuma’s Agents when at Nagasaki and read them a long lecture on 
the necessity of obedience to the Tycoon, told them that France was a friend of 
the latter, and was going to send him out two ironclads. To me, M. Roches denied 
that his Government had any intention of the kind and said that he had mentioned 
it to Satsuma’s Agents by way of jest only. I doubt, however, whether such jests 
are entirely judicious.918 
Parkes assured Hammond that his own arrangements with the daimyō remained strictly 
neutral. While he understood why they wanted a say in government, he had encouraged 
a cautious approach towards constitutional change that preserved national unity. He had 
also tried to convince those he met on his travels of the bakufu’s increasingly liberal 
inclinations, as evidenced by the recently concluded Tariff Convention. Above all, Parkes 
had repeatedly stressed ‘the indisputable necessity of a strict observance of Treaties’ to 
preserve peace in Japan.919 
Despite the mounting evidence that the bakufu had no intention of sharing in the profits 
of trade, it is clear that Parkes strongly discouraged the daimyō from taking matters into 
their own hands. The British government wanted a stable and prosperous trade in Japan, 
and it was difficult to see how a civil war would result in better commercial conditions 
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than those which currently existed. He was certainly pleased that the daimyō were keen 
to trade with the treaty powers, but this did not change the fact that the treaties had been 
concluded with the bakufu and that it retained responsibility for the conduct of foreign 
relations. After all, international law dictated that the administration in Edo remained the 
legitimate treaty-making authority in Japan until the foreign representatives were 
informed otherwise. To Parkes, it was also ‘the only power in the State which is able to 
preserve general order, and secure the faithful observance of our Treaties’.920 After all the 
years that Parkes and his predecessors had spent coaxing Edo to ease restrictions on trade, 
the British minister was not about to risk everything by encouraging an unpredictable 
group of self-interested feudal lords to launch an armed attempt to overthrow the bakufu.  
One thing that did change after Parkes returned to Yokohama was his attitude towards 
Roches. The British minister found it troubling enough that the Frenchman had lectured 
Satsuma about disloyalty, but he was appalled that a fellow diplomat had taken the 
dangerous step of encouraging Edo to resist demands for constitutional reform. The final 
straw was the publication of an official bakufu notification stating that France had agreed 
to help construct a shipyard and arsenal at Yokosuka.921 Parkes did not know whether the 
French government was aware of this initiative, but the arrival of a French naval engineer 
to oversee construction suggested official approval. Fleury-Hérard’s recent appointment 
as ‘Japanese Consul’ in Paris was further evidence that the project had been discussed 
back in France. The prospect of Japanese money being spent in the French interest filled 
the British minister with foreboding, as did the likelihood that Edo would find it difficult 
to meet its obligations to French suppliers. Parkes was particularly concerned about the 
knock-on effect this would have on trade, for Yokohama was already rife with rumours 
that the bakufu was interfering with the supply of silk to the open market to cover its 
costs. On more than one occasion, Roches had assured Parkes that the orders from France 
were worth less than two million Francs. ‘Yet when I mentioned to him that I had 
information of the transmission of a million of Dollars, or upwards of three times the 
amount he stated,’ Parkes wrote to Hammond, ‘he could not meet it with an unequivocal 
denial.’922 The British minister’s decision to confront his French colleague was a 
watershed moment: Roches was now aware that Parkes was watching his every move. 
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In fact, Parkes did not yet know the half of what his colleague was up to. For Roches, the 
‘liberalisation’ of Japan’s system of trade simply meant the extension of the bakufu’s 
commercial monopoly to include Osaka, the country’s largest and most prosperous 
domestic market. Yet time was running out for the shogun to re-assert control over his 
internal opponents before they mounted a successful challenge to his supremacy. As 
Parkes suspected, the bakufu was also finding it increasingly difficult to finance the 
military development necessary to establish a centralised Tokugawa state, which even 
conservatives in Edo now believed was necessary for the shogunate to survive. Roches 
was equally aware of this problem, so he set about developing a new way to ensure Edo 
received the financial aid and material support necessary to subjugate the daimyō once 
and for all. The plan centred on the proposed import-export company, which had yet to 
get off the ground due to the bakufu’s failure to organise Edo merchants into an official 
trading association. Rather than using the company to establish Tokugawa control over 
foreign trade as originally planned, Roches and Oguri Tadamasa, his principal contact in 
the kanjō-bugyōsho (the bakufu finance bureau), hatched the idea of using it as a vehicle 
to borrow money from France. If successful, Edo would finally have enough funds to 
strengthen the Tokugawa armed forces and put the daimyō to the sword.  
Roches was aware that raising such a loan would require lengthy negotiations with 
Coullet, who arrived in Yokohama in May 1866.  Before these could get underway, 
however, the French minister was compelled to follow Parkes to Nagasaki. In the end, 
this journey to the south helped Roches to gain the support of influential figures within 
the bakufu for the idea of raising a foreign loan. After reading the riot act to the Satsuma 
representatives in Nagasaki, Roches’s first port of call was Kokura in northern Kyūshū, 
where Ogasawara Nagamichi was preparing a contingent of bakufu forces for the war 
against Chōshū. During a confidential meeting with this rōjū, Roches advised cutting off 
Chōshū’s supply route to Nagasaki by launching an invasion across the Straits of 
Shimonoseki. When Ogasawara pointed out that this would require more warships and 
cannon, Roches replied that secret negotiations were taking place in Edo regarding a 
method of company financing between Japan and the West. Before discussions could go 
any further, Parkes scuppered the idea of launching an invasion from the Straits on the 
basis that it would disrupt foreign trade.923  
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Following their joint visit to Shimonoseki, the two ministers went their separate ways. 
This provided Roches with an opportunity to meet with another one of the rōjū at Hyōgo, 
where he repeated his promise to help Edo purchase steamers and weapons using a 
company which, if established, ‘would enable Japan to trade without money’.924 This 
news soon reached Osaka, where a lack of funds was making it increasingly difficult for 
Hitotsubashi Keiki to pursue the campaign against Chōshū. Some bakufu officials warned 
that it would be catastrophic to get into debt with the treaty powers, but Keiki was 
convinced that borrowing from foreigners was the only way the bakufu could possibly 
finance the war.925 With many senior members of the bakufu now in favour of the foreign 
loan scheme, Roches returned to Yokohama to supervise negotiations between Coullet 
and Oguri. In mid-September 1866, he informed Ogasawara that a loan had been agreed, 
but cautioned that the bakufu still had much work to do to modernise its armed forces. ‘I 
have the desire to develop these matters,’ Roches explained, ‘combining your country’s 
intention with that of mine, the army and navy can be developed within three years and 
the han will humbly submit to the government.’926  
A week after this letter was sent, Oguri wrote to John Robertson, the local agent of the 
Oriental Bank in Yokohama, requesting a loan of six million dollars. Robertson promised 
to recommend this application to the home offices of the Oriental Bank Corporation and 
the Société Générale, on the condition that Edo agreed to secure the loan with one million 
dollars of copper from northern Japan. The bakufu readily agreed to offer this security, 
and over the months that followed placed orders with Coullet for arms and military 
supplies totalling 720,000 Mexican dollars (of which Coullet was advanced $M200,000). 
In addition to a further order from the rōjū in early October for two warships from France, 
Coullet and Roches facilitated the purchase of $M100,000 worth of rice from French 
merchants in Saigon to address shortages in Edo caused by daimyō who had withheld rice 
shipments.927 To pay for the rice and the money advanced to Coullet, the bakufu deposited 
three hundred tonnes of copper with the Oriental Bank towards the end of 1866, an 
amount that covered less than 30 per cent of what was owed on both accounts.928 
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By the time Coullet departed Japan in early 1867, the bakufu had abandoned all pretence 
of paying for the arms and military materiel it required through a trading association of 
‘independent’ Japanese merchants. Instead, the orders would be financed through a huge 
loan that would be repaid through the export of Japanese produce over a period of many 
years. While this would still enable the Société Générale to promote the development of 
French commerce and industry in Japan, the success of the entire project was now 
contingent on raising the sixty million Francs necessary to capitalise the Compagnie 
Française d’Exportation et d’Importation in Paris. Both the Société Générale and the 
(British-based) Oriental Bank Corporation would also have to underwrite a large loan to 
a regime whose status was by no means secure within a country on the cusp of civil war. 
These were hardly ideal conditions for investment, even for an organisation such as the 
Société Générale that specialised in underwriting loans to foreign governments. Aside 
from presenting Coullet’s negotiations to the Quai d’Orsay as positively as possible, there 
was little that Roches could do except put his faith in Coullet and Fleury-Hérard to secure 
the investment necessary to get the project off the ground.929 
A more immediate concern for Roches was the need to ensure his pugnacious British 
colleague did not get wind of the foreign loan scheme before it came to fruition. Since 
Parkes was already deeply concerned about the impact of Roches’s pro-bakufu policy 
upon Japan’s export trade, he was hardly likely to approve of Edo using copper to pay for 
commercial orders. It was also very doubtful that the French government would sanction 
this direct interference in Japanese politics either given that the Quai d’Orsay and the 
Foreign Office had agreed upon the neutrality policy. Roches therefore revealed very little 
about his recent activities in the dispatches he sent to Paris during the latter part of 1866, 
making no mention of the negotiations about the loan that took place at Kokura and 
Hyōgo during his trip to southern Japan. Instead, he claimed these visits were primarily 
motivated by his desire to broker peace between the bakufu and Chōshū. Perhaps 
anticipating what Parkes might say to London and angry at the British minister’s 
interference at Shimonoseki, Roches attempted to discredit his colleague by depicting 
him as a jealous agitator whose reckless courting of the daimyō risked plunging Japan 
into civil war. ‘I have constantly strived up to this point to alleviate all causes of conflict 
between my colleague and the Japanese government,’ he told Drouyn, ‘I will not cease 
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from persevering in this approach but, I repeat, his entirely unpredictable character causes 
me concern.’930 
Roches also did his best to maintain the illusion that it was business as usual in Japan, 
even though the bakufu’s increasingly disastrous campaign against Chōshū was clearly 
weakening its grip on power. When rumours of the sudden death of the shogun reached 
Yokohama in mid-September, for example, he appeared delighted about the widely-
anticipated prospect of Keiki – a man of great ‘energy and intelligence’ – becoming the 
new shogun.931 It was in this context that Roches finally informed the Quai d’Orsay about 
Edo’s request for a foreign loan, but only to reinforce his argument that Keiki’s expected 
elevation would herald an immediate improvement in bakufu administration. Once again, 
Roches made no allusion to his own role in encouraging Edo to apply for the loan, and 
instead alleged that the request came directly from the kanjō-bugyō.932 A few weeks later, 
he wrote a commercial dispatch concerning the ‘considerable orders’ that Coullet had 
negotiated with the Japanese government for the import-export company. According to 
this report, Coullet had made such a good impression on the Japanese that they had 
introduced him to associates of the greatest bankers and merchants of Edo and Osaka.933 
As Ericson has pointed out, there is not a shred of evidence in either the French or 
Japanese sources that Coullet ever met with such men, which was inconceivable given 
Edo’s expectations for the company at the time. Once again, Roches was painting a false 
picture of what he and his associates were up to.934  
The dispatches described above do not support Meron Medzini’s assertion that, because 
the French government had sanctioned the establishment of the import-export company, 
Roches ‘did not have much to fear or conceal’ from the Quai d’Orsay.935 While it is true 
that Drouyn and Béhic approved the scheme at the end of 1865, they clearly did so under 
the impression that the company would develop French industrial and commercial 
relations with Japan without contravening the principles of free trade. Clearly, the 
exclusive contracts that Roches and Coullet negotiated the following year did not adhere 
to these principles. The fact that Roches virtually stopped communicating with the Quai 
d’Orsay on matters of commercial policy once the negotiations with Coullet were 
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complete suggested deliberate deception on his part. In other words, Roches did 
everything he could to conceal the real purpose of the import-export company: to 
establish French control over the Japanese treaty-port system by supplying the bakufu 
with the resources it needed to crush the daimyō once and for all. 
In contrast to his French colleague, Parkes was apprehensive as to whether the rumoured 
death of the shogun would provide an opportunity to heal existing divisions or ‘throw the 
country into a blaze’.936 Whatever happened he was anxious for foreigners not to 
interfere, and therefore relieved that even Roches appeared convinced that the bakufu no 
longer had ‘the ball at their feet’.937 Parkes initially suspected that this change of heart 
had much to do with the fact that Roches no longer had the material means at his disposal 
to support the bakufu. Much to the French minister’s irritation, Admiral Pierre-Gustave 
Roze, the French naval commander in East Asia, had withdrawn every French warship 
from Japan in preparation for a punitive naval expedition against Korea, where some 
Catholic missionaries had been executed.938 Yet after Parkes had spent two weeks in Edo 
during the latter part of September, he began to share his French colleague’s optimism 
that Keiki might agree to the constitutional reform that the daimyō desired.939 In late 
October, Parkes was further buoyed by news that the hostilities against Chōshū had been 
suspended, and by reports that an assembly of the daimyō was due to convene at either 
Kyoto or Osaka. He dared to hope that these discussions, which were to determine many 
important constitutional affairs, would enable the bakufu and the more liberal daimyō to 
unite against those opposed to reform.940 
In addition to keeping a close eye on proceedings at Kyoto during the latter part of 1866, 
Parkes continued to monitor what was going on at French legation. In mid-October, he 
was delighted to learn of the sudden departure of Mermet de Cachon, who was widely 
believed to be the primary supporter of Roches’s pro-bakufu policy. Parkes was not sure 
what had prompted Cachon’s decision to leave Japan, but he hoped that the troublesome 
missionary would stay away.941 The British minister’s high spirits were short-lived, as he 
                                                
936 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes2/W20, Parkes to Winchester, 12 September 1866 
937 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 12 September 1866. 
938 Idem. 
939 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 29 September & 17 October 
1866. 
940 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 31 October 1866; and CUL, 
Parkes Papers, MSParkes2/W22, Parkes to Winchester, 31 October 1866. 
941 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 17 October 1866. 
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soon discovered to his fury that a French military mission was on its way to Japan.942 
Despite Roches’s appeals for haste, it had taken Fleury-Hérard and the French 
government six months to negotiate the travel expenses and salaries of the military 
instructors, who finally departed for Japan on 19 November 1866.943 The delay was 
significant, as it meant that Parkes found out about the mission just as he was beginning 
to hope that Roches had realised the folly of his ‘politique personelle’. Instead, here was 
fresh evidence of the Frenchman’s preponderant influence in Edo. It was this revelation 
that spurred Parkes to transfer the British legation back to the capital in November with 
a view to cultivating better relations with the bakufu and keeping a closer eye on his 
energetic French colleague. In just two months, Parkes organised a British naval mission 
to Japan, procured English instructors to teach at Cachon’s language school, and 
dispatched a group of young bakufu scholars to study at the University College in 
London.944 During this period, Parkes and his Dutch colleague Dirk de Graeff von 
Polsbroek also discovered that Edo was using copper to pay for commercial orders from 
France, an arrangement that they objected to the strongest possible terms.945 
His burgeoning rivalry with Roches aside, Parkes was cautiously optimistic about the 
future as 1866 came to a close. He was particularly encouraged by the friendly attitude of 
bakufu officials in Edo and their willingness to accept his help and advice, including his 
suggestions for the reconstruction of Yokohama after a devastating fire at the port. At 
last, it seemed that the shogunate had accepted the presence of foreigners in Japan.946 Yet 
Parkes was acutely aware that everything still depended upon the unpredictable outcome 
of the negotiations at Kyoto, where Keiki faced the unenviable task of reconciling the 
bakufu’s natural proclivity for absolutism with the daimyō’s desire to throw off their 
subservience to Edo.947 What Parkes really needed was reliable and up-to-date political 
intelligence, so he dispatched Satow to Nagasaki, Kagoshima, Uwajima, and Hyōgo at 
the end of December to gather information.948 Satow quickly discovered that negotiations 
                                                
942 See Cortazzi, op.cit., pp.22-3. 
943 Ericson, op.cit., pp159-60. 
944 See TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 17 November 1866 & 
1 December 1866. 
945 Although it seemed to Parkes that the bakufu was bartering for French goods outside 
of the open market, which was a breach of the treaties, Edo was actually consigning 
copper to the Oriental Bank in order to raise enough capital to cover its financial 
obligations. None of this copper ever made it to France. See Ericson, op.cit., p.103. 
946 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond 31 December 1866. 
947 Idem. 
948 Fox, op.cit., p.191. 
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had collapsed due to the refusal of many daimyō to attend the assembly, but that Keiki 
had assumed the title of shogun nonetheless. Both contesting parties were apparently now 
in favour of the opening of the new ports, while Satsuma and Chōshū had reached an 
understanding to unite against the shogun for defence purposes. Finally, the daimyō 
remained deeply mistrustful of Roches, whom they believed had hatched a plan to burnish 
Keiki’s prestige by presenting him with a letter of credence from Napoléon III 
recognising the new shogun as the undisputed sovereign of Japan.949  
By the time Satow returned to Yokohama with this news in January 1867, Parkes had 
already received an invitation from Keiki for all the foreign representatives to visit him 
in Osaka. After consulting with Satow, Parkes realised that accepting this invitation 
unconditionally would do much to serve the interests of the new regime without securing 
anything in return. Unlike his more enthusiastic colleagues, the British minister had no 
intention of allowing himself to become a pawn in Japan’s political game. Before 
agreeing to meet with Keiki, therefore, Parkes wanted the new shogun to guarantee that 
the new ports would be opened. The news that Keiki had lost the support of Satsuma also 
convinced Parkes that the political status quo was no longer tenable, so he resolved to 
withhold his own letter of credence from the new shogun if the diplomatic corps did 
decamp to Osaka. ‘I cannot avoid the feeling that the titles of His Imperial and Royal 
Majesty are too high for the Tycoon,’ he explained to Hammond, ‘and that it is incorrect 
to speak (as these letters and our Treaties do) of Japan as the “dominions” of the Tycoon. 
It appears to me that I can give a good and sufficient reason in the death of the late Tycoon 
and the absence of a formal announcement of the death by his successor, for not delivering 
the letters I now hold.’950 Following the apparent failure of the daimyō assembly to 
resolve Japan’s internal conflict, Parkes refused to accept that the inauguration of a new 
shogun meant business as usual as far as his relations with the bakufu were concerned. 
From now on, the British minister was determined that all future audiences with the 
shogun would conform to Westphalian standards of diplomatic practice. 
Roches also believed that the time had come for change, albeit of a different kind to that 
which Parkes had in mind. The French minister had long urged the bakufu to modernise 
Japan’s system of government and reform its laws and institutions, but it was only after 
Keiki’s investiture as shogun and the suspension of the Chōshū campaign that this advice 
                                                
949 Satow, op.cit., pp.167-184. 
950 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 16 January 1866. 
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found a genuinely sympathetic ear. In October 1866, therefore, Keiki made it explicitly 
clear to Roches that he intended to initiate the type of political reform that the Frenchman 
had recommended ever since his arrival in Japan.951 Yet as Ericson has pointed out, it was 
Roches who began to develop concrete proposals for reform over the months that 
followed, not Keiki as he later alleged.952 By the end of December, Roches had put 
together a radical programme of reform that would transform the Tokugawa regime into 
a more efficient and powerful centralised authority while curtailing the feudal power of 
the tozama daimyō forever.953 All that was necessary now was for the shogun to grant his 
approval in person. The invitation for all the foreign representatives to visit Osaka was 
not just an attempt to bolster Keiki’s prestige, therefore, but also a smokescreen to 
disguise the real reason why Roches and the shogun were meeting in private. Little did 
the French minister know that his hopes of directing Japan’s transformation into a modern 
state were about to be dashed by his ‘pestilently active’ British colleague.954 
 
Conclusions 
If 1866 was a year of great political upheaval in Japan, the same can certainly be said of 
Europe. More than any other country on the Old Continent, the French Second Empire 
was engulfed in a near perpetual state of crisis that year, as Napoléon III fought to contain 
the burgeoning forces of nationalism that he had unleashed in Italy, Mexico, and Prussia 
while simultaneously attempting to introduce political reform at home. The rise of 
Prussian militarism also caused great anxiety in London, as the treaties that had 
maintained an uneasy peace in Europe since the end of the Napoleonic Wars began to 
unravel at an increasingly alarming rate. There was also significant political change in 
Britain itself, as seven years of Liberal rule ended with the departure of first Palmerston 
and then Russell – Queen Victoria’s ‘two dreadful old men’955 – from the political scene. 
They were replaced by a Conservative ministry that was ideologically hostile to the 
doctrine of liberal interventionism as a means to protect free trade across the globe. Far 
                                                
951 AD, CPJ59/14, Roches to Drouyn, No. 74, 31 October 1866, enclosure 1. 
952 Ericson, op.cit., pp.241-2. 
953 For an overview of these reforms, see Sims, op.cit., pp.53-5. 
954 As described in Hugh Cortazzi, ‘The Pestilently Active Minister: Dr Willis's 
Comments on Sir Harry Parkes’, Monumenta Nipponica , Vol. 39, No. 2 (Summer, 1984), 
pp.147-61. 
955 Frank Hardie, The Political Influence of Queen Victoria, 1861-1901, (London: Frank 
Cass & Co., 1963), p.126. 
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more important to Lord Derby and his fellow Tories was the need to tackle the defining 
domestic issue of the age: extending the political franchise. 
In comparison to these pressing domestic and foreign policy matters, Japan was very low 
on the list of priorities for either the British or the French government in 1866. Indeed, so 
complex was the political crisis that was unfolding in Japan during these twilight years 
of the Tokugawa shogunate that very few observers in Europe had a clear understanding 
of what was really going on there. The lack of interest and the dearth of knowledge about 
Japanese affairs in both Paris and London afforded Parkes and Roches a wide discretion 
over policymaking, a responsibility that the British minister wielded with much greater 
restraint than his French colleague. While Parkes was always careful to operate within 
the boundaries set by Hammond in his efforts to encourage both the bakufu and the 
daimyō to respect the treaties, Roches initiated a deeply partisan and opportunistic attempt 
to bypass the treaties altogether. It did not take long before these two abrasive characters 
were embroiled in an existential struggle for control over the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan 
– a struggle that mirrored the contrasting philosophies of their respective countries 
towards the global expansion of industry, commerce, and empire.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Competing Visions: Parkes, Roches and the Collapse of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate, 1867 
 
Although none of the treaty-power representatives knew it, 1867 was to mark the final 
year of the Tokugawa shogunate. Until this point, Roches had successfully managed to 
conceal his plan to restore the Tokugawa house to a position of absolute power by 
subverting the treaties. Ironically, this policy was proving increasingly 
counterproductive, as his commercial schemes were bleeding the shogunate’s coffers dry 
and making Edo less inclined to adopt the liberal policies recommended by Parkes. His 
subversion of the treaties as a means to supplant British hegemony over the ‘enclave 
empires’ in Japan was certainly bold, but his personal line was predicated on the 
continued indifference of the French government to his activities, the long-term survival 
of the bakufu, and the ignorance of Parkes – all factors that were entirely out of his control. 
Slowly but surely, it was beginning to dawn on Parkes that there was more to Roches’s 
‘politique personnelle’ than met the eye. By the beginning of 1867, he was on the verge 
of discovering that Roches’s schemes were not simply acts of diplomatic grandstanding 
and one-upmanship, but direct threats to British dominance over the Japan trade, and 
indeed to the very idea of the treaty-port system itself. With all signs indicating that the 
long-expected military struggle between the bakufu and its well-prepared opponents was 
imminent, Parkes would have to act fast to thwart his French rival. With the British and 
French governments fixated by the inexorable rise of Prussia in Europe, the British 
minister took matters decisively into his own hands. 
 
A decisive intervention 
In early 1867, a series of developments finally convinced the British minister to take 
direct measures to stop his French colleague from undermining Britain’s commercial and 
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political position in Japan. The first was the postponement of the proposed visit of the 
representatives to Osaka in early February on the grounds that the Mikado had fallen ill 
with smallpox, which Parkes suspected was actually caused by his insistence upon 
making the visit conditional on a guarantee that the new ports would be opened at the 
time stipulated in the treaties. In addition to fresh rumours that the bakufu would soon 
renew hostilities with Chōshū, Parkes feared that the inauguration of a new shogun would 
do nothing to change Edo’s policy. Worse, he believed that Roches was continuing to 
undermine his efforts to ensure that the new regime would respect the treaties. 956 
The growing tensions between the two ministers over this issue were laid bare in a letter 
Roches sent to Parkes on 4 February 1867, in which Roches declared himself ‘deeply 
pained’ that the British minister appeared to doubt his willingness to demand guarantees 
from the new shogun in advance of the joint visit to Osaka. ‘Was it not thus understood 
between us that we would only travel to Osaka after having received official notification 
of the opening of Hiogo at the time fixed by the treaties?’ the Frenchman asked, ‘Why 
then return to this condition that I accepted without hesitation, if not to express doubts 
about my intentions?’957 It is highly doubtful that this letter allayed any of the British 
minister’s deep-rooted suspicions about his French colleague, even though it was soon 
confirmed that the Mikado had in fact been gravely ill and had passed away on 30 January. 
In fact, with a French war against Korea looking increasing likely following the 
humiliating withdrawal of Admiral Roze’s punitive expedition to the peninsula at the end 
of 1866, it appeared that even certain bakufu officials were beginning to question the 
value of Roches’s assistance. After all, Parkes explained to Hammond, if the French 
government decided to go to war in Korea there was little doubt that they could make 
Japan as a base of their operations, ‘and the Japanese would probably find that they have 
been at the expense of constructing magazines for the use of their allies’.958  
The idea that the French would attempt to make Yokosuka a base for their navy in East 
Asia was troubling, but it was the publication of an article in The Japan Times on 14 
February 1867 that really awakened Parkes to the threat that Roches’s policy posed to 
British interests. The article not only revealed the extent of Coullet’s commercial dealings 
during his stay in Japan but also publicly accused Roches of breaching the treaties by 
helping him to conduct trade in Edo, which was not an open port, and negotiating 
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exclusive contracts for the supply of French arms and materiel for the shogun’s new army. 
As a direct result of these contracts, the newspaper alleged, the bakufu had already 
forbidden Japanese merchants to purchase certain items from private merchants on the 
grounds that it intended to procure everything it required through the French government 
at vastly overinflated prices. The article also cited recent reports from The Economist 
concerning the registration in Paris of a trading association aimed at developing trade in 
Asia by ‘making loans to states, contracting for great public or private enterprises and 
undertaking other financial operations’, before suggesting that Coullet was a director of 
this new company and preparing for the establishment of a branch in Japan. It further 
claimed that the bakufu was paying for the purchases it had negotiated with Coullet in 
copper. There was little reason to doubt that silk would be next, and if allowed to continue, 
it was only a matter of time before Roches established a French monopoly on the Japan 
trade, an arrangement that historical precedent suggested would lead to the complete 
extinction of all British trade with Japan.959 
This was certainly not the first time that the Yokohama press had attacked Roches for his 
commercial practices. As the article itself made clear, the same paper had strongly 
opposed the announcement of the Yokosuka project in September 1866 on the basis that 
it would lead to the establishment of a gigantic French monopoly. Indeed, so notorious 
were Roches’s activities in Yokohama at this point that he was regularly satirised in the 
Japan Punch as managing director of the ‘Governmental-Mercantile Unlimited Liability 
Company of Benten’ (Benten was the street on which the French legation was located).960 
However, on this occasion the newspaper appealed directly to Parkes to lodge a protest 
with the British government against Roches. Given that Parkes wrote two highly 
significant letters to London on the same day that this article was published, it seems that 
                                                
959 The Japan Times, 14 February 1867. The article does not appear in the collection of 
English-language newspapers from Japan at the Yokohama Archives of History, but can 
be found in AD, MDJ/3, Cowley to Moustier, 18 April 1867. 
960 See, for example, the July 1866 edition of the Japan Punch, which makes it clear that 
Benten & Co. was not, as Medzini seemed to believe (Medzini, op.cit., p.147), a real 
company but the satirical creation of Charles Wirgman, the British editor of the magazine. 
Prior to his departure from Japan, Cachon was often singled out by Wirgman as the 
architect of the French commercial schemes, most obviously in the June 1866 edition. 
Attention soon turned to Roches, who appeared in the January 1867 edition leading away 
an allegorical depiction of commerce while merchants of other treaty powers wept in the 
background. For a detailed summary of Wirgman’s critique of French policy during this 
period, see Todd S. Munson, The Periodical Press in Treaty-Port Japan: Conflicting 
Reports from Yokohama, 1861-1870, (Leiden: Global Press, 2013), pp.114-8.  
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this appeal succeeded. The first letter, predictably enough, was addressed to Hammond 
and concerned the imminent departure of Keiki’s younger brother, Tokugawa Akitake, to 
Paris, where he was due to attend the Paris Exposition and receive a French education.961 
Accompanying the young prince was Mukōyama Ichiri, the bakufu’s newly appointed 
envoy to France, and it was to this individual that Parkes drew Hammond’s attention: 
Some endeavor will probably be made by Mukoyama…to raise a loan through 
Fleury Herard the banker and Japanese Consul General, who would probably seek 
to engage English Capitalists in the operation. I trust however that no one will 
take part in it, for the money this raised would pass into French pockets, and the 
security is probably questionable. Any money that the Tycoon could raise in this 
way would only be spent on military preparations, and I am afraid commerce 
would be taxed in order to enable him to meet such obligations.962 
It is surely no coincidence that Parkes first mentioned the bakufu’s desire to raise a foreign 
loan on the same day that details regarding the creation of a French trading association in 
Paris for the purpose of ‘making loans to states’ appeared in the local press. What Parkes 
did not reveal to Hammond, however, was that he had already taken measures to deny the 
bakufu access to British credit by writing privately to Charles J. F. Stuart, Chief Manager 
of the Oriental Bank Corporation in London that very same day. Stuart’s reply, dated 10 
June 1867, is worth quoting in full:  
I duly received your letter of Feb 14 for which I beg to thank you most sincerely.  
The advice you so kindly gave me has been carefully followed and the financial 
operation referred to has been left entirely to our friends across the Channel. 
Whether they will be able to make anything of it I do not know, but there are 
indications that the money will be required shortly, considerable stocks of arms, 
clothing &c. having been contracted for.  
                                                
961 As mentioned in Chapter 8, although this was ostensibly a demonstration of the special 
favour that Roches enjoyed with the new shogun, this unofficial embassy was also a 
response to the dispatch of a Satsuma mission to Paris to exhibit products from their own 
domain at the Exposition. See Hugh Cortazzi, ‘Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862-72’, in 
Nish, Ian, ed., Japanese Envoys in Britain, 1862-1964, (Folkestone: Global Oriental, 
2007), p.15; and Andrew Cobbing, The Japanese Discovery of Victorian Britain: Early 
Travel Encounters in the Far West, (Folkestone: Japan Library, 1998), p.20. 
962 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond 14 February 1867. 
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You will I am sure acquit me of seeking to dive into the arcanum of Japanese 
politics, if I say that should the time arise when you consider the Government of 
Japan and the interests under your charge would be benefited by a loan, we shall 
be equally ready to take your advice then as have been now – and you are too 
good a diplomatist not to know that the power of raising money is not a bad card 
to have in one’s hand.963 
The discovery of this critical letter proves for the first time that Parkes intervened 
personally to thwart the bakufu’s attempts to raise a financial loan in London. 
Furthermore, it suggests that those who previously argued that such a loan was probably 
an impossibility from the outset given the unstable economic conditions in Europe at the 
time were not necessarily correct.964 In fact, Stuart made it quite clear that the Oriental 
Bank would consider a loan to the Japanese government if and when Parkes believed one 
was necessary. 
If taken in isolation, it would be tempting to argue that this letter proved that Parkes had 
abandoned Britain’s policy of neutrality of Japan in favour of the daimyō, as Mark 
Ericson and many Japanese historians have argued.965 But the fact that Parkes made it 
explicitly clear to Hammond, on the very same day that he wrote to Stuart, that he feared 
the foreign loan would both enrich the French while taxing commerce at the ports 
demonstrated that his primary concern remained the maintenance of a stable and free 
trade. In any case, at the time that these letters were sent Parkes had yet to meet the new 
shogun, and his determination to receive assurances from Keiki regarding the opening of 
the new ports and cities before doing so demonstrated his continued recognition of the 
bakufu at the legitimate government of Japan. Indeed, when Parkes heard from Mitford 
at Hyōgo that Satsuma was eager for Britain to enter into formal treaty relations with the 
Mikado, he dismissed the idea on the basis that the treaties made with the shogun and 
ratified by the emperor were constitutionally legitimate. In addition to the support and 
advice he was providing to the bakufu on matters of political and social reform at Edo, 
Parkes continued to hope for a peaceful resolution to Japan’s domestic crisis.966 Thus, 
                                                
963 This letter can be found at the bottom of a note from John Robertson, the local agent 
for the Oriental Bank at Yokohama, in CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R2, Robertson 
to Parkes, 19 June 1867. 
964 See Sims, op.cit., p.314, footnote 52. 
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scholar believes that Parkes and the British were neutral in the Restoration’. 
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while it is true that Parkes wished to prevent the bakufu from stifling free trade, he clearly 
had no intention of abandoning his neutrality policy at this time. 
What this letter does prove beyond doubt was that Parkes was not only fully aware of 
Roches’s schemes for the monopolisation of the Japan trade but also determined to thwart 
them by whatever means possible. Yet Parkes understood that he could not simply accuse 
a fellow diplomat of deliberately conspiring against British interests without concrete 
evidence, not least one from a country that shared close relations with Britain. Thus, 
instead of relying upon the speculations of the local press alone, from this point onwards 
Parkes ensured he was fully informed of Roches’s activities, both in Japan and back in 
Europe. In the latter respect, Parkes had a useful stroke of luck. Alexander von Siebold, 
the young interpreter at the British legation recruited by Alcock back in 1861, was eligible 
for home leave following the death of his famous father Philip in Munich in October 
1866, and had been trying for some months to return to Europe in the service of the bakufu 
in order to offset some of the expense of the voyage.967 In early January 1867, he was 
asked by Shibata, who was now back in Japan, if he would mind accompanying 
Tokugawa Akitake on his trip to Europe. Although this was to be an unofficial mission, 
Shibata was concerned that Roches would oppose the presence of a British officer on a 
mission ostensibly sent to Paris. However, Siebold knew that the French legation had no 
one else available who spoke Japanese, and he asked Parkes if he could put in a good 
word with Roches to ensure he approved of the arrangement.968 The British minister, 
never one to look a gift horse in the mouth, swiftly secured Roches’s acquiescence.969 
Whether Roches was aware of the extent to which Parkes relied upon Siebold is 
impossible to say, but it was an indication of how limited the French minister’s resources 
were following Cachon’s departure that he allowed such an experienced British informant 
to accompany Akitake and his suite to Paris. 
Having solved the problem of monitoring the activities of Mukōyama and his associates 
in Europe, Parkes turned his attention to the prospective visit of the representatives to 
Osaka. By this point, Mitford had convinced the British minister that both the bakufu and 
the daimyō sincerely desired the foreign representatives to come to the city. However, 
Parkes was still determined to refuse an audience with Keiki unless the rōjū confirmed 
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that it would conform with Western court etiquette, and guaranteed that the opening of 
the new ports would be discussed.970 He hoped to use the time set aside for mourning the 
death of the emperor to secure these guarantees, but he was thrown off by Roches’s 
unexpected announcement at the end of February that he was proceeding to Osaka alone 
before the imminent departure of Admiral Roze left him with no warships at his 
disposal.971 Two weeks later, Parkes received a private note from Roches explaining that 
he was postponing his stay at Osaka in order to come to a practical understanding with 
the bakufu in respect to the French military mission and the Yokosuka arsenal. Naturally, 
Parkes was suspicious as to whether this was the only reason why Roches was visiting 
the city on his own, especially after Roze returned to Yokohama with news that a private 
meeting between the shogun and the French minister had been scheduled to take place 
the day after his flagship left Osaka. This flagrant departure from the concerted policy 
agreed by the representatives provoked Parkes to submit a lengthy complaint about 
Roches’s policy to his superior at the Foreign Office:  
I shall not be surprised to hear that he has taken this step, for he…is not partial to 
concerted movements, partly because he has in some degree to take a secondary 
part in these when the British Minister is present, and the naval force by which he 
is usually attended is general inferior to our own, and also because he does not 
care to support very warmly the Commercial Policy of England, which scarcely 
agrees with that of France, or at all events with M. Roches’ “politique personelle”. 
He prefers to minister to the military aspirations or vanities of the Japanese rather 
than to their commercial prosperity and his heart therefore is not in the opening 
of Osaka or other Ports but in becoming the military mentor of the Tycoon and 
advising a system of rule based upon military strength rather than in the 
advancement of the Commercial classes.972  
Parkes did not for a minute believe that Roches had prolonged his stay in Osaka to discuss 
the arsenal or the military mission. Instead, he warned Hammond that Roches was 
attempting to coax the new shogun into allying with France in a war against Korea, which 
he feared Keiki would find an attractive prospect in more ways than one. After all, Korea 
                                                
970 See pencil note at the bottom of CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R7, Roches to 
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was considered a ‘natural enemy’ by the Japanese, and the prospect of pecuniary 
indemnities and guarantees of French support against the daimyō in return for fighting 
the Koreans would be enticing. Parkes pointed out that it was only a month since a bakufu 
official had asked him if Britain would cooperate with the French to obtain redress from 
Korea, and the rōjū seemed increasingly desperate to know when the British naval 
instructors would arrive. He also had it ‘on good authority’ that the bakufu had contracted 
with the Société Générale for the supply of vessels of war to the extent of one million 
dollars. The increased activity of Roze in Japan and the rumoured departure of the French 
director of the Yokosuka project to Korea all added to the impression that another naval 
expedition was imminent. Parkes did not dispute that it would be a clever move by the 
French to use the Japanese to make up for their own lack of manpower in the region, but 
he was concerned about the impact of such an expedition on the Japan trade.973 
This letter was just as noteworthy as that sent by Parkes to Stuart the previous month, 
since it revealed the full extent of Roches’s ‘politique personnelle’ to the British 
government for the first time (albeit in semi-official form). It was written not simply out 
of anger at the French minister’s violation of the principle of collective diplomacy at 
Osaka, but also because Parkes had seemingly acquired a much clearer idea of what 
Roches’s schemes actually entailed. The evidence for this can be found in the form of 
some rough notes that the British minister scribbled on the back of a short letter from his 
French colleague dated 26 February. These notes, which lie buried in the Parkes Papers 
at Cambridge University Library, are enclosed with an envelope entitled ‘Oriental Bank 
– proposed loan; Expenses of French mission – Europe; French Commissions – Coullet 
and Roches’. They outline each of Roches’s projects as follows: 
• Société Générale: £5,000,000, Béhic, French merchants can make…but 
cannot debark - consign to trustworthy agents. 
• Equipment for 10,000 men: complete - infantry, 400 cavalry, artillery - but 
not guns, about 2,800,000 Fcs. = £700,000. 
• Ironclads: Two, and a gunboat…option of about 200,000 each but not 
determined on. 
                                                
973 Idem. 
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• Yokosuka: Contract for $600,000 pr. annum, five years to construct 
everything. 
• Military instruction: idea to form corps of 500 for drill, towards that 
everything should be under the orders. 
• No information of Govt. bonds to be paid to Fleury Herard. Paper money 
payable to Herard.974 
Although these notes are not dated, their appearance on the back of a letter dated 26 
February suggests that they were penned at around the same time, as does the fact that 
Parkes first mentioned the Société Générale to Hammond in his correspondence of 16 
March 1867. Their discovery is deeply significant, for they demonstrate for the first time 
just how much information Parkes had gathered on Roches’s activities by this stage. 
No sooner had Parkes dispatched his attack on Roches’s policy to Hammond than he 
received word from the French minister that he had obtained all the ‘solutions’ he desired 
in his meetings with the bakufu ministers at Osaka, and had pressed them to approve of 
Parkes’s conditions for agreeing to a formal audience with the shogun.975 Roches made 
no further mention of his two meetings with the shogun until after his return to 
Yokohama, when he assured Parkes that Keiki wished to improve relations with foreign 
powers by opening Hyōgo and a port on the Western coast but was averse to opening Edo 
and Osaka.976 After receiving these assurances, Parkes suddenly sensed that he might 
have overstepped the mark in his recent criticism of his colleague. In mid-April, he 
assured Hammond that, though his opinion differed with Roches on some points, ‘there 
is no rupture of the ‘Entente Cordiale’.977 Little did Parkes know what Roches had really 
been up to in Osaka, where he not only presented his radical proposals for constitutional 
reform of the bakufu but also made a point of contrasting his benevolent policy with the 
divisive strategy adopted by his British colleague. He even accused Parkes of conspiring 
with the southern han to dismantle the Tokugawa regime so that Britain could seize 
Japanese territory like it had done in Hong Kong. Korea was also discussed, albeit not in 
                                                
974 See CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R7, Roches to Parkes, 26 February [?]. The list 
is not exhaustive, as not all the notes are legible or relevant. 
975 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 17 March 1867; and 
enclosed letter from Roches to Parkes, March 1867. 
976 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 30 March 1867. 
977 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 14 April 1867. 
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the way Parkes had imagined, as Roches actually encouraged the Japanese to mediate in 
the missionary dispute.978  
In the end, it proved more important to Keiki to conciliate the tenacious British minister 
than to attempt to implement Roches’s plans for the re-establishment of bakufu authority, 
which were not only unrealistic but ‘altogether too sweeping to be acceptable to the 
shogun’.979 A few days after his arrival in Osaka on 18 April 1867, therefore, Parkes was 
able to secure permission from the rōjū to notify British subjects officially that the ports 
and cities would be opened on schedule on 1 January 1868.980 Much to Parkes’s delight, 
his two meetings with the new shogun at the end of April conformed perfectly to Western 
diplomatic standards. Even so, and despite the fact that Parkes though Keiki was ‘the 
most superior Japanese I have yet met’, these meetings did nothing to change Parkes’s 
opinion that his letters of credence overstated the shogun’s true position, and he was the 
only foreign representative not to present his credentials to the new shogun at Osaka.981 
Parkes also had no illusions that Keiki, talented as he was, faced a difficult task in 
reconciling the daimyō to his regime. Whether the new shogun was prepared to give them 
a consultative voice in affairs was not clear, but it was obvious that some concessions 
were necessary if he was to establish a government that controlled all parts of the country. 
To that end, Parkes hoped that the announcement of a fresh assembly of the daimyō at 
Kyoto in early May would help bring about the constitutional reform that Japan so 
desperately required.982  
Unfortunately, there was no hiding from the fact that the bakufu was beset by pecuniary 
difficulties, much of which Parkes blamed on the French for the expenditure they had 
instigated. On this point, he again drew Hammond’s attention to Keiki’s desire to raise a 
foreign loan. ‘I discourage the idea,’ he explained, ‘as one which is calculated to add to 
their embarrassments, and as so little is known of their Government and revenues in 
                                                
978 See AD, CPJ59/15, Roches to Moustier, Nos. 80 & 81, 1 March & 19 April 1867 for 
the way in which Roches presented these discussions to his government. For a detailed 
analysis of what actually took place, see Ericson, op.cit., pp.243-251. 
979 Beasley, op.cit., p.87. 
980 See Fox, op.cit. pp.198-9. See also CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes2/F8, Parkes to 
Flowers, 11 May 1867. 
981 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 6 May 1867. 
982 What the British minister did not know was that Keiki had been forced to call this 
assembly by the imperial court (under direction by influential agents of Satsuma) in order 
to discuss the opening of Hyōgo, even though the shogun had already promised the 
representatives to adhere strictly to the treaties; see Beasley, op.cit., pp.87-8 & pp.308-
11. 
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Europe, I doubt very much whether any proposals for a loan would be favourably received 
in the money market.’983 His confidence was understandable. 
 
The penny drops 
While these events unfolded on the other side of the world, Hammond was growing 
increasingly irritated by reports about French activities in East Asia. In October 1866, he 
received word from Alcock in Beijing that the French chargé d’affaires, Henri de 
Bellonnet, was apparently ‘talking very big, and very foolishly’ about a French 
occupation of Korea.984 In November, dispatches arrived from Parkes concerning French 
involvement in the construction of the Yokosuka shipyard and the curtailment of the silk 
trade at Edo.985 Hammond learned soon afterwards that, contrary to Parkes’s belief, the 
French government was strongly opposed to Roze’s punitive expedition to Korea.986 Yet 
the arrival in March 1867 of another dispatch from Alcock enclosing Bellonnet’s 
accusation that the Qing government had been complicit in the Korean massacre of the 
Catholic missionaries caused further disquiet in London.987 Hammond asked Cowley to 
show Alcock’s dispatch confidentially to Moustier to warn him about the risk of sparking 
another Chinese war.988 Once again, the Quai d’Orsay disavowed the actions of its agents 
in Korea and condemned their meddling in China.989  
Unfortunately for Moustier, British complaints regarding the behaviour of the French 
authorities in East Asia continued thick and fast. On 10 April 1867, Hammond informed 
Parkes that Oliphant had a question scheduled in the House of Commons that night 
concerning Roches’s commercial dealings in Japan. Although Oliphant was eventually 
convinced by Lord Stanley, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, to table a different 
question, the arrival a few days later of the 14 February 1867 edition of The Japan Times 
compelled Stanley to seek clarification from the Quai d’Orsay.990 On 18 April, Cowley 
                                                
983 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 6 May 1867. 
984 TNA, FO519/192, Hammond to Cowley, 9 October 1866. 
985 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H11, Hammond to Parkes, 9 November 1866. 
986 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H14, Hammond to Parkes, 24 December 1866. 
987 TNA, FO17/452, Alcock to Stanley, No. 60, 13 December 1867. 
988 See cover to idem. 
989 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H20, Hammond to Parkes, 10 April 1867. 
990 See Hansard, Series 3, House of Commons, 4 April 1867, Vol. 186, c.1107 for the 
question that Oliphant asked in the end, which concerned arrangements for European 
troops at Yokohama. The date is inconsistent with that given by Hammond in his letter 
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wrote confidentially to Moustier to raise concerns about the article, which attributed to 
Roches ‘a course of proceeding of which it is certain the Imperial Government would not 
approve’ and the Japanese government with entering into an arrangement with a French 
subject that was ‘incompatible with their general treaty arrangements with other 
Powers’.991  
Before Cowley received any response, the Quai d’Orsay received a note from Cachon on 
9 May alleging that Japan was paralysed by the prospect of an imminent crisis and that 
the daimyō no longer recognised the shogun’s authority.992 This note echoed the 
sentiments of a letter that Cachon had also published in La France newspaper just a few 
days earlier.993 The timing of both was significant, as they corroborated the British 
interpretation of Japan’s domestic crisis at precisely the moment when doubts were 
growing in the Quai d’Orsay over Roches’s overtly pro-bakufu policy.994 To make matters 
worse, Parkes’s private exposition of Roches’s ‘politique personelle’ landed on 
Hammond’s desk the day after Cachon’s note was received in Paris. After reading it 
carefully, Hammond was persuaded that the conniving French minister was ‘probably 
acting to make capital in more than one sense for himself’.995 Once again, this intelligence 
was forwarded to Cowley alongside further dispatches from Alcock regarding the 
unsatisfactory conduct of the French authorities at Shanghai.996 Despite this deluge of 
complaints from the Far East, however, Hammond did not appear to expect an immediate 
response from Paris. After all, the reckless policies of French diplomatic agents in East 
                                                
to Parkes. The letter from Stanley to Cowley of 15 April can be found in TNA, 
FO27/1652. 
991 AD, MDJ/3, Cowley to Moustier, 18 April 1867; and enclosures.  
992 Cachon’s note can be found in AD, MDJ/1. Given his former position in Japan, his 
attack on the bakufu seems curious on first glance, especially as he had been looking 
forward to overseeing the education of Akitake following the arrival of the young prince 
on 11 April 1867. According to Siebold, Mukōyama rejected Cachon’s appointment 
because of his affiliation with the missionary movement. In response, the jilted Cachon 
suddenly turned against the bakufu. For more, see TNA, FO46/85, Siebold to Hammond, 
18 April 1867; Medzini, op.cit., p.146 and p.222, footnote 11; and Sims, op.cit., p.315, 
footnote 58. 
993 See Medzini, op.cit., p.146. 
994 See the anonymous Quai d’Orsay memorandum prepared for Moustier in AD, MDJ/1, 
May 1867. 
995 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Hammond to Parkes, 10 May 1867. Although 
rumours of this nature were rife at the time, they have never been proved; see Sims, 
op.cit., p.68. 
996 TNA, FO519/193, Hammond to Cowley, 16 May 1867. 
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Asia were the least of Moustier’s concerns at a time when the Second Empire was deeply 
mired in crisis over relations with Prussia. 
The collapse of talks over a Franco-Prussian entente in early 1867 had done nothing to 
stop Napoléon III from seeking to secure the territorial concessions he believed France 
deserved as a reward for remaining neutral in Prussia’s war with Austria the previous 
year. After the war, Bismarck had given the emperor the impression that he would not 
stand in the way if France decided to purchase Luxembourg from Holland. On 1 April 
1867, however, Bismarck publicly announced his opposition to the acquisition of this 
former territory of the German Confederation, even though the emperor had already 
negotiated a treaty of cession with the Dutch king. Humiliated, Napoléon III seemed to 
have little choice but to go to war to save his honour, but the unprepared state of the 
French army and the continued absence of its best units in Mexico (the last of which only 
departed on 11 March 1867) persuaded him not to resort to force until the military 
situation improved. Instead, the emperor accepted a compromise proposed by the British 
and the Dutch at a conference in London in May, whereby Luxembourg remained the 
property of Holland but the Prussians agreed to evacuate their garrison from its fortress, 
which was dismantled.997 It was a close run thing, since Hammond believed as late as 7 
May – four days before the compromise was agreed – that the Prussians were on the verge 
of mobilisation.998 No sooner was Luxembourg safely neutralised than news from Mexico 
announced that Maximilian, who had refused to abdicate despite the withdrawal of French 
military support, had been captured by Liberal troops and sentenced to death.999 This 
chaotic and bloody outcome to the Mexican intervention was a fitting symbol of 
Napoléon III’s catastrophic foreign policy.  
Given his reliance on British support to avert a potentially disastrous war with Prussia, 
the last thing that Moustier wanted was to provoke a rift with the British government over 
the unsanctioned conduct of rogue diplomats overseas. It is therefore easy to imagine the 
consternation that the steady flow of British grievances concerning the independent action 
of French agents in East Asia caused within the Quai d’Orsay. On 18 May 1867, Moustier 
wrote a dispatch to Roches to make it quite clear that the French government disapproved 
                                                
997 Ibid., pp.652-3. 
998 TNA, FO519/193, Hammond to Cowley, 7 May 1867. 
999 TNA, FO519/193, Hammond to Cowley, 29 May 1867. Despite pleas from the courts 
of Europe to save the Habsburg prince, Juárez refused to commute the sentence and 
Maximilian was executed by firing squad on 19 June 1867. 
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of the nakedly partisan policy that he had pursued in Japan, which the Foreign Minister 
feared would embarrass France should the daimyō in the end triumph over the bakufu. 
Although Moustier acknowledged the zeal with which Roches had procured commercial 
advantages for France, he was warned not to compromise those advantages by ‘marked 
meddling in internal affairs’. ‘I need hardly point out to you,’ Moustier concluded, ‘how 
important it is to pursue our interests in a way that does not provide our rivals with the 
slightest pretext to make an accusation.’1000  
A few days later, Moustier assured Cowley that he had written ‘very strongly’ to Roches 
in consequence of the British ambassador’s letter and the comments from Lord Stanley 
contained therein.1001 The fact that Moustier was so candid with London about this matter 
supports Richard Sim’s view that the Quai d’Orsay was vulnerable to British pressure on 
matters of Japan policy.1002 At the same time, Sims too easily dismisses the argument put 
forward by the Japanese historians Ishii Takashi and Otsuka Takematsu that the 
worsening of France’s position in Europe after the Austro-Prussian War and the Mexican 
expedition also contributed to Moustier’s eagerness not to offend Britain over a country 
that, despite all of Roches’s efforts, remained of very minor importance to France and the 
Second Empire.1003 According to Sims, this argument wrongly implied ‘that there was a 
greater sense of impending international crisis than actually existed’.1004 As the following 
observations made by Hammond to Parkes on 10 April 1867 demonstrate, however, this 
assessment is flawed: 
The most serious point however is that between Prussia and France respecting 
Luxembourg, and there seems no means by which the latter can escape from the 
intolerable position in which she is placed…The irritation at Paris and in the 
French army, who long to measure swords with Prussia, is described as extreme… 
I see nothing for it but war.1005 
If Hammond believed that war between Prussia and France was imminent at this time, 
then it is fair to assume that the other foreign ministries of Europe felt the same. Indeed, 
as mentioned above, the likelihood of a conflict breaking out at any moment cast a shadow 
                                                
1000 AD, CPJ59/15, Moustier to Roches, 18 May 1867. 
1001 TNA, FO27/1661, Cowley to Stanley, No. 333, 23 May 1867. 
1002 Sims, op.cit., pp.64-5. 
1003 Ibid., p.316, footnote 62. 
1004 Ibid, p.64. 
1005 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H20, Hammond to Parkes, 10 April 1867. 
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over the negotiations at London right up to the minute that the crisis was resolved. Even 
then, Hammond did not hide from the fact that it was a ‘narrow escape’, and that war was 
only averted by Prussian fears and French unpreparedness.1006 Thus, there clearly was an 
impending atmosphere of crisis in France when Moustier repudiated Roches’s policy in 
his dispatch of 18 May, and it was highly likely that the Foreign Minister considered the 
need to keep on good terms with London when he issued this strong rebuke. It is therefore 
difficult to agree with Richard Sims that Moustier’s dispatch was ‘cautionary rather than 
censorious’, especially given Roches’s defensive and pained reaction upon receiving 
it.1007 
The poisonous atmosphere in Paris during this period increased the already significant 
challenges facing Coullet and Fleury-Hérard with regard to raising a foreign loan for the 
bakufu and establishing the import-export company.1008  Following the collapse of the 
London-based wholesale discount bank, Overend, Guerney and Co. in May 1866, 
economic conditions in Europe were already dire by the time that Coullet arrived back in 
France in early 1867.1009 The shadow of a potential war with Prussia and the disastrous 
conclusion to the Mexican campaign made investors even more averse to risky ventures 
in far-flung foreign destinations like Japan thereafter, especially when this involved 
backing a regime that the French government itself seemed increasingly reluctant to 
acknowledge as the country’s only legitimate governing authority. This became painfully 
evident in April, when the Quai d’Orsay conspicuously declined to respond to 
Mukōyama’s vociferous protests that Satsuma’s agent in Paris, the French aristocrat 
Charles, compte de Montblanc, had been allowed to erect a separate pavilion at the Paris 
Exhibition on the tenuous pretext that the daimyō of Satsuma was King of the Ryūkyū 
Islands. 
                                                
1006 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H23, Parkes to Hammond, 27 May 1867. 
1007 See Sims, op.cit., p.68; and AD, CPJ59/15, Roches to Moustier, No. 89, 13 July 1867. 
1008 Even before the Luxembourg Crisis, the general feeling in Paris was described by one 
British official in January as ‘very bad about the Emperor and his versatile policy at home 
and abroad’. See TNA, FO519/193, Hammond to Cowley, 25 January 1867. 
1009 The run on the banks that followed during the ‘Panic of 1866’ brought down Dent & 
Co, one of China’s wealthiest British merchant firms, and led to the collapse of the French 
investment bank Crédit Mobilier in 1867. In November 1866, Hammond warned Parkes 
that the refusal of City institutions to accept bills of exchange from Dent would have 
‘disastrous consequences for China and Japan’. See CUL, Parkes Papers, 
MSParkes1/H10, Hammond to Parkes, 9 November 1867. 
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Coupled with Moustier’s disavowal of Roches’s policy (of which at least some of Béhic’s 
financial associates were surely aware), the reaction in London to the Japan Times 
articles, the anti-Tokugawa propaganda campaign led by Montblanc and Cachon in the 
Paris press, and the legal restrictions that prevented the Société Générale from issuing 
more secure long-term bonds, it hardly seems surprising that a public bond subscription 
for the import-export company failed miserably. Between 15 and 20 July 1867, only 1400 
of the 40,000 shares initially offered were taken up, and the company was abandoned on 
3 August due to a lack of public support.1010 In the weeks that followed, Coullet and 
Fleury-Hérard broke the disappointing news to Roches in a series of letters that revealed 
the full extent of Montblanc and Cachon’s intriguing in Paris.1011 Nonetheless, Coullet 
remained optimistic that a core group of investors would still be able to raise the necessary 
capital for the company – a solution he believed preferable to the failed public 
subscription model in any case. ‘Like me, sir, you will regret these delays’, Coullet wrote 
to Roches on 9 August, ‘but it was force majeure.’1012 
It is possible that when Coullet cited force majeure he was simply referring to the inherent 
risk of attempting to float shares for a foreign investment at a time of great instability. 
After all, this was the reason cited by Ericson and Sims for the failure of the company, 
and it is certainly true that Coullet attributed the lack of subscriber interest to the 
difficulties that always arose in France when organising distant and long-term financial 
affairs.1013 That said, he also stated explicitly in his 9 August letter to Roches that ‘you 
already know that at this moment there can be no question of a foreign loan’, which would 
suggest that there was more to the failure of the company than simply the unfavourable 
political and economic conditions at the time. Fortunately, the discovery of a series of 
letters that Parkes received in 1867 from John Robertson, agent for the Oriental Bank in 
Yokohama, can shed new light on what Coullet really meant. Indeed, these letters prove 
for the first time that it was the Oriental Bank’s refusal to offer the bakufu a foreign loan 
                                                
1010 See Ericson, op.cit., pp.106-7; and Sims, op.cit., pp.63-4 & p.315, footnote 58. The 
full details of the subscription can be found in a document written in Siebold’s hand that 
was sent to Parkes, probably when the former visited London in August 1867. See CUL, 
Parkes Papers, MSParkes33/18. 
1011 The letters are enclosed in TNA, FO46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 14 November 1867. 
They include two from Coullet dated 9 & 18 August and one from Fleury-Hérard dated 
10 August. 
1012 Ibid., Coullet to Roches, 9 August 1867. 
1013 See Ericson, op.cit., p.107; and Sims, op.cit., p.64. 
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that led to the collapse of the import-export company, rather than the other way around 
as Ericson and Sims asserted.1014  
The first of these letters, which can be found in Parkes’s private papers, was an extract of 
a note from the directors of the Oriental Bank in London informing Robertson that any 
loan was contingent upon Edo offering Japanese commodities as security. The bank was 
prepared to open a current account to facilitate future monetary advances to the bakufu, 
but even this was conditional upon Edo providing securities in the form of government 
duties and taxes. The bakufu would also have to declare the Oriental Bank as its official 
banker before the directors would authorise such an account.1015 Dated 17 April 1867, 
this note was probably the bank’s official response to the application for a five-million-
dollar loan made by the bakufu the previous year. Robertson had only agreed to forward 
this application to London under the understanding that the money would be secured 
against one million dollars’ worth of Japanese copper. The response he received indicated 
that Stuart and his colleagues were already deeply sceptical about lending to the bakufu 
even before the arrival in London of Parkes’s private note of 14 February 1867. The 
British minister’s warning about lending unsecured money to the Tokugawa 
representatives in Paris was undoubtedly the final straw, however, as Stuart notified 
Robinson soon afterwards that there was no prospect of such a loan without cast-iron 
guarantees from Japan in the form of copper and silk. When Robertson received this news 
in June, he wrote immediately to Parkes: 
Our people don’t seem to fancy the loan…Mr Stuart in his private note says that 
he had received your letter but your point was just his – i.e. the wrong man – “I 
am awfully afraid of getting hold of the wrong man and then being told he had no 
authority to do what he did…Such is the state of credit in England at present that 
even were the Japanese Government quite good and undoubted and were they to 
offer 25% I doubt if they would float a loan”.1016 
The failure of the foreign loan scheme was therefore already a fait accompli by the time 
the public bond subscription for the import-export company opened in July 1867. In fact, 
                                                
1014 This was in any case a curious argument given that Coullet’s letter makes it quite 
clear that Roches was aware of the impossibility of raising a foreign loan before he found 
out about the collapse of the company. See Ericson, op.cit., p.108; and Sims, op.cit., p.62. 
1015 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R1, ‘Extract from Head Office letter of 17 April 
1867’. 
1016 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R2, Robertson to Parkes, 19 June 1867. 
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even before Parkes’s critical intervention, the Oriental Bank had been unwilling to offer 
the bakufu significant credit unless it provided substantial security. After it, any prospect 
of a foreign loan vanished entirely. As a result, the bakufu was unable to pay for the 
contracts it negotiated with Coullet and the import-export company was doomed to 
failure. Given the stormy economic climate at the time, no sensible investor was prepared 
to back a company whose principal client appeared to lack both the funds and the 
legitimacy necessary to honour its commercial commitments. 
The collapse of the import-export company left the Tokugawa representatives in Paris in 
dire financial straits. Ten days after its abandonment in early August, Mukōyama wrote 
to Siebold requesting his help to arrange for Akitake’s visit to England. By this point, 
Siebold had embedded himself in Paris so successfully that Coullet had no idea he was 
feeding everything he saw and heard back to Hammond and Parkes.1017 When the young 
interpreter arrived back in Paris, he discovered the Japanese desperately short of money 
and increasingly estranged from their French hosts. He soon learned that Akitake and 
Mukōyama had only brought a small amount of credit to Europe because Coullet had 
promised them unlimited funds upon arrival. However, the failure of the import-export 
company had left Coullet, Fleury-Hérard, and the other committee members exposed to 
the tune of four million Francs for the goods that had already been shipped from France. 
Coullet did his best to put a positive spin on the situation in his correspondence with 
Roches, but there was no disguising the fact that contracts worth one million Francs had 
been countermanded by the end of August. These financial difficulties left the committee 
in a significantly less generous mood towards the Japanese than they had been before. 
Despite all the personal favour that Napoléon III had showered on Akitake since his 
arrival in France, the Japanese were so angered by the overbearing attitude of their hosts 
and disillusioned by the way in which they had been led into penury that they were 
considering leaving Europe without visiting Britain at all. Sensing an opportunity to 
further drive a wedge between Mukōyama and the French, Siebold travelled to London 
to meet with Stuart in order to discuss the matter of an emergency loan to cover the 
expenses of Akitake’s visit.1018 When Stuart asked how the prince could be so short of 
money and why Fleury-Hérard had refused any further liability for bills drawn by Oguri 
                                                
1017 See, for example, Coullet’s complimentary description of Siebold at the end of his 
letter to Roches on 18 August 1867, enclosed in TNA, FO46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 14 
November 1867. 
1018 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/S1, Siebold to Parkes, 25 August 1867. 
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at the Oriental Bank, Siebold explained that the Japanese had been abandoned by Coullet 
following, as Stuart put it, ‘the failure of some proposed company and other schemes’. ‘I 
have no doubt that the failure of the European loan was at the root of the difficulty,’ Stuart 
reported to Robertson upon hearing this sorry tale, ‘then the Frenchman tried to repair 
this by establishing a “Company of Importation and Exportation”, which would have 
pledged the contracts to us – but they could not establish it so collapse is the result.’1019 
In the end, Stuart agreed to an immediate advance of five thousand pounds and a promise 
of a further loan for the same amount if required. As the man who had denied the 
delegation access to foreign credit in the first place, it was the least that he could do! 
Although Siebold, like Stuart, had not heard of the import-export company until August, 
he suspected that Parkes had at least some prior knowledge of this ‘bubble scheme’. ‘You 
know possibly that this society was to be organized with a capital of 12,000,000 Francs 
and that Coullet their agent in Japan had through the French Minister got contracts for 
7,000,000 Francs,’ he wrote to the British minister on 25 August, ‘It was the fancy of M 
Roches to get thereby the whole trade of Japan into French hands – these 7,000,000 
should have be [sic.] repaid by the Japanese Government in produce which would have 
exhausted the export market to no small amount.’1020 The collapse of the company had 
caused consternation in Paris, Siebold reported, including the seizure of La France, an 
anti-official newspaper, after it openly criticised the French government for repeating the 
same mistakes in Japan as it did in Mexico by associating with the scheme. Yet Siebold 
believed that the Quai d’Orsay’s refusal to discuss the affair with Fleury-Hérard proved 
that the government neither knew nor cared about the company. He also dismissed 
rumours that Roches himself had a personal interest at stake, instead considering it simply 
‘a matter of national jealousy for him to cut out the English in Japan’. Whoever was 
behind the debacle, Siebold was confident that his personal efforts to rescue the Japanese 
from financial difficulty had turned them against the French for good. He hoped that 
Mukōyama’s imminent return to Japan would finally open Edo’s eyes to the full extent 
of French deceit.1021  
                                                
1019 Stuart’s letter to Robertson, dated 26 August 1867, was again forwarded by the latter 
to Parkes. It can be found in CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R4, Robertson to Parkes, 
26 October 1867. 
1020 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/S1, Siebold to Parkes, 25 August 1867. 
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Sensation diplomacy 
It is difficult to know for sure whether Parkes knew about the import-export company 
scheme before he received Siebold and Stuart’s intelligence from Europe. The fact that 
he made no mention of it in his private notes on Roches and Coullet’s commercial 
engagements with the bakufu implies at the very least a reluctance to believe newspaper 
tittle-tattle without concrete evidence. He also responded cautiously to the news of 
Oliphant’s proposed question in the House of Commons, explaining to Hammond in June 
that he had not written officially on the subject because he had no information about 
Roches’s role in the commercial transactions the question referred to. ‘A French 
merchant, M Coullet, has I believe made such a contract [for the supply of clothing to the 
shogun’s troops],’ he wrote, ‘but I do not see what exception we can take to this, so long 
as our own trade is not interfered with.’1022 He added that the Chamber of Commerce of 
Yokohama, which had launched an enquiry into the newspaper reports concerning 
Roches’s activities, had ‘failed to ascertain anything that compromised him in any 
degree’. ‘He has I believe urged the Japanese Government to undertake a heavy and 
unwise expenditure in the construction of Docks and in the purchase of military 
equipments,’ Parkes went on, ‘but he has not been personally concerned in these 
purchases’.1023  
This letter, which appears to contradict Sims’s assertion that Parkes had a hand in 
Oliphant’s decision to table the question, struck a decidedly less hostile tone towards 
Roches than that which the British minister sent to Hammond a few months earlier.1024 
Perhaps he was feeling more optimistic about his own relations with Edo after his trip to 
Osaka, or confident that his personal intervention over the foreign loan would deny 
Roches the fruits of his endeavours. Whatever the reason, Parkes’s claim to have no 
knowledge of Roches’s activities seems very unlikely given what his own private notes 
reveal. The most likely explanation for his reluctance to forward this information to the 
Foreign Office officially was that he had yet not obtained irrefutable proof of what Roches 
and his associates were up to. The arrival of Stuart and Siebold’s letters at the end of 
October 1867 was therefore highly significant, as they contained concrete evidence at last 
that the French could not be trusted to handle Edo’s money. 
                                                
1022 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 14 June 1867. 
1023 Idem. 
1024 See Sims, op.cit., p.63. 
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Once they had digested this intelligence, Parkes and Robertson decided that the best 
course of action was to inform the bakufu of ‘the real position of their Prince and the risk 
he runs of being seized for debt in Europe’.1025 In Robertson’s view, the sooner Oguri 
understood that Coullet was no longer willing or able to supply Akitake with the funds 
he needed the better, since the kanjō-bugyōsho still appeared to be handing over money 
to Coullet’s friends in Japan – money that Stuart’s letter suggested was being appropriated 
for other purposes. On 21 October, therefore, a letter signed by Robertson but written in 
Parkes’s hand was dispatched to Oguri informing him that Akitake had been unable to 
access credit in France, that he had applied successfully for temporary assistance from 
the Oriental Bank in London, but that Akitake’s credit as well as that of the bakufu now 
rested upon Edo’s willingness to accept liability for the sum already advanced. To make 
it clear who now controlled the bakufu’s purse strings, the kanjō-bugyō was also advised 
to ‘consult on the subject with the British Minister Sir Harry Parkes’.1026 A bakufu official 
arrived in Yokohama to accept liability for the money a few days later, where he 
confessed to Robertson that no one in Edo knew anything of the failure of Akitake’s 
guardians to raise the necessary funds in Paris. ‘I told him all I knew was that they had 
sent to London to us direct,’ Robertson reported to Parkes, ‘and if money had been at 
their disposal in France there would have been no need of any application to us’.1027 One 
can only imagine the shock and anger in Edo when those who trusted Roches to revive 
the bakufu’s fortunes discovered how much they had been duped. 
Even before this earthshattering news, there was growing evidence that Roches had less 
influence over his government than he was willing to admit. He had been severely 
weakened by the arrival of Moustier’s stern reprimand during the summer of 1867, even 
though he strongly contested the criticism it contained of his policy and the allegations of 
official trading made against him by the Japan press. Nonetheless, his request for 
permission to go on extended leave at the end of the year to spend more time with his 
family suggested an air of resignation.1028 Roches’s mood cannot have been much 
improved when news of Cachon’s letter in La France arrived in late July, which even 
Parkes believed went too far in asserting that the daimyō were just as entitled to the title 
of shogun as the head of the Tokugawa house. Its appearance naturally caused great 
                                                
1025 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R3, Robertson to Parkes, 21 October 1867. 
1026 Ibid., encl., Robertson to Oguri, 21 October 1867. 
1027 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R4, Robertson to Parkes, 26 October 1867. 
1028 AD, CPJ59/15, Roches to Moustier, No. 89, 13 July 1867. 
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consternation in Edo, where bakufu officials had previously spoken of Cachon ‘as the 
best informed foreigner as to the language and institutions of the country’.1029 According 
to Parkes, it also completely undermined Roches’s unfounded claim that the shogun was 
Japan’s legal and supreme sovereign rather than the Mikado.1030 In August, Roches 
received another dispatch from Moustier detailing allegations of impropriety in relation 
to a commercial company in Tunis, where he previously served as consul general.1031 The 
increasingly beleaguered French minister now insisted on returning to France at the end 
of the year to defend his honour.1032 
As the summer wore on, Roches’s problems continued to mount. Through most of August 
and September he was preoccupied with the arrest of a community of Japanese Christians 
from Urakami village, near Nagasaki, who had been encouraged by French Roman 
Catholic missionaries to declare their faith openly in expectation of an imminent 
relaxation of Japan’s laws against the practice of Christianity. His attempts to free these 
prisoners without antagonising either the bakufu or the missionaries were not entirely 
successful, although he at least prevented the shogun’s enemies from exploiting the 
situation. At a meeting with Keiki in Osaka in mid-August, he acknowledged the Japanese 
position that the proselytization of Christianity breached the treaties, despite the outrage 
this inevitably provoked among the French missionary community. No sooner had he 
done so than word arrived that Montblanc was bringing a party of retired French officers 
and soldiers to Japan to help Satsuma establish its own navy. Roches immediately assured 
Keiki that neither Montblanc nor his companions had any connection to the French 
government, but their appearance strengthened the growing impression in Japan that his 
influence in Paris was weaker than he claimed.1033 The arrival in the early autumn of 
Coullet and Fleury-Hérard’s letters regarding the collapse of the import-export company 
and the failure of the foreign loan further undermined Keiki’s trust in his French ally. As 
Sims has accurately pointed out, there can be little other explanation for the fact that 
                                                
1029 The irony was not lost on Parkes when the bakufu dispatched an official to Europe to 
refute Cachon’s arguments. See TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond 
27 July 1867. 
1030 Idem. 
1031 Medzini, op.cit., p.149. 
1032 AD, CPJ59/15, Roches to Moustier, 10 August 1867. 
1033 Medzini, op.cit., pp.152-60. 
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Roches was caught completely off guard when Keiki suddenly resigned as shogun and 
restored political authority to the emperor in November.1034  
Keiki’s decision to abdicate came only a few months after he had finally secured imperial 
sanction for the opening of Hyōgo and a pardon for Chōshū in a form approved by the 
daimyō. The issue of this joint decree on 26 June 1867 represented a setback for the anti-
bakufu party, which feared the opening of Hyōgo would make the bakufu unassailable. It 
proved a Pyrrhic victory for Keiki, however, as his highhanded insistence on issuing a 
joint declaration alienated the remainder of the kōbu-gattai lords. The daimyō of Tosa 
therefore began to formulate plans for the peaceful establishment of a federation of great 
daimyō along the lines that Parkes had long recommended. Meanwhile, Satsuma and 
Chōshū began active preparations for war and the transfer of troops to Kyoto. In late 
October, Tosa submitted a memorial to the rōjū urging the shogun to relinquish his 
political authority and support the establishment of a new imperial government. This 
radical document included proposals for a new constitution, the creation a bicameral 
council in Kyoto composed of an upper house of daimyō and a lower house of vassals 
and commoners, the building of an imperial army and navy, and the institution of a pro-
foreign policy. The alternative was war, as the anti-bakufu faction at the imperial court 
had already contrived to issue an imperial decree authorising military action against the 
bakufu. It was the knowledge of this decree and a desperation to preserve some semblance 
of Tokugawa influence in the new government that compelled Keiki to surrender his 
administrative authority to the emperor on 8 November 1867, a decision that was readily 
accepted by the court. Lacking the authority to follow the court’s orders to protect and 
defend the country until all the daimyō were assembled at Kyoto the following January, 
Keiki resigned his position as shogun on 19 November 1867.1035 
With his policy facing total defeat, Roches attempted to present Keiki’s resignation to the 
French government as a ‘progressive improvement in the political situation of the 
Tycoon’.1036 Unsurprisingly, this rose-tinted assessment was not shared by Moustier, who 
made a number of sceptical annotations on the margins of the dispatch containing the 
news.1037 Indeed, the more that Roches argued that the shogun’s surrender of supreme 
                                                
1034 Sims, op.cit., p.70. 
1035 Beasley, op.cit., pp.88-90; Fox, op.cit., p.202 & pp.208-9; and Marius B. Jansen, The 
Making of Modern Japan, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2002), pp.310-2. 
1036 AD, CPJ59/15, Roches to Moustier, No. 98, 28 November 1867.  
1037 Idem. See also Sims, op.cit., p.70 and p.317, footnote 80. 
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power was an enlightened decision, the less convincing his argument became. To be fair, 
Parkes was also optimistic at the time that Keiki’s abdication meant there was ‘a fair 
chance of the unworkable Government of Japan being replaced by an intelligible 
system’.1038 Of course, one of the reasons why the British minister was so upbeat was that 
his gamble of withholding his letters of credence from the shogun had paid off 
handsomely. In late November, therefore, Parkes finally requested fresh credentials from 
the Foreign Office, this time addressed to the true sovereign of Japan: the Mikado.1039  
In hindsight, this decision seems obvious, as the shogun’s power was clearly on the wane 
from the moment that Parkes arrived in Japan. Yet it is important to stress that none of 
the other treaty-power representatives took this bold step or dared to question the 
shogun’s authority so openly with their own governments. It would also be inaccurate to 
assume that the British government was on the verge of changing tack on this issue by 
late 1867. Indeed, just two days before Parkes wrote to Hammond to inform him that the 
shogun had restored political authority to the emperor, the British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Stanley penned a letter to Queen Victoria advising her to accept an audience with Akitake 
on the basis that he was the brother of the shogun, ‘who is in fact, though not in name, a 
sovereign’.1040Aside from demonstrating just how little Stanley really understood about 
the situation in Japan, this letter illustrated the common consensus within the 
chancelleries of Europe and the United States.1041 While it is true that the Foreign Office 
placed much faith in Parkes, it was still a brave decision to go against the grain so 
resolutely.  
Given the risks, it was little wonder that Parkes praised Keiki for a decision that entirely 
vindicated his own policy. The British minister was now hopeful that civil war might be 
avoided through the implementation of the Tosa plan for reform, which Satow had by this 
point acquired and translated.1042 What he did not realise, however, was that this memorial 
                                                
1038 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 28 November 1867. 
1039 TNA, FO46/82, Parkes to Stanley, No. 197, 28 November 1867. 
1040 Liverpool Record Office, Liverpool (LRO), Derby Papers, 920/CDer/15/13/2/6, 
Stanley to Queen Victoria, No. 34, 26 Nov 1867. 
1041 The Foreign Secretary was not alone in his ignorance, as the Admiralty had raised 
concerns with him in October that Britain might be ‘hustled into a war with Japan’ if 
strong instructions were not sent out to deter Vice-Admiral Henry Keppel (Commander-
in-Chief of the China Station) from having a ‘go’ at the Japanese. It seems unlikely that 
such orders were ever necessary. See LRO, Derby Papers, 920/CDer/15/12/3/12, Henry 
Lennox to Stanley, No. 65, 26 October 1867. 
1042 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 28 November 1867. 
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did not accurately reflect the ambitions of the anti-bakufu faction of middle-ranking 
samurai within Satsuma and Chōshū, who were concerned that the size of the Tokugawa 
land, revenues, and property would still allow Keiki to dominate any daimyō council. For 
these agitators, nothing short of the full surrender of the Tokugawa territories to the 
imperial court and a plea from Keiki for a pardon for his ‘crimes’ would be sufficient. As 
troops from the two domains began to pour into Kyoto, the revolutionary objectives of 
the Sat-Chō alliance finally became clear.1043 
These seismic political changes naturally dominated Parkes’s attention during the latter 
part of 1867, especially as he and his colleagues were anxious to see if the opening of 
Osaka and Hyōgo on 1 January 1868 would go ahead as planned. He still found the time 
to stick the knife into his shattered French colleague, however, whose recall from Japan 
had been rumoured since the beginning of October 1867.1044 Parkes made his move in 
mid-November, shortly after he had received a private letter Hammond in which the 
Permanent Under-Secretary deplored the exploitative treatment of Akitake in Paris and 
expressed his ‘thorough contempt and disregard for all the by-play and scheming of the 
French and other foreigners’.1045 Hammond’s note was well-timed, as it arrived just after 
Roches had inexplicably shown Parkes the correspondence that Coullet and Fleury-
Hérard had sent from Paris regarding the failure of the import-export company and the 
foreign loan scheme.1046 Parkes immediately forwarded this intelligence to Hammond in 
a private letter that revealed much about his own role in the collapse of both schemes: 
You will find I think the justice of your remarks in your note of Sep 9 relative to 
the French education of the Tycoon’s brother attested by the enclosed letters 
which Roches allowed me to read. They show also what a peculiar position a 
French minister may hold with a French financier or commercial speculators. The 
company which he and Coullet had endeavoured to form has proved an utter 
                                                
1043 Jansen, op.cit., p.311 and Fox, op.cit., p.209. 
1044 TNA, Hammond Papers, FO391/14, Parkes to Hammond, 1 October 1867. 
1045 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes1/H29, Hammond to Parkes, 9 September 1867. 
1046 Sims was probably right that Roches showed these letters to Parkes to prove that 
Montblanc’s military mission to Satsuma did not have the backing of the French 
government, as Parkes wrote the following private note to Flowers at the end of 
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failure from their not being able to get their shares taken. Their stock in trade 
would have been contracts with the Japanese Govt. and finance operations, in the 
way of loans on their account, but I have had something to do with checking these 
operations. Most of the contracts the Japanese Govt. thought of making have been 
abandoned as also the idea of raising a loan and the proposed company therefore 
found themselves without a field for their enterprise. I should of course not allow 
such a company to obtain any exclusive privileges.1047 
Both Ericson and Sims have speculated about the steps that Parkes took to frustrate 
Roches’s schemes.1048 While the assumptions they made were largely accurate, there is 
now no room for doubt: it was Parkes who instructed the Oriental Bank not to approve of 
a loan to the bakufu; and Parkes who told the Foreign Office that it was not in Britain’s 
interests to offer Edo financial support. He therefore played the paramount role in 
thwarting Roches’s plan to re-establish Tokugawa supremacy, the failure of which 
destroyed the Frenchman’s credibility and influence in Japan forever. This is not to query 
the accuracy of Mitford’s description that such influence was ‘built upon foundations as 
unstable as the shifting sand’.1049 Given the inherent weakness of the bakufu by this stage, 
Roches was perhaps always doomed to failure. Yet it was Parkes who guaranteed that 
failure by denying the bakufu access to credit; his warning letter that crystallised Stuart’s 
reservations about lending to Edo into a firm refusal. Indeed, the fact that the Oriental 
Bank was ready and willing to offer a loan whenever Parkes recommended one proved 
that it was not the financial instability of the period that did for Roches, but his failure to 
win the battle to control Edo’s purse strings. The situation was summed up best by 
Robertson:  
It seems to me to be very clear that the Frenchmen mean to trade on our name – 
with our money. Our name and our money belong to ourselves – and our interests 
are English. The Japanese Govt. can – to my thinking – find no credit except 
ours.1050  
                                                
1047 TNA, FO46/82, Parkes to Hammond, 14 November 1867. 
1048 See Ericson, op.cit., p.109; and Sims, op.cit., p.63. 
1049 Quoted in Cortazzi, op.cit., p.78. 
1050 CUL, Parkes Papers, MSParkes14/R6, Robertson to Parkes, Wednesday evening 
(although it would appear from the context that it was written soon after Parkes read 
Coullet and Fleury-Hérard’s letters). Robertson’s emphasis. 
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Parkes could not have put it better himself. He now had the Japanese right where he 
wanted them: in his pocket. Even better, the utter failure of Roches’s policy had, 
according to Mitford, ‘destroyed the last particle of prestige that he had once had with his 
colleagues, who now had no better course left to them than to follow the lead of Sir Harry 
Parkes’.1051 For the tenacious British minister, victory was total; the ‘enclave empires’ in 
Japan now his to control. 
 
Conclusions 
While there were already signs in late 1866 that Parkes was no longer willing to allow 
Roches to pursue his ‘politique personnelle’ with impunity, the beginning of 1867 marked 
the point when a clear schism began to emerge between the two men over their differing 
assessments of Japan’s domestic political crisis, their contrasting visions for a modern 
Japan, and above all their divergent approaches to diplomacy. Despite these differences, 
Parkes never deviated from his instructions during the final year of the Tokugawa 
shogunate. Although keen to encourage the contesting parties in Japan to put aside their 
differences and institute Western-style constitutional reform, his consistent adherence to 
the neutrality policy throughout 1867 definitively puts to rest any suggestion that he 
somehow favoured the daimyō prior to the Meiji Restoration. His decision to withhold 
his letters of credence from the shogun should therefore not be interpreted as support for 
the daimyō cause, but rather as evidence of a pragmatic approach to diplomacy that was 
based on sound intelligence and an improved understanding of the realities of Japan’s 
system of government. 
By contrast, Roches could hardly have been more partisan. Despite strict instructions 
from Paris not to interfere, he launched a determined but fatally flawed attempt to 
influence the outcome of Japan’s domestic dispute in Edo’s favour. With the French 
government fixated on other global events, Roches had free rein to implement a brazen 
economic strategy to re-establish Tokugawa hegemony and monopolise the Japan trade 
for France. Unfortunately for the French minister, Parkes had no intention of allowing 
this pernicious attempt to circumvent British leadership of the treaty-port system to 
succeed. Once he discovered that Roches’s commercial schemes required British finance 
to get off the ground, he took immediate measures to ensure that the Oriental Bank denied 
                                                
1051 Quoted in Cortazzi, op.cit., p.92. 
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the bakufu access to foreign credit. His direct intervention precipitated the collapse of 
Roches’s ‘politique personnelle’, hastened the Frenchman’s disgrace, and shielded the 
‘enclave empires’ in Japan from the creeping threat of French colonisation.  
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EPILOGUE 
 
The Meiji Restoration and Beyond, 1868 
On 3 January 1868, the imperial court in Kyoto proclaimed the abolition of the Tokugawa 
shogunate and the restoration of imperial rule. Earlier that day, troops from Chōshū, 
Satsuma, Tosa, and other anti-bakufu domains had supplanted the Tokugawa guards at 
the gates of the imperial palace, forcing Keiki and his supporters to withdraw to the safety 
of Osaka castle. It was there that the former shogun informed Roches and Parkes a few 
days later that a coup d’état had taken place in Kyoto before the daimyō could assemble, 
leaving the new Meiji Emperor under the control of the Satsuma coalition. The outbreak 
of fighting between the two factions on 27 January was met with dismay by Parkes, whose 
private notes revealed that he doubted the intentions of the agitators in Kyoto even at this 
late stage: 
We have lost by this quarrel all the guarantees we possess for the execution of the 
Treaty. [There is] no notice yet from this new party, but aggression [was] only 
inspired by Daimios! [They] cannot be regarded as a regular government but as 
enemies, failing notice…Who more able to protect foreigners than the Tycoon? 
Can there be more safety with Daimios? Conclusions: not to trust to promises of 
new party; not to change the diplomatic situation.1052  
Despite this resolution, the swift defeat of Keiki’s more numerous but poorly equipped 
forces on the outskirts of Kyoto left the foreign representatives with little choice but to 
leave Osaka out of fear for their safety at the end of January. A few days after taking 
refuge in Hyōgo, however, a regiment of samurai from the Bizen domain opened fire on 
the diplomatic representatives while they inspected the site for the new foreign settlement. 
Although a general massacre was averted by the ignorance of the Bizen men in the use of 
their new Western rifles, it was clear that the Tokugawa could no longer protect foreigners 
from the significant number of sonnō-jōi adherents that remained among the daimyō. 
Spurred into swift and united action by this realisation, the foreign representatives 
threatened to take retaliatory measures against the whole of Japan unless full reparation 
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from Bizen was immediately forthcoming. In the interim, they empowered their military 
commanders to secure the port of Hyōgo and seize all Japanese steamers in the harbour.  
Just when it seemed that the treaty powers would be pulled into Japan’s civil war after 
all, envoys from Kyoto arrived with an urgent message for the foreign representatives. 
On 8 February 1868, they were informed that the emperor had assumed control of all of 
Japan’s domestic and foreign affairs, which meant that the Mikado’s title could be 
substituted for that of the shogun in the treaties. After receiving assurances about the 
safety of foreigners and promises of reparations for the Bizen affair, the ministers agreed 
to release the steamers they had seized and withdraw their troops from Hyōgo. To the 
dismay of the sonnō-jōi party, whose adherents had hoped that the overthrow of the 
shogunate would finally lead to the expulsion of foreigners from Japan, on the same day 
the new Meiji government also issued a public proclamation in favour of an ‘open door’ 
policy towards foreigners and the treaties as part of an overarching strategy of enriching 
the country and strengthening its military (fukoku-kyōhei).1053 The Meiji Restoration, or 
perhaps more accurately ‘revolution’, was rapidly taking shape.  
The imperial proclamation was the last nail in the coffin of Roches’s ‘politique 
personelle’, which he had continued to pursue even after Keiki withdrew from Kyoto by 
urging the former shogun to resist the Satsuma coalition.1054 After the meeting of 8 
February, however, Roches’s unbending loyalty to the Tokugawa cause became a source 
of acute embarrassment to both the man himself and the government he represented. 
According to Mitford, he cut a pathetic and uncomfortable figure,1055 while Satow 
declared that he had ‘so far committed himself with the Baku-fu that he found it 
impossible to remain one day longer in Japan after its overthrow’.1056 In fact, it was 
Moustier who decided in mid-February to replace Roches with Ange-George Maxime 
Outrey, previously consul-general to Alexandria. Although Moustier was careful to avoid 
accusations of censure by emphasizing Roches’s previously stated desire to leave Japan, 
the fact that Roches was awarded the permanent title of minister plenipotentiary but not 
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appointed to another position confirmed that his time in the French diplomatic service 
was at an end.1057 By contrast, Parkes revelled in his status as doyen of the diplomatic 
corps in the months following the Restoration. Thanks in large part to the close links that 
Satow and Mitford had established with the chief architects of the Kyoto coup, relations 
with the new government started off very positively. After an initial meeting with the 
Mikado alongside his diplomatic colleagues at the end of March, on 22 May 1868 the 
British minister became the first to present his credentials officially to the young emperor 
during an historic ceremony at Osaka that marked the beginning of a new era of Anglo-
Japanese relations.1058 
Outrey arrived in Japan a few weeks after Parkes’s diplomatic triumph, when he inherited 
a difficult legacy from his predecessor. His first task was to negotiate with Kyoto for the 
payment of all the merchandise contracted for by the bakufu with Coullet and the Société 
Générale.1059 Although all the treaty-power representatives had agreed to abide by a 
policy of strict neutrality in Japan’s ongoing civil war, Outrey also had to field 
unwelcome appeals for mediation from the pro-Tokugawa daimyō in northern Japan who 
continued to defy Kyoto’s authority even after Keiki surrendered Edo to the new regime 
in May.1060 Worse was to come in October, when some restless members of the French 
military mission to Edo absconded from Yokohama to help the remnants of the Tokugawa 
forces capture the island of Ezo (Hokkaido). Much to Outrey’s embarrassment and 
indignation, the leader of these officers, Captain Jules Brunet, assisted in the creation of 
the short-lived Republic of Ezo, which he hoped would both introduce democracy to 
Japan and reassert French influence in the country. Like Outrey, the French government 
wanted nothing to do with this latest scheme, for the predictable reason that it did not 
want to risk incurring the wrath of the British. In the end, Brunet’s actions did little to 
change the outcome of Japan’s civil war, which was definitively ended by the recapture 
of Ezo by imperial forces in June 1869. Unlike his predecessor, Outrey pursued a much 
more cautious policy during his three-year tenure in Japan and was at pains to remain on 
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good terms with Parkes throughout. The Quai d’Orsay, it seemed, had also had enough 
of adventurous diplomacy in the Far East.1061 
Although the Brunet affair took place after Roches’s departure from Japan, it provided a 
fitting footnote to his Japanese career. The independent, interventionist approach that he 
adopted during his four-year tenure reflected in many respects the ambitious but reckless 
foreign policy pursued by the French emperor himself during the 1860s. Like Roches, 
Napoléon III discovered too late that France no longer had the military strength nor the 
political influence to shape the modern world in its own image. Indeed, it was only when 
the under-prepared and overconfident French army was crushed by Prussia’s modernised 
and disciplined forces in 1870 that the full extent of the emperor’s failure to react to the 
global emergence of the nation state finally became clear. After the collapse of the Second 
Empire, the Third Republic was more focused on developing its colonial interests 
elsewhere in the world than in exploring commercial opportunities in Japan, where British 
influence remained paramount. As a result, for the remainder of the nineteenth century 
and beyond, French policy in Japan never again replicated the bold, though fatally flawed, 
characteristics of Roches’s ‘politique personelle’.  
By contrast, Britain continued to expand its influence within the Japanese treaty-port 
system in the two decades after the Meiji Restoration, even if Japan remained low on 
Britain’s list of priorities for most of that period. Unlike the rapid turnover of French 
representatives in Japan (eight between 1868 and 1883), Parkes remained British minister 
for eighteen years, during which time his position as leader of the treaty-port system was 
never again under serious threat. Although he was free to shape Japan’s process of 
modernisation as he saw fit, as time wore on his irascible diplomatic style and refusal to 
agree to treaty revision inevitably began to aggravate a Meiji government that was keen 
to free itself from British constraints. Yet though Parkes may not have always been 
popular with the Japanese during his long tenure in Tokyo, the support and guidance he 
offered while the country underwent a period of rapid modernisation undoubtedly proved 
invaluable. Although certainly a man of his time, his paternalistic policy was less nakedly 
manipulative than that pursued by Roches, which even the French government 
summarised as ‘the exploitation of Japan by privileged French speculators’.1062  
                                                
1061 For a full analysis of the Brunet affair, see ibid., pp.78-82 
1062 AD, MDJ/3, April 1869; quoted in Sims, op.cit., p.81. 
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By the time Parkes left Japan in 1883, British foreign policy was dominated by the 
Conservative mantra of ‘splendid isolation’ – a defensive reaction to the rise of Prussian 
and Russian expansionism in Europe and Asia that must have seemed ironic to a man 
who had spent most of his career forcing China and Japan to open to the West. Coupled 
with this cautious policy, Britain was initially slow to see the potential benefits of ‘equal’ 
commercial relations with the rising power in the East. Japanese requests for treaty 
revision were therefore resisted in London until the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on 16 July 1894, which finally heralded the end of 
the Japanese treaty-port system when it came into force in 1899. Although this spurred 
the British government into seeking a new strategic partnership with Japan as a buffer 
against an expansionist Russia, it did little to change London’s view that British 
commercial, political, and strategic interests in East Asia were well served by the 
surviving treaty ports in China. The Chinese treaty-port system therefore endured until 
the invading Japanese finally swept it away in 1943, while Hong Kong remained under 
British control right up to 1997. Today, many of East Asia’s former treaty ports have been 
transformed into thriving hubs for international commerce and industry – the era of 
‘enclave empires’ at last eclipsed, if never truly forgotten.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
From the moment that the Ansei Treaties were signed in 1858 until the collapse of the 
Tokugawa shogunate a decade later, the relationship between Britain and France defined 
the Japanese treaty-port system. This thesis has demonstrated that it is impossible to 
understand how this system worked without considering Anglo-French relations in Japan, 
in the wider East Asian region, in Europe, and elsewhere in the world. By default, the 
global power and influence of the British and French empires ensured their status as the 
two leading Western nations to enter into treaty relations with the bakufu. The policies 
adopted in London and Paris for the imposition and implementation of the ‘unequal 
treaties’ were therefore central to the way in which Western ‘enclave empires’ developed 
in Japan over the ten years covered by this study. At the same time, it is important to 
stress that Japan was rarely, if ever, a foreign policy priority for either power between 
1858 and 1868. Though rarely highlighted by the historiography, the overwhelming focus 
of the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay on international developments elsewhere 
proved critical to the way in which events unfolded in Japan during this period. The 
relative unimportance of Japanese affairs to successive foreign ministers in London and 
Paris also perpetuated a general ignorance of Japan’s complex system of government, not 
to mention the difficulties that arose out of its gradual transition from absolute seclusion 
into the East Asian maritime trading network. 
The introduction to this thesis identified four factors overlooked by the historiography of 
this period: the international context; the comparative approach; the corpus of documents; 
and the cast of characters. In the final reckoning, each has proved crucial to understanding 
the historical events described in this study. Let us begin with the cast of characters. At 
the outset of this thesis, I pointed out that many histories of the opening of Japan to 
Western trade were exclusively focused on the decisions taken by diplomatic 
representatives and their superiors back in Europe. By contrast, there was much less 
information about how the other members of Western society who populated the treaty 
ports influenced the development of Anglo-French policy during the bakumatsu era. By 
exploring the contributions made by the most influential of these non-diplomatic actors, 
this thesis has demonstrated that there certainly were times when personalities outside the 
diplomatic sphere had a critical role to play. 
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Relations between diplomatic representatives and regional naval commanders were 
especially important, as the fractious relationship between Sir Rutherford Alcock and 
Rear-Admiral Sir James Hope demonstrated. Alcock was a staunch subscriber to the 
Palmerstonian view of the Royal Navy as the ‘armed wing’ of British diplomacy in East 
Asia, but the use of this tactic was always dependent upon the cooperation of the 
Commander-in-Chief on the China Station at the time. Unfortunately for Alcock, he 
quickly discovered that Admiral Hope rarely shared his belief that ‘gunboat diplomacy’ 
was as necessary in Japan as it was in China. The several occasions when Hope refused 
to dispatch naval reinforcements to Japanese waters thus forced Alcock into making 
concessions to the bakufu he would not have otherwise considered. They also compelled 
him to work more closely with his colleagues to find a diplomatic solution to their 
difficulties with Edo until such options were exhausted. Yet in the end it was the arrival 
of Rear-Admiral Augustus Kuper that proved pivotal to the success of Alcock’s attempts 
to confront the anti-foreign movement. Put simply, the naval victory at Shimonoseki and 
the important advantages it secured for the treaty powers would not have been possible 
without the British admiral’s acquiescence. The same was true of his French colleague 
Admiral Benjamin Jaurès, which is why Léon Roches concealed his decision to commit 
French forces to the expedition until the French admiral had no choice but to support it. 
In short, British and French naval commanders played a very influential role in the 
implementation of Anglo-French policy in Japan during the 1850s and 1860s, especially 
given the limited strategic importance of the country throughout this period. The fact that 
they often had more pressing matters to deal with elsewhere in East Asia explains why 
the delay or curtailment of visits by their forces to Japanese waters rarely provoked 
complaints from the Foreign Office or the Quai d’Orsay, even if they had important 
consequences for the diplomatic representatives on the spot. 
In contrast to the influence wielded by naval commanders, British and French 
missionaries in Japan did not have much say over Anglo-French policy during the 1860s 
– with one notable exception. After a far from stellar career in the Societé des Missions 
Étrangères de Paris, the appointment of Mermet de Cachon as interpreter to the French 
legation was a significant factor in the development of Roches’s pro-bakufu policy. An 
astute political intriguer with close connections to Edo, his influence over Roches was 
widely known within the treaty-port community and a matter of great concern for the 
British diplomatic representatives. Ironically, Cachon’s attack on the bakufu in 1867 
contributed to Roches’s eventual downfall, while the commercial agreements he helped 
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to broker eventually proved financially ruinous for Edo. His overall impact upon French 
policy cannot therefore be described as very positive, even if he was by far the most 
interesting missionary in Japan at the time. Aside from Cachon, the French missionary 
presence in Japan created few problems until 1867, when old tensions over the preaching 
of Christianity began to bubble to the surface again. Given how quickly French diplomats 
and naval commanders had exploited the murder of Catholic missionaries in Vietnam and 
Korea during this era, the bakufu was fortunate that none were ever martyred in Japan.  
For the British, missionary activity was rarely a matter of official concern prior to the 
Meiji Restoration, although religion did become an issue for Sir Harry Parkes thereafter. 
It was rather Cachon’s activities as interpreter and political intriguing at the shogun’s 
court that caused the most headaches at the British legation. Knowledge was power in a 
country as mysterious and perplexing as bakumatsu Japan, so Cachon’s linguistic abilities 
and close connections to the regime in Edo posed a direct threat to British interests. It was 
little surprise that Parkes welcomed his sudden departure in 1866, therefore, as it left 
Roches bereft of reliable political intelligence at a critical time in his battle for supremacy 
with his British colleague.1063 Yet even before Cachon departed the scene, an increasingly 
well-connected network of talented British interpreters had already started to tip the 
balance of the intelligence war in Parkes’s favour. While Roches was often reliant upon 
partisan sources within the bakufu for information about Japan’s unfolding political crisis, 
Parkes was far better informed about what was really going on thanks to the close 
connections that Ernest Satow and Algernon Mitford cultivated with influential middle-
ranking samurai from Satsuma and Chōshū. Without this intelligence, it would have been 
much more difficult for Parkes to counteract Roches’s policy and protect British interests 
during the final years of the shogunate. 
Much credit is therefore due to the British interpreters who operated in Japan during this 
period, as well as to the Foreign Office for dispatching such exceptional linguists to the 
country in the first place. Of course, it took some time for these young interpreters to gain 
proficiency in Japanese, so Alcock had little option in the early days of treaty relations 
but to employ local translators just as Duchesne de Bellecourt did. The assassination of a 
native Japanese linguist at the gates of the British legation in early 1860 highlighted the 
flaws in this approach, yet Alcock turned the problem to his advantage by recruiting 
                                                
1063 According to the Japan Directory for 1867, the only other interpreter at the French 
legation in Edo was the Dutch interpreter Alphonse J. Van Der Voo. See The China 
Directory, 1867, Hong Kong, China. 
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young Alexander von Siebold as a supernumerary interpreter in late 1861. Siebold proved 
a highly reliable intelligence asset who imbedded himself with the 1867 Akitake 
delegation to Paris so successfully that the French government had no idea he was feeding 
vital information about Roches’s activities to Parkes and the Foreign Office right under 
its nose. While Satow and Mitford have justifiably received plaudits from historians for 
their achievements in Japan, it is only fair that Siebold shares some of the credit for 
establishing British intelligence supremacy there, as does Alcock for having the foresight 
to recruit him in the first place. This thesis has therefore rehabilitated Siebold to his 
rightful place as one of the most influential of the British and French interpreters who 
worked in Japan during the bakumatsu period. It has also demonstrated that the British 
system of appointing student interpreters to the Japan consular service produced much 
more reliable informants than the Quai d’Orsay’s ad-hoc approach of employing 
whatever linguist came recommended by their man on the spot. The fact that the first 
wave of British student interpreters arrived in Edo alongside Alcock in 1859 but no such 
position existed within the French consular service until 1868 says much about the 
resources each government was prepared to dedicate to Japanese affairs.1064 
The foreign merchant community in East Asia was another important driver of Anglo-
French policy in Japan. This is hardly surprising, for it was commercial interests that the 
British and French governments were ostensibly defending at the treaty ports. Even so, 
the relationship between the merchant class and their diplomatic representatives varied 
enormously. Alcock had a particularly torrid time attempting to restrain his countrymen 
during the early years of trade relations, when the treaty ports were populated with the 
hardiest adventurers. Their disgraceful manipulation of the currency exchange also 
strengthened the impression in London that it was the unruly conduct of foreigners, rather 
than the determination of the bakufu to revert to seclusion, that posed the biggest threat 
to the treaties. This attitude was reinforced by the hysterical reaction in Yokohama to the 
murder of Charles Richardson, which could easily have led to a general massacre if 
Colonel Neale had not resisted merchant demands for an armed response. Unlike his 
predecessors, Parkes enjoyed a reasonably good relationship with the merchant 
community, especially after he thwarted Roches’s monopoly schemes and secured 
significant commercial concessions from Edo. French merchants in Japan were 
                                                
1064 The Japan Directory for 1868 lists Leon van de Polder as the first student interpreter 
at the French consulate in Yokohama. See The Chronicle & Directory for China, Japan 
& The Philippines, 1868, Hong Kong, China. 
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significantly less influential than those of their British counterparts, for the obvious 
reason that were far fewer of them. Yet with so few compatriots around to defend his 
actions, Roches was frequently exposed to attack and ridicule in the Anglophone treaty-
port press. In the end, one such attack contributed to the French government’s decision to 
disavow his entire policy. 
Although still in its infancy during the 1860s, the British banking sector was a very 
important constituency of treaty-port society. As Parkes’s private correspondence with 
John Robertson demonstrated, the Oriental Bank trusted to the British minister’s 
judgement on matters of financial policy in Japan. This was a huge boon for Parkes in his 
battle with Roches for control over the treaty-port system. No matter how much the 
French minister ingratiated himself with the bakufu, he could not change the fact that 
Parkes and his friends at the Oriental Bank controlled Edo’s purse strings. As a result, the 
moment that the bakufu became dependent on foreign money to honour its commercial 
contracts with France, his schemes collapsed. The imbalance in financial power in East 
Asia was probably one of the reasons why the French Ministry of Commerce promoted 
the creation of trading factories in East Asia during the 1860s. Yet these plans never came 
to fruition, leaving British financiers unchallenged as the modernisation of Japan took 
shape following the Meiji Restoration. 
While naval commanders, missionaries, interpreters, merchants, and bankers all made 
important contributions to the development of ‘enclave empires’ in Japan, it was the 
British and French diplomatic representatives who wielded the most influence over 
policymaking at the treaty ports. Japan’s extreme isolation, coupled with the relative 
ignorance of Japanese affairs in London and Paris, meant that these men on the spot were 
granted more independence by the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay than was 
normally the case. Indeed, it could be argued that every representative who served in 
Japan during this time developed their own ‘politique personnelle’ to cope with the 
challenge of implementing the treaties. Some, like Neale, were determined to follow their 
orders as closely as possible regardless of political realities on the ground. Others, like 
Parkes, Alcock, and Bellecourt, tried to adhere to the spirit of their instructions when 
circumstances made it impossible to abide by their letter. This was what Roches also 
attempted to do when he first arrived in Japan, before the departure of Alcock spurred 
him to take matters into his own hands. Although this gamble ultimately failed to pay off, 
it is important to stress that ‘man on the spot’ diplomatists were accustomed to taking 
such risks. Time and expediency often forced them to take decisions without reference 
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home or a clear understanding of what the consequences might be, and the line between 
success and failure was usually very thin. This was an era of tightrope diplomacy, when 
foreign agents had to balance their personal views as to the best course of action against 
the wishes of the government they represented. The fact that Alcock and Roches were 
both punished for pursuing an independent line demonstrated that, regardless of how far 
away agents were stationed from home, there were still limits to their freedom of action. 
Thus, while diplomats in Japan certainly enjoyed more room for manoeuvre than their 
peers in Europe, it is clear that the parameters of on-the-spot diplomacy were still set by 
officials in the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay. 
In this context, the history of the first decade of treaty relations with Japan offers some 
useful insights into the mechanics of British and French foreign policy during the mid-
nineteenth century. Previous histories of this period have often focused on the decisions 
taken by the British Foreign Secretary of the day, but this thesis has proved that it was 
really Edmund Hammond, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs between 
1854 and 1873, who controlled Britain’s Japan policy during the 1860s. As Mitford 
pointed out in his memoirs, Hammond ‘was the Foreign Office; he kept all the strings in 
his own hands…his colossal industry and retentive memory enabled him to direct, single-
handed the whole current work of the department’.1065 Naturally, that work included 
Japan, which meant that it was often the Permanent Under-Secretary who decided how to 
respond to developments in Edo, and his privately-communicated policy 
recommendations that formed the basis of official instructions dispatched to the men on 
the spot. This was as much the case during the Liberal ministries led by Lords Palmerston 
and Russell as it was for the minority Conservative administration that came to power in 
1866.  
Hammond’s omnipotence at the Foreign Office during the 1860s helps to explain why 
British foreign policy in Japan remained remarkably consistent throughout this period, 
even though the Tories were far more hostile to the ideology of free trade than their 
Liberal predecessors. Indeed, the only time a Foreign Secretary directly overruled 
Hammond over Japan policy was during the summer of 1865, when Russell vetoed his 
proposal for Parkes to open trade negotiations with the Mikado independently of the other 
treaty powers. Even so, Hammond continued to exert significant influence through his 
                                                
1065 Algernon Bertrand Freeman-Mitford, Baron Redesdale, Memories, Vol. 1, (London: 
Hutchinson, 1915), p.110-1. 
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regular private correspondence with Parkes, where he discussed the need for Western-
style constitutional reform in Japan much more overtly than was possible in the official 
dispatches.  
These private letters reveal much about what Hammond expected from a senior diplomat 
in Japan. Although willing to grant experienced ‘China hands’ like Alcock and Parkes a 
certain degree of latitude in their efforts to make the treaty ports a safer and more 
prosperous place, he was always very clear that direct interference in Japan’s internal 
affairs would not be tolerated without express sanction from home and unless absolutely 
necessary to protect British life and property. Parkes respected these boundaries by 
favouring intelligence-based diplomacy to naval grandstanding – an approach that 
secured British commercial supremacy in Japan without the need to fire a single shot. 
Alcock, by contrast, felt in 1864 that he had no other choice but to resort to ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’, even if such a course risked incurring Hammond’s wrath. Sure enough, he 
suffered the ignominy of an official recall that not only tarnished the greatest triumph of 
his diplomatic career but also fractured the fragile alliance he had brokered with the other 
treaty-power representatives. Clearly, British diplomats overseas crossed the Permanent 
Under-Secretary at their peril. Certainly, any historiographical assertion that Alcock and 
Parkes acted with complete autonomy in Japan is inaccurate. In fact, like in most parts of 
the world where the Foreign Office had interests at stake, Hammond’s shadowy hand was 
always guiding the actions of the British representatives in Edo. For too long, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary’s role in the creation of ‘enclave empires’ in Japan has been 
obscured by an historiography that is overly focused on decision-making by the men on 
the spot. As the person ultimately responsible for the way in which British foreign policy 
was made in Japan between 1858 and 1868, Edmund Hammond can now be recognised 
as one of the most influential of the diverse cast of characters covered by this study. 
While Hammond always kept a close eye on the activities of his agents in Japan, French 
diplomats in Edo were largely left to their own devices, with typically unpredictable 
consequences. The Quai d’Orsay must therefore bear some responsibility for the long-
term damage done to French interests by appointing a reckless buccaneer like Roches to 
the position of minister plenipotentiary, and for allowing him to pursue his ambitious 
‘politique personelle’ in Japan without sufficient oversight. Even before Roches’s 
appointment, however, there was very little evidence of a coherent diplomatic strategy 
for Japan at the Quai d’Orsay, where successive foreign ministers were either too 
disinterested or too ignorant of Japanese affairs to challenge London or Washington on 
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matters of policy. Their indifference was entirely symptomatic of the general malaise that 
afflicted French foreign policymaking during the Second Empire, an era when the work 
of the Quai d’Orsay was frequently undermined by Napoléon III’s megalomaniacal 
approach to international diplomacy. The emperor, who wielded absolute authority over 
France’s foreign relations for most of his reign, generally preferred personal diplomacy 
to official channels of communication. Whether this meant conducting secret negotiations 
with other heads of state or instructing one of his close confidantes to act as an 
intermediary at the courts of Europe, such an approach inevitably diminished the role and 
influence of the Foreign Minister. Unsurprisingly, the emperor’s penchant for political 
intrigue also hampered the Quai d’Orsay’s attempts to formulate a coherent response to 
the most pressing matters of the day, as did his indecisiveness when international crises 
flared up across the European continent. Add to that his confused attempts to convince 
the sovereigns of Europe to revise the 1815 Vienna treaty settlement whilst 
simultaneously supporting nationalist movements within their borders, and it is little 
wonder that contemporary observers considered the Second Empire to be one of the 
darkest periods in the history of the French diplomatic service.1066 
The fact that the foreign affairs portfolio changed hands at least nine times during the 
eighteen years of the Second Empire – more times than any other great power in Europe 
– gives some indication of the chaos that Napoléon III’s personal diplomacy unleashed 
within the Quai d’Orsay.1067 Yet apart from Lionel de Moustier, who resigned on health 
grounds in December 1868, the three other foreign ministers who served during the period 
covered by this study all left the government due to fundamental differences with the 
emperor over European matters. Since Japan was rarely, if ever, a French foreign policy 
priority during the 1860s, it seems unlikely that the dysfunctional relationship between 
the emperor and Alexandre Walewski, Édouard Thouvenel, and Édouard Drouyn de 
Lhuys really had much impact upon the Quai d’Orsay’s approach to Japanese affairs. 
Instead of focusing exclusively on the men at the top, therefore, it is also useful to 
consider why no one further down the chain of command at the ministry was monitoring 
the activities of their agents in Edo as carefully as Hammond was in London. 
                                                
1066 See Jean Baillou, ed., Les affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français, Tome 
I: de l’ancien régime au Second Empire, (Paris: Éditions du centre national de la 
recherche scientifique, 1984), p.687. 
1067 Ibid., p.701. 
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One possible explanation was that the Principal Private Secretary in the French Foreign 
Ministry wielded far less influence over foreign affairs than his British counterpart. As 
the head of a politically impartial civil service department, the Permanent Under-
Secretary was expected to supervise foreign policy development and delivery in concert 
with the Foreign Secretary. By contrast, the chef du cabinet at the Quai d’Orsay was 
merely a middle-ranking bureaucrat who was responsible for little more than the effective 
organisation of the ministry. This was not a role for highly capable, experienced and 
independently-minded officials in the Hammond mould, but for ambitious careerists with 
a strong track record of following orders from above. Their first loyalty was to the Foreign 
Minister they served rather than to the Quai d’Orsay itself, which explains why there were 
no fewer than eight during the eighteen years of the Second Empire. Far from the pinnacle 
of a diplomatic career, therefore, the position of chef du cabinet was viewed as a 
springboard to better things – specifically to a plum posting at a French legation 
overseas.1068 With so much churn within the ministry and so little influence over 
policymaking, it is hard to imagine that these bureaucratic placeholders understood 
Japanese affairs any better than their superiors. 
There was much greater permanence in the lower echelons of the Quai d’Orsay, where 
changes in administrative personnel were few and far between. However, the fact that the 
number of agents employed in the political bureau only increased from twenty in 1855 to 
twenty-four in 1868 was hardly very conducive to effective policymaking either, since 
their workload increased significantly over this period. Much of that work was routine in 
any case, for substantive foreign policy matters were always dealt with by the emperor 
and his ministers alone. Policymaking was further hampered by the Quai d’Orsay’s 
outdated organisational structure, which remained much the same at the end of the Second 
Empire as it had been during previous regimes. This had a direct impact upon the 
management of Japanese affairs, for whilst the political business of the Foreign Office 
had been streamlined into five separate geographical departments by 1865, the Quai 
d’Orsay still only had three by the time the Second Empire collapsed. Though Japan was 
assigned to the American Department in both ministries, the French division covered a 
far wider geographical area than its British equivalent, making it much less likely that 
Japanese affairs would be as closely monitored in Paris as they were in London.1069 
                                                
1068 Ibid., pp.713-5 
1069 For a complete list of the British arrangement, see Keith Neilson and T.G. Otte, The 
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946, (London: Routledge, 2009), 
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Although Thouvenel and Walewski had both called for a complete administrative 
overhaul of the Quai d’Orsay during the early 1850s, any attempt at reform in the years 
that followed was scuppered by the shortage of talented staff and the pressures of dealing 
with the emperor’s double diplomacy. Indeed, so little had changed by 1869 that the last 
Foreign Minister of the Second Empire, the Duke of Gramont, described the bureaucratic 
framework at the Quai d’Orsay as ‘little short of detestable’, particularly in terms of how 
it scrutinised the work of overseas agents.1070 The failure of successive foreign ministers 
to get a grip on this problem resulted in a diplomatic service that was struggling to adapt 
to the modern world, as the recruitment processes for entry into the French diplomatic 
service demonstrated.  
Unlike in Britain, where an open entrance exam had been introduced during the 1850s to 
ensure that appointments to the Foreign Office were made on merit, political patronage 
remained the only way to enter the Quai d’Orsay in Napoléon III’s France. Most 
diplomatic postings were therefore reserved for members of the aristocracy regardless of 
ability, experience or suitability for the position. Even a man of Léon Roches’s unique 
talents owed his career in the service to a personal endorsement that the Governor of 
Algeria, Thomas Bugeaud, issued on his behalf to the Foreign Minister François Guizot 
in 1845. Personal connections aside, it is unlikely that such an irregular request would 
ever have been granted had Roches not come from an old bourgeoisie family that played 
a prominent role in the French Revolution.1071 Twenty years later, this well-connected 
political insider was posted to Japan despite having no experience of the country or its 
people. Given the dysfunction within the Quai d’Orsay’s chaotically-organised political 
bureau, the overwhelming workload that its officials were dealing with by this time, and 
above all the apathy of those who controlled French foreign policy towards events in 
Japan, it is little wonder that Roches was largely left to his own devices there for so long. 
In sum, the opaque way in which French foreign policy was made during the reign of 
Napoléon III could not have been more different from the professionalised and politically-
neutral approach adopted by the British Foreign Office. Indeed, it remains unclear who, 
if anyone, was directly responsible for managing France’s Japan policy during this period, 
                                                
footnote 40, p.268. A summary of the French arrangement can be found in Baillou, op.cit., 
pp.716-7. 
1070 Ibid., p.716. 
1071 See Jean-Pierre Lehmann, ‘Léon Roches – Diplomat Extraordinary in the Bakumatsu 
Era: An Assessment of his Personality and Policy’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XIV. No. 
2, (1980), p.275 & pp.279-81. 
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which may explain why the Quai d’Orsay was so reactive to events and amenable to 
interventions by the other treaty powers. Unlike Hammond’s carefully crafted private 
correspondence to Alcock and Parkes, the official dispatches from Paris rarely gave the 
impression that anyone at the ministry really understood what it was that Duchesne de 
Bellecourt and Léon Roches were attempting to achieve in Japan. The overwhelming 
impression was instead one of ignorance and indifference, at least until something 
happened that might antagonise the other treaty powers or entangle France in a country 
that the emperor neither understood nor cared about. For better or worse, therefore, the 
most important drivers of French policy in Japan between 1858 and 1868 were the men 
on the spot. That both Bellecourt and Roches left the country under a cloud was as much 
the fault of their disinterested superiors at the Quai d’Orsay as it was their own vaulting 
ambition.1072 
In the introduction to this thesis, I hypothesized that that the corpus of documentary 
evidence analysed by previous historians was insufficient to understand accurately how 
British and French foreign policy was made during the mid-nineteenth century, not only 
in Japan but all over the world. This thesis has demonstrated that, as far as British foreign 
policymaking is concerned at least, the importance of private and semi-official 
correspondence was absolutely critical to this process. Private letters were exchanged on 
a regular basis between members of the British Cabinet, high-ranking officials in the 
Foreign Office, the Admiralty and other government departments, and of course Queen 
Victoria herself. As previously discussed, the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Edmund Hammond also maintained a regular correspondence with both 
permanent British ministers to Japan during their tenures, as well as with all the major 
players in government at the time. Similarly, British naval commanders in East Asia often 
supplemented their official dispatches with private notes to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty. These letters were highly valued by the British government, as Palmerston 
explained to Russell in February 1865: 
It is inconvenient to place on record without necessity speculative opinions as to 
further events in which we do not mean to take a part; but if it is in any case 
                                                
1072 For a comprehensive overview of French foreign policy during the Second Empire, 
including a detailed bibliography, see ibid., pp.687-785. 
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desirable to give a diplomatic agent a guide as to our views and his language that 
can be done in a private letter.1073 
Similarly, Hammond testified to a Foreign Office inquiry in January 1868 that ‘a sort of 
friendship grows up from private correspondence…I feel that there is a great benefit that 
derives from the general harmony which prevails’.1074 Private letters helped the British 
government to understand what was really going on in far-flung consular stations. Unlike 
official dispatches, they enabled isolated diplomats like Alcock and Parkes to explain the 
realities of the situation that confronted them without fear of publication in Parliament or 
the national press. Critically, they allowed the British government to make policy 
recommendations without putting them on the official record, ensuring plausible 
deniability if anything went wrong. One simply cannot understand British policy in Japan 
during the 1860s without considering the private correspondence of those involved. 
Although it has been much more difficult to locate similar papers in Quai d’Orsay 
archives, this does not necessarily mean that the French system worked any differently. 
Indeed, private paper collections of certain prominent Second Empire politicians do exist, 
such as those of Édouard Thouvenel, Foreign Minister between 1860 and 1862, which 
can be found in both the Archives Nationales and the Archives Diplomatiques in Paris. 
The latter collection contains some letters from Léon Roches during his stint as consul at 
Tripoli during the early 1850s, but nothing from his time in Japan. Other private paper 
collections held at the Archives Diplomatiques include those of Hippolyte Desprez, 
director of the political bureau at the Quai d’Orsay from 1866, and other prominent 
bureaucrats at the ministry, but none of these contain correspondence with anyone in 
Japan either. Unfortunately, Thouvenel’s successor Édouard Drouyn de Lhuys destroyed 
all his private papers, so we will never know what discussions he might have had with 
his agents overseas.1075 The three ‘Mémoires et Documents’ folders contained in the 
official Japan correspondence to the Foreign Ministry do contain some private letters, 
albeit few from the men on the spot. The most likely explanation as to why no one at the 
Quai d’Orsay appeared to maintain a regular private correspondence with French 
diplomatic representatives in Japan was that events there were simply not very important 
                                                
1073 The National Archives, London, Russell Papers, PRO30/22/15D, 15 February 1865. 
1074 Cambridge University Library, Cambridge, Parkes Papers, MSParkes26/4, 
‘Statement respecting Foreign Office Agencies’, 24 January 1868. 
1075 See Warren F. Spencer, ‘French Archives and Special Collections’, in Proceedings 
and Papers of the Georgia Association of Historians, Vol. 3 (1982), p.45. 
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to the French government. As mentioned earlier, such indifference played into Roches’s 
hands, as it enabled him to pursue his personal policy with little scrutiny from home. 
Thus, while much can be gleaned about British policy in Japan from the substantial 
corpus of private papers contained in the British archives, the lack of a similar collection 
in France also tells us a lot about the Second Empire’s foreign policy priorities at the time. 
It is clear from the historical analysis contained within this thesis that the relationship 
between Britain and France is central to understanding the treaty-port system in Japan. It 
seems strange, therefore, that so few historians have adopted a comparative approach to 
this period of history. This thesis has remedied this gap in the historiography by 
demonstrating how Anglo-French relations influenced the development of the Japanese 
treaty-port system between 1858 and 1868. It has shown how the close-knit relationship 
between the British and French diplomatic representatives during the early years of treaty 
relations metamorphosed into a bitter struggle between their successors for control over 
the ‘modernisation’ of Japan. By comparing and contrasting the respective policies of the 
British and French governments over the same timeframe, this study has also shown how 
France was willing to defer to Britain on matters of Japan policy on almost every 
occasion. 
The international context is probably the most overlooked factor in historical studies of 
bakumatsu Japan, the vast majority of which make only passing reference to events 
elsewhere in East Asia and the world. At times, historians have even dismissed the 
importance of contextual factors outright. For example, Richard Sims explicitly 
discounted the outcomes of the Austro-Prussian War and the Mexican expedition as 
having any impact on French policy at the time when the Quai d’Orsay received 
complaints from the British government about Roches’s activities in Japan.1076 In fact, 
there can be little doubt that the outbreak of international crises elsewhere significantly 
influenced treaty-power policy in Japan. Regional events often had a direct impact, such 
as the Anglo-French expeditions in China between 1858 and 1860 and the French colonial 
conquest of Cochinchina between 1858 and 1862. On other occasions, the defence of 
global interests frequently required the diversion of vital naval resources from Japan, as 
evidenced by Hope’s withdrawal of all his warships and marines in the aftermath of the 
Trent Affair in 1862. In general, the American Civil War had a major impact on the 
                                                
1076 See Sims, Richard, French Policy Towards the Bakufu and Meiji Japan, 1854-95, 
(Richmond: Japan Library, 1998), pp.64-5. 
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policies that Britain, France, and, of course, the United States pursued in Japan during the 
1860s. Indeed, this devastating conflict explains why this study is specifically focused on 
Anglo-French relations, for the war forced the Americans to play second fiddle in Japan 
while Britain and France scrambled for control over the ‘enclave empires’ there. In short, 
when crisis hit elsewhere, Japanese interests were always sacrificed. 
International contexts are central to the findings of this thesis because they demonstrate 
how Japan was almost always at the bottom of the list of foreign policy priorities in 
London and Paris. This was especially true of the French government, which had little 
interest in the Japanese treaty-port system beyond ensuring that France was afforded the 
same commercial rights and privileges as other treaty powers. This was because Napoléon 
III was much more focused throughout the period in question on advancing his foreign 
policy objectives in other parts of the world, including in China, Vietnam, Syria, Mexico, 
and Italy. By contrast, Japan was never considered an area of strategic interest to the 
emperor, despite Parkes’s fears that Roches’s interventionist policy was synonymous 
with that of the Quai d’Orsay. Although this was a fair assumption for Parkes to make 
given the emperor’s track record, these fears were rarely shared in the Foreign Office – 
not least because the Quai d’Orsay was very quick to disavow Roches’s policy and had 
always consulted London on substantive decisions over Japan policy. 
While the British government was certainly more engaged in Japanese affairs than its 
French counterpart, there were very few times during the 1860s when events in Japan 
were a matter of great concern in London either. During the early years of treaty relations, 
the Foreign Office was mostly content to allow the men on the spot to direct Britain’s 
Japan policy. Since expectations for a profitable trade in Japan were very low from the 
outset, Alcock’s increasingly panicked reports about the deteriorating situation there were 
frequently dismissed. The vociferous criticism directed at Palmerston’s ministry 
following the destruction of the Summer Palace in Beijing also made the Foreign Office 
reluctant to endorse the aggressive solutions that Alcock recommended. It was also much 
more concerned with the slow but steady disintegration of the 1815 treaty settlement in 
Europe and Napoléon III’s apparent desire to reconquer Europe. On the rare occasion 
when attention in Whitehall did turn away from events in Europe, the Near East, or the 
Americas, it was usually to China.  
When the assassination of Richardson in 1862 finally convinced the British government 
that British trade in Japan was under threat, Alcock’s recommendations for a complete 
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reassessment of Britain’s treaty relationship with the bakufu largely went unheeded in the 
Cabinet, which did not understand the complexities of the political upheaval that the 
‘unequal treaties’ had sparked in Japan. This compelled Alcock to take matters into his 
own hands, and it was only after he did so that Russell, Layard, and Hammond took a 
long, hard look at Britain’s Japan policy. Even after the formulation of Russell’s 
neutrality policy in 1865, however, it was not long before attention in London shifted 
back to European affairs and the rise of Prussian militarism, while the more insular 
Conservative ministry that entered government in 1866 was even less interested in Japan 
than its predecessor. Thus, by taking the international context into account, it becomes 
clear that British policy towards Japan during the 1860s, like that of France, was primarily 
reactive. In the grand scheme of things, Japan was simply not that important. 
By shedding light on how the treaty-port system created ‘enclave empires’ in Japan, this 
thesis has opened new and exciting opportunities for further study. It has demonstrated 
that the survival of these ‘enclave empires’ was fundamentally dependent upon the 
cooperation and collaboration of all the treaty powers. It has shown that the principle of 
collective diplomacy and defence that underpinned the ‘unequal treaties’ meant that no 
individual treaty power, no matter how strong, could ever formally annex these ‘enclave 
empires’. In short, it has proved that treaty-power relations with Japan were defined in 
large part by relations between the treaty powers themselves. Thus, even though this study 
has necessarily focused on Anglo-French relations, an historical analysis that also 
incorporates the policies of all the treaty powers in Japan at the time, especially the United 
States, Holland, Russia, and Prussia, is clearly long overdue. Naturally, such research 
would be enhanced by incorporating Japanese perspectives as well so that we can better 
understand the dynamic between the treaty powers, the government at Edo, and the anti-
Tokugawa movement. With the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Meiji 
Restoration fast approaching, there is still much to learn about how the arrival of the West 
influenced this seminal event in Japanese history. 
What is already clear, however, is that the ‘unequal treaties’ transformed Japan beyond 
all recognition. This thesis is the first to identify the cause of that transformation as the 
creation and development of informal ‘enclave empires’ within Japan under the guise of 
treaty ports. The basic characteristics of these ‘enclave empires’ were the same wherever 
they emerged in East Asia. They were multilateral constructs underpinned by the 
cooperation and collective military and diplomatic strength of the Western powers that 
operated within them. They acted as international entrepôts in which every facet of 
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Western society, from culture to politics, religion to jurisprudence, was introduced and 
imposed upon countries where such ideas and practices had previously been rejected and 
resisted. Finally, as this thesis has so clearly demonstrated, they created the pretence of 
an egalitarian system of free trade that was in reality controlled by the only Western 
country powerful enough to fix the rules of the game in its favour. Just like in China and 
Siam, the ‘enclave empires’ in Japan guaranteed Britain’s status as first among equals in 
the East Asian treaty-port system. 
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